In a letter to Suhrawardy, written on 27 October 1947, Gandhi wrote:
My Dear Shaheed,
I address you frankly. I would like you, if you can, to remove your angularity. If you think you have none, I withdraw my remarks.
Hindus and Muslims are not two nations. Muslims never shall be slaves of Hindus nor Hindus of Muslims. Hence you and I have to die in the attempt to make them live together as friends and brothers, which they are. Whatever others may say, you and I have to regard Sikhs and others as part of India. If any one of them declines it is their concern.
I cannot escape the conclusion that the mischief commenced with Quaid-i-Azam and still continues. This I say more to make myself clear to you than to correct you. I have only one course—to do or die in the attempt to make the two one.
Yours,
Bapu
Gandhi again tested Suhrawardy's sincerity by asking him to condemn Pakistan's hand in the invasion of Kashmir, by so-called tribesmen. Either Pakistan was behind it, as all circumstantial evidence showed, or it was not. If Pakistan was involved, was it not Suhrawardy's duty as an Indian national to proclaim his conviction? On the other hand, if even in the face of the organised forces in such strength in Kashmir, Shaheed maintained that Pakistan had no hand in it, was it not up to him to try and find out who was actually responsible? 'I suggest to you that it is your duty to ascertain the truth. Nothing would please me more than to find that I was wrong and you were right'. Suhrawardy agreed with all that Gandhi said, but did nothing.
After one of the many infructuous meetings he had with Suhrawardy, Gandhi commented that, although he was afraid that Shaheed was not being of any use to either India or Pakistan, he did not want to give up on him. 'He has undoubted talent. He could render great service to the Indian Union, whose citizen he claims to be, and to the Indian Muslims if he had the will. But that will is completely lacking. I have, however, faith'. Gandhi was warned by many that by giving him close and unlimited access he was allowing Suhrawardy to spy on him and the Union government. Gandhi replied that he did not mind being spied upon as he had no secrets; in fact he wanted Suhrawardy to keep a close watch on him and on those who came to meet him and then report to Jinnah what he saw and heard. 'He has not changed his spots,' Gandhi told Pyarelal when he came back from Noakhali in December 1947, 'but I continue to nurse him.'
While the north-east was smouldering and the north-west was an inferno, some other parts of the country were beginning to simmer as well. The situation in Junagadh—one of the three princely states which had not decided the question of accession when the transfer of power took place—was deteriorating. Junagadh was surrounded on all sides by other princely states of Kathiawad, which had acceded to India. The Muslim Nawab—who spent legendary amounts on his passions: motorcars, polo and pedigree dogs—ruled over a majority Hindu populace.
In May 1947, a few months before the transfer of power, a Muslim Leaguer, Shah Nawaz Bhutto of Karachi, was appointed diwan, prime minister of Junagadh, and took over the reigns of the principality. He opened secret negotiations with Jinnah for Junagadh's accession to Pakistan. Two days after the transfer of power, on 17 August, it was made public that Junagadh had acceded to Pakistan. Neither the Nawab nor his diwan had bothered to consult their subjects, who would have overwhelmingly voted to join India. In acceding to Pakistan the Nawab had violated his promise to the other Kathiawadi princes, that he would stand by their decision on accession, as well as the principle of geographical contiguity which had been agreed upon by the leaders of both India and Pakistan. The Government of India immediately reacted and asked the Pakistan government to define its attitude vis-à-vis Junagadh's accession to Pakistan. After keeping silent despite repeated reminders, on 13 September Pakistan declared that it had accepted Junagadh's accession to it.
During British rule, the Sheikh of Mangrol and the principality of Babariawad were vassals of Junagadh. On 19 September Mangrol broke away from his 'suzerain' and acceded to India. The diwan of Junagadh forced him to withdraw his accession within twenty-four hours. Having forced Mangrol to retract, Junagadh sent its military into Babariawad, which had acceded to Indian earlier. The use of force to coerce its neighbours, over whom its claim of sovereignty had ended with the lapse of paramountcy, led the other princes of Kathiawad to appeal to the Indian Union government to intervene. The Government of India wrote to Pakistan requesting it to order Junagadh to withdraw from Mangrol and Babariawad, which had acceded to India. The government of Pakistan agreed to the withdrawal, but no action followed.
A movement for setting up a provisional government on behalf of the people of Junagadh gathered momentum in Kathiawad in the third week of September 1947. Gandhi hoped that the movement would remain non-violent, and that once the people decided to refuse to acknowledge any authority that did not represent their will, the ruler would bow to their decision. 'What is more, Junagadh can, in this way, blaze the trail for the Kashmir National Conference to follow and thus provide an automatic solution to the Kashmir problem,' he said.
On 1 November, a week after the ransacking of Kashmir by Pakistan-backed tribesmen, Indian forces entered and liberated both Mangrol and Babariawad. The people's movement was spreading in Junagadh. The merchants of Kathiawad had boycotted it, and the state was now starved of provisions and essentials. The forces of the 'provisional government' were on the move, capturing one position after the other. Shah Nawaz Bhutto, sensing defeat, wrote to the Government of India on 8 November, requesting it to take over the administration of the state, pending the settlement of issues involved in the state's accession, in order to save it from complete anarchy. He also informed the prime minister of Pakistan that he had decided to ask for the Indian government's intervention with the support of the people's opinion, the authority of the State's Council and of the Nawab himself, who had flown a few days prior to Karachi with his treasures, dogs and harem.
The Government of India accepted the diwan's request and asked their regional commissioner at Rajkot to take over charge of the state administration. But immediately after his escape to Karachi, Bhutto began making allegations of an illegal and forceful taking over of Junagadh by the government of the Indian Union. The Pakistan government termed the action taken by India as 'a clear violation of the Pakistan territory and a breach of international law'. While accepting the Nawab's sovereignty when he went against the wishes of his people and acceded to Pakistan, the Pakistan government now challenged his authority to bow to the will of his subjects, claiming that after acceding to Pakistan the Nawab or his diwan had no right to decide on their own or on behalf of their subjects on any issues, and hence their withdrawal of accession to Pakistan was null and void.
Gandhi made his stand on Junagadh clear. He said, 'In free India, the whole country belongs to the people, none of it belongs to the Princes as individuals. Accession to Pakistan by the Nawab of Junagadh was therefore, ab initio void. There is nothing unlawful in the actions of the provisional government on behalf of the people of Junagadh and illegal about the actions of the Union Government lending the services of its troops for the preservation of peace in Kathiawad. As for the question of the accession of Junagadh it would be decided by a referendum.'
A plebiscite was accordingly held in February 1948, just weeks after Gandhi's murder. The results showed that out of the total votes polled, 190,779 were in favour of accession to India; only 91 were for Pakistan. However, Pakistan refused to accept the verdict of the plebiscite. Till date, every time they refer to Kashmir, Pakistan usually refers to the issue of Junagadh as well.
One of the fallouts of the Junagadh imbroglio was that extremist elements of the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha infiltrated the people's movement and there was a spate of killing, looting and arson before they could be brought under control. This led to an exodus of the Muslim mercantile community of Kathiawad, which spilled over into Sind. Till then the provincial government of Sind had protected the Hindu mercantile community, partly because the g
overnment feared that, without the Hindu business community's acumen, the economy of Sind would collapse. With the arrival of the merchants of Kathiawad, however, this need was fulfilled and the dependence of the Sind government on the Hindu merchants vanished. In its place there was persecution, harassment and attacks; a few 'examples' were set to send the message that the Hindu merchants would have to leave or be driven out. Another wave of immigration of refugees from Pakistan ensued, adding to the already strained situation in the Indian Union.
Gandhi severely condemned the atrocities committed against the Muslims in Kathiawad. Some people complained that he was 'jumping the gun' by commenting on unverified allegations by the Muslims, which would provide Pakistan with a handle to use in its propaganda against the Indian Union. He was not unaware of the danger, Gandhi replied, but that made no difference to him. If he had ignored the charges made in influential Pakistan journals backed by the prime minister of Pakistan, he explained, his indifference would have resulted in the Muslim world giving credence to the reports as if they were gospel truth. 'Now the best Muslim mind is already sceptical about the truth.... We should never make the mistake of thinking that we never make any mistakes. The bitterest critic is bitter because he has some grudge, fancied or real, against us. We shall set him right if we are patient with him and, whenever the occasion arises, show him his error or correct our own when we are found to be in error.... In the present disturbed atmosphere, when charges are hurled against one another, it would be folly to live in a fool's paradise and feel that we can do no wrong.... Nature has so made us that we do not see our backs; it is reserved for others to see. Hence it is wise to profit by what they see'.
To the Muslims he said that if their object was, as he took it that it was, not to discredit the Hindus of Kathiawad and the Indian Union but to elucidate the truth and to protect Muslim life, honour and property, all that could be secured by the strictest adherence to truth and by going to the many Hindu friends that the signatories knew they had. 'The workers in Kathiawad who have no communal prejudice are striving to reach the truth and seek redress of every wrong done to the Muslims who are as dear to them as themselves. Will they (the Muslims) help the process?'
Gandhi wrote to Shamaldas Gandhi, his nephew, referring to him as 'His Provisional Highness' of Junagadh. Shamaldas had initially led a people's movement against the Nawab's decision to accede to Pakistan. However, power soon went to his head and he began acting like a dictator several complaints had reached Gandhi. 'I am sending you herewith a wire about Junagadh that I have received, Gandhi wrote. 'If the facts stated in it are true, you have been guilty of a very serious lapse. If, on the other hand, the charges are unfounded, what I have said falls to the ground. I have received numerous letters from Hindus to the effect that you talk nothing but the sword. The Kathiawad tangle is not so simple as you think.... If the leaders are not free from selfishness and pride, it will profit Kathiawad nothing. It was easy to win Swaraj, it is far more difficult to sustain it'.
Gandhi sent two of his own trusted workers to Kathiawad on a fact finding mission. These workers, along with workers from Bombay and Kathiawad, after comparing notes with local Muslims, wired Gandhi admitting that some excesses had occurred, but that a lot of the reports had been gross exaggerations. This had an immediate effect on the local Muslim leaders who had initially complained to Gandhi. They admitted that there had been much exaggeration and what had appeared about the situation in Kathiawad in the papers in Pakistan was incorrect: 'Our telegram was the result of reports which are still not verified.... We are satisfied that damage was not extensive as originally feared.... No question of unimaginable wrong or wrong without parallel. Please do not be worried'.
This was a good example of Gandhi's technique of publicity and propaganda in action. He pointed out the moral: False propaganda did no good; 'the proper thing is to trust truth to conquer untruth'. He wrote in Harijan: 'When it is relevant, truth has to be uttered, however unpleasant it may be.... Misdeeds of the Hindus in the Union have to be proclaimed by Hindus from the housetop, if those of the Muslims in Pakistan are to be arrested or stopped'.
Gandhi always had uneasy forebodings about Kashmir and had tried his best to prevent it from becoming a potential menace in establishing peace between the two dominions. In mid-July 1947 Mountbatten had tried to persuade the Maharaja of Kashmir to make up his mind to accede to either of the dominions, after ascertaining the will of the people and to announce his decision before 15 August. The state department under Patel went out of its way to reassure the Maharaja, through Lord Mountbatten, that in case Kashmir decided to accede to Pakistan, the Union government would not regard it as an 'unfriendly act'. But the Maharaja failed to come to any decision by the appointed date. He said he needed more time to decide. It was not merely to which dominion he should accede to; it was much more whether 'it is not in the best interest of both Dominions and of my State to stand independent'. The indecision cost him dear. Three days before the transfer of power the Maharaja entered into a standstill agreement for one year with Pakistan. He had wished to enter into a similar agreement with the Indian Union as well, but while talks in that regard were still in progress, Pakistan proceeded to force the issue by enforcing a virtual siege. The main line of communication and transport to Kashmir lay through West Punjab, now a province of Pakistan. The supply of essential commodities and the route for its timber and fruits exports was via Pakistan as well. The Pakistan Government stopped the supply of essential items like sugar, salt, food grains, medicine and fuel to Kashmir through its territories. The prime minister of Kashmir, M.C. Mahajan, sent a wire to the governor general of Pakistan on 15 October: 'Ever since August 15, even in spite of agreement to observe standstill on matters on which agreement existed on August 14 ... difficulties have been felt not only with regard to supplies from West Punjab of petrol, oils, food, salt, sugar and cloth but also with the working of the postal system. Savings bank accounts were refused to be operated. Postal certificates were not cashed, cheques on West Punjab banks were not honoured. Owning to the failure of remittances from the Lahore Currency Office even the Imperial Bank was hard put to meet obligations. Motor vehicles registered in the State held up at Rawalpindi. Railway traffic from Sialkot to Jammu discontinued.... The Radio of Pakistan appears to have been licensed to pour volumes of malicious, libellous and false propaganda. Smaller Feudatory States are prompted to threaten and even intervene with armed interference into Kashmir State....
'The Kashmir Government cannot but conclude that all this is being done with the knowledge and connivance of the local authorities. The Kashmir Government considers these acts extremely unfriendly if not actually inimical. Finally, Government wish to make it plain that it is not possible to tolerate this attitude any longer.... The Governor-General and the Premier are asked personally to look into the matter and put a stop to all the inequities which are being perpetrated. Unfortunately, if this request is not heeded, the Government fully hope that the Governor-General and Premier of Pakistan would agree that it would be justified in asking for friendly assistance and oppose trespass on its fundamental rights'.
The reply from Pakistan was:
'We are astonished to hear your threat "to ask for assistance" presumably meaning thereby assistance from an outside power. The only object of this intervention by an outside power secured by you would be to complete the process of suppressing the Musalmans to enable you to join the Indian Dominion as coup d'etat against the declared and well known will of 85 per cent of the population in your state.... If this policy is not changed and the preparations and active measures that you are now taking in implementing this policy are not stopped, the gravest consequences will follow for which you alone will be responsible'.
In an editorial in Dawn published on 24 August, a dire warning was issued to the Maharaja of Kashmir: 'The time has come to tell the Maharaja of Kashmir that he must make his choice and choose Pakistan'. Should Kashmir fail to join Pakistan, it warned, 'th
e gravest possible trouble will inevitably ensue'.
On 23 October a large scale invasion by a body of what were called tribesmen from the Frontier province led by Pakistani army regulars who were said to be 'on leave', occurred from Abbottabad-Mansera. The invading force—fully armed with modern weapons, including Bren guns, machine guns, mortars and flame throwers—were transported in one hundred trucks fuelled by petrol issued from Frontier province and West Punjab rationed quota; they moved rapidly down the valley towards Srinagar, the capital. All along the way they resorted to arson, loot and murder, women were subjected to mass rape and carried away as trophies of war.
On the 24th, the Indian Army intelligence reported that the socalled tribesmen were being transported by the military up the Rawalpindi road. Muzaffarabad and Domel were captured by a band of over five thousand attackers on the 25th; Srinagar was only thirty-five miles away. The state forces were in full retreat, the situation was critical. The Kashmir government panicked. The Maharaja approached the Indian government with a request for armed assistance to save the situation. The Union government, on the advice of Lord Mountbatten, refused, stating that they could not commit their troops for the protection of Kashmir unless it became an inescapable obligation due to that state's accession to India. V.P. Menon, secretary to the ministry of states, flew to Kashmir on the 25th to convey the Indian government's decision to the Maharaja. He returned to Delhi the following day with a duly signed letter of Kashmir's accession to India. The Maharaja had finally capitulated. Under the terms agreed to by the Partition Council, by signing a treaty of accession, Kashmir became a part of the Indian union. The letter stated: 'With the conditions obtaining at present in my state and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government'. The Maharaja informed the government of the Indian Union that 'it is my intention at once to set up an interim Government and ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibility in this emergency with my Prime Minister'.
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