The summer of 1947 was one of the hottest Delhi had experienced in a long time. Gandhi wrapped a wet cloth over his head, his 'air conditioning', but a far more sinister and volatile wind of hatred was blowing across his beloved country, threatening to consume all in its path and the country itself. Outwardly he appeared calm and serene, but his mind was in turmoil. He was being flooded with hate mail; he was given names like 'Mohammad Gandhi', 'Maulana Gandhi', 'Communalist', while yet another called him 'Jinnah's slave'. All of them amused Gandhi, who said, 'It is the people who conferred the title of Mahatma, these epithets, too, are a gift from them; they are equally welcome.'
The role of the British colonial administration and British commercial interests in India was not only considered suspect in the eyes of the Indian leadership, but was also seen as an irritant to the smooth progress towards transfer of power by the last viceroy. Someone had written to Gandhi saying that he should beware of the designs of the British; they were still up to their old tactics. The new government in Britain and its representative, the viceroy, were sincere about their intentions to transfer power, but there was widespread apprehensions that his intentions might be sabotaged by forces that had so often before successfully defeated British aims. It was not an idle fear or the imagination of a conspiracy theorist. Lord Mountbatten had himself admitted feeling constrained to bring home to the higher British officials and the permanent services the urgency that actuated British plans and intentions.
'People's minds are perturbed,' remarked Gandhi on the evening of 10 April. 'They ask me whether Lord Mountbatten would be able to deliver the goods or whether he would be forced to eat his words in the face of organised non-cooperation of the various entrenched British elements in India. Anything is possible in the prevailing circumstances. The dawn of freedom has appeared but we do not feel the glow of its sunrise. We do not know whether what we see is true dawn or false. We are trembling between hope and fear. So far the British officials and commercial interests have ridden on our backs. Let me tell them, it is now high time that they made up their mind to get off our backs. The Viceroy has declared that the British have finally decided to withdraw from India by the 30th of June, next year, and his declaration is backed by the full authority of the British Parliament. Churchill and his party seem determined not to give in without a fight. But fight or no fight, the British power has got to go. I have sounded this note of warning so that if there are any elements again heading for the wrong path, they may pause, reflect and desist.
'I am further told that the British officials and the commercial community are behind the present communal trouble. Lord Mountbatten has become apprehensive, lest what is being alleged against them may after all be true. It is up to the British elements in India to dispel his doubts.
'The success of Lord Mountbatten's mission is bound up with the loyal cooperation of the British commercial interests, the British army and the British civilians in India. If what is being said about them is true, it is a tragedy and they are not being loyal either to the people of India or their own. I appeal to them to help the Viceroy in the peaceful transfer of power. I hope the Britishers will leave India not as enemies but as friends.'
His advice to his own people was that they should beware of anything untoward; however, his plea fell on deaf ears. Neither did the British vested interests curb their mischief nor did his political heirs avoid the traps expertly prepared and laid out for each one of them. All the Indian leaders were manipulated expertly according to the profiles of their strength and weaknesses and the methods to be used to ensnare them by the British administration. Gandhi was left standing alone.
On 12 April, Gandhi left for Patna. He wrote to Patel the following day:
'There was one thing I wanted to ask you but could not as there was no time ... I see I ought now to write something in Harijan ... I also see that there is a wide and frequent divergence of views between us. In the circumstances, is it desirable that I should see the Viceroy even in my individual capacity?
Think over it dispassionately, keeping only the country's interest before you. Discuss it with others if you like. There should not be even a shadow of suspicion in your mind that I am making a grievance of it. I am only thinking as to what my duty is in terms of the highest good of the country. It is just possible that in the course of administrating the affairs of the millions you can see what I cannot. Perhaps I too would act and speak as you do if I were in your place.'
And so they all—Mountbatten, the CWC and the Muslim League—for different reasons and differing one from the other, went together into the same cry: the 'nation's voice' became a 'voice in the wilderness', in the arena of high politics in the land of his birth. With her motherly instinct Sarojini Naidu discerned the pathos of the situation, Gandhi's utter spiritual loneliness, the wide gulf that separated him from his friends and opponents alike, and which at three score and eighteen was sending him once again to plough his lonely furrow in Bihar, where over a quarter of a century ago he had made his debut in Indian politics and launched upon a career which in the course of a single generation had changed the face of the country under their very eyes. She wrote:
Beloved Pilgrim
You are, I learn, setting out once more on your chosen Via Dolorosa in Bihar.
The way of sorrow for you may indeed be the way of hope and solace for many millions of suffering human hearts. Blessed be your pilgrimage.
I am still incredibly weak or I should have attempted to reach the Harijan Colony to bid you farewell.
But even though I do not see you, you know that my love is always with you—and my faith.
Your Ammajan
Sarojini
Back in Bihar, after the stifling heat and even more stifling political atmosphere, Gandhi felt at ease. He had reasoned with the leaders of all sections and failed. The only thing that could possibly prevent the partition of India now was a radical change in the overall situation. Verbal persuasion alone would not do the trick, however, he would have to set about creating a milieu in which the parties would be compelled to think afresh. But he was running out of time.
Gandhi was to be in Bihar for less than three weeks, but nevertheless made a supreme effort for the people there. Since the days of the Champaran satyagraha, Gandhi had always held the people of Bihar close to his heart. The betrayal, by his own, caused him extreme anguish. Two days later, he severely took to task a section of Hindus who had complained against the levying of punitive tax on an area, where the locals were not helping the authorities arrest absconders accused of crimes during the riots. 'How disloyal of you to shelter fugitives from justice! You complain that innocent people are being victimised for the misdeeds of the hooligans but when the government wants to take action to make people cooperate in the arrest of the criminals, you raise a hue and cry. True, those who are harbouring the absconders are few but the remedy is in your hands. You should bring to light the real culprits so many may not have to suffer for the sins of a few.'
During the past few months, as Gandhi had been busy in Bengal and Bihar, he had been unable to keep abreast with the activities of the various organisations he had founded or patronised that were engaged in constructive work and societal reforms. A series of meetings were organised in Patna so that he could catch up and guide the workers of these organisations. Over the next few days he met representatives from Nai Talim, his model of progressive education, and Rashtra Bhasha Prachar Samiti, the committee which was working towards the propagation of Hindustani as the national language of free India. 'Now that Swaraj, self rule, is coming,' he wrote to a co-worker, 'we need the co-operation and service of every individual for sustaining it. In 1942, X. carried on mendacious propaganda outside India not only in respect of me but even in regard to poor Kasturba's illness and demise. But today we must make use of his talents, too, as we are doing. The same applies to constructive work organisations. We should discard old prejudices. We need to harness the energy of each and all to build up our str
ength'.
He met with workers of the Sadaqat Ashram, and the Harijan Sevak Sangh, a body of volunteers engaged in the removal of untouchability and the uplift of the untouchables. He said that what was needed now was the cultural and economic uplift of the Harijans so that the very distinction between 'touchables' and 'untouchables' would be obliterated. This insistence to obliterate caste barriers and create a homogenous and classless society was one of the many causes for anger against him in certain high caste Hindu circles.
Gandhi's sharpest criticism was reserved for the Bihar ministers whom he met just before departing for Delhi. He had received a complaint that they had not been implementing the rehabilitation policy they had agreed to in his presence. 'I am told that the ministers tell me one thing and do another,' he said to them. 'That is not how we shall be able to attain or to maintain independence. If you nod assent merely to flatter me, you are being unfaithful to me, to your people and to your trust. I do not claim to be infallible. If what I say does not appeal to you, you should straightaway tell me so and try to convince me of my error. By nodding a formal assent when you actually believe me to be wrong, you wrong me and put yourself in the wrong. You must realise that what is happening in the Punjab, Bihar and Bengal is hindering Indian independence.'
Gandhi was very severe on those who were close to him. He expected them to be blameless; when their failings were seen by him or reported to him, he felt as though their failings were a reflection of his own weaknesses. He expected the ministers there to set an example of propriety in independent India.
That night he went to bed at half past nine. Due to the tormenting heat he had reduced his food intake to the barest minimum. As a result he was feeling weak and his blood pressure had also risen. He had forgotten to do his day's quota of spinning. Just as he lay down on his mattress and shut his eyes, he suddenly remembered the forgotten chore. This would not do, he thought. He got out of bed, prepared the spinning wheel and faithfully spun the daily quota. He then went to sleep, at peace with himself.
The 29th of April 1947 was the last day of Gandhi's stay in Bihar. While bidding farewell to Bihar in his post prayer speech that evening, he requested the people of Bihar to show their affection towards him by working for communal unity, and not by thronging at railway stations. At this age I cannot stand the shouting of the crowds. Moreover, I hate to hear "Jai" shouts, they remind me of the Hindus who massacred innocent men and women, just as the Muslims killed Hindus to the shouting of Allah-o-Akbar. I know of no greater sin than to oppress the innocent in the name of God.'
With this message he took leave of Bihar. He was going back to the national capital where more political intrigue awaited him. He was certain that he would not be able to wean his political colleagues away from the path they had chosen. He had also realised that his influence over them was on the wane; they had found a new guiding light—Lord Mountbatten. Gandhi was doubtful how effective his stay would be in influencing the course of events, but the eternal optimist was keen to try his best. If his faith in the power of truth and ahimsa did not waver he would find a way, and he felt certain that even at the proverbial eleventh hour he would be able to steer his country away from partition and the resulting human tragedy. Unfortunately, time would tell that he would not succeed.
10
* * *
A LONESOME MAHATMA
'Willing to cut off the head in order to get rid of the headache!'
– Justification for accepting Partition
'I won't call the police. I might be killed but you will afterwards feel sorry for it and weep over what you have done. If, on the other hand, I retaliated or called the police, I might still be killed but those who shall have killed me would then have a good reason to gloat over their success.'
– MAHATMA GANDHI, January 1947
'One calls himself my beta, the other calls himself my chela. Par meri koi sunta nahin, But no one listens to me anymore.'
– MAHATMA GANDHI, January 1948
The situation preceding the transfer of power in New Delhi was becoming a hotbed of intrigue and political chicanery. The chief villain in this plot of conspiracies and deceit was the Political Department of the colonial administration. Along with the Muslim League ministers in the interim government, they were continuously up to mischief. The Congress had parted with the Finance portfolio when the Muslim League joined the interim government. This put the pursestrings of the government in the hands of the Muslim League ministers, and they made full use of this gift from the Congress to infiltrate government departments. This lack of foresight caused more grief for the Congress leaders, than any of their other blunders.
Evidence of the complicity of the Muslim League and the various wings of the Political Department, and the subversive activities of their agents were reported from all over the country. A group of commandos who had been working behind the Japanese lines in Burma under Brigadier Wyngate, were found to be engaged in disruptive activities in India; how they infiltrated into India was never explained. Officers in the British Indian Army were known to be active in the efficient trade of arms siphoned off from the military. Secret dumps of illegal arms and explosives were discovered in many places in' India. In one instance, a cache of over a thousand stenguns was discovered at Nagpur, Jabalpur, Kanpur and several other places. Narayan Apte procured a stengun in Pune with ease at about this time. The Congress high command had documentary evidence of the complicity of the Political Department with certain princes in hatching a conspiracy to further fragmentise India. It revealed a well-laid out plan to run in large supplies of arms through some of the princely states to organise a D-day all over India. Godse procured the Beretta automatic pistol which he used to murder Gandhi, from a princely state, Gwalior. In the face of all this, the Congress leadership, to quote Nehru, became at last willing 'to cut off the head in order to get rid of the headache'!
Immediately on his return to Delhi, Gandhi was confronted with the worsening political and communal situation in the country. On 1 May he was extensively briefed by Nehru at his camp in the Harijan Colony. Gandhi told Nehru very firmly that the Congress must not allow itself to be dragged into the game of diplomacy with the British to score any advantage over the League. In no case should they barter India's unity for any concession at British hands, but should instead demand that the British abandon their middle-of-the-road policy and play straight, strictly enforce the rule of law throughout the country pending the transfer of power, and refuse to have parleys with a party that was remiss in that respect or refused to cooperate; and if the British were unwilling, to go out of the game and bide their time till they quit, leaving the Indian parties to settle it among themselves.
The CWC met that evening. By now Gandhi had realised that, although the Congress leadership made a show of listening to his advice, they very seldom acted on it. The Congress leaders knew that, unless their actions were endorsed by Gandhi, they would not be acceptable to the party rank and file or to Indians in general. So they prevailed on Gandhi to attend the meeting. He remained a mute spectator at the meeting where the Congress pushed through the resolution accepting the partitioning of India in principle. The operative part of the Working Committee's decision accepting the principle of partition was contained in the following letter from Nehru to the viceroy: 'In regards to the proposal which, I presume, Lord Ismay is carrying with him to London, our Committee are prepared to accept the principle of Partition, based on self-determination applied to definitely ascertained areas. This involves the partition of Bengal and Punjab. As you know, we are passionately attached to the idea of a United India, but we have accepted the partition of India in order to avoid conflict and compulsion. In order to give affect to this partition, every effort should be made to meet the wishes and the interests of the people affected by it. Even before and apart from such partition, recent events have made an administrative division of both Bengal and the Punjab an obvious and urgent necessity.
'Any proposal to put an e
nd to a duly constituted Provincial Government having a large majority at its command, and to hold elections as a result of terrorism must be considered a surrender and must be resisted'. This part of Nehru's letter alluded to the nefarious designs of the Muslim League and the British governor of the NWFP, where a Congress government headed by Dr. Khan Saheb, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's brother, was in power. The Muslim League had unleashed a reign of terror with the connivance of the colonial governor, and had convinced the Central administration that the only solution was to dissolve the democratically elected Congress government and install a puppet government of the Muslim League, which would then vote to merge the province with Pakistan. At this point the plan was a closely guarded secret on paper, but it was to be implemented very soon. The Khan brothers, ardent nationalists and bitter foes of the Muslim League, were a thorn in Jinnah's flesh. Jinnah and his colleagues in the League were worried that, under the leadership of the Khan brothers, the Pukhtoons would vote to stay with India, refusing to be subjugated by the Punjabi-Muslim majority which would dominate Pakistan. If that happened, even if they succeeded in forcing the creation of Pakistan along with independence, they would not be able to sustain it for too long. They had to deal with the Pukhtoons decisively, and with the collusion of their colonial patrons they did just that.
Even now Gandhi refused to accept partition as the only solution and rejected the reasoning that it was a necessary step to avoid chaos. He had previously expressed his views in this regard in a message to a British news magazine, Cavalcade, saying that no organic peace was possible without complete independence, including the withdrawal of British troops and influence from India. Imposed peace could only disturb human relations: 'Hence establishment of organic peace in India inevitably involves senseless strife. This will end quicker when no party is able to look to British power for protection. Forced emasculation of a great nation was bound to have sad result. No doubt much would depend on Indian wisdom for minimising mischief. While connection dissolves, honesty and sagacity of British statesmen and British residents in India are equally necessary. I must regretfully say that distrust of British statements has gone too deep and that perhaps legitimately. Therefore, British dealings have to be strictly frank and above suspicion at this critical moment'.
Lets Kill Gandhi Page 42