Lets Kill Gandhi

by Gandhi, Tushar A.

  Failing an agreement, those who believed in the political unity of their country would have fought to save it. They would have had something to live and die for. Many examples of nations passing through a period of chaos and then emerging stronger for it are available in history. As Gandhi said: 'If they get a chance to fight it out among themselves and show bravery, they would play fair [and ultimately come together] if only out of self-interest. It would give one who desires to work for unity a chance. At present he gets no opportunity and the pent up hatred goes on accumulating. The plain fact of the situation is that so long as the police and the military are there, no one else has a chance.' Even if a period of chaos had followed, it would not have been too great a price to pay for averting the division of India into two mutually hostile neighbouring countries, with conflicting interests, which would turn them, and the region, into a hotbed of international intrigue. India would have been spared the horrors of the senseless, undeclared civil war and dismemberment that preceded and followed Independence. Not to mention the biggest migration in recorded history which still arouses passions on both sides of the border after over six decades. Three declared and many undeclared wars over the past five decades have taken a great toll on both the nations and its people.

  But Mountbatten was not one to swallow the proverbial bitter pill. It is possible that he was overtly loyal to his country and the crown but he was the one who could have shown sagacity and done what was right by India. Mountbatten's reaction to Gandhi's letter was conveyed to the latter by a colleague a few days later: 'I came up here [Simla] and dined at the Viceregal Lodge last night.... He said, "I am touched and moved by your Bapu's letter. Though he gives me more headache than anyone else, I admire his instinct. I would love to be able to do what he says, but I can't always see how to do it, and what is more, the Congress members of the Interim Government do not see eye to eye with him". He was, however, determined not to allow civil-war to raise its head. He agreed that Pakistan was a bad thing but felt that the Congress high command were "now quite anxious for it and for it to happen as soon as possible" in the hope that eventually the League itself would give it up. "You [Gandhiji]... were the only person who stood out against it and he [Mountbatten] agreed with you. I asked why a strong coalition Government in both the Punjab and Bengal with a preponderance for the time being of Hindu or Muslim officers in the minority areas of those Provinces could not be possible to allay fear, and in the interregnum he was there to see that injustice was not done and there could be a permanent court of arbitration. He agreed but remarked that this would mean coalition Governments in the Hindu majority Provinces also. Jawaharlal had said it was impossible. I told him to consult Sardar. He felt the latter would be less liberal than Jawaharlal. He praised them both very much—wholly different types but straight and easy to work with. Jawaharlal more liberal ... often agreed with him but pleading with him his inability to carry the Congress Working Committee with him. He [Mountbatten] again said he was against the whole conception of Pakistan. He was not wholly satisfied with the reaction of His Majesty's Government and was struggling to get them to think along your lines. He repeatedly deplored "the legacy that had been left him and the short time he had to do things in".'

  The train taking Gandhi to Calcutta stopped at Patna where he was greeted by ministers from the Bihar Cabinet. The scheduled stop there was for fifteen minutes but their meeting with Gandhi went on for longer. The station master asked Gandhi if he could signal departure. 'You do not go to any other passenger to take orders,' Gandhi answered, 'then why me? You should do your duty and not be afraid of ministers.'

  Gandhi had decided to stay at the Khadi Pratisthan Ashram at Sodepore ten miles outside Calcutta. A strictly enforced curfew was imposed in the city. The day he arrived was the birth anniversary of Rabindranath Tagore. At his post-prayer meeting, Gandhi told the crowd that when he had appended his signature to the joint peace appeal, he had done so with the utmost sincerity, and was, in a sense, guaranteeing peace and unity. He had made himself a hostage for the preservation of peace by both the parties. The Hindus of Bihar and the Muslims of Noakhali must, therefore, remember that if they again went on a rampage, they would force him to launch on an unconditional fast unto death.

  Meanwhile, Suhrawardy, the chief minister of Bengal, was a worried man. He had led the faction of the Muslim League who vociferously demanded Pakistan. Now he feared that, with the demand put forth by the Congress, the eastern wing of Pakistan would be a truncated version of what they had always assumed it to be. Assam and the industrialised parts of Bengal would, in the new equation, remain with India. In all probability, the port and city of Calcutta would also be lost to the eastern wing of Pakistan. What also worried Suhrawardy, was the realisation that the eastern and western wings of Pakistan would be separated by a powerful group of intervening Indian Union provinces. He had, for long, cherished the idea of creating a greater Bengal, by amalgamating to it the rich iron and coal bearing belt of Bihar. To realise his ambition, he was prepared even to reinterpret the League's 'two nation' theory. 'The two nation theory,' he said in a press interview, 'has had as its background mainly political considerations. But there are other considerations such as common language, economic ties, interdependence, ethnological and historical ... which directly affect the people.... There has been no finality even among eminent professors of politics on the question of what constitutes a nation and different criteria would furnish different answers. Therefore, the two nation theory should be fully capable of being suitably moulded so as to be adaptable to local conditions as the situation demands.'

  On 9 May, the press reported Jinnah's statement that he had no objection to allowing Bengal to participate in the existing Constituent Assembly 'or going out of his Pakistan plan, if the Western zone of Pakistan was conceded to him'. This shows how concerned Jinnah, who claimed to be the sole representative of the Indian Muslims, was about the Bengali Muslims.

  The Bengali Muslims were different from the Muslims living in the western provinces of India. Both communities were proud of their common language, Bengali. The Bengali Hindu was as proud of the poetry of Nazrul Islam as the Bengali Muslim was of Rabindranath Tagore. These linguistic and cultural bonds had survived the recent shocks of the political divide. The political and ideological divide between the Muslims of Bengal and the Muslims of the western provinces was highlighted by two incidents. The first was when the Muslim League ministers accompanying Gandhi to Noakhali had told him that Bengali Muslims were quite content to have Bengal as a Muslim-controlled province in undivided India; their only quarrel was with the Muslims being assigned the status of underdog. The second was a press report filed by its Delhi correspondent, published on 29 April in the Hindu said: 'It is significant that while the Punjab Muslim Leaguers are thinking in terms of a separate Constituent Assembly, those from Bengal want to enter the existing one'. The European group in Bengal had a large stake in jute. They did not want the partition of the province as the loss of jute growing districts, which were in East Bengal, would hit the jute trade and industry very hard. There was a band of nationalist Hindus, too, who saw in the partition of Bengal, its ruination. The group was led by Sarat Chandra Bose. One amongst the group was a veteran Congressman Akhil Chandra Dutt. Soon after the movement for the partition of Bengal had been launched by a section of the Hindus, he wrote to Gandhi: 'A movement has been set on foot for partition of Bengal and thus "secure a homeland for Hindus". This appears to be the result of a defeatist mentality. In fact this movement seems to me to be a communal one. Communalism must no doubt be fought, but not by a counter communal movement for a Homeland for the Hindus. This movement is practically a concession to the principle on which the demand for Pakistan is based. This will not be a solution to the communal problem but will aggravate and perpetuate it. It ignores the fundamental position that communalism is a passing phase and is bound at no distant date to be replaced by political division on economic grounds.... Partition will inevita
bly lead a section of well to do Hindus to migrate to West Bengal, leaving the poorer caste Hindus and scheduled caste Hindus to save their life, property and honour by conversion to Islam. Partition will be a wrong step politically, economically, socially, linguistically and culturally.... It was my lot in the prime of my life to fight against the partition of Bengal, proposed by Lord Curzon. By an irony of fate I have to fight in the evening of my life against partition sponsored by my own people. I ... request you to express your views and give a correct lead before further mischief is done'.

  There was not a slightest chance that the Hindus would agree to a united Bengal joining Pakistan, or the Muslims consenting to its retention in the Indian Union. So they agreed on a plan of a 'sovereign united Bengal', independent of both India and Pakistan. Gandhi had opposed partition on moral as well as political grounds, both at the Centre and in the provinces. He was amazed, he remarked to a group of Bengali friends who had seen him in that connection a few days earlier in Patna, at the levity with which some people regarded partition, as if it were child's play. 'They do not seem to realise they are gambling with the lives of millions.' Again at Delhi he said, 'It surprises me that we do not see what price we shall have to pay for this third party intervention.... I have faith that, when the flood of insanity has subsided, the mud and silt will settle down to the bottom, leaving the waters crystal clear and pure, to bring the blessings of peace to the whole world. For with all its aberrations, our freedom struggle is essentially based on justice, righteousness, non-violence and truth.'

  Sarat Chandra Bose, accompanied by Abdul Hashem, secretary of the Bengal Muslim League, met Gandhi the day he arrived at Sodepore Ashram. Hashem, to Gandhi's surprise, based his case for a united Bengal on the grounds of 'common language, common culture and common history that united the Hindus and Muslims of Bengal alike'. Gandhi was surprised by this about turn in one who had staunchly supported the demand for Pakistan just a few months ago. Wearily Gandhi asked Hashem whether he would have any objections to their joining Pakistan, if instead of incorporation, Pakistan invited them to enter into a 'voluntary federation for the propagation of Islamic culture and religion'. Hashem chose not to reply to his query. Gandhi tried a different approach. Since Bengal's common culture as embodied in Tagore, to which the League secretary had referred, had its roots in the philosophy of the Upanishads, which was the common heritage not only of Bengal but of the whole of India, would the sovereign Bengal contemplate entering into a 'voluntary association' with the rest of India? Hashem again chose to remain silent.

  On 11 May, Suhrawardy accompanied by Mohammad Ali and Abdul Hashem met Gandhi to discuss the issue of a sovereign Bengal. Gandhi tried to impress upon Suhrawady the need for a complete and genuine change of heart. It must reflect in his own conduct and the conduct of his administration, if he expected his professions to be taken seriously by the Hindus. But Suhrawardy adamantly maintained that all was well in Bengal, peace reigned in Calcutta and no one could accuse the government of Bengal of being guilty of any injustice! He got angry when Gandhi told him that, as the head of administration, he was morally responsible for every death that had occurred in Bengal. Suhrawardy accused Gandhi of being the author of the whole trouble, and marched out of the meeting! Gandhi was upset with this and said, 'It matters nothing to him what he says. He wants people to trust him because, he says, the new Bengal which he wants to build will assure to all communities equal treatment. But the future is the child of the present. If what is happening in Calcutta today is a portend of things to come, it does not bode well for his plan.'

  On the 12th, Suhrawardy met Gandhi again to enlist his support in the demand for a united sovereign Bengal. The latter told him that the only way in which they could prevent the partition of Bengal was by getting Jinnah to implement the joint peace appeal to which he was a signatory. 'Although I represent no community in particular, you see how I am wearing myself out in a supreme effort to bring the Hindus of Bihar to a sense of repentance and wrong doing. But you are the accredited representatives of the Muslims. Should you not do what I am doing and more, in respect to the Indian Muslim? But you cannot claim to have done that. I am sure that if the Bengal Ministry acted with hundred per cent sincerity, Jinnah Saheb and the Muslim League would be compelled to follow suit.'

  Suhrawardy complained that no Hindu trusted him; he could not even get a patient hearing, so how could he convince them of his sincerity? In reply Gandhi made him an astounding offer, which he confirmed later in writing: 'I recognise the seriousness of the position in Bengal in the matter of Partition. If you are absolutely sincere in your professions and would disabuse me of all the suspicion against you and if you would always retain Bengal for the Bengalis—Hindus and Musalmans—intact by non-violent means, I am quite willing to act as your honorary private secretary and live under your roof, till Hindus and Muslims begin to live as brothers that they are'. Suhrawardy was shocked by this offer. 'What a mad offer! I shall have to think ten times before I can fathom its implications,' Suhrawardy exclaimed as he came out of Gandhi's room.

  In this move for a united sovereign Bengal, Gandhi saw a flicker of hope for his dream of an undivided India. If the Muslims of Bengal were to allow their regional identity to supersede their religious identity, the two-nation theory of the promoters of Pakistan could be easily debunked. Jinnah would lose his claim as the only representative of all the Muslims of India and thus, coupled with the discontent of the Pathans in the north-west, he could stop Jinnah and the Muslim League from browbeating the Congress and the British administration from conceding his every demand. But before he could plan any further, there was the question of the Bengali Hindus and their demand for the division of Bengal to contend with.

  On 13 May Gandhi met Dr. Shyamaprasad Mukherji, head of the Bengal Hindu Mahasabha. Dr. Mukherji was a staunch opponent of the movement for a sovereign Bengal. He was one of the promoters of the divide-Bengal demand, and as early as 19 March, in a statement to the press, he had demanded the division of Bengal even in an undivided India; he condemned the 'sovereign Bengal' movement as one instigated by the Europeans for their vested interests. 'So your objection is on the ground of its parentage?' Gandhi asked him. Dr. Mukherji expressed his fear that if a sovereign Bengal state was allowed to be formed, there was no guarantee that Suhrawardy would not manoeuvre it into joining Pakistan afterwards. To avoid such an eventuality Gandhi had suggested to both Suhrawardy and Sarat Chandra Bose that, in a sovereign Bengal, all major decisions regarding its future status would be taken by 'mutual consent'. So any decision would not be taken by a simple majority vote of the House, but by both the communities agreeing to it severally by a majority of votes. Gandhi had suggested to Suhrawardy that there should be two-thirds majority of each community. Further, since under his proposed formula the same procedure would apply to any subsequent change in the constitution of sovereign Bengal, he personally saw no ground for apprehension in the proposed plan. 'If Suhrawardy has to win over to his side the majority of the Hindu members of the Assembly, don't you see that the present communal situation in Bengal becomes immediately changed for the better?'

  'Supposing the majority of the Hindus wanted to join Hindustan and the majority of Muslims were in favour of Pakistan, what then?' Mukherji asked.

  'Then Bengal would be partitioned, but it would be a partition by agreement among the Hindu and Muslim inhabitants of Bengal,' Gandhi replied. 'It would not be a partition by a third party on the basis of Jinnah's two nation theory.' Gandhi's premise was that, since recognition of the fundamental unity of the people of Bengal, whether Hindus or Muslims, constituted the basis of Suhrawardy's proposal, and since the Bengal Muslims would be the majority in Pakistan, as envisaged by the Muslim League, repudiation of the two-nation theory in action by the Bengal Muslim League, with Jinnah's concurrence and consent, would leave nothing of the Pakistan plan based on that theory.

  Here was an opportunity to avert the division of India by open diplomacy—the dipl
omacy of goodwill and truth. But Mukherji and his group were filled with vague fears about the future of 'Hindu' Bengal.

  Before leaving Calcutta, Gandhi toured the riot-affected areas of the city. The acting chief minister Mohammad Ali, and the secretary of the Bengal Hindu Mahasabha, accompanied Gandhi. It was a hot afternoon when Gandhi returned from the fifty mile drive.

  Later, Sarat Chandra Bose sent him a draft of the united Bengal proposal on 23 May at Patna. It said: 'At a conference on 20th May attended by Suhrawardy, Fazlur Rehman, Mohammad Ali, Abdul Hashem, Abdul Malek, Kiran Shankar Roy and Satya Ranjan Bakshi, [we] arrived at a tentative agreement, a copy is enclosed herewith for your consideration. For the sake of identification it was signed by Abdul Hashem and myself in the presence of the others. It will, of course, have to be placed before the Congress and Muslim League. As far as the Congress and Muslim League organisations in Bengal are concerned, it seems to me from the trend of the discussions, the agreement will be ratified by them, possibly with some modifications here and there. I feel that if with your help, advice and guidance, the two organisations can arrive at a final agreement on the lines of the tentative agreement, we shall solve Bengal's problems and at the same time, Assam's. It may also have a very healthy reaction on the rest of India.'