Lord Ismay to Gandhi:
6th April, 1947
I think that there has been some misunderstanding about the form of the short note which I prepared last Friday. As I understood it, Lord Mountbatten ... asked if you would be so good as to spare a little more time for a talk with me about your plan, in order that I might prepare a short note summarising its salient features in general terms. He had no intention ... that I should attempt any thing formal or elaborate.... He confirms that my interpretation of his wishes was correct.
Gandhi to Lord Ismay:
6th April, 1947
The very thought that at the threshold of my friendship with Lord Mountbatten and you, there can be any misunderstanding at all fills me with grave doubt about my ability to shoulder the burden I have taken upon my weak self ... I can only say that there must be some defect in my understanding or my attentiveness if I misunderstand very simple things. I do not feel inclined to reproduce the talk about this topic except to mention one thing, viz. that H.E. mentioned Menon [V.P. Menon, the reforms commissioner] to you and said you should prepare something in conjunction with him and I was to give you the points which were to become the basis of the draft you were to prepare....
Since writing this, Badshah Khan came into my room and I find that he confirms the gist of the conversation with Lord Mountbatten as described by me and adds that when we went to your office I told you that I had only to give the points as I hastily thought of them in order to enable you and your draftsman to prepare a draft agreement.
Lord Mountbatten to Gandhi:
7th April, 1947
Ismay has shown me your letter to him of 6th April, and we both are most upset to think that any act, or omission, on our part should in any way increase the great burden you are bearing. I therefore think it right to send you the following personal explanation.
As we were parting last Friday afternoon, I said that your plan had many attractions for me and ... I asked Ismay to make a note of its salient features, and I authorised him to talk it over in confidence with the Reforms Commissioner. I am extremely sorry if by these observations I gave you the impression that I wished your plan reduced to the terms of a formal agreement.
As I explained to you during the many talks that we have enjoyed, my aim has been and is to keep a perfectly open mind until I have had the advantage of discussions with important Indian political leaders with the object of seeking an agreement between all parties, so that peace can be restored in the country and an acceptable basis for transfer of power to be worked out. When these preliminary conversations have been completed, I shall then have to make up my mind as to what I am going to recommend to His Majesty's Government, and before I do so, I shall most certainly take advantage of your kind offer of further discussion with you.
Gandhi to Lord Mountbatten:
8th April, 1947
Many thanks for your two letters of 7th instant. As to the first, I am glad that as I read it, whatever misunderstanding if there was any, was of no consequence.
The concluding portion of Gandhi's letter to Ismay on 5 April said: 'I must add that Nehru has at least one fatal objection to the outline. But I will not tax you with its mention here. If the outline appears workable to His Excellency, I would like to wait on him once more and discuss Nehru's objection'. That stage, however, never arrived. The Congress high command's wagon had by then been irrevocably hitched to Lord Mountbatten's star. A gradual change had been coming for some time, particularly under the impact of Lord Wavell's plan for the transfer of power. The salient feature of that plan was transfer of power province-wise, with dissolution of the existing Centre. This—with six hundred and odd Indian states, all declared independent; the Muslim League provinces forming themselves into a separate state by voluntary association, which, as things stood, would have meant the loss to the Indian Union of the whole of Bengal and perhaps also the Punjab; certain parts of the country that were centrally administered left without any constituted authority; partisan factions in the administration, in the army and in the police free to accentuate the internal disruption—would have meant confusion and chaos all over the country. The prospect was disturbing for the Congress leaders. Slowly the pendulum began to swing in favour of letting the Muslim League provinces form themselves into a separate state—which in any event could not be prevented—while demanding a division of Punjab and Bengal. A picture of the cross-section in the Congress mind is furnished by a letter that Patel wrote to a friend in Bombay on 4 March 1947, before Mountbatten's arrival in India: 'If the League insists on Pakistan, the only alternative is the division of Punjab and Bengal... I do not think that the British Government will agree to division. In the end, they will see the wisdom of handing over the reins of Government to the strongest party. Even if they do not ... a strong centre with the whole of India—except Eastern Bengal and part of Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan—enjoying full autonomy under the Centre will be so powerful that the remaining portions will eventually come in'.
It was in a jungle in Noakhali in the last week of February 1947, that the plan of tearing Bengal into two was brought to Gandhi's attention by Dr. Amiya Chakravarty. Gandhi was visibly pained by it. What was then a faint whisper now became a 'trumpet call'. On 4 April, a statement signed by the Hindu members of the Central Legislature from Bengal was submitted to the viceroy It demanded the formation of a separate autonomous province of West Bengal within the Indian Union. It also called attention to the immediate need for the introduction, as a transitional measure, of two regional administrations with separate ministries under a common governor for the two parts of Bengal. This was necessary, it added, to avoid further bloodshed. On the same day, the executive committee of the Bengal provincial Congress committee passed the following resolution: 'If His Majesty's Government contemplate handing over its power to the existing Government of Bengal, which is determined on the formation of Bengal into a separate sovereign State and which by its composition is a communal party Government, such portions of Bengal as are desirous of remaining within the Union of India should be allowed to remain so and be formed into a separate Province within the Union of India'.
Gandhi strove with the CWC for the acceptance of the plan he had outlined to the viceroy. There were heated discussions, confused counsels, frayed nerves. Gandhi and Badshah Khan were strongly opposed to any partition under the British aegis. To Gandhi's mind, for the Congress to ask for partition of the Punjab and Bengal by the British sounded like a counsel of despair. He was opposed to the entire idea of partition; it would solve none of their difficulties. On the contrary, it would accentuate those that were already there and create fresh ones. But he could not convince them, nor they him. The next day he reported to the viceroy his failure to carry the Working Committee with him. His colleagues and he had come to a parting of ways.
Gandhi to Lord Mountbatten:
11th April, 1947
I had several short talks with Nehru and an hour's talk with him alone; and then with several members of the Working Committee last night about the formula I had sketched before you and which I had filled in for them with all the implications. I am sorry to say that I failed to carry any of them with me except Badshah Khan.
I do not know that having failed to carry both the head and heart of Nehru with me, I would have wanted to carry the matter further. But Panditji was so good that he would not be satisfied until the whole plan was discussed with the few members of the Congress Working Committee who were present.
I felt sorry that I could not convince them of the correctness of my plan, from every point of view. Nor could they dislodge me from my position although I had not closed my mind against every argument. Thus I have to ask you to omit me from your consideration.
Congressmen who are in the Interim Government are stalwarts, seasoned servants of the nation, and therefore so far as the Congress point of view is concerned, they will be competent advisers.
I would still love to take the place that the late C.F. A
ndrews took. He represented no-one but himself. If you ever need my service on its merits it will be always at your disposal.
In the circumstances above mentioned, subject to your consent, I propose, if possible, to leave tomorrow for Patna.
Another side to the talks with the viceroy had been the joint appeal for communal peace with the signatures of Jinnah and Gandhi under Mountbatten's aegis. On the eve of his departure for Noakhali, in October 1946, when Lord Wavell had made a similar proposal, Gandhi had felt that it was addressed to the wrong person. But circumstances had since changed; both sides had tarred themselves with the same brush. His old objection still remained but Lord Mountbatten pleaded that if Gandhi did not sign Jinnah would not. His signing the appeal would inspire confidence in the masses and help stop the holocaust. In the face of that argument Gandhi could not refuse. The following was the text of the appeal:
'We deeply deplore the recent acts of lawlessness and violence that have brought the utmost disgrace on the fair name of India and the greatest misery to the innocent people irrespective of who were the aggressors and who were the victims.
'We denounce for all time the use of force to achieve political ends and we call upon all the communities of India, to whatever persuasion they may belong, not only to refrain from all acts of violence and disorder, but also to avoid both in speech and writing, any incitement to such acts.'
The appeal was signed by Gandhi in Devanagari, Persian and Roman; by Jinnah only in English. Gandhi pressed strongly that since Kripalani was Congress president, his signature be added to Jinnah's since he alone had the authority to speak on behalf of the Congress as Jinnah did with respect to the Muslim League. To exclude the Congress president's signature from the appeal would mean acceptance, by implication, of Jinnah's accusation that Hindus and Muslims were two nations—Gandhi being the spokesman of the one as Jinnah claimed to be that of the other. But Jinnah would not yield on that point. Lord Mountbatten had put a straight question to Jinnah whether the issue of a joint peace appeal would put the Muslim League at a 'political disadvantage'. To this Jinnah had replied in the negative. Mountbatten pleaded with Nehru that he should not keep at that point, if only to give him (Mountbatten) an opportunity to test Jinnah's bona fides. Nehru, on merits, fully agreed with Gandhi. But in the face of this argument, he fell in line with Mountbatten. The following telegrams were exchanged between Gandhi and the viceroy in this connection:
Lord Mountbatten to Gandhi:
13th April, 1947
Mr Jinnah is perfectly ready to sign statement deploring acts of violence etc. which you signed before you left Delhi provided that your and his signatures are the only ones that appear on the document. As you mentioned that you thought Mr Kripalani's signature might also be added, though I gathered that you did not make this a stipulation, I am not issuing statement until I hear from you. Nehru is agreeable to leaving matter to my discretion, but I feel I must have your views. Unless statement bears your signature alone Mr. Jinnah will not sign. May I therefore appeal to you to agree?
Gandhi to Lord Mountbatten:
(Patna) 14th April 1947
Am of opinion President Congress should also sign. You should know reason for exclusion President Congress. However I leave final decision to you and Panditji.
Lord Mountbatten to Gandhi:
15th April, 1947
'I am glad to inform you that Nehru also agreed to leave the decision to me. I consider it so vital that the appeal should be issued, that I thought it best that it should go out over the signatures only of yourself and Mr. Jinnah.'
The net result of Mountbatten's move was to prolong an unnatural situation in which the use of violence continued to pay fabulous dividends to the League. If the appeal had come as a result of a spontaneous effort by the parties concerned, it would have had some chance of being implemented. As it was, it provided the Muslim League with opportunity for yet another manoeuvre on the chessboard of diplomacy. The comment of the Dawn, the mouthpiece of the Muslim League, was illuminating: 'There is novelty in the manner of the dramatic appeal which the leaders of India's two nations have signed. But there is hardly anything in it which the Quaid-i-Azam has not said before without anybody's prompting ...
'The next step should follow without much delay and in the logical sequence. We stress the word "logical" advisedly because the very fact of the Viceroy having chosen the Quaid-i-Azam and Mr. Gandhi for the purpose of an appeal of this kind being conveyed to the public is tantamount to a recognition that two voices and not one must speak in this context. Why is it necessary that two should make such an appeal if it is not recognised that there are two peoples, two nations, who would respect their own respective leader only?'
And again:
'Mr. Gandhi has been persuaded by the Viceroy to denounce violence "for all time: as a means to the attainment of political ends", but the Mahatma's political heirs and successors remain still unpersuaded.'
To expect the League to throw away their only weapon, which Jinnah had claimed they had forged, would have been wishful thinking. But Gandhi reasoned with himself that, even if the Muslim League was not sincere, the joint appeal having been issued at Mountbatten's instance made the viceroy party to it by implication and put upon him the burden of its full implementation, which he would not fail to discharge. This implication, the viceroy has since stated, he did not accept, though he told Gandhi that he would do everything in his power to help bring about communal peace. Be that as it may, Gandhi felt this was not enough. But neither then nor with subsequent pleading could he induce the viceroy to change. The peace appeal, consequently, remained a dead letter and Gandhi expressed his disappointment over it more than once.
While all this was happening in Delhi, Punjab was burning. The Muslim League had unleashed a reign of terror there too. Hindus were being terrorised, their properties looted and burned, their lands usurped, their women defiled and entire minority communities, living amidst a majority of Muslims, massacred. The stories of the atrocities in western Punjab were inflaming the rest of North India. Slowly a steady trickle of Hindu refugees fleeing West Punjab began seeking refuge in New Delhi and its outskirts. The numbers were increasing by the day. Fanatic Hindu organisations began infiltrating the refugee camps and encouraging people to take revenge. All of North India was waiting to explode. The leaders were surprisingly unconcerned, however; Gandhi was the only exception, but he found himself completely isolated.
Gandhi returned from the penultimate session of the Asian Conference in time for the evening prayer meeting. As soon as the recitation from the Koran commenced, a Hindu Mahasabha youth jumped up and shouted, 'This is a Hindu temple, we will not let you recite Muslim prayers here.' Volunteers tried to remove the interrupter from the meeting, but Gandhi intervened. 'I shall not proceed with the prayer so long as there is a single person objecting. I want to ensure the fullest freedom to the dissenting minority.' The young man tried to work his way up to the rostrum but was prevented from doing so. Gandhi moved half-way down to meet him saying, 'Let no one come between me and this young man.' The same sequence of events occurred the following day as well. On the third evening, as Gandhi was proceeding to the prayer ground, a letter was put in his hands purporting to be from the president of the Sweepers' Union, stating that they did not wish him to stay in the Harijan Colony; but the letter was proved to be fake. That evening too, three people objected to his reciting verses from the Koran. Thus each day his ahimsa was put to the test. On the fourth day, he woke up with the thought: 'Why does the opposition at the evening prayer still persist?' He told Manu that his striving for non-violence and truth could be nullified not only by a mistake on his part, but even by flaws in his colleagues. Since she was conducting the prayers, it was for her to ask herself whether the verses she uttered came from the fullness of her faith. The fanatical opposition to the prayers must cease if her prayers came straight from her heart. He was greatly troubled; after a talk with Maulana Azad, he sadly remarked: 'It se
ems God will not let me live for long.'
His penance bore fruit at last: a leader of the RSS came to see him that evening and assured him that there would be no more interruptions at his prayer meetings. 'Let no one imagine,' Gandhi observed, in his after prayer discourse, 'that we have had no prayer for the last three days. We did not pray with our lips but we prayed with our hearts, which is by far the more effective part of prayer. In this those who have opposed have also helped, though unconsciously. Their opposition has helped me to turn the searchlight inward as never before. You might be tempted to ask what I mean by giving so much of my time and energy to such trifles, when negotiations are in progress with Lord Mountbatten on which hangs the fate of the nation. Let me tell you, for me there is no big, no small. They are all of equal importance. In Noakhali, in Bihar, in Punjab, in Delhi, even in this prayer ground the battle of undivided India is being lost and won daily. The experience here today has provided me with the key to success elsewhere.'
The 6th of April marked the commencement of 'National Week'. It was on this day in 1919 that satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act was launched by observing the day as one of prayer and fasting throughout India. The spontaneous mass upsurge it evoked was a soul-stirring spectacle, signalling the awakening of India. A week later the Jallianwala Bagh incident in Amritsar occurred.
Khwaja Saheb Abdul Majid, a nationalist Muslim leader and a very old friend of Gandhi, came to see him during National Week. He was deeply grieved by the impending division of India, but tried to laugh away his sorrow. 'Bapuji is now going to drive us out of India in our old age,' he remarked. 'When India is divided, I shall come to take asylum with you. You won't let the Hindus murder me,' he added playfully. Gandhi interjected, 'If a fanatic should kill you, I will dance with joy! My misfortune is that I don't have many like you who would die bravely and without anger. If I had even half a dozen like you, the flames that threaten to devour us would be put out and peace would reign in India in no time.' Little did Gandhi realise that, just nine months later, Khwaja Saheb would be the one who would recite the fateha, the Muslim funeral prayer, over his bullet-riddled body.
Lets Kill Gandhi Page 41