Lets Kill Gandhi

by Gandhi, Tushar A.

  Gandhi continued to make the refugee crisis his priority. On a visit to the Muslim refugees in Panipat, he was shocked to see the living conditions in the refugee camps. There were close to twenty thousand Hindu refugees from West Punjab and their plight was pathetic: the camps were disorganised, ill equipped and filthy. That evening, in his post prayer speech, Gandhi took the authorities to task. The chief minister of Punjab was a veteran Congressman and an old colleague, but if Panipat was a sample of his administrative abilities, Gandhi observed, it was a sad reflection on himself and the capabilities of his government. Why were the refugees dumped anywhere without notice? Why were arrangements for their reception inadequate? Why were the officers not informed in advance about who and how many they were to expect and provide for? He was even more disturbed to find out that over a hundred and fifty thousand Muslims from the Gurgaon districts had been driven out of their homes. They were camped by the roadside with no arrangements for their stay or for their passage to Pakistan. They were faced with a three hundred-mile march in the bleak winter.

  The AICC met after a gap of four months to chart their future; on their decisions would depend the path the newborn nation and its people would take. The question of refugee rehabilitation or repatriation was utmost on everybody's minds. The Congress was deeply divided on the issue of whether or not the Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Punjab should be permanently settled in India, or whether the government should work to create conditions where they could return to their original homes. Gandhi was convinced that it was possible for them to go back, provided a situation was created whereby the Muslims who had left to Pakistan were able to return to their homes in India, with a guarantee of their safety and self-respect.

  In the end, though the CWC passed no definite resolution on the subject to be placed before the AICC, Gandhi was able to announce at his prayer meeting on 6 November, that they were unanimously of the view that the Congress, which had stood from its inception for perfect communal harmony, could not in any circumstance go back upon that ideal. The committee was further of the view that, even though the Congress might for a time find itself in a minority, they should cheerfully face the ordeal rather than succumb to the prevailing insanity.

  Two days later, on 8 November, Gandhi addressed the AICC for the last time. Pyarelal writes: 'Ever since its inception over a quarter of a century ago, it had been guided by him, whether he was present or not. A straight from the shoulder talk by the Father of the Nation, it was listened to by all sections of the House with the respect it deserved. Each period was a sledge-hammer blow aimed at the anvil of their conscience to strike the fire of the old Congress tradition and the ideals that had made the Congress a power without a rival in the land...

  ' "I have seen enough to realise that though not all of us have gone mad, a sufficiently large number have lost their heads.... It is to me obvious that if we do not cure ourselves of this insanity, we shall lose the freedom we have won. You must understand and recognise the gravity of the plight we are in.... You represent the vast ocean of Indian humanity. You will not allow it to be said that the Congress consists of a handful of people who rule the country. At least I will not allow it.... When we were fighting for our freedom, we bore a heavy responsibility. But today, when we have achieved freedom, our responsibility has grown a hundred-fold.... There are many places where a Muslim cannot live in security.... I would not be satisfied if you said that it could not be helped or that you had no part in it.... It is the basic creed of the Congress that India is the home of Muslims no less than that of Hindus ... I do not need to quote the authority of the Congress constitution to support my claim.

  ' "Some say that if we perpetrate worse atrocities on Muslims here than those perpetrated on Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan, it will teach the Muslims in Pakistan a salutary lesson. They will indeed be taught a lesson, but what will happen to you in the meanwhile? The wicked sink under the weight of their own evil; must we sink with them? ... I hold it to be an impossibility that three and a half crores (thirty-five million) of Muslims can be driven away to Pakistan. What crime have they committed? The Muslim League may have been culpable but not every Muslim ... it is your duty to call back all those Muslims who have been obliged to flee to Pakistan. India is big enough to keep them as well as all the Hindu and Sikh refugees who have fled here from Pakistan. Of course those Muslims who believe in Pakistan and wish to seek their happiness there are welcome to migrate. For them there is no bar....

  ' "A hundred and fifty thousand Muslims near Gurgaon are about to be sent to Pakistan. It is said they are no better than criminal tribes and had better be sent to Pakistan. I cannot understand the logic of this argument. There were criminal tribes in India during the British regime. Was there any talk of deporting them then?... Our duty should be to reform them. How shameful it is for us that we should force them to trudge three hundred miles! I am against all such forced exodus.... I know some people are saying, the Congress has surrendered its soul to the Muslims. Gandhi! Let him rave as he will. He is a wash-out. Jawaharlal is no better. As regards Sardar Patel, there is something in him. A portion of him is sound Hindu, but he, too, is after all a Congressman! Such talk will not help u s . . . will not save either Hinduism or Sikhism. Such is not the teaching of Guru Granth Saheb. Christianity does not teach these ways. Nor has Islam been saved by the sword. I have heard many things about the R.S.S.... You have to preserve your freedom".'

  Many of the resolutions passed by the AICC were extracted from Gandhi's speech. One assured the minorities that the Congress would always stand by them and ensure that they enjoyed equal privileges and security as every citizen of India. In another resolution it warned many of the private militia to desist from mischief, the resolution identified and named the Muslim National Guard, RSS, Akali volunteers and such other organisations as actual and potential culprits under that category—'a menace to the hard won freedom of the country'. It appealed to them to discontinue such activities and asked the Central and provincial governments to take necessary steps to ensure this. Another resolution appealed to the citizens to help in creating an atmosphere where the evacuees from both the dominions would be induced to return to their former homes. Unfortunately, the AICC resolution had no effect: a fresh wave of refugees brought with them their tales of woe, and violence erupted once more.

  It was reported to Gandhi that some of the members of the AICC, who had voted for the resolutions, were insincere. In a letter to Pyarelal, Gandhi wrote: 'I see my battle has to be fought and won in Delhi itself. There is a lot for me to do here.... Six resolutions of the All-India Congress Committee this time were practically mine.... It now remains to be seen how they are implemented'.

  Acharya Kripalani expressed his desire to step down as Congress president. He said that since he had become president of the party, he had been unable to work with many of his Congress colleagues in the government. He felt that, if he continued, the disharmony between the party executive and the government would weaken both the party and hinder the Congress government at the Centre, and thus it was best for him to step down. Gandhi endorsed his stand. Almost all the stalwarts in Congress were in the government. Who would take up the presidency of the party? Some suggested that, under these circumstances, Gandhi should take charge. However, Gandhi said he was not sure whether his drastic remedies would appeal to any one. He preferred a Congress socialist leader to take charge as he did not want the party executive to become a mere rubberstamp of the government in power. He suggested the name of Acharya Narendra Dev, but his candidature was unacceptable to some of the Congress leaders. Finally, they decided to appoint Dr. Rajendra Prasad, who resigned from the government and took charge as Congress president.

  The question of the accession of princely states and their assimilation into the Indian Union was a matter that required great diplomacy. The government was coping admirably with this, but a few irritants remained. The Nizam of Hyderabad was using every trick in his armoury to obstruct and de
rail the process of assimilation. He ruled over a majority Hindu populace who were keen to join the Indian Union, but his henchmen and he had other plans. He obstinately refused either to accede to the Indian government or to hand over power to a popular government. He argued that Hyderabad was an independent country and was organised as a country. The Government of India rejected this argument outright.

  On 12 August, Mountbatten secured a two-month extension to allow the Nizam to reach an agreement on the issue of accession. Outwardly the Nizam expressed his desire to join the Indian Union on special terms and carried on with negotiations; however, the government later discovered that he was in advanced negotiations with Czechoslovakia to procure arms. At the same time, Ittehad-ul- Mussalmin, a Muslim militant organisation, and its para-military wing the Razakars, launched a campaign of terror and subjugation amongst the Hindu population of Hyderabad. They held anti-India demonstrations in Hyderabad to give the Nizam an excuse to put off a decision on accession.

  The Nizam orchestrated events in such a way that his ultimate intentions became increasingly suspect. It was discovered that he had kept a line open with Pakistan, and was negotiating with Portugal as well, to form a confederation with its colony in Goa, thus securing an outlet to the sea for his landlocked state. He threatened the Indian government that, if his demand for special privileges and powers were not granted, he would accede to Pakistan. The invasion in Kashmir had kept the Indian government occupied, and the Nizam exploited this to the hilt.

  The Nizam's deviousness was referred to by Mountbatten's press attache in his diary: 'The Nizam of Hyderabad is undoubtedly playing for time to see how Kashmir develops before taking a final decision.... The Ittehad which he originally encouraged has now become a veritable Frankenstein....' Finally, the Nizam signed a standstill agreement on 29 November for one year, during which a permanent settlement would be arrived at. Three days before the signing of the agreement, Razakar leader Kassim Rizvi met Gandhi. The meeting had little or no effect on the swash-buckling Razakar chief. He became more ambitious and continued to make outrageous claims by declaring that he would not rest till he had established himself in the Red Fort. This was a common boast among many Muslim hotheads who considered themselves to be modern-day Moghul emperors, and so used the Red Fort to symbolise their dream of one day ruling India. Eight months later Rizvi did find himself established in the Red Fort, but as a prisoner, after the Union government's 'Police Action' liberated Hyderabad. Kassim Rizvi was charged with sedition and incarcerated as a traitor.

  In the meantime, violence was erupting in Sind. On 17 December a vicious riot broke out in Hyderabad, Sind, where non-Muslims were identified and targeted systematically. Under the pretext of housing the refugees from East Punjab the government began forcibly occupying educational institutions run by non-Muslims; even places of worship of the minorities were not spared. The government put many obstacles in the sale or transfer of non-Muslim property, its reason was to discourage migration of non-Muslims from the province. Non-Muslim government servants who had sent their families away were being forced to call them back so that the government could hold them hostage and ensure their loyalty.

  Gandhi publicly warned the Pakistan government that their actions would lead to grave consequences if they made it impossible for non-Muslims to remain in Sind as free citizens. He advised the government that the only way to check the exodus was to regain the confidence of the minorities. His advice fell on deaf ears. By 5 January 1948, nearly 500,000 of the total 1.4 million Sikhs and Hindus had left Sind. Initially Muslim refugees fleeing North India and East Punjab had settled in refugee camps in West Punjab, but the conditions in these camps was abysmal. With the onset of winter the plight of these refugees was desperate and so the exodus began towards Sind. By mid-January the trickle had turned into a torrent. One column of refugees, almost a quarter of a million strong, reached Multan on the Punjab-Sind border.

  The minorities in Sind were fearful, knowing that this new influx indicated that terror would be unleashed against them once again. That is precisely what happened. On 6 January riots broke out in Karachi, the capital of Sind. Sixty-four Sikhs, who had earlier been driven out of their homes and had found shelter in a gurdwara were attacked by a Muslim mob and butchered. Nearly seventy per cent of non-Muslim property in Karachi—houses, shops and business premises—were looted. The combined population of Hindus and Sikhs in Karachi stood at three and a half lakhs before partition, by 13 January 1948, all the surviving Sikhs had left and only ninety thousand Hindus remained. The Pakistan government expressed its inability to cope with the situation, Gandhi advised them to quit if they were powerless to provide security to their citizens. 'That might make things worse for a while, but ultimately the things would improve,' he said. In Delhi, he gave identical advice to the government.

  Pyarelal writes: 'The exodus from East Bengal continued. To this was added still another from the State of Bahawalpur (Pakistan). It helped to swell the ranks of destitute refugees in Bombay, Kathiawad, the C.P., Delhi and the U.P. on one side and Bengal, Assam, Bihar and Orissa on the other. The incoming refugees did not come with any friendly feelings towards those whose coreligionists across the border had dispossessed them of their hearth and driven them almost naked and penniless from the land of their birth which they dearly loved. A menacing situation thus began to develop in India generally and in Delhi in particular.

  'In the face of this, the Congress High Command felt helpless. They could neither stem the exodus nor the rising tide of passions which the growing pressure and the worsening condition of the refugees had generated. This could result only in a catastrophe which threatened not only the values for which the Congress and the Indian Union stood but independence itself. And this Gandhiji had vowed to himself he would not live to see'.

  Many Muslim League leaders and supporters who did not subscribe to Jinnah's views had stayed back in the Indian union. Here they were under surveillance: once before they had betrayed the country and sided with the separatists, where were their loyalties now? Patel, the eternal pragmatist, warned them: 'I believe in plain speaking. I want to tell the Muslims frankly that, at this critical juncture, it is your duty to sail in the same boat and sink or swim together with us. You cannot ride on two horses. You must select one horse, whichever you like best.'

  The leader of the Muslim League party in the Constituent Assembly, Khalik-uz-Zaman, told his erstwhile colleagues across the border to mind their own business and leave the Indian Muslims alone. The leader of the Muslim League party in the Orissa Assembly appealed to the Indian Muslims: 'Let us now forget the two-nation theory and owe allegiance to the Indian Union.... In spite of the platitudes by the Pakistanists (sic), they cannot do anything for our safety and it would be futile for us to look to them for protection.' To Gandhi it was clear that the Muslim League, like other non- Muslim communal bodies, could not continue any longer as a political organisation. 'They may function as religious organisations for internal religious reform for the purpose of exploring the best and living the best that is in their religion.'

  According to the partition plan, government employees in the partitioned provinces and those serving under the Central government were given the option to serve either in the Indian Union or in Pakistan. As a result Muslims opted for Pakistan, and Hindus for the Indian union. But some Muslims working in the postal services and the railways, who had originally opted for Pakistan, now had a change of heart. They claimed that their earlier decision was based on populism and propaganda and they now wished to remain in their original postings. Some other Muslim employees complained that they had been discharged from their posts, presumably on the grounds of suspected anti-Hindu bias. Gandhi told them that while his sympathies were with them, the right course for them was not to resent 'pardonable suspicion' although it might be unjustified in individual cases. 'Until the dominating and corroding communal poison is eliminated, I think it is necessary and dignified for Muslims not to aim at the loav
es and fishes in Government employment. Power comes from sincere service. Actual attainment often debases the holder.'

  During the riots in Delhi many mosques had been vandalised and forcibly occupied by refugees. Some had been converted into temples. Gandhi drew Patel's attention to this and told him to ensure that such incidents did not occur again. Gandhi had suggested that his department, on behalf of the Union government should make an announcement that no sacrilege would be suffered in regard to mosques and if any damage did occur, the repairs would be affected by the government. The Delhi administration issued a communique giving seven days' notice to the non-Muslims occupying mosques to vacate them, failing which the police would eject them by force.

  Pyarelal writes: The Muslims made grave allegations against Sardar Patel and his officers. The latter, they alleged, were turning a blind eye to the looting of Muslim Shops. While making a pretence of taking action, they were actually telling the refugee crowds to come in their numbers so that the police could afterwards plead helplessness in the face of 'superior numbers'. Gandhiji arranged a meeting between their spokesmen and three of the senior members of the Cabinet to thrash out the whole matter in his presence. The meeting was repeated on the 25th December, when the police chief of Delhi was also present. Gandhiji did not feel very satisfied with the result. Quite a proportion of the police and military personnel in Delhi had their homes in the West Punjab and the Frontier Province, now part of Pakistan. Some had been recruited from among the ranks of the refugees as an emergency measure.... Deep resentment and bitterness against the Muslims was the order of the day. The womenfolk, as might naturally be expected, were even more distraught and resentful than the men. The police did not openly defy Government's orders. But very often they let their deep personal bitterness get the better of their sense of duty and discipline.