In his own mind Gandhi was convinced that there was no reason for the feared chaos to tear India apart if the British rulers and higher officials dealt with the situation honestly and sincerely. But if everyone's worst fears came true and the nation was plunged into chaos let loose by the withdrawing British, and he was asked to choose peace imposed by the fear of the British, he would unhesitatingly choose chaos. Under no circumstances would he choose partitioning of the country at British hands as the price for peace. But the Congress leadership was not willing to play the waiting game. They were afraid that the longer they waited the greater trouble the Muslims League would create, and the entire country would slip out of their hands. Gandhi pointed out to them that Jinnah's declaration that the minorities in Pakistan would be fully protected was being honoured more in the breach than in the observance. It was incumbent upon the British power to denounce the guilty party, but for that they were not ready, which made their bona fides suspect in his eyes. If the Congress accepted the logic of partition, it would ultimately lead to conflict and the disintegration of India for which future generations would have to pay the price.
That evening, in his post prayer speech, Gandhi referred to the joint appeal for peace signed by Jinnah and himself at the behest of the viceroy. It was not open to Jinnah to plead that his followers did not listen to his appeal. It would remove the ground from under his feet because he was the undisputed president of the All India Muslim League, and the League claimed to represent the vast bulk of the Muslim population. Where was the authority of the League if the Muslims resorted to violence to gain its political aim which was summed up in the word Pakistan? Was the British government to yield to the force of arms rather than the force of reason? The viceroy had solemnly declared that nothing would be yielded to force. There was no meaning to issuing the joint appeal unless it was certain that it meant for both the signatories all that the words thereof conveyed: 'May I ask the viceroy why he is a silent witness of all this? Why does he not hold me or Jinnah Saheb, whoever is remiss in the implementation of the joint appeal, to account? And if the British cannot make the Hindus and Muslims to live at peace with one another, why do they not retire leaving them to square it out among themselves?' But even if the British did not leave, he went on to say, the answer would not be to take up the sword. 'You are greatly mistaken if you think the British will yield anything to force. And that should be an object lesson to you, too. If you learn to die to the last man, no-one can take anything from you by force.'
Gandhi broached the issue of the breach of the joint appeal and the responsibility of the viceroy as its proposer, during his meeting with Mountbatten on 3 May. The viceroy maintained that both the signatories had freely and willingly signed it, and he therefore had no responsibility. The viceroy was reluctant even to apportion responsibility for the continuation of disturbances and name Jinnah and his Muslim League as the culprits. His sole purpose was to transfer power in a peaceful manner to Indian hands as quickly as possible. He was most anxious that India be united. It would not rebound to the credit either of Britain or of India if communal strife continued. If strife continued in spite of his best endeavours during the period of the liquidation of the British power, he finally assured Gandhi, he would not hesitate to use the services of the military.
However, there remained a basic divergence in their outlook. Gandhi was not able to bring either the Congress leaders or the viceroy to approach the problem of unity and communal harmony in a manner which called for the implementation of the difficult, but right, formula. While Punjab was burning and the tide of lawlessness and communal frenzy was threatening to engulf the whole of India, trouble erupted again in Noakhali. Gandhi asked Mountbatten whether he should go to Punjab, as was being repeatedly requested by his friends there, or to Noakhali, where he had unfinished business. 'Nehru agrees. Nevertheless I would like you to guide me. This outbreak of violence is not a mere detail. If it cannot be dealt with now, it won't be fourteen months hence.' Mountbatten replied, 'I quite agree that these outbreaks are not a mere detail. What we have to secure is a settlement between the parties at the Centre and, if possible, a combined front against violence.' The British colonial administration, in their twisted desire for revenge, played one Congress leader against the other and secretly encouraged Jinnah and the Muslim League to create more and more trouble so that finally, when India was free, it would be a Pyhrric victory.
Pyarelal writes: 'The divergence persisted till the end. The policy of trying to please both parties continued and with that the phantom hunt for a "combined front" with the perpetrator of violence to bring violence under control while the death roll mounted up, converting the country into a vast powder magazine'. Replying to a question posed by Doon Campbell, special correspondent, Reuters, whether he believed that the communal division of India was inevitable, Gandhi said, 'Personally, I have always said "no" and I say "no" even now.' He was then asked, 'Do you subscribe to the opinion that the British will be morally obliged to stay on in India if the outstanding Hindu-Muslim differences have not been resolved by June, 1948?'
This was the first indication to Gandhi that there was a behind-the-scenes lobby working towards prolonging British withdrawal and postponing independence under the pretext of communal strife. It was believed that even the new viceroy, Mountbatten, had hinted at such a possibility, provided the Indian parties invited the British power to remain, though personally he regarded this to be a 'most unlikely contingency'. Gandhi made it clear that British withdrawal—'noblest act of the British Nation', as he had called it—if it was to be honestly and fully carried out, must take place according to schedule, irrespective of internal conditions. He replied, 'It would be a good thing if the British were to go today—thirteen months means mischief to India. I do not question the nobility of the British declaration, I do not question the sincerity of the Viceroy, but facts are facts. Neither the British Cabinet nor the Viceroy, however outstanding he may be, can alter facts. And the facts are that India has been trained to look to the British power for everything. Now, it is not possible for India to take her mind off that state all of a sudden. I have never appreciated the argument that the British want so many months to get ready to leave. During that time all parties will look to the British Cabinet and the Viceroy. That being so, the thirteen months' stay of the British power and British arms is really a hindrance rather than a help, because everybody looks for help to the great military machine they have brought into being. That happened in Bengal, in Bihar, in the Punjab and in the North-West Frontier Province. The Hindus and the Muslims said in turn: "Let us have the British troops". It is a humiliating spectacle. I repeat: The British will have to take the risk of leaving India to chaos and anarchy. This is so because there has been no Home Rule; it has been imposed on the people. And when you voluntarily remove that rule, there might be no rule in the initial state. It [ordered rule] might have come about if we had gained victory by the force of arms. The communal feuds you see here are, in my opinion, partly due to the presence of the British. If the British were not here, we would still go through the fire no doubt. But that fire would purify us.'
Patel had become increasingly uneasy by reports of the growing Anglo-Muslim bond and the intrigues they were indulging in. At this stage the colonial administration put forth a proposal: 'Would he convince the Congress to accept Dominion Status as an ad interim arrangement? This would make it possible to anticipate the date of British withdrawal from India. It would also take away from the Muslim League its bargaining power with the British'. Patel was taken in by the argument. On 1 May the viceroy's secretary reported that Patel was ready to accept an offer of dominion status for the time being, but officially the Congress stood committed to the sovereign independent republic resolution of the Constituent Assembly. This did not deter the British government; they realised that all this impasse required was a cleverly worded 'face-saving formula'. It was ultimately found by dropping the words 'King-Emperor' and 'Empire', to s
pare the conscience of the Congress high command.
The political situation of the country was becoming increasingly tense as the days went by. This, coupled with the growing communal frenzy, put a very heavy strain on Gandhi. But optimism was an integral part of his faith. Asked whether he thought that the growing gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims was permanent and unbridgeable, he replied, 'Nothing of the kind. For that would mean that neither religion had any truth in it'.
The acceptance of the partition of India by the CWC convinced Gandhi that he should be in Bihar and Noakhali rather than in Delhi. Independence would prove to be an illusion if people did not, in the meantime, learn to live in peace with one another. In the meanwhile, disturbing news of the deteriorating communal situation was trickling in from Calcutta. Some Pathans from Dera Ismail Khan narrated the lawlessness created by the Muslim League there. On 5 May Gandhi told Nehru that he would proceed to Calcutta post haste.
That day the viceroy had invited both Gandhi and Jinnah for successive interviews. Their visit to the Viceroy's House briefly overlapped. Taking advantage of this, Mountbatten arranged a meeting between the two in his presence. As a sequel to this brief meeting, Gandhi met Jinnah again at the latter's residence the next evening. He wrote to the viceroy about the meeting in a letter dated 8 May: 'I had a very pleasant two hours and three-quarters with Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah on Tuesday last. We talked about the joint statement for peace. He was agreeably emphatic over his belief in non-violence. He has reiterated it in the press statement drafted by him. We did talk about Pakistan-cum-partition. I told him that my opposition to Pakistan persisted as before and suggested that in view of his declaration of faith in non-violence, he should try to convert his opponents by reasoning with them and not by show of force. He was, however, quite firm that the question of Pakistan was not open to discussion. Logically, for a believer in non-violence, nothing, not even the existence of God could be outside its scope'.
Patel was opposed to Gandhi going to meet Jinnah, fearing it would send a wrong signal, he felt that this was enhancing Jinnah's prestige. But if Jinnah was to be isolated how would a dialogue begin? Gandhi brushed aside his objections and said he would meet Jinnah to plead with him, not once but if necessary 'seventy times seven' times. Commenting on Jinnah's statement during his prayer address on 7 May, Gandhi remarked: 'On bended knee I ask those who want Pakistan to convince me that Pakistan is for the good of India. Let them put their case before the people and explain to them how it will benefit them. If they succeed in appealing to their reason, well and good, but let them understand that not an inch will be yielded to force.'
The CWC, he went on to say, had practically decided to concede Pakistan, but demanded that the Hindu majority areas of Bengal and the Punjab must be excluded from it in the event of India being divided. He was opposed to that too. The very idea of breaking up the country made him shudder. But in that he was alone. He had told Jinnah plainly that he could not be party to the vivisection of India and would never append his signature to any partition plan. If the Congress high command had resolutely stood by Gandhi and refused to parley on the basis of Pakistan with the British till peace was re-established in the country on the basis of the joint peace declaration and on the basis of the British government's declaration that nothing would be yielded to force, the issue of Pakistan would have been decided by appeal to reason alone. But the Congress high command could not take that firm moral stand, with the result that the ground steadily slipped from under their feet. Mountbatten could not be expected to be more punctilious in that regard than the Congress itself!
Later that day, Gandhi boarded a train for Calcutta. He had a very disturbed journey, because the more he thought about the entire reasoning of the acceptance of partition as a prelude to independence, the more he was convinced that a wrong step was being taken, for which, in the end, all the parties involved would have to pay heavily. He decided to make another effort to avert, if possible, the threatening disaster. In the 8 May letter to Mountbatten which he posted from a wayside station, Gandhi went on to say: 'It strikes me that I should summarise what I said and wanted to say and left unfinished for want of time at our last Sunday's meeting.
Whatever may be said to the contrary, it would be a blunder of the first magnitude for the British to be party in any way whatsoever to the division of India. If it has to come, let it come after the British withdrawal, as a result of understanding between the parties or an armed conflict which according to Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah is taboo. Protection of minorities can be guaranteed by establishing a court of arbitration in the event of difference of opinion among contending parties.
Meanwhile the interim government should be composed either of Congressmen or those whose names the Congress chooses or of Muslim League men or those whom the League chooses. The dual control of today, lacking team work and team spirit, is harmful for the country. The parties exhaust themselves in the effort to retain their seats and to placate you. Want of team spirit demoralises the Government and imperils the integrity of the services so essential for good and efficient government.
Referendum at this stage in the Frontier (or any Province for that matter) is a dangerous thing in itself. You have to deal with the material that faces you. In any case nothing should or can be done over Dr. Khan Saheb's head as Premier. Note that this paragraph is relevant only if division is at all to be countenanced.
I feel sure that partition of the Punjab and Bengal is wrong in every case and a needless irritant for the League. This as well as all innovations can come after the British withdrawal, not before, except by mutual agreement. Whilst the British power is functioning in India, it must be held principally responsible for the preservation of peace in the country. That machine seems to be cracking under the existing strain which is caused by the raising of various hopes that cannot or must not be fulfilled. These have no place during the remaining thirteen months. This period can be most profitably shortened if the minds of all are focused on the sole task of withdrawal. You and you alone can do it to the exclusion of all other activity so far as the British occupation is concerned.
Your task as undisputed master of naval warfare, great as it was, was nothing compared to what you are called to do now. The single mindedness and clarity that gave you success are much more required in this work.
If you are not to leave a legacy of chaos behind, you have to make your choice and leave the Government of the whole of India including the States to one party. The Constituent Assembly has to provide for the governance even of that part of India which is not represented by the Muslim League or some states.
Non-partition of the Punjab and Bengal does not mean that the minorities in these Provinces are to be neglected. In both the Provinces they are large and powerful enough to arrest and demand attention. If the popular Government cannot placate them, the Governors should during the interregnum actively interfere.
The intransmissibility of Paramountcy is a vicious doctrine, if it means that the Princes can become sovereign and a menace for independent India. All the power wherever exercised by the British in India must automatically descend to its successor. Thus the people of the States become as much part of Independent India as the people of British India. The present Princes are puppets created or tolerated for the upkeep and prestige of the British power. The unchecked powers exercised by them over their people is probably the worst blot on the British Crown. The Princes under the new regime can exercise only such powers as trustees can and as can be given to them by the Constituent Assembly. It follows that they cannot maintain private armies or arms factories. Such ability and statecraft as they possess must be at the disposal of the Republic and must be used for the good of their people as a whole. I have merely stated what should be done with the States. It is not for me to show in this letter how this can be done.
Similarly difficult but not so baffling is the question of the Civil Service. Its members should be taught from now to accommodate themselves to the new re
gime. They may not be partisans taking sides. The slightest trace of communalism among them should be severely dealt with. The English element in it should know that they owe more loyalty to the new regime than to the old and therefore to Great Britain. The habit of regarding themselves as rulers and therefore superiors must give place to the spirit of true service to the people.'
Gandhi asked Mountbatten, as viceroy, to do the right thing. He was the representative of the British government, which had insisted upon retaining reserve powers. The army was in its exclusive control. Pending the final solution it, therefore, was honour bound resolutely to maintain the reign of law and order, irrespective of whether the Congress leaders insisted upon it or not. If this was beyond the British resources, then the viceroy should immediately advise HMG to unconditionally withdraw and transfer power over the whole of India, including the states, to whichever party they preferred. The interim government could be treated as a full fledged dominion government. This had been suggested even by British experts and newspapers. However, there was another alternative: the Constituent Assembly was in being and was a fully representative body and power could be transferred to it. This, as a last resort, would not have required the consent of the Indian parties. And if the British government was. to disregard the viceroy's advice, Gandhi suggested to Mountbatten that he should pack his bags and leave. He should not use a fast deteriorating situation to pass off partition as a lesser evil and make himself an accessory to the sacrifice of India's political unity, which the British government had often in the past claimed as their proudest achievement. If this line of action had been accepted instead of allowing chaos to build up under the protection of British arms, it was certain that in the case of Gandhi's opposition, the Congress leaders would never have accepted the evil of partition at British hands. It was possible that, with the third party divested of its ability to queer the pitch, the collective personality of India would have asserted itself. And one of the greatest human tragedies would have been averted.
Lets Kill Gandhi Page 43