Lets Kill Gandhi

by Gandhi, Tushar A.

  On 29 May, during the morning walk, a co-worker said to Gandhi: 'You have declared you won't mind if the whole of India is turned into Pakistan by appeal to reason, but not an inch would be yielded to force. You have stood firm by your declaration. But is the Working Committee acting on that principle? They are yielding to force. You gave us the battle cry of "Quit India"; you fought our battles; but in the hour of decision, I find, you are not in the picture. You and your ideas have been given the go by.'

  Gandhi replied, 'Who listens to me today?' to which the co-worker replied, 'The leaders may not but the people are behind you.' Gandhi then added, 'Even they are not. I am being told to retire to the Himalayas. Everybody is eager to garland my photos and statues. Nobody really wants to follow me.'

  The co-worker said, 'They may not today but they will have to before long,' to which Gandhi replied, 'What is the good? Who knows, whether I shall then be alive? The question is: what can we do today? On the eve of independence we are as divided as we were united when we were engaged in freedom's battle. The prospect of power has demoralised us.'

  With the return of Mountbatten to the national capital, the tempo of events quickened. On 31 May Rajendra Babu had a brief talk with Gandhi during his morning walk. The CWC was to meet that afternoon. The Congress leaders felt that, with the acceptance of the idea of partition by all parties, peace would return to the land. Gandhi had grave doubts about this line of thinking; he was emphatic that the establishment of peace must precede any talk of partition; partition before peace would be fatal. As events were developing, the minorities would not be able to live in Pakistan after partition. There would be a mass exodus of minorities from both sides of the dividing line resulting in chaos and inevitable bloodshed. It would be next to impossible to keep the incoming refugees under control. Badshah Khan was waiting for them to end their walk. With disappointment in his voice he said, 'So, Mahatmaji, you will now regard us as Pakistanis? A terrible situation faces the Frontier Provinces and Baluchistan. We do not know what to do.'

  Gandhi replied, 'Non-violence knows no despair. It is the hour of test for you and the Khudai Khidmatgars. You can declare that Pakistan is unacceptable to you and brave the worst. What fear can there be for those who are pledged to "do or die"? It is my intention to go to the Frontier as soon as circumstances permit. I shall not take out a passport because I do not believe in division. And if as a result somebody kills me I shall be glad to be killed. If Pakistan comes into being my place will be in Pakistan.'

  That evening during the prayer meeting, as the verses from the Koran were recited, a young man dressed in western clothes got up and began to shout, 'Imprison Jinnah, stop reciting from the Koran, declare war upon the Muslim League.' Even while a Zoroastrian prayer was being recited, he continued to raise anti-Muslim and anti-Jinnah slogans. Gandhi interrupted the prayers and requested the volunteers not to be rough on the young man. At this time, All India Radio used to tape Gandhi's prayer meetings. I have a recording of that particular prayer meeting and have heard it many times over. The man's voice has a frightening intensity, but is matched by Gandhi's calm and reasoned response. It is clear that these hecklers were very well aware how to garner public sympathy for their cause. Earlier, they raised objections to recitations from the Koran, but this did not go down well. So the Hindu extremists, the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha changed their strategy. They now demanded Jinnah's arrest and revenge on the Muslim League. At that time there were very few people, if any, in India, who would oppose these demands.

  Gandhi was extremely disappointed by the turn of events and the stress and anxiety began to take its toll on him. That afternoon the Working Committee again met to discuss strategies to be used while negotiating independence. They were all unanimous on one point— partition was inevitable. It was on 2 June 1947 that Mountbatten was to meet the Indian parties and unveil the plan for the transfer of power he had brought back from London. He was going to offer three options to the Indians: a final attempt to make them accept the Cabinet Mission Plan, which he personally felt would not be accepted; HMG's partition plan; and finally a plan for the transfer of power on the basis of the existing constitution. Under this, provincial subjects would be transferred to existing provincial governments and the central subjects to the existing Central government. This was to be a unilateral action with nobody having the power to either question or challenge where they were transferred.

  The Indian leaders assembled at the Viceroy's House at 10 am. The Congress was represented by Patel, Nehru and Kripalani; the Muslim League by Jinnah, Liaquat Ali and Rab Nishtar. Jinnah had objected to the presence of Kripalani—a ploy to irritate the Congress leaders. When his objection was overruled, since Kripalani, as Congress president, had every right to attend the meeting, Jinnah nominated Rab Nishtar to counter Kripalani. The Sikhs were represented by Sardar Baldev Singh. Mountbatten opened the meeting with the formal offer of the Cabinet Mission Plan for acceptance, Jinnah refused to accept it and the offer was withdrawn. Next, Mountbatten unveiled HMG's partition plan which he had brought back from London. It offered:

  (1) A separate Constituent Assembly for the Muslim majority provinces that were unwilling to join the existing Constituent Assembly, coupled with the partition of the Punjab and Bengal by the decision of their respective Legislatures voting separately for Hindu and Muslim majority districts.

  (2) In the event of Bengal being partitioned, there would be a referendum in Sylhet to decide as to which province it would be part of—East Bengal or Assam.

  (3) Referendum to be held in the North-west Frontier Province without disturbing the ministry in power, to decide which of the two Constituent Assemblies it would join.

  (4) The Sind Legislative Assembly to decide by a simple majority vote as to which part of India it would belong to.

  (5) As there was no Legislative Assembly in Baluchistan, the procedure as to how it would decide its future would be left to the viceroy in consultation with the Indian parties.

  (6) The final shape of the partition would be decided by a Boundary Commission appointed for the purpose.

  (7) No change in the interim government until separation was affected when two governments would be set up with complete powers in all subjects.

  (8) To meet the desire of the major Indian political parties for the earliest possible transfer of power, power would be transferred to an Indian government or governments on dominion status basis at even an earlier date.

  (9) The attainment of dominion status would be without prejudice to the right of the Indian Constituent Assemblies to decide in due course whether or not the part of India in respect of which they had authority, would remain in the British Commonwealth.

  (10) The position of the princely states to remain the same as under the Cabinet Mission Plan.

  The viceroy had mentioned that the date for independence would be advanced. In fact he had dramatically foreshortened the date of departure, bringing it forward to August 1947.

  The Congress leaders declared acceptance of this plan on the condition that the offer was accepted without alteration by Jinnah and the Muslim League. The Congress and Sikh leaders agreed to convey their final decision in writing that evening. Jinnah, however, said that only the full council of the League could decide on the partition offer, and it would take some days for the Muslim League's Council to be summoned. The only commitment he was willing to make—and that only on his personal part—was that he had 'no desire to wreck the plan'.

  At 12.30 pm Gandhi came for his meeting with the viceroy. This was merely a courteous formality on part of the viceroy; no matter what Gandhi said or suggested, his comments did not mean anything any longer. Even Gandhi knew this, and he was resigned to the fact. The 2nd of June was a Monday—Gandhi's day of weekly silence. He conveyed all he had to by writing on slips of papers which were then passed to the viceroy. A section of the British administration and the viceroy's staff had conjured up a phantom threat to the partition plan. They were convince
d that Gandhi would dissociate with the Congress and lead a mass movement against the acceptance of the partition plan; this had caused a lot of consternation in the viceroy's staff as well as in Whitehall. This meeting was basically to gauge Gandhi's reaction and ascertain whether their fears had any merit. Such was Gandhi's influence, that even having successfully isolated him from the Congress leaders, the British colonial administration and the British government were still fearful. But Gandhi had gauged the mood of his political colleagues and the people of India and knew that at that fateful juncture he stood alone. Allaying the viceroy's fears he wrote: 'I am sorry, I can't speak. When I took the decision about the Monday silence, I did reserve two exceptions, i.e., about speaking to high functionaries on urgent matters or attend upon sick people. But I know you do not want me to break my silence'.

  Responding to the viceroy's guarded inquiry about his fear that Gandhi would foment trouble for the partition plan, Gandhi wrote: 'Have I said one word against you during my speeches? If you admit that I have not, your warning is superfluous. 'There are one or two things I must talk about, but not today. If we meet each other again, I shall speak'.

  The CWC's final decision was communicated that night by a letter addressed by the Congress president to the viceroy. He wrote: 'We accepted in its entirety the Cabinet Mission's statement of May 16, 1946, as well as the subsequent interpretation thereof dated December 6,1946. We are still prepared to adhere to that plan. However, we are willing to accept as a variation of that plan the proposals now being made. While we are willing to accept the proposals made by His Majesty's Government, my Committee desire to emphasise that they are doing so in order to achieve a final settlement. This is dependent on the acceptance of the proposal by the Muslim League and a clear understanding that no further claim will be put forward'.

  In view, however, of what had happened at the time of the Cabinet Mission Plan, when Lord Wavell had brought the Muslim League into the interim government without obtaining a proper guarantee in writing, the Working Committee's letter added: 'There has been enough misunderstanding in the past and in order to avoid this in the future, it is necessary to have explicit statements in writing in regard to these proposals'.

  On the question of joining the Commonwealth and the right of either unit to forge individual alliances with the British government, instead of taking a firm stand on the issue the Congress president's letter reflected how the will to fight had left its leadership: 'It seems extremely undesirable and likely to lead to friction if the relations of the British with the Indian Union and the seceding parts of it are on a differential basis. We should, therefore, like to make it clear, that we cannot be consenting parties to any such developments'. In conclusion the Congress president's letter mentioned: 'We believe as fully as ever in a United India. We earnestly trust that when present passions have subsided, our problems will be viewed in their proper perspective and a willing union of all parts of India will result therefrom'.

  Jinnah's adamant refusal to give the League's reply in writing precipitated a showdown between the viceroy and him at a midnight meeting, to which Lord Ismay was the only witness. This meeting showed how confident Jinnah was of achieving all his objectives with the tacit support of the British colonial administration, that he could remain unflappable in the face of dire threats issued by Mountbatten. On his refusal to give a written reply to the partition plan the viceroy warned him that if he continued with his intransigence, power may be transferred on the basis of the constitution in force. Jinnah called the viceroy's bluff with a nonchalant 'What must be, must be.' At last Mountbatten unsheathed his final 'secret weapon'. It was a message from Winston Churchill, to be delivered as a last resort. The message was blunt: if Jinnah was to reject the plan or try to place hurdles in its acceptance, it would sound the death knell of his dream of a Pakistan. Jinnah displayed no emotion. The only reaction was that, when asked for his acceptance of the partition plan during the leaders' conference the next morning, he nodded, which was taken to be an acceptance. The Muslim League Council then met at New Delhi on 9 June under the presidentship of Jinnah and, while deploring the partition of the Punjab and Bengal, adopted a resolution accepting the British government's plan 'as a compromise' in the interest of 'peace and tranquillity'.

  During his walk on the morning of 3 June, Gandhi asked Rajendra Babu if he might now return to Bihar. But the latter did not feel he should as his presence was essential in the capital 'if only for Badshah Khan', thus cryptically suggesting that the whole process might still degenerate into chaos on the question of the fate of the NWFP 'Of late I have noticed,' Gandhi remarked, 'that I get very easily irritated. That means I cannot now live for long. But my faith in God is daily becoming deeper and deeper. He alone is my true friend and companion. He never deserts even the least of his creatures.'

  'In all probability,' he said later, 'the final seal will be set on the partition plan during the day. But though I may be alone in holding this view, I repeat that the division of India can only do harm to the country's future. The slavery of 150 years is going to end, but from the look of things it does not seem as if the independence will last as long. It hurts me to think that I can see nothing but evil in the partition plan. May be that just as God blinded my vision, so that I mistook the non-violence of the weak—which I now see is a misnomer and contradiction in terms—for true non-violence, he has again stricken me with blindness. If it should prove to be so, nobody would be happier than I.'

  After his evening walk, as he sat soaking his feet in a hot water bath, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur came and gave him the news that all three parties, the Congress, the League and the Sikhs had signed the plan. The League would not accept anything else; the Congress therefore had no other choice but to accept partition. Gandhi listened to the news without comment; finally he heaved a sigh of relief. 'May God protect them, and grant them wisdom,' he whispered. That night, the decision was broadcast on AIR; 'India will be partitioned'. The announcement was followed by addresses of Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh. And so ended the suspense about India's future and independence. It also crashed Gandhi's dream of keeping his beloved nation united against all odds. India would be free, but it would be torn in the process.

  At this juncture there was nobody with Gandhi, neither politicians nor the people, willing to launch a movement to keep India united, to fight against the League's violence and the Congress' meek surrender. Many people claimed that they felt betrayed by Gandhi as he had accepted partition quietly and did nothing to avert it. But no one launched independent agitations against the acceptance of the partition plan either. The Hindu Right-wing and the self-proclaimed patriots of the RSS and Hindu Mahasabha did not even once demonstrate against this division which they now, sixty years later, call a grave betrayal. The only thing they did was to issue a firman to all their supporters not to celebrate India's independence. The only leader who unfurled the Tricolour on the terrace of his home in Shivaji Park, in central Mumbai, on Independence day, was V.D. Savarkar. For his patriotic act he had to face the censure and boycott of his Hindu Mahasabha colleagues.

  Even before the ink had dried on the final partition plan, the signatories were busy with political intrigues. The NWFP was now the focus of all activities. The adamant refusal of the Pathans to join Pakistan was a great worry for Jinnah. Under the partition plan the NWFP could vote to remain with India. If this happened, there was a possibility that Sind, or at least the Hindu-dominated parts of Sind, would also choose not to join Pakistan, leaving Jinnah landlocked, with a part of Punjab and in all probability, Baluchistan, surrounded by Indian provinces. He realised that if this happened his fledgling state would not survive. So the Muslim League directed all its energies in destabilising the Congress government of Dr. Khan Saheb. They unleashed a reign of terror on the province. They also insisted that the proposed referendum to decide the future of the province be held only after the Congress government there was dismissed. Strangely, the Congress leadership in New Delhi
was lackadaisical towards the pleas of the Khan brothers. Instead of lobbying with the British colonial administration and the viceroy to come down heavily on the Muslim League, Patel and Nehru did nothing; they seemed unconcerned about the fate of the NWFP. Patel argued with Gandhi that the Khan brothers were' no longer powerful in their province. Gandhi was not expected to play games of political intrigue and one-upmanship, but Patel and Nehru should have recognised this opportunity to keep India united. If they had strongly supported the Pathans in their fight to remain with India, they would perhaps have been able to start a chain reaction which could have been replicated in Sind. As a result, what then remained with Jinnah would have resembled more a principality than a country.

  When the Muslim League unleashed a tidal wave of violence in the NWFP, the duality and the tacit support of the colonial administration to the objectives of the League cornered the Dr. Khan Saheb government. From the time trouble started brewing, the governor, Sir Olaf Caroe, had seemed determined to hand the province over to the League. Instead of trying to work in tandem with the democratically-elected government to control the situation and crack down on the trouble-makers, the governor tried to get the ministry dismissed. At a meeting with his ministers he harangued them for being with the Congress. According to him, they—Muslims—had nothing in common with the Congress; they should be with their coreligionists—the Muslim League, he said. He threatened them with dismissal unless they agreed to form a coalition with the Muslim League. The proud Pathans were not going to be crushed so easily. They dared the governor to do his worst.