Lets Kill Gandhi

by Gandhi, Tushar A.

  The first meeting of the peace committee was held at the Ramgunj Police Station on the evening of the 25th. Shamsuddin Ahmed, minister of the West Bengal government, announced that seven Union peace committees had been recently formed and were functional in restoring peace in East Bengal. He promised that the Bengal government was sincere in its desire to win the confidence of its minority citizens. Speaking last, Gandhi remarked that success of the scheme would depend on the people in the committee. He was troubled by some Muslims scrambling for a place on the peace committees. It filled him with a sense of fear, as he felt that in some parts of the state, trouble was still brewing. He had recently received a telegram from Sandwip Island reporting grave trouble there. Women, fearing molestation, had stopped wearing vermilion on their foreheads.

  Early on the morning of 24 November, Sarat Chandra Bose, accompanied by a few friends and colleagues, met Gandhi at Srirampur. He voiced his doubts about the sincerity of the ministers and the chief minister of Bengal towards restoring peace. He told Gandhi that he had offered to camp along with Suharwardy in the riot affected areas and work to build peace. However, the chief minister and his colleagues had made insincere excuses and forestalled the idea. Gandhi agreed with Bose that the ministers had indeed sunk to the lowest possible levels.

  One member complained that Nehru and Rajendra Prasad had intervened in Bihar but they hadn't done so in Bengal. Gandhi replied to him saying that, besides being responsible members of the Central Government, they both were distinguished leaders of the Congress. In the interim government they had to abide by the procedures laid down by that body, and could not therefore intervene in matters under the purview of provincial governments, such as the one in Bengal. On being challenged that his opposition to conversion was identifying him with the Hindu Right wing and the Hindu community exclusively, he replied that he personally had no issue with the religion a person chose. However, such conversions could not in its very nature be on a mass scale and never for saving one's life or property, or for temporal gains. What had happened in Noakhali was a travesty and negation of all religion.

  There was an opinion that pockets should be carved out of Bengal where exclusive colonies of the minorities could be established. Gandhi opposed this demand and said it would pose a threat to a united India in future. A delegation of Hindu Mahasabha members, headed by their leader N.C. Chatterjee, met Gandhi and argued for the creation of such 'colonies'. Gandhi told them that this was a dangerous and unworkable solution, since a concentration could always be overwhelmed by superior numbers. At best it would mean that the country would be permanently divided into hostile sections enjoying a sort of armed truce. 'Whether they are many or few, the Hindus of East Bengal have to learn the art of being brave. What if the Muslims of Bihar wanted to create Muslim colonies in Bihar; it would be looked upon by the Hindu population of Bihar as a potential menace. By the same token, the creation of pockets can bode no good to the Hindus of East Bengal.'

  Noakhali was now being flooded with relief organisations and relief workers. There were about thirty relief organisations and half a dozen medical missions working amongst the victims. Gandhi's mission of one worker per village was now operational in twenty villages. Aid was pouring in from all over. He feared that with all the aid and volunteers the government would ease off on their responsibilities. The demobilised and recently freed men of the INA had come to Noakhali to assist Gandhi. Their leader, Sardar Niranjan Singh Gill, approached Gandhi to ask him to assign them duties in Noakhali. The Muslim League had expressed concern at the presence of the large number of INA men in their midst. Gandhi advised Singh to obtain permission from Suhrawardy before starting on their relief work. Suhrawardy had been facing increasing criticism from his cabinet colleagues and Muslim League members for allowing Gandhi and his band of workers a free hand in Noakhali. Some Muslim League fanatics had launched a propaganda war against Gandhi, accusing him of prolonging his stay in Noakhali to defame the League and of hindering the establishment of peace. Suhrawardy pleaded with Niranjan Singh not to make his situation worse. However, at that time the central leadership of the Muslim League was desperately trying to woo the Sikhs of Punjab to join their grouping in the north-west, so that the Muslim League, supported by the Sikhs, could lay claim to the entire north-west provinces, right upto New Delhi. Orders were sent to Suhrawardy not to anatgonise the Sikhs, and thus Singh was granted permission. Instead of a thousand, Gandhi allowed only a hundred volunteers. The group included a Muslim from East Bengal, a Muslim from Punjab and a non-Sikh from South India. Ultimately the bulk of the INA volunteers were sent back; only a batch under Col. Jiwan Singh continued to be in charge of Gandhi's camp in Srirampur, and accompanied him on his village-to-village march on foot through the riot-torn districts. Finally even this group was sent back when Gandhi left for Bihar in March 1947. Jiwan Singh, however, continued to work in Noakhali along with other volunteers in the Gandhi camps.

  Soon, Gandhi's work began to show results. Muslim families began to break the shackles of mistrust and suspicion and see him as their friend. They began flocking to his prayer meetings and gathered around him during his daily walks. The Hindus did not remain untouched either. 'Gandhiji's continued presence in Noakhali is resulting in a slow but steady restoration of confidence among the affected people', reported a correspondent, in the third week of December. 'Evacuees are now returning to their homes'. 'The Mahatma's method of solving the communal problem has been found to be a super-method', reported another. 'It may take time to yield its fullest results; it does always when it is an appeal to the soul but it is always a sure and more lasting method.... It is not a peace dictated from above but worked up from within'. The change was also felt by people in other parts of the country; however, there were many sceptics, one of them being C. Rajagopalachari. In a letter written on 19 November, on the eve of Gandhi's departure for Srirampur, he wrote to Pyarelal: 'When is Bapu coming back? What is the good of remaining there so long?.... All the good that can result has already resulted.... What is the good of under feeding? It is dangerous'. Two weeks later, Rajagopalachari wrote to Gandhi: 'I have been silently watching and reading the reports that appear about your work there. There is not much in the newspaper reports, but one can read a lot between the lines if one thinks it out with some imagination. I agree with you that the work you are on is great in every way and all else must give way. I have been thinking it over for some days past. My note to you was wrong. You are now—I think for the first time in some respects—putting into the field positive Ahimsa. And you will win. And it will be most valuable....I expect your new experience will unfold altogether new lines of thought and action and you will come back richer. God willing our problems may be solved. My love and fullest confidence'.

  By this time, the rift between Nehru and Patel had begun to widen. The suspicion Gandhi had about the sincerity of the Cabinet Mission's intentions with regards to the grouping clause had proved to be right. The British Parliament rejected all the objections raised by the Congress and promulgated a law which made it a fait accompli for the minority groups to compulsorily tag along with the dominant factions while voting on or opting out of a grouping. After a failed conference in London, where the Congress was represented by Nehru, the possibility of the Sikhs and Hindus in Punjab and the non-Muslims in Assam having to remain within the grouping dominated by the Muslim League, in other words having to break away from India, became a reality. The Congress leaders were once again realising their folly in disregarding Gandhi. Patel was also rattled by the terror tactics of the Muslim League and began to publicly advocate a tit-for-tat policy. He wanted to deal with the Muslims the way some of them were dealing with the Hindus. The 'Iron Man' of India did not realise it then, but was later to admit that this was just the response the Muslim League was hoping to invoke, to strengthen their demand for a homeland for Muslims. Not paying heed to Gandhi and abandoning his methods during times of crises was going to cost India and the Congress dearly. Bu
t Gandhi would pay the price for the follies of his political heirs.

  While correspondence between Gandhi and Patel remained warm and honest, the thoughts expressed in the letters accentuated the drift between the two. While disagreeing with his opinions and disapproving of some of his actions, Gandhi encouraged Patel to act according to his beliefs. It was during this period that the Nehru loyalists within the Congress launched a campaign to politically weaken Patel; many written and oral complaints were made against him. Those that were sent to Gandhi were promptly forwarded to Patel. Although the rift between Patel and Nehru and the situation in Delhi was taxing the already stressed Gandhi, he resolutely refused to abandon East Bengal and rush to New Delhi or Bihar.

  Speaking of his inner turmoil to Dr. Amiya Chakravarty of Calcutta University, who was visiting him in Srirampur, Gandhi commented: 'I am in the midst of a raging fire, and will not leave till it is put out; life in these parts must be made liveable for sorely affected men and women. The work of organisation must go on, and physical as well as moral rescue achieved.' Dr. Chakravarty asked him what technique could be used to approach the wrongdoers so that their resistance could be dissolved as, 'They are not only unrepentant but defiant and even jubilant over their misdeeds.' Gandhi replied, 'The only way to meet their attitude is not to succumb to it but to live in their midst and retain one's sense of truth. I am groping for light. I am surrounded by darkness—but I must act or refrain as guided by truth. I find that I have not the patience and the technique needed in these tragic circumstances—suffering and evil often overwhelm me and I stew in my own juice. Therefore, I have told my friends that they should bear with me and work or refrain as guided by wisdom which is now utterly demanded of us. This darkness will break and if I see light even those will see it who enacted the tragedy of the recent communalism in Bengal.'

  Describing the last morning of his stay in Srirampur, Dr. Chakravarty wrote: 'The stars were still shining in the sky and the village of Srirampur lay quiet, waiting for the new day, when after the morning prayer Gandhi settled down to work. One could see him wrapped in white, his forehead shining as he went on writing in the light of a hurricane lantern. After 7 am he came out for his morning walk in the village, crossing precarious bridges and grassy lanes wet with the morning dew. He greeted Muslim peasants as they proceeded to their fields and work in the farms'.

  The antagonism that the Muslim League rank and file felt towards Gandhi's peace mission in Noakhali was summed up in a press statement issued by one of the Muslim League parlimentary secretaries, Hamiduddin, who had accompanied him. 'Mr. Gandhi does not intend to go to Bihar.... Will it be wrong if one feels that Mr. Gandhi is in Noakhali only to focus the attention of the world on the happenings there and to magnify the same for keeping the Bihar happenings in the background?.... Does Mr. Gandhi want to complete his organisation through the number of volunteers he has got from outside?.... Mr. Gandhi may conveniently ask all the outside volunteers both male and female to quit while advising the refugees to return to their homes....No more sermons or instructions seem to be necessary for the Hindus there and the Muslims never required it ... Free from outside propaganda, they will begin to repose faith in their Muslim neighbours with whom they have been living peacefully for centuries.' Hamiduddin went on to deny that any forcible conversions had taken place. He alleged that, by not refuting the exaggerated reports about the casualties and carnage in Noakhali as widely reported by the press, Gandhi had lent credibility to them. He ended his 'open letter' saying, 'Gandhiji should now leave Noakhali and utilise his valuable time and energy for something else, if not for the Bihar sufferers'.

  Srirampur soon became a beehive of activity. Nehru, the newly appointed president of the Congress, was coming to meet Gandhi. Accompanied by Acharya Kripalani and a small group of Congress workers, they reached the Gandhi camp at midnight. The next day there were crowds of locals who had gathered to catch a glimpse of Gandhi and the leaders from Delhi. Joking with his mentor Jawaharlal commented, 'So, this is your lone sojourn!'

  'You forget I am a Mahatma, too!' replied Gandhi with a hearty laugh.

  By this time, the Nehru loyalists in the Congress had begun their campaign against Patel. Verbal and written complaints against Patel's alleged anti-Muslim attitude were constantly being registered with Gandhi. Nehru was also accompanied by Mridula Sarabhai, an ardent follower of Gandhi. She complained to him about Patel's speeches, which, from being critical of the Muslim League, were now becoming against the entire Muslim community. The harrassment suffered by the Congress members of the interim government was a result of the Muslim League's sustained and well-thought-out strategy; to blame all Indian Muslims was not a correct response. However, through his speeches, Patel was justifying the actions of the Hindu fanatics. The perpetrators of the Bihar massacre were emboldened by their misplaced notion that they had Patel's support. By no stretch of imagination could anyone allege that Patel was communal or a Hindu supremacist; his drawback was that he had a short temper and was prone to sometimes saying something without realising its consequences. As a minister holding the Home portfolio in the interim government, Patel lacked 'diplomacy'. This enabled the Muslim League to spread the canard amongst the Muslims that their interests would be jeopardised in an undivided India with leaders like Patel at the helm, and made easy the efforts of Nehru loyalists within the Congress to launch a campaign to weaken Patel within the party. After listening to the complaints of Mridula Sarabhai and others, Gandhi wrote to Patel. The latter wrote back saying that if Gandhi wished he was ready to step down from the Cabinet. He defended himself by saying that he was being targetted by some Congressmen, and named Mridula as the leader of the coterie acting against him. Thus, at a cruicial time in the history of India, the Congress was compromised by internal skirmishes between two of its premier leaders.

  Nehru updated Gandhi with the goings-on in New Delhi for the past two months. He talked about the obstinacy of the League; the duplicity of Viceroy Lord Wavell, and his bureaucrats who kept capitulating to the League each time it resorted to arm-twisting. Wavell was even forcing the Congress to form coalition governments with the League, in provinces where the Congress had won clear-cut majorities. Nehru admitted that the Congress had been betrayed over the issue of the interpretation of the clauses relating to the grouping. After a lot of dithering, the British government had invited Nehru for talks in London, and inspite of Patel's objection, Nehru went ahead, only to realise that the talks were a sham. On 6 December, HMG put an end to the controversy about the interpretation of the grouping clause by an 'Act of State'. A declaration was made in both the Houses of Parliament that HMG had legal advice which confirmed that the statement of 16 May meant what they had always stated was their intention, namely, that voting in the Sections should, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, be taken by a simple majority vote of the representatives in the Sections and that part of the statement so interpreted should, therefore, be considered as essential part of the scheme of 16 May. The Constituent Assembly was free to refer the matter to the Federal Court, if it so wished, but if the Muslim League could not be persuaded to come into the Constituent Assembly and a constitution came to be framed without the participation of the League, parts of the country in which the Muslim League was in a majority would not be bound by the results. HMG would not, therefore, undertake to submit to Parliament for acceptance the constitution so framed, as they could not contemplate 'forcing such a constitution upon any unwilling part of the country'. 'That position,' commented Sir Stafford Cripps, on the floor of the House of Commons, on 12 December, 'had always been realised by the Congress, which had repeatedly said that they would not coerce unwilling areas to accept the new constitution.'

  Thus, the Congress had been pushed into a corner. Many Congress leaders were now expressing regret at not having listened to Gandhi. Patel was one of them. His guilt was more so because it was on his insistence and in defiance of Gandhi in June 1946 that had seen the Working C
ommittee hurriedly accept the Cabinet Mission's plan of 16 May, against Gandhi's instincts. Now the Cabinet Mission had left the Congress stranded. In a letter to Sir Stafford Cripps, written on 15 December 1946, Patel wrote: 'When the invitation to go to London came, our first instinct was to decline to accept it. But the Prime Minister's appeal and his assurance in reply to our cable created a feeling in Pandit Nehru's mind that the refusal to accept the invitation may be regarded as an act of discourtesy; and he left India full of hopes for a message of goodwill and sympathy, but he returned sadly disappointed. He now realises his mistake.... You called the League delegation there at a time when there was some realisation that violence is a game at which both parties can play.... Just when the time for settlement was reached, Jinnah got the invitation and he was able to convince the Muslims once again that he had been able to get more concessions by creating trouble and violence.... In London the stage was set against us.... Your interpretation means that Bengal ... can draft the constitution of Assam. It is amazing. Do you think such a monstrous proposition can be accepted by ... Assam, particularly after the sad experience of wholesale forcible conversions, arson, looting, rape and forcible marriage? You can have no idea of the resentment and anger caused by your emphasis on this interpretation. If you think that Assam can be coerced to accept the domination of Bengal, the sooner you get rid of that illusion the better.... If they frame the constitution of Assam in such a way as to make Assamese opting out impossible, what is the remedy in your statement?

  'You know that Gandhiji at the age of 77 is spending all his energy in the devastated Hindu homes in Eastern Bengal and trying to recover the lost girls and bring back those forcibly converted to their old faith. But he is working against heavy odds.... He is surrounded by a very hostile atmosphere. In the event of his death there in these circumstances, what will happen no one can say. I shudder to think of the consequences.... You must have seen what Jinnah has said in London immediately after the debate. He swears by Pakistan, and everything conceded to him is to be used as a lever to work to that end. You wish that we should agree to help him in his dream?.... You know when Gandhiji was strongly against our settlement, I threw my weight in favour of it. You have created a very unpleasant situation for me. All of us here feel that there has been a betrayal. The solution has now been made more difficult, nay almost impossible. The settlement can only be made if there is no outside interference and the parties are left alone. The Viceroy would not give us peace. We have to work through this. It is an impossible situation.'