Lets Kill Gandhi

by Gandhi, Tushar A.

  The following day Gandhi camped at Bir, from where he undertook visits to the surrounding riot-ravaged villages. On 20 March he returned to Masaurhi. Speaking after the evening prayer, he said, 'I am scared to describe the kind of devastation I have seen in the past few days, for fear of breaking down with grief. It is your duty to rebuild what you have so ruthlessly destroyed. You have committed a crime and it is for you to do penance for it.' He said he would accept names for a volunteer corps for relief and rehabilitation for all the ravaged localities.

  While Gandhi was trying to soothe the people, news of further trouble started pouring in from Punjab and Noakhali. The Muslim League, emboldened by the tacit support of the colonial administration, had launched 'Direct Action' in Punjab, in a similar manner as in Calcutta, with similar results. Agitated by the tales of rabidity filtering through from Punjab, the Hindu Mahasabha and RSS began organising their cadres to observe 'Punjab Day' as a day of revenge for the events in Punjab, in a volatile Bihar. The Muslim League announced its intention of observing 'Pakistan Day' in Bengal; the more the polarisation, the more the hatred and suspicion, the better their political prospects.

  On 21 March Gandhi shifted to Hasadiha village, where he met several Muslim refugees from surrounding villages; in the afternoon he met with village representatives. He advised them that normal relations would only be re-established if the Muslims withdrew all the criminal cases against the Hindu rioters.

  On his return to Patna on 22 March, Gandhi spoke about his experiences over the six days he had travelled through the devastated villages at the evening prayer meeting. Patel had written to Gandhi that some peace seemed to have been established in the Punjab through military measures.

  Gandhi arrived at Jehanabad station on 26 March 1947 to be welcomed by a huge crowd. Of the three sub-divisions affected during the riots in Gaya district, Jehanabad was the worst. Two gangs were known to be the chief troublemakers. Some areas had managed to ward off the trouble-makers. One such person was Sakal Babu, a local headmaster. With the help of his students and some locals, he had patrolled the surrounding villages of Daulatpur, Nagma and Rasalpur day and night until the entire Muslim population had been safely evacuated to Jehanabad. Nine months later the Hindus of Daulatpur were still guarding Muslim homes. One Muslim told a member of Gandhi's entourage, that his property had been so well protected that on returning home after he was reassured of his safety nine months after the riots, he found that the plate containing the half-eaten meal he had left hurriedly during the riots was still lying undisturbed!

  After resting for a bit, Gandhi visited the refugee camp at Kako village, which had about five hundred Muslims. Some of them were from Saistabad in Ghosi police station—the worst affected police station in the sub-division. When Gandhi had reached Jehanabad, Mridula Sarabhai—who was travelling with him—had, without consulting him, asked the authorities to make appropriate arrangements for Gandhi and his entourage. When Gandhi realised that his promise to the Muslim Leaguers, that he would live with local Muslims in every village, would be broken due to the new arrangements, he tried to send a message to them explaining the situation. They had already taken affront, however, and—without giving him a chance to explain—passed a resolution accusing Gandhi of a breach of promise. This was released to the press and widely publicised amongst the Muslims of Jehanabad. This saddened Gandhi, who felt that they should have allowed him to apologise and explain the situation prior to condemning him.

  The next day Gandhi visited the refugee camp at Amathua village; a predominantly Muslim village, they had escaped any attack due to the arrival of the military in the nick of time. The camp was under the charge of the Muslim League and the refugees were thus primed to respond with acrimony and bitterness. Their representative read out a petition, which was more of a document accusing the Congress and its government. At Ghosi the representative came to meet Gandhi and said that the Muslims had faith in Gandhi and trusted no one else. He added that the Muslims would suffer again once Gandhi left Bihar, but the latter gave him all assurances. He said he had conferred with the government and had met almost all the leaders of the provincial Muslim League; he would see that justice was done to the Muslims. However, he added that he did not agree with either his or the League's suggestions. There had been a constant demand that at least fifty per cent of the policemen and officers in charge of new police stations that were being established to create confidence, should be Muslims. Gandhi refused to support any such demand here, nor did he think that such a demand from non-Muslims in Pakistan would be countenanced either. 'Therefore, I say, there is no other course to Hindus and Muslims than to be friends one of the other.'

  The Muslims alleged that by repeatedly referring to Noakhali in his public speeches in Bihar, he was likely to make the Hindus think that what they had done was only a reaction to Noakhali. Would this not create difficulties changing their way of thinking. Gandhi said that the inference was incorrect, for he had not spared the Hindus. In fact there was a time when he used to be equally plainspoken with the Muslims, too. He had even fasted for twenty-one days for what they had done in 1924. The Muslims did not then regard him as their enemy. But of late, he had to confess, that when he spoke about Muslims, he did so very guardedly. 'I avoid reference to Noakhali as much as I can. But to avoid it altogether would not be right. I must not remain silent in the face of the disturbing news that keeps coming in from Noakhali and the Punjab, if only for the sake of the Bihar Muslims. The two are so interlinked.' Gandhi was then asked his opinion of the Bihar government's decision to appoint Reuben of the Indian Civil Services as the sole judge on the Bihar Inquiry Commission set up to probe and report on the riots. Gandhi replied that it was fine if the one-man commission could be trusted to do justice. If, however, they had no confidence in Reuben, they could suggest somebody else, but to suspect someone simply because he was a non-Muslim was not right.

  That afternoon Gandhi had a meeting with representatives from surrounding villages and some Muslim refugees. A report of the morning's meeting was read out, and then the villagers were asked to bring up any issues not touched upon in the meeting.

  During the latter part of March 1947, a lightning strike by policemen took place in Bihar, which threatened to add to the volatile situation. Ever since his arrival in Bihar, Gandhi had felt that the infiltration of communal elements in the police was one of the main reasons for the success of the rioters, and the extent of the carnage.

  A special train brought the party back to Patna on 28 March at 10 pm. Some members of the entourage left immediately by car on arrival, taking a shorter route to reach the camp earlier than the main party. They were greeted at the camp entrance by a couple of grave-faced Congressmen. Prof. Abdul Bari, the Muslim president of the Bihar provincial Congress committee, had been shot dead by a Gorkha sentry of the anti-smuggling force that evening. While returning from a trip to the rural areas, Prof. Bari's car had been stopped and challenged by the sentries of the anti-smuggling force. The sentry had pointed his gun at Prof. Bari, when he failed to respond. Prof. Bari was known for his short temper, and seeing a gun pointed at him, he jumped out of his car and rushed forward to snatch the rifle from the sentry. The other sentry, without waiting to ascertain the identity of the person, had levelled his gun at Prof. Bari and shot him at point blank range. In losing Bari, Bihar had lost one of its most noble and illustrious sons and an astute nationalist Muslim. The incident had sparked off many rumours and created a lot of panic. The Gorkha sentry was an ex-member of the INA, and the rumour that INA men were targeting prominent Muslims started doing the rounds.

  On 30 March 1947, Gandhi left for Delhi in response to an invitation from the new viceroy, Lord Mountbatten. He planned to return to Bihar after a fortnight. The viceroy had extended an invitation to both Jinnah and Gandhi. He had offered to send his personal York aircraft to pick Gandhi up from Patna, but the offer was declined. He would travel by a regular train in his favourite third class compartment su
rrounded by his countrymen. Sarabhai had booked two adjoining compartments to provide a buffer between him and other passengers, as she was concerned about him. But nothing escaped Gandhi's eye. At midnight, when the train reached a station, he called for the station master and told him to open the compartment to the general public. He spent most of his time doing his own secretarial work.

  Arrangements had been made for him to detrain at a small station near Delhi. As he was being driven to his residence at the Harijan Colony, he requested the driver to stop, saying it was time for his morning walk; he got out of the car and walked the rest of the way. At three that afternoon Gandhi met the new viceroy for the first time. Very little or almost no politics was discussed. The viceroy asked Gandhi about his early life and education in England, about his fight for equal rights in South Africa and the early years of satyagraha. Gandhi was equally eager to meet Mountbatten and discover the man behind the title. They both knew that this was their last chance to hammer out a peaceful settlement of the Indo-British question. Gandhi was greatly impressed by the new viceroy's sincerity, gentlemanliness and nobility of character.

  Gandhi woke at three the next morning, his usual time, even though he had retired very late the previous night. At five Rajkumari Amrit Kaur came to see him; Maulana Azad followed at half past six. This was followed by meetings with Nehru, Rajaji, Rajendra Babu and lastly Patel, who arrived at nine to take him for another meeting with the viceroy. Gandhi's lunch was brought to him in the middle of the meeting by Manu and one of his secretaries, Brijkrishna Chandiwala. After being introduced to Manu, the viceroy told her, 'You are a lucky girl. My daughter tells me she feels jealous of you on seeing your photograph with Mr. Gandhi. I shall be sending her to attend your prayer meeting.' As Gandhi had his lunch the viceroy joined him with a cup of tea. Gandhi asked the viceroy if Manu could roam the gardens so that they could continue their talks uninterrupted. 'Certainly,' replied the viceroy, 'all this is yours; we are only trustees. We have come to hand it over to you.'

  'You can search her person for any hidden arms,' Gandhi said and laughed.

  'I am perfectly satisfied there can be no need for that in a disciple of yours,' replied the viceroy with a smile.

  The talks started from where they had been left the previous day. The viceroy told Gandhi that it had always been British policy not to yield anything to force, but Gandhi's non-violence had won. They had decided to quit as a result of India's non-violent movement for freedom. Towards the close of the meeting, on being invited to do so, Gandhi placed before the viceroy his solution of the Indian deadlock. He reiterated what he had often said: that he had no objections to Jinnah or the Muslim League turning the whole of India into Pakistan, provided it was done by appeal to reason and not under the threat of violence. But while he had previously held that this could be done only after the British had quit India, and while in principle he still adhered to the view, the crux of his present proposal was that he was now prepared, under Mountbatten's umpireship, not as a viceroy but as an unbiased individual, to invite Jinnah to form a government of his choice at the Centre and to present his Pakistan plan for acceptance even before the transfer of power. The Congress would give its wholehearted support to the Jinnah government. At the same time, since the Muslim League would now be the government, it would have no further excuse for continuing the movement of organised lawlessness which it had launched in some of the provinces. These must be called off. Further, since the viceroy had declared that he was out to do justice only and nothing would be yielded to force, if the League did not accept the offer, the same offer mutatis mutandis should be made to the Congress. The old policy of trying to please both parties must be given up.

  Mountbatten was faced with a dilemma; he liked the proposal but it went against his duties as viceroy. His preference naturally was in terms of his directive for a solution 'which leaves such good feeling that the Indian parties will want to remain in the Commonwealth'. This was intrinsically an admirable and worthy sentiment, but a curious irony of history had charged it with a tragic implication. Jinnah was not prepared to look at any formula which might even by implication commit him to a recognition of India as one entity, and among the British officials it was a 'political commonplace' that with the transfer of power 'Pakistan would become the last outpost of British Imperialism' and 'the anti-British bias of the Congress would quickly prevail'. The part relating to 'the anti-British bias' of Congress was found to be erroneous prejudice as evidenced by the tumultuous reception and ovation given to Lord Mountbatten as he was sworn in on Independence as the first governor general of free India. But for the time being their pet prejudice prevailed and they threw their weight against Gandhi's plan. Apart from the danger of a civil conflagration, this would have forced them to make their choice between the Congress and the League and drop one or the other 'packet', as Lord Morley referred to the two, from the Commonwealth bag. Lord Mountbatten felt he could not risk the practical for the problematical, even though the latter might appear to be the ideal solution, and so they were all drawn into the deep tragedy which held the whole situation in its grip and in which the British government was consciously or unconsciously cooperating, to bring about the failure of its own declared intentions. Like characters in a Greek tragedy, they were victims of the sins of their predecessors from the consequences of which there was no escape. Gandhi told the viceroy what must have sounded cruel to his ears, that the system of British policy of 'divide and rule' had brought about a situation in which the only alternative to a continuation of the British rule, which they had found was no longer feasible, was to accept the logic of the 'Quit India' demand and retire unconditionally, leaving India to its fate. The role of peacemaker in the 'communal triangle' which they had themselves helped create was not for them.

  Mountbatten found the plan attractive and suggested that Gandhi discuss it with Lord Ismay, the viceroy's chief of staff, so that Ismay could give it a proper structure. But whereas Gandhi understood this to mean that the viceroy wished the plan be made into a formal agreement, the viceroy and his advisors had, in the meantime, come to a different decision. The viceroy felt that he had moved too impetuously in allowing himself to be almost persuaded to advocate Gandhi's plan before he knew what the alternatives were and what the views of the other parties were. The plan was discussed in the viceroy's staff meeting on 5 April, and dubbed 'an old kite flown without disguise'. The consensus was that 'Mountbatten should not allow himself to be drawn into negotiation with the Mahatma, but should only listen to advice'.

  The British officials in New Delhi had regarded the Gandhi-Irwin Pact of 1931 to have been a political blunder of great magnitude on the part of Irwin, which must never be allowed to be repeated. It was assumed that Patel would vehemently oppose the plan suggested by Gandhi; the viceroy's advisors felt sure that he would stand his ground. But they were apprehensive that Nehru would succumb to Gandhi's influence if he thought that the viceroy also favoured Gandhi's plan. In one of his letters to Nehru, Gandhi referred to the 'surrounding atmosphere of which the Indian element is the author' and which might 'overwhelm' the viceroy 'as it may well do any of us'. The freelance advisors, with their 'tips', and 'inside information' about Indian leaders, their personal weaknesses, idiosyncrasies and even internal alignments which these friends were ready to purvey to the British officials could not have inspired them or the viceroy with much respect for Indian character. Some of them later claimed credit for putting across to the Indian leaders, formulae which they had previously denounced as unpatriotic.

  At Lord Mountbatten's instance, the matter was again discussed among the members of his staff in the afternoon of 5 April. The conclusion reached at the end of the day was that 'it was essential to make clear to Nehru, before Gandhi got to work too hard on the Congress, that Mountbatten was far from being committed to the Gandhi plan, and that it would need careful scrutiny'. Nehru was accordingly notified about the viceroy's second thoughts. When he saw Gandhi that evening w
ith a note from Lord Ismay, it was with 'at least one fatal objection to the plan'. That did not discourage Gandhi, who was still under the impression that the viceroy was wholeheartedly with him. Gandhi wrote to Mountbatten that Nehru's difficulty could be overcome if the two of them were of 'one mind'. In reply he was informed that his original policy of learning a great deal more about the problem before taking any line was the one which the viceroy intended to follow. And so the friendship which had commenced so happily received a severe jolt at the very start.

  The following is an extract of the correspondence between Gandhi, Mountbatten, Ismay and several Indian leaders during his stay in New Delhi, Pyarelal's Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, Vol. 10, Part II.

  Gandhi to Lord Ismay:

  5th April 1947

  Nehru gave me what you have described as an outline of a scheme. What I read is merely a copy of the points I hurriedly dictated, whereas, I understood from His Excellency the Viceroy, you were to prepare a draft agreement after the lines of the points I had dictated....