Lets Kill Gandhi

by Gandhi, Tushar A.

  In paragraph 15 clause 5, the Cabinet Mission's report recommended that: 'Provinces should be free to form groups, executives and legislatures, and each group could determine the Provincial subjects to be taken together'. This was contradicted in paragraph 19 sub-clauses (iv) and (v), where it practically forced Assam, a non-Muslim province, to join the Muslim-dominated Group C; and the North-west Frontier Province, where a Congress Ministry was in power, to join the Muslim League-dominated Group B against the will of its chosen representatives. It said: 'Thereafter the Provincial representatives will divide up the three sections.... These sections shall proceed to settle the Provincial constitution ... and shall decide whether any group constitution shall be set up for those Provinces.' The Sections B and C were so demarcated that the Muslim League-dominated Punjab would be able to dominate Section B and, similarly, Bengal would dominate Section C. Both these provinces had a Muslim majority and a large number of representatives in the legislature; it was obvious that they would steamroll any objection raised by the other provincial representatives in their group. The Hindu majority areas of Punjab and the non-separatist Congress-dominated NWFP in Group B and Assam in Group C, the dominating provinces, could similarly very easily nullify the efforts of the dissenting provinces from opting out of the grouping by framing a constitution and establishing rules for elections in a suitable fashion.

  Gandhi studied the document in detail and gave his interpretations in an article published in Harijan dated 26 May 1946: 'After four days of searching examination of the State Paper issued by the Cabinet Mission and the viceroy on behalf of the British government my conviction abides that it is the best document the British government could have produced in the circumstances. My compliments, however, does not mean that what is best from the British standpoint is also best or even good from the Indian. Their best may possibly be harmful.... It is an appeal and an advice. It has no compulsion in it. Thus the Provincial assemblies may or may not elect the delegates. The delegates, having been elected, may or may not join the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly having met, may lay down procedure different from the one laid down in the statement. Whatever is binding on any person or party arises out of the necessity of the situation.

  'Therefore, when Lord Pethick-Lawrence, secretary of state for India, said to a press correspondent, "If they do come together on that basis, it will mean that they will have accepted that basis, but they can still change it, if by a majority of each party they desire to do so", he was right in the sense that those who become delegates, well knowing the contents of the statement were expected by the authors to abide by the basis, unless it were duly altered by the major parties.... This is perfect so far but what about the Units? Are the Sikhs, for whom the Punjab is the only home in India, to consider themselves against their will, as part of a Section which takes in Sind, Baluchistan and the Frontier Province? In my opinion, the voluntary character of the Statement demands that the liberty of the individual Unit should be unimpaired. Any member or Section is free to join it. The freedom to opt out is an additional safeguard. It can never be a substitute for the freedom retained in Para 15(5)'.

  The three main parties involved in the Cabinet Mission's deliberations ended up interpreting the recommendations as was convenient and beneficial to them and their necessities. The Congress interpreted it differently, as did the Muslim League, but the Cabinet Mission delegation had its own interpretation and all were at variance. The only way out was to refer the recommendation to a judicial tribunal.

  Both the Congress and Muslim League refused to accept or reject the recommendations without first studying them. They wanted to test out the recommendations before deciding their course of action. Gandhi insisted that as long as British troops remained on Indian soil, freedom would remain a farce; he wanted immediate withdrawal of the British Armed Forces from Indian soil. To the Cabinet delegation he said, '....Finally, it can in no way be contended that in the face of the troops there would be natural behaviour in the Constituent Assembly'.

  The recommendation of the mission that paramountcy, enjoyed by the British, over the Indian princely states would 'lapse' and not be transferred to the Government of India, was another bone of contention. There were over six hundred princely states spread over almost 7,12,000 square miles or one-third of the territory of India. Some were hereditary princedoms and some were British creations as rewards for their ruler's services to the British during the first war for freedom in 1857. What the Cabinet Mission's recommendations would mean was that these princes would become heads of independent fiefs with the end of paramountcy, and the moth-eaten Indian nation that would emerge would be an unmanageable mess. Gandhi suggested to the Cabinet Mission that, if paramountcy was to cease, then it should cease immediately even while the Constituent Assembly was hammering out a constitution and independence was at work 'in fact though not in law': 'Sir Stafford saw danger in acting upon my suggestion. I held the opposite view. Acceptance on my proposal would vivify the people of the States as if by a stroke of the pen. And the Interim Government would be a boon to the Princes who, though the creation of the Paramount Power and dependent upon it for the continuance of their existence, still chafed under its heavy hand. The immediate end of Paramountcy would test the sincerity of the Princes and the Paramount Power'.

  The Congress contended that if the Constituent Assembly was not to be composed of disparate elements, the states' representatives who came into the Constituent Assembly must do so in the same way as the representatives of the provinces, in a democratic manner. This would give the people of the princely states a say in the selection of their representatives and further democracy. Finally, there was the question of the powers of the national government at the Centre, and of the Constituent Assembly. If the Constituent Assembly was to function as a sovereign body, with powers to decide on any matter before it and give effect to its decisions, it must be a provisional national government in the true sense of the term. This was subject to the limitation that the Congress had voluntarily accepted, namely, that in regards to communal issues, decisions would be by a majority of the two major communities.

  The response of the Cabinet Commission to all these points was an emphatic 'No' to the withdrawal of British troops and an equally categorical refusal to relinquish paramountcy. As regards the participation of Europeans, the only assurance they could give was that they would use their good offices to try to influence the Europeans not to exercise the right conferred on them under the 16 May Plan. But finally, it would be upto what the Europeans decided. With regards to the powers of the Constituent Assembly, the Cabinet Delegation assured that, once the Constituent Assembly was formed, there was no intention to 'interfere with its direction or questioning its decisions'. Lastly, while the Cabinet Mission was not prepared to accept the proposition of having an interim government legally responsible to the Central Legislature, they gave the assurance that 'His Majesty's Government would recognise the effect of ... changes' that were contemplated to be introduced at the Centre and would 'attach the fullest weight to them, and will give to the Indian Government the greatest possible freedom in the exercise of the day-to-day administration of India'.

  As Gandhi was wont to do, he would jot down the gist of the discussions he had with members of the Cabinet Mission and send them for verification to the concerned member. In response to the transcripts of their discussions on 18 and 19 May, Pethick-Lawrence responded that there were some discrepancies between what he had inferred from their discussions and what was noted. He set out points on which they differed. Cripps categorically denied that he had admitted that paramountcy had in the past been used to protect the princes against their people in the shape of suppressing their liberty and progress: 'You are misinterpreting what Sir Stafford said. He stated that he knew the view was held that in the past Paramountcy had been used in certain cases to support the Princes against their people....' On another point of difference Pethick-Lawrence wrote: 'The delegation wished me, in particu
lar, to make it plain that independence must follow and not precede the coming into operation of the new constitution'. Gandhi responded the following day saying: 'Whilst I thank you for your prompt reply ... you will let me say that it is unfortunate. It has the old official flavour. Has the cry "independence in fact" no foundation? I adhere to all that I have said in my letter.... Your letter is in the best imperialistic style which I thought had gone for ever. This is from an old friend'.

  On 28 May the members of the CWC dispersed. Gandhi accompanied some of the members to Mussoorie for a short rest and respite from the scorching Delhi summer. There was nothing to do since the Muslim League was going to make known its response to the 16 May Plan only after the meeting of the Council of the Muslim League on 6 June. On the 7th, Gandhi returned to Delhi. The car carrying him covered the 175 miles almost entirely in the night. The car was stopped on the Yamuna Bridge as it entered Delhi. The sentry on duty peered through the window and asked the Sikh driver to identify himself and his passengers. The driver replied, 'I carry the King of India's poor'; the sentry stood in attention and let the car pass.

  The CWC met on 8 June. It later came to light that Cripps had met Jinnah and the latter was agreeable to the formation of a coalition interim government consisting of the fittest persons without any reference to parity. During the course of an interview, the viceroy suggested to Gandhi that representatives of the Congress and the League should meet and jointly finalise a list of people to be nominated to the coalition government. Welcoming the viceroy's suggestion, Gandhi replied that the nominees should be persons of 'proven ability and incorruptibility'; there should be no talk of parity, they should agree to be closeted in a room, and no one should leave till an agreement was reached. In the absence of an agreement in spite of all the efforts, the viceroy should examine the merits of the respective lists submitted by both the parties and accept one or the other, 'not an amalgam' of the two. Just as people began to feel that the new formula would succeed, Jinnah again refused to sit at a negotiating table with the Congress president Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a non-League Muslim. According to Jinnah, Hindus were the enemies, but non-League Muslims were traitors and he would not 'treat with traitors'! The Congress refused to backtrack on this matter. Fearing another breakdown in talks the viceroy suggested that the Maulana, as the Congress president, nominate Nehru to represent him at the proposed meeting. Gandhi advised the Congress to accept this proposal for the sake of a settlement, but with a clear understanding that at the meeting Nehru would act as the Maulana's mouthpiece.

  Nehru reached the viceroy's office for the meeting at noon on 12 June. Jinnah did not turn up for the meeting. Nehru showed the viceroy the Congress's list of proposed nominees for the interim government. Now it was Wavell's turn to change colours. At the meeting he raised the issue of Hindu-Muslim parity. Again Nehru left without any decision being made. The next day Gandhi wrote to Wavell: 'You are a very great soldier, a daring soldier. Dare to do the right. You must make your choice of one horse or the other. So far as I can see, you will never succeed in riding two at the same time. Choose the names submitted either by the Congress or the League. For God's sake do not make an incompatible mixture and in trying to do so produce a fearful explosion'. In a personal letter addressed to Cripps, Gandhi wrote: 'You are handling the most difficult task of your life as I see it. The Mission is playing with fire. If you have the courage you will do what I suggested from the very beginning ... you will not be able to have your cake and eat it too. You will have to choose between the two—the Muslim League and the Congress, both your creations.... Coquetting now with the Congress, now with the League and again with the Congress, wearing yourself away, will not do. Either you swear by what is right or by what the exigencies of the British policy may dictate. In either case bravery is required. Only stick to the programme. Stick to your dates even though heavens may fall. Leave by the 16th [June 1948] whether you allow the Congress to form a coalition or the League. If you think that the accumulated British wisdom must know better than these two creations of yours I have nothing to add. But I have fancied that you are not cast in that mould'. The letter ended with the advice: 'Bury yourself in private life, unless the brave British announcement made is fulfilled to the Indian hope. A word to the wise'.

  Sir Stafford Cripps replied: 'I can assure you, neither I nor my colleagues lack courage to act but we want to temper our courage with prudence.' Referring to the advice given by Gandhi, he continued: 'Certainly I shall never put my desire to return home and rest before my determination to leave nothing undone which may help a solution of the difficult problems here.... I shall have great hope that before we leave India, we may have helped towards the settlement of the problem.'

  It was now apparent that the Cabinet Mission was also going the way of the Viceroy's Conference of 1945. Although they kept talking of being fair to both sides, their inclination towards the Muslim League was clearly showing. The partisan hand of the British Civil Service was playing its role behind the scene. Gandhi was filled with forebodings of a catastrophe. Had he not reiterated time and again that till the third party was present, true Hindu-Muslim unity could not be expected? 'The slaves and their masters are both in an unnatural state,' he remarked during a prayer meeting speech, 'they cannot think and act naturally.' Speaking to a friend he commented, 'A nameless fear has seized me ... as a result I feel paralysed. But I will not corrupt your mind by communicating my unsupported suspicions to you.' To him the Cabinet Mission's efforts were like that of a mother who sees her child dying. 'Still she does not give up hope. She keeps on trying the prescriptions of doctors, physicians and quacks—now of the one, then of the other, then of a third till the last moment.' Similarly, the Mission did not wish to give up.

  The demand for parity was also very complicated. The British kept talking about establishing a democratic order for independent India, but their stand on the princely states as well as their insistence on parity was at variance to the democratic principle. The Muslims constituted a little over one-fourth of the population of India, thus according to democratic principle they could claim less then one-third of the total representation. But the Muslim League cleverly argued that the Muslims constituted a nation apart from the Hindu nation, a theory endorsed by Savarkar. Thus they claimed that nations had to be on an equal footing and so the Muslim minority had to have parity with the Hindu majority. The British colonial administration, the representative of the Crown and the viceroy were partial towards this claim of their wartime allies, the League. Initially during the Viceroy's Conference in Simla in 1945, parity was mooted between caste Hindus and Muslims; now parity was aimed for between Congress and the Muslim League. The Congress, as a party, represented all religions, castes, classes and groups that made up India whereas, as per their claim, the Muslim League only represented the Muslims. Yet there was to be parity between the two. The Muslim League, in its lust for power, was not willing to acknowledge the existence of their own coreligionists who had thrown in their lot with the Congress, and the British encouraged their undemocratic and immoral demands.

  Initially, it was agreed that out of the five seats to which Muslims were to be nominated, four would be nominees of the League and one would be a Congress nominee. Now the League was given the right to nominate all the five Muslims since they were acknowledged to be representing Muslims. But since the Congress was truly representative of the national make-up and was a nationalistic organisation, they were honour-bound to nominate one nationalist Muslim amongst its quota of six members and another from the schedule caste. This would reduce the number of the majority community members to a minority of four in the interim government comprising thirteen members. On 14 June, the Congress president wrote to the viceroy saying: 'We are unable to agree to this proposal. If the position about the European vote and "parity" remains, my Committee are reluctantly compelled to inform you that they will not be able to assist you in the difficult task ahead'. The letter brought to a close the Cabinet
Mission's negotiations on the issue of the formation of the interim government.

  Ever since his return from Mussoorie, Gandhi had been feeling extremely restless. He was disturbed by the direction the events were taking in the on-going negotiations with the Cabinet Mission and the mechanisations of the colonial administration. He suspected that things were going awry and the country would have to pay a heavy price. He was also doubtful of the willingness of the Congress leadership to fight for a right and just solution. His anxiety has been mentioned by Pyarelal Nayyar in his diary while writing about his day on 15 June 1946: 'Again, Bapu is in the grip of his "instinct"! For the last three days he has been feeling that things are going wrong. Everybody, including the viceroy, seems to be afraid of Jinnah and vainly trying to please him at any price. They admit that his position is untenable yet the blame is laid at the door of the Congress! Cripps seems to be isolated from his colleagues'.

  It was an acknowledged fact that Gandhi had an uncanny intuition.

  On 16 June, the viceroy and the Cabinet Mission issued a joint statement declaring that they had decided to abandon further negotiations and were going to declare their own list of persons who would form the interim government. Invitations were sent to fourteen persons, six Hindu members of Congress, including a representative of the schedule caste, five Muslims of the Muslim League and three representatives of the minority communities: one Sikh, one Indian Christian and one Parsi. Lord Wavell sent an advance copy of the statement to Gandhi. All the Muslims in the list were those recommended by the Muslim League, but there were changes in the list submitted by the Congress. The Congress' nominee Sarat Chandra Bose was replaced by another Congressman, Harekrushna Mahtab; the name of Rajkumari Amrit Kaur was omitted, and the nationalist Muslim nominee, Dr. Zakir Hussain, was deleted. The Congress had objected to the Muslim League nominee Abdur Rab Nishtar right from the beginning, their argument being that Nishtar was a defeated candidate of the League in the just concluded elections, and nominating him to the interim government would go against the people's verdict. But the viceroy ignored the objection. The original figure of a thirteen-member interim government had been increased by one at the Congress' insistence that the interim government be balanced. However, the viceroy nominated a government official, N.P. Engineer, the advocate general. Engineer was the prosecution counsel in the recently concluded trials of the Azad Hind Fauj soldiers. His inclusion in the list of nominees for the interim government was a slap in the face of Indian national pride.