Lets Kill Gandhi

by Gandhi, Tushar A.

  Para 3.42: 'The Deputy Inspector General of Police, (C.I.D.) Poona, U.H. Rana was in Delhi, he was summoned by Sanjevi in the presence of the Superintendent of C.I.D., Delhi. The D.I.G. was given the report of the two Delhi Police Officers and his attention was drawn to the importance of locating the absconding accused. A copy of the detailed statement of Madanlal was given to him. Both he and Sanjevi went over it, and the D.I.G. was asked to fly to Bombay but he did not, as he could not. (If he could not one should have thought that another officer could have been sent by air to deliver the statement to Nagarvala). He left by train via Allahabad and reached Bombay only on the 27th evening.'

  Para 3.43 states: 'This acquiescence in this circuitous route is corroborative of Rana's statement that "no one expected the conspirators to strike so soon, certainly not Sanjevi." '

  On 27th evening, most probably inspired by the knowledge of the lavish hospitality provided by Jimmy Nagarvala, Rana went straight to his house. Sanjevi describes the phone call he received from Rana and Nagarvala. 'On 27th evening Rana rang me up from Bombay and told me that he had seen Nagarvala, and that Nagarvala would give me an explanation for what had happened to the two Delhi Police Officers at Bombay. Nagarvala told me that he had good reason for not allowing the two Delhi Police Officers to move about freely in Bombay. He told me of the information that he and the Bombay Police had of a conspiracy to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi. He told me that it was a very big organisation with about 20 principal conspirators, each assisted by 20 persons and in possession of considerable quantities of firearms and other lethal weapons. I asked him about the absconding accused whose names or descriptions were given to the Delhi Police by Madanlal. Nagarvala told me that he would send a detailed note on the investigation made at Bombay City and elsewhere in the Province by air the next day.' (The report was lying on Sanjevi's desk on 31 January 1948, the day after Gandhi was murdered.)

  This note does not state if Sanjevi asked if Nagarvala had been given the names and descriptions of the persons named by Madanlal. Nagarvala also does not make any reference to this beyond saying that he would send a progress report by air the next day. There is nothing to show that Sanjevi pressed Nagarvala to tell him if he had done anything to trace those who were named by Madanlal, neither did he show any anxiety about their arrest or even tried to find out who they were or whether they had been located at all. On the other hand, Patel's replies in the Constituent Assembly made on 6 February 1948, show that the Bombay and Delhi police were in accord on the steps taken and on the question of the proposal to make simultaneous arrests to prevent some of the accused going underground. Who was; lying to the Union Home minister?

  Para 3.45 says: 'The note then goes on to say Nagarvala did not write to Sanjevi. On the 30th he sent a letter which reached Sanjevi on February 3, and a copy of that letter was received through an officer who came by air from Bombay on 1st February'.

  Para 3.50 of the Commissions Report deals with Para 11 of Sanjevi's note-11. It is now definitely known that from the 23rd to the 28th January, Godse was in Bombay. He flew from the Bombay aerodrome to Delhi on the 28th morning. From 22nd to 28th January was a long enough period for the Bombay Police to find out who the editor of the Agranee or the Hindu Rashtra was. As long as the Delhi Police did not have full information in regard to the identity and correct description of this person, they could not possibly spot him when he arrived in Delhi. He had completely changed his clothes, and on 30th evening, was wearing a military khaki jacket, and went into the prayer grounds with the large crowds that congregated there. 'In these circumstances, the Delhi Police did all that was possible. In his observations the Judge has, unfortunately, not distinguished between the Delhi and the Bombay Police. He was not aware of the real position. He did not know that the Bombay Police had not taken all the action necessary on the information conveyed from Delhi. Even on the evidence that he had before him, his observations against the Delhi Police cannot be justified'.

  If Sanjevi had shown the same zeal in saving the life of Gandhi as he did in defending the reputation of his department, history would have been different. The Kapur Commission's report states—'Sanjevi is unfortunately dead and this is the only record of what he did or did not do in regard to Mahatma Gandhi's life and safety'.

  H.V.R. Iyengar, secretary of the ministry of Home Affairs, wrote in a note on receipt of the explanations he received from Sanjevi and Nagarvala: 'Secondly, while it is clear that Bombay Police took all possible steps to arrest Karkare and Badge, they do not appear to have taken any notice of Godse. Admittedly his name was not mentioned in Madanlal's statement but there was a description of him as the editor of the "Hindu Rashtra" or the "Agranee". According to D.I.B.'s (Sanjevi) report the investigating officers from Delhi took with them to Bombay on the 21st January a statement (Annexure V to D.I.B.'s report—Slip 'T') which mentioned the editor of this paper. Nagarvala says that these officers did not give him any information other than that they wanted Karkare. Here is a discrepancy which cannot be reconciled without further examination.

  'I have put to the D.I.B. the view that as soon as it became clear that there was a conspiracy among certain Maharashtra Brahmins from Poona, Ahmednagar and the neighbourhood to commit assassination, plainclothesmen from that part of the Bombay Province should have been summoned to Delhi, on the chance that they might have been able to identify these persons if they came to Birla House. Sanjevi says that as the Bombay Police did not take the idea of conspiracy to assassinate very seriously, the responsibility was really theirs. Personally I do not accept this view and that there was a failure in Delhi to insist on this precaution. It may not have been successful in preventing the assassination, but it was certainly worth trying.

  'I think the Bombay Police are to blame more seriously because they refused to take note of the idea of a conspiracy to assassinate seriously, although every rule of commonsense pointed in that direction'.

  This was a very severe comment from one of the senior-most bureaucrats serving the Union government, indicting both the police departments severely.

  The two letters of Nagarvala, dated 30th and 31st January, one on the day of the murder and the other a day after, make for interesting reading, they show how an obstinate mind refuses to acknowledge reality.

  'The first letter shows that Madanlal's statement in the Press showing that "he had come from Bombay" led to the initiation of investigations in Bombay. In the course of preliminary investigations names of Balraj Mehta, Karkare, Talwar, Badge, Avtar Singh (Proprietor of the Sher-e-Punjab Hotel), Chavan and Somnath Kapoor transpired of whom Avtar Singh and Chavan were under detention. Balraj had been identified and a trail put on him. Karkare and Badge were the two Maharashtrian companions of Balraj and Somnath Kapoor who were both Punjabis, Badge had been seen in Ahmednagar three days earlier (This shows the accuracy of the investigation by Nagarvala and his subordinates. Badge was at that time hiding in Poona. During the trial Nagarvala had said that they were looking for Badge since the 24th but he was hiding in Poona.) i.e. on the 27th and arrangements had been made to bring informants from Ahmednagar to Bombay who knew both Karkare and Badge, the object being to get them (Badge and Karkare) identified and to arrest them. Karkare's rendezvous in Bombay was known to the police and if he came to Bombay he would be arrested but Talwar had not been identified and inquiries were going on.

  'From investigation it appears that there were 21 Punjabis and Maharashtrians in the conspiracy and they had 20 workers under each one of them. The object of the gang was to drive out Muslims from the Indian Dominion. With that object they had collected arms and ' ammunition and it was also learnt that Col. Mohan Singh of the Indian National Army had organised the gang and he had the support of the Akali leader Master Tara Singh. But the information had not yet been corroborated. There was also a suggestion that one of the Sikh refugees had been sent by the gang to the Speaker of the Uttar Pradesh Assembly Shri Purshotamdas Tandon for further consultation as to their plan. The opinion amon
gst the members of the gang was that it was easy to win over the Delhi Police and their object was to kidnap Gandhiji. But the letter made it clear that this was only an information which have been collected but they had yet to see if it was correct. Nobody had been arrested but a fair amount of progress had been made in the investigation.

  'The general policy which Nagarvala proposed to follow was (and Rana agreed with him) that they might arrest Karkare and Badge which was not likely to (a)rouse any suspicion because Karkare had been named by Madanlal and Badge was always with Karkare and they were known by the police to be good friends. Rana agreed with Nagarvala that arrest of others should wait till the Information collected by the Delhi Police, Poona Provincial C.I.D. and the Bombay City C.I.D. was pooled together. The Home Minister of Bombay and Rana had entrusted the case to him (Nagarvala) for the Province of Bombay and Nagarvala was hoping to produce concrete results.

  'The letter of 31st January, said that Nagarvala had arrested Balraj Mehta, Somnath Kapoor, Kasar—the bodyguard of Savarkar—and Damle, his secretary. It had also transpired that Godse had seen Savarkar along with one Apte on the eve of their departure to Delhi. Kasar and Damle had not stated what conversation these two had with Savarkar during their 40 minutes interview but they had admitted that these two had access to the house of Savarkar without any restriction. If Madanlal was brought to Bombay, they would be able to "drag out Madanlal and get all facts and details out of him" '.

  In the Kapur Commission's report a detailed analysis of Nagarvala's letter has been made and the discrepancies highlighted.

  'That after the statement of Madanlal appeared in the Press about his being from Bombay, investigations were taken up. There is no mention of either the orders of Morarji Desai or of what Jain had told Desai.

  'It does mention Madanlal's statement where in Karkare wasmentioned.

  'It mentions that Karkare and Badge were two Maharashtrian companions of Balraj and Somnath Kapoor, and the former two were good friends.

  'It then states that Badge was seen at Ahmednagar about 27thJanuary but he had left that place and that two informants had beencalled from Ahmednagar who would identify and help in the arrestof Karkare and Badge. Now if Badge belonged to Poona and Karkareto Ahmednagar, even if they were friends, one would have expectedthat informants would have been called from Poona also.

  'The letter mentions that a large number of Punjabis and Maharashtrians being in the conspiracy which was being organised by Col. Mohan Singh of the I.N.A., this gentleman was examined by the Commission (Witness No. 86) and he denied any knowledge about this gang and it is difficult to imagine that Col. Mohan Singh would be a party to encouraging either the assassination or the kidnapping of Mahatma Gandhi and it would be still more astonishing if the then Speaker of the Uttar Pradesh Assembly, Shri Purshottamdas Tandon, could be persuaded to join the plan. Even if the objective was eviction of the Mohammedans, the Speaker was unlikely to give his blessings to any such action.

  'Although the letter mentions that the plan was to arrest Karkare and Badge, there is no indication as to what tangible steps had been taken to carry out the plan.

  'The most important omission is the non-mention of either the editor or the proprietor of the "Agranee" or the "Hindu Rashtra" because that seems to have been emphasised again and again in the note of Sanjevi. This would show that either these persons were never mentioned till then or Nagarvala was deliberately omitting them. The latter possibility appears likely in the circumstances.

  'There is no indication in the note that in the telephonic talk with Nagarvala, Sanjevi mentioned either of these two persons. All he says in the note is, "I asked him about the absconding accused whose names or descriptions were given to the Delhi Police by Madanlal and Nagarvala promised to send a detailed note". One should have imagined that if the editor of the newspaper had been mentioned, Sanjevi would have made pointed inquiries about the editor and/or the proprietor.

  'Further there is nothing in this note that when Nagarvala mentioned the conspiracy to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi, Sanjevi ticked him off or told him that the very theory or idea was absurd.

  'Commission has been unable to discover any reason why Nagarvala in his letter made the Press report of Madanlal's statement the basis of his investigation rather than the information or order given to him by Morarji Desai, the factum of which is not denied and was accepted by both the trial court as well as the High Court in the Conspiracy Case. Unfortunately, this matter was not put to Nagarvala before the Commission.

  'The omission of references to names, descriptions, avocations or places of residence of Madanlal's co-conspirators has remained unexplained.

  'The letter of the 30th by Nagarvala to Sanjevi was top secret and there could not have been any inherent danger in disclosing to Sanjevi the factum of information given by Morarji Desai or the order he passed'.

  The correspondence between the Inspector-General of Police Bombay N.M. Kamte and the D.I.G., C.I.D., U.H. Rana describes the extent of bungling by Rana. In a letter written on 6 February 1948 to Rana, Kamte wrote that he had carefully read Madanlal's statement which showed that there was sufficient indication to make out that there was a plot to kill Gandhi by certain Poona men and he wanted information on two matters from Rana:

  (1) What steps were taken by him to arrest them immediately; and

  (2) What steps were taken to send men to Delhi to comb out Delhi and arrest them there.

  Rana replied to this letter on 24th February 1948, mentioning the sequence of events and of the action taken by him. There is a very surprising claim by Rana, he says that: 'On 21st morning when two Delhi Police Officers met him and gave him the information they had up to then, he (Rana) told them at once that the gang must be followers of Dr. Savarkar and suggested that two officers be sent to Bombay to contact Nagarvala at Bombay and Rao Saheb Gurtu at Poona'. This claim does not hold water: in the investigation reports it is very clearly stated that Rana was brought into the picture by Sanjevi after the two officers sent by Sanjevi to Bombay returned to Delhi and complained about the non-cooperation of the Bombay Police and the obstinacy of Nagarvala. Rana further said that: 'By the time the Delhi Policemen arrived in Bombay, the Bombay Police had already got some information about Karkare and some inquiries had been made' or as he put it, 'this information had already been worked out by the Bombay City Police. The Delhi Police officers went and stayed at the National Hotel which was in the vicinity of the Sher-e-Punjab Hotel whose proprietor, Avtar Singh had been detained by the Bombay City Police and whose name had transpired as one of the conspirators to kill Mahatma Gandhi'.

  Instead of giving an explanation about his actions, as desired by Kamte, Rana gave a detailed description of the actions of the Bombay Police. About his own actions Rana says that he left for Poona on the 28th and asked the D.S.P. Poona to spare his L.I.B. Inspector Angarkar. On the 29th, he was informed that Angarkar was down with fever. Rana then sent a wireless message to recall Dy. S.P Deulkar, who was in Colaba district at the time. Deulkar returned on the night of the 30th. Immediately four officers were sent by plane as there was a lurking suspicion that these men would attack other ministers in the Central Cabinet. From the facts which were revealed later the culprits had slipped out on the morning of the 28th from Bombay.

  Rana's reply to Kamte smacks of obfuscation and excuses and an attempt to take credit for actions initiated and executed by others. Kamte caught him out, in a reply dated 6 March 1948. In this letter Kamte restated the two questions he had asked to which, according to him, Rana's reply appeared appears not have answered satisfactorily. He then asked Rana to give his remarks on certain specific matters which were:

  (1) What did the two police officers tell him (Rana) on the 21st which was not quite clear from the letter?

  (2) Why did he not ask his own CID to make inquiries because two officers from Delhi were not going to make much headway inBombay or Poona?

  (3) The object of contacting Nagarvala by these police officers
was not stated.

  (4) The statement of Madanlal was given to him (Rana) on the 25th. What action did he take till the evening of 27th? (What actions would he have taken? He was on his leisurely sojourn to Bombay via Allahabad.)

  (5) The information that Nagarvala learnt through a source about associates of Madanlal was not correct because all he had come to know was Karkare's name and the other information was very vague. But in Madanlal's statement, pp 7,16,18 etc., the description given therein showed that the other accused were Godse, Apte, Badge, etc. Why was there no attempt made to arrest them from the 25th evening onwards?

  (6) Although on 27th he (Rana) had telephoned the DIB about taking precautions for Gandhi's protection, he could very well have deputed his own men to Delhi because Madanlal's statement showed that there was a plan to kill Gandhi by men from the Bombay province.

  (7) Kamte could not subscribe to the proposition that the Bombay police had done all that they could in the matter of precaution. The best thing which Rana could have done on 29th was to havesent for Rao Saheb Gurtu and get that officer on the move.

  (8) Sending men by air to Delhi was done at Kamte's suggestion and not Rana for which Rana could not take any credit.

  This letter makes some telling points of criticism—(a) why Rana did not send his own CID to make inquiries rather than send Delhi police officers; (b) why he did not send his own CID to Delhi to protect Gandhi; and (c) why he did not get hold of Gurtu even on 29th January.

  'Rana did not take any further action because he presumed that the gang must have been located in Bombay and he had one C.I.D. Head Constable Yadav in Delhi who was directed to move about in Delhi and visit railway stations and try to locate Karkare whom the Head Constable knew "as a communist from Ahmednagar" (this is another erroneous description; Karkare was not known to be a communist he was known to be a fanatical communalist). Rana did not think it necessary to send a special man from Bombay to Delhi. Rana's explanation for not doing anything further was that he had given instructions to the Delhi Police officers in regard to what was to be done in Bombay and Poona.' This is again a lie. Investigation records showed that Rana did absolutely nothing from the time he was handed the copy of Madanlal's detailed confession till the 30th; his claim that he had on his own briefed Delhi police on the 21st was a blatant lie, it is surprising he was not questioned let alone reprimanded.