On 29 September, the Maharaja ordered the release of Sheikh Abdullah and other members of his Kashmir National Conference. Addressing a rally after his release, Sheikh Abdullah declared: 'I have never believed in the Pakistan slogan ... but in spite of it Pakistan is a reality ... I am the President of the Indian State People's Conference whose policy is clear. Pandit Nehru is my best friend and I hold Gandhiji in real reverence. It is also a fact that the Congress has greatly helped us in our movement for a democratic Government in the State. But in spite of all this my personal conviction will not stand in the way of taking an independent decision in favour of one or the other Dominion. Our choice of joining India or Pakistan would be based on the welfare of the four million people living in Jammu and Kashmir. And even if we join Pakistan we will not believe in the two nation theory which has spread so much poison'.
The National Conference and Sheikh Abdullah joined in the request to the Indian government to accept the accession and send in troops to repel the invaders. Thus the accession was not only the action of the ruler but it had been ratified by a democratic organisation with public opinion behind it. In the few weeks after the transfer of power, due to the arm-twisting indulged in by Pakistan and the atrocities committed on the people of Kashmir, there was no possibility any one of them could have wished to join the newly- formed state of Pakistan.
While accepting the accession, the government of the Indian union declared that it was their intention to ratify the Maharaja of Kashmir's decision with the people of Kashmir: 'as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir, and her soil is cleared of the invader, the question of the state's accession should be settled by a reference to the people'. Early on the 27th morning, three hundred and thirty officers and men of the First Sikh Battalion were airlifted to Srinagar to stop the hordes of tribesmen who, after sacking Baramulla, were reaching the outskirts of the capital, Srinagar. Now began one of the most well-planned military operations. The logistics were difficult as there were no supply and communication lines. The only way of reaching men, supplies, arms and equipment was by air. Commandeering every military and civilian aircraft, a continuous supply link was established. Planes ferried men, arms and supplies to the only airstrip at Srinagar. The battle to drive back the invaders was being fought just over the perimeter fence of the airport; as troops disembarked they joined the fight. Lord Mountbatten, the much-decorated hero of the Second World War, commented, 'As a military operation the speed of the flyin on 27th October left ... South East Asia Command's efforts standing'. It left the Pakistani war machine standing too.
The raiders were caught totally by surprise, but it had been touch and go; another twenty-four hours and all would have been lost. In fact, the raiders' downfall had also come from the time they had spent ransacking Baramulla. The arson and plundering had continued there for nine days. Neither the Hindus nor the Muslims had been spared; the Kabalees, as the invaders came to be known, did not even spare the clergy. They sacked St. Joseph's Convent, looted and burnt the Welfare Hospital; shot and wounded the Mother Superior, and raped many of the nuns. These nine days, however, gave the workers of the National Conference time to organise the local people's militia for defence against the raiders. There was no administration in Srinagar. Under advice, the Maharaja had shifted to his summer palace in Jammu. There were no troops, no police; electricity had failed since the burning of the power station at Mohor. And yet, remarkably, Srinagar functioned without panic. The leaders of the National Conference and their workers took charge; Hindus and Muslims of Kashmir united to defend their motherland.
Soon the raiders were on the run. Uri was recaptured, the Poonch garrison was relieved and by the time a ceasefire was declared, Kashmir had been strategically secured and the threat to the valley was removed.
Jinnah, who had made the capture of Kashmir a personal ambition, was said to have stationed himself at Abbottabad to make a triumphant entry into the capital of Kashmir on the festival of Eid, at the head of a procession reminiscent of the conquerors of the past. When news of India's military intervention and the subsequent rout of the infiltrators was conveyed to him, he was livid. He ordered an immediate intervention by the Pakistani army. General Gracy, the acting commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army, informed Sir Claude Auchinleck, the supreme commander. Sir Claude advised Jinnah that the Indian Union was perfectly within its rights in sending the troops into Kashmir in response to the Maharaja's plea for help. If Pakistan intervened with its army, it could trigger a war between the two dominions. He warned Jinnah that this would result in every British officer being withdrawn from both sides. Jinnah was not prepared for this, and so he withdrew his earlier orders.
The Pakistan government denounced Kashmir's accession to India and alleged that it was engineered by 'fraud and violence'. In a meeting at Lahore on 2 November, Mountbatten pointed out to Jinnah that, while Kashmir's accession had certainly been brought about by 'force and violence', the violence had come from the tribes for which Pakistan, not India, was responsible. 'The argument then got into a vicious circle.... Jinnah would retort that in his opinion it was India who had committed the violence by sending in the troops and Mountbatten would continue to stand his ground that where the tribesmen were was where the violence lay. Thus it went on until Jinnah could no longer conceal his anger at what he called Mountbatten's obtuseness'.
The Pakistan government categorically denied any complicity in the invasion of Kashmir by, what they claimed to be, 'tribesmen'. They pleaded their inability to prevent their passage through Pakistan. The Pakistan prime minister said that the only way they could help pull out the invading tribes from Kashmir was if the Pakistan Army Regulars were allowed to enter Kashmir. When Mountbatten apprised them about the strength of the Indian Armed Forces in Kashmir, the projected build-up over the next few weeks and India's determination to hold on to Kashmir 'at any cost', Jinnah offered to 'call the whole thing off'. Blatantly the prime minister and the governor general of Pakistan were speaking at variance.
At the time of Kashmir's accession to India, there were estimated to be between three to ten thousand non-Kashmiri infiltrators in Kashmir. By the end of the year, their numbers had increased to fifty-thousand inside the state. Another one hundred thousand were amassing on the Pakistan side of the border. In response, India at that time could field sixteen thousand men of its armed forces to defend Kashmir. Although outnumbered, these brave hearts proved to be more than enough to deter the Pakistan threat.
Gandhi had been closely watching the developments in Kashmir and was pained at the way the matter was becoming a festering sore between the two fledgling nations. He had always maintained, he affirmed in one of his prayer addresses, that the real rulers of all the states were their people. The people of Kashmir, without any coercion or show of force from within or without, must by themselves decide the issue. The Pakistan government had been coercing Kashmir to join Pakistan. When in distress, the Maharaja, backed by Sheikh Abdullah, therefore, wished to accede to the Union, the Indian governor-general could not reject the advance. If the Maharaja alone had wanted to accede, Gandhi said, he could not have defended such an accession. As it was, both the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah, speaking for the people of Jammu and Kashmir, had asked for it.
Having previously taken the stand in the case of the accession of Junagadh, that the ruler had 'full legal right' to decide the issue of accession, the Pakistan government's objection to the ruler of Kashmir exercising the same prerogative in respect of his state, could be held only as frivolous. The association of the Kashmir National Conference—the inter-communal popular political organisation that had been carrying on a struggle for democratic rights in Kashmir— combined with the Maharaja's request, rendered the Indian government's acceptance of Kashmir's accession valid, and fully justified the sending of its troops to repel the Pakistan invasion.
The defence of Kashmir exacted its toll of heroic sacrifice. Brigadier Usman, a Muslim officer of the Indian Army, fell fig
hting valiantly while commanding his troops at Naoshera. He is remembered as 'Naoshera ka Sher—The Lion of Naoshera'. Mir Maqbool Sherwani, a young Muslim leader of the National Conference in Baramulla, engaged in organising the people against the raiders, was captured by the invaders when they took Baramulla. They asked him to repudiate the Kashmir National Conference and swear allegiance to the so-called Azad Kashmir government. Sherwani courageously refused to comply, telling the invaders that their triumph was short-lived since the Indian troops would shortly recapture Baramulla and drive the infiltrators out. He was dubbed a traitor. The infiltrators drove nails through his palms and feet and used him as a live target. Every direct hit was confirmed by a moan from Sherwani. He was shot fourteen times. The infiltrators then displayed their bestiality by mutilating his body and defecating on it. Sherwani's dying prophecy came true within forty-eight hours: liberating Indian troops drove the infiltrators out of Baramulla. Paying tributes to the young martyr's steadfastness and undaunted courage, Gandhi remarked: 'This was a martyrdom of which anyone— Hindu, Sikh, Muslim or any other—would be proud.'
After a dialogue between both the governors general and the prime ministers failed to resolve the Kashmir issue, Lord Mountbatten, with concurrence from Nehru, cabled Attlee, inviting him to rush to the sub-continent to mediate in the dispute. Attlee declined to intervene and suggested that both the parties take the matter to the United Nations. Accordingly, the Government of India, acting on Mountbatten's advice, agreed to refer the dispute to the UNO. Nehru described it 'as an act of faith'. As a necessary preliminary, he handed their official letter of complaint to Liaquat Ali Khan on 22 December. Gandhi was not in favour of taking any Indo-Pak dispute to an outside organisation for arbitration. It would only get 'monkey justice' he warned. Were the union and Pakistan always to depend on a third party to settle their disputes? he asked in his post prayer address on 25 December. Could not the representatives of the union and Pakistan sit down together and thrash out the Kashmir issue, just as they had already done in the case of many others? Alternatively, could they not select from among themselves good, true persons who would direct their steps? The first necessary condition for it was 'an open and sincere confession' of past lapses. Hearty repentance broke the edge of guilt and led the way to proper understanding.
Four days later he again said, 'Will not the Pakistan government and the Union government close ranks and come to an amicable settlement with the assistance of impartial Indians? Or, has impartiality fled from India? I am sure it has not.'
On 30 December 1947, the Government of India made a formal reference to the Security Council of the United Nations in regard to Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir. Gandhi again made it public that his own views on the subject remained unchanged. Speaking on 4 January, Gandhi appealed to the government of Pakistan to remain pure, 'Pak', as its name implied. He remarked that both Hindu and Muslims had resorted to cruel acts and made grievous blunders. He pleaded for amity and goodwill, which could enable the Union's representation to the UNO to be withdrawn with dignity, which even the latter would welcome. The main thing, however, was a real change of heart. The understanding should be genuine. To harbour hatred would be even worse than war.
The issue of Kashmir's accession to the Indian union became a decisive factor in the Indian union's battle for the secular state ideal. Gandhi used it to bring home to the Indian people the vital necessity for the return to sanity, of which they seemed for the time being to have taken leave. Many of the land routes to Kashmir from the new Indian union passed through Pakistan. There was a narrow strip which joined Kashmir to East Punjab. How could Kashmir have trade with India if Muslims could not safely pass through, much less live in East Punjab? If the insanity continued in East Punjab, he warned, Kashmir's accession to the union would be rendered nugatory. He hoped, however, that wisdom would dawn upon East Punjab.
To say that Kashmir was untouched by communal madness would be untrue. Following the upheaval in Punjab, in October 1947, Muslim evacuee convoys going out of Jammu were attacked and massacred by non-Muslims who were armed and guided by the RSS cadres. The Maharaja's army played a very disreputable part in these massacres. When these events were reported to Gandhi he said that the Maharaja, as the absolute ruler, could not be absolved from responsibility for the happenings; he said the Maharaja was unfit to continue to rule. He advised the Maharaja to either abdicate or to remain only as a titular head 'even as the British King is'; full power de jure and de facto being transferred to the true representatives of the people.
Some members of the Indian government were distrustful of Sheikh Abdullah's ultimate aims; they had doubted the loyalty of all the Indian Muslims who had stayed back. They felt that empowering the Sheikh was too great a political risk and were willing to place their faith, under the prevailing circumstances, in the Hindu Maharaja. The Cabinet was vertically divided over the issue. Gandhi too had his misgivings, but added that it was far better to risk everything for the sake of a principle than to compromise one's principles for fear of a risk, however great.
'If Sheikh Abdullah is erring in the discharge of his duty as the Chief of the Cabinet or as a devout Muslim, he should certainly step aside and give place to a better man. It is on the Kashmir soil that Islam and Hinduism are being weighed. If both pull their weight correctly and in the same direction, the chief actors will cover themselves with glory and nothing can move them from their joint credit. My sole hope and prayer is that Kashmir should become a beacon light to this benighted sub-continent'.
In the matter of strict justice being meted out to the Maharaja, Gandhi was even more uncompromising than the Kashmir leaders themselves seemed to be at that time. He continued to fight for it till the very end. In Pakistan the government continued to exploit the Kashmir issue to whip up anti-India passions. They called for a jehad against the kafirs of the Indian Union and egged on the tribesmen and other Islamic hotheads to join the crusade.
A person posing as the president of the Kashmir Freedom League wrote to Gandhi from Lahore that, as Kashmir was the root cause of tension between the two dominions, withdrawal of the 'aggressive' Indian troops from Kashmir and its handing over 'to whomsoever it rightly belongs' would help to bring about a rapprochement between the two countries and clear the way for the establishment of Hindu- Muslim unity, which was so dear to Gandhi's heart. The naïvete of the argument hurt Gandhi. He had never learnt to be generous at the cost of his principles. His non-violence was of a tough sort and there was no place for vicarious magnanimity. Gandhi asked if the Muslims would continue to distrust the Hindus and Sikhs and vice versa till the Kashmir issue was solved. The army of the Indian union had not entered Kashmir on their own; they had gone there at the call of the ruler of the state and leaders of the Kashmir people. 'If the invaders, tribesman and others, withdraw and leave the issue to the rebels in Poonch and the rest of Kashmir without any aid from outside, it would be time to ask the Indian troops to withdraw.'
The suggestion that Kashmir should go to whomsoever it rightly belonged, he went on to observe, was perfectly true. Who were the rightful owners of Kashmir? The Maharaja was there and the Indian government could not ignore him. Ultimately, it was for the people of Kashmir to decide their own fate. Hence, the Government of India had unilaterally decided to ascertain their wishes as soon as the requisite conditions for it were forthcoming.
Some advocates of partition, both in India and Pakistan, proposed the division of Kashmir; their formula—surprisingly similar to the one proposed by Bharatiya Janata Party leaders in recent times—was that Jammu, with a predominant Hindu population, would go to India, and the valley of Kashmir, with a majority Muslim population, would accede to Pakistan. Gandhi characterised this proposal as 'fantastic'. He indignantly asked if it was not more than enough that India had been divided into two? One would have thought that it was impossible for man to divide a country which God had made one. Yet it had happened and the Congress and the Muslim League had both accepted
it, though each for its own reasons. But that did not mean that the process of dividing should be further extended. If Kashmir was to be divided, then why not the other states? Where would this process stop?
Before long, his fears with regard to referral of the Kashmir issue to the UNO proved true. After a series of denials and prevarications, Pakistan was ultimately driven to admit that its troops had participated in the invasion of Kashmir. The United Nations Commission put on record their findings that on Kashmir soil Pakistan had violated India's sovereignty. But the UNO would not name Pakistan as 'aggressor'. Pakistan placed a series of counter complaints against India, including one of 'genocide', which were put on par with that of India's, with the result that it ended up appearing as the 'aggrieved' party. The British representative in the UN, in pursuance of the old British tradition of Anglo-Muslim League collaboration, sided with Pakistan. India was thus put in the dock.
Meanwhile, the harassment of the Muslims who had decided to stay back in India, continued, taking many distasteful forms. In some parts of the country they were told to wear what the Hindus did, and their women were forced to unveil their faces. Complaints were coming in that Muslims were not being allowed to cook non-vegetarian food, with the excuse being that the smell was offensive to Hindus. This was strange, because a large percentage of Hindus themselves were meat-eating. Gandhi was himself a vegetarian and Kasturba was even more strict in her adherence to vegetarianism and orthodox Hindu practices. Yet during one of their voyages, when it was suggested that arrangements would be made for a private galley for Kasturba, to spare her from the sight and smell of non-vegetarian food, Gandhi declined, saying that it would be an insult to the ship's company who had been so kind and hospitable to them.
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