Making War to Keep Peace

by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

  Peacekeeping may become the key to preventing virulent conflicts, from causing regional explosions, destroying hopes for democracy, and creating grave humanitarian crises…. The president is serious about exploiting new opportunities to bolster international peacekeeping efforts and organizations…You should help Americans understand what is, in fact, a revolutionary policy, and what you are doing at DOD to make it happen.90

  U.S. support would be crucial, Halperin explained. It would require “preparing our forces and our thinking to engage in peacekeeping; paying for peacekeeping so that we have forces ready to fight; and strengthening international peacekeeping organizations and practices so that peacekeeping will be truly international.”91 U.S. forces would be trained to participate in international peacekeeping without earmarking any particular units for this function. The U.S. military would be introduced to the new thinking and new practices, including the idea of serving as requested by the Security Council and under non-American commanders. The new program would include joint training and peacekeeping exercises with other NATO members and with the Russians. The UN’s military capabilities would be reinforced by the United States, which would contribute intelligence, planning, communications, and other kinds of help.

  William Perry, then deputy secretary of defense, made similar proposals in an essay that appeared after his elevation to secretary. In the essay, Perry anticipated that core activities of international security would be centralized in the UN, and that “preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, war, postwar management would be carried out as multinational operations under UN command and control.” He said that a chief function of DOD would be to prepare Americans for such service and provide equipment, technology, and advice to the UN.92

  Perry’s plan assumed a level of harmony and cooperation among nations that has never existed in human history. It was based on the premise that the United States had an interest in peace, preventive action, and conflict resolution everywhere, and that we should be ready to risk American lives to achieve ambiguous goals in remote countries with which we have no significant ties. Perry’s plans further assumed that a large number of other countries would be willing to join the United States in the disinterested use of force; that the putative beneficiaries would desire this international “help”; and that the UN would be competent to exercise command and control, and willing and able to use the intelligence and technology he planned to transfer to them. As Senator Richard Lugar (RIA) later commented, “The Clinton administration was not comfortable with the use of military power and simply hoped it wouldn’t have to be used. Or, if it did, it would be shared responsibility with others, and that there might be some overall legitimacy through the United Nations or some international command.”93

  Underlying the approach was a conception of force that differed sharply from the one that had prevailed up to and throughout the cold war. Gone, too, were the Weinberger-Powell principles: Perry, Lake, Halperin, and others associated with the Clinton administration were less reluctant to use force than the Reagan administration, perhaps because there was less danger of provoking a major war. They were also less concerned about having a preponderance of force when they did use it, instead advocating limited force for limited purposes.94 The Clinton team and the UN secretary-general seem to have underestimated the dangers of peacekeeping, assuming that peacekeepers would seldom face armed conflict or confront serious adversaries. This benign conception of the new peacekeeping explains why Clinton’s Department of Defense leadership was casual about denying requests for additional armor in Somalia, and about intelligence and reinforcements. The president and his top advisers had not seriously considered the dangers involved in committing men to conflict under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, under UN command, or under Boutros-Ghali’s rules of engagement.

  FROM UNITAF TO UNOSOM II: U.S. FORCES UNDER UN COMMAND

  Phase I of the Somalia intervention, the Bush phase, ended on May 4, 1993, when U.S. Marine Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston handed command of the force to the UN force commander for UNOSOM, the widely respected Turkish lieutenant general Cevik Bir. U.S. Major General Thomas Montgomery served as deputy force commander. Forty-seven hundred U.S. troops remained to ease the transition. The goals of the mission changed again. The Security Council requested the secretary-general—through Admiral Howe—to assist in political reconciliation and rehabilitation. When the four thousand remaining U.S. troops were transferred to UN command, American participation in UNOSOM II got under way.

  On July 1, 1993, President Clinton wrote to congressional leaders: “At the height of the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) operations, just over twenty-five thousand U.S. Armed Forces personnel were deployed to Somalia. Consistent with U.S. policy objectives, the current smaller U.S. contribution of approximately forty-four hundred personnel reflects the increased participation by other UN Member States.”95

  In a letter to Senator John Warner (R-VA), Walter Slocombe, deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, explained the planned command and control structure:

  The United States is participating in the UN Operation in Somalia(UNOSOM II) with two basic types of forces: support forces for logistics purposes and a quick reaction force (QRF) of combat troops. All U.S. forces…remain under the command authority of General Hoar, the Commander of USCENTCOM. He exercises his authority over those American troops through his representative, MG Thomas Montgomery, in his role as the commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia (USFORSOM). MG Montgomery is also dual-hatted as the Deputy Commander of the UNOSOM II Force Command.

  The U.S. support forces that provide logistic services to the UNOSOM II Commander, LTG Bir, are under the UN’s operational control. General Hoar retains operational control over the QRF but has delegated tactical control to MG Montgomery in specific instances…. The UN directs the military actions of the UNOSOM II Force Commander but, although Howe is in the UN’s military chain of command, he cannot order the QRF into action. That authority remains within U.S. channels.96

  At its peak, UNITAF (the original force commanded by the United States, consisting mainly of Americans) had just over 25,000 U.S. troops distributed over 40 percent of Somalia.97 By August 17, 1993, the secretary-general reported that the UNOSOM II force included 20,707 troops from twenty-seven countries. The primary contributors were Pakistan (4,973), the United States (2,703), Italy (2,538), Morocco (1,341), and France (1,130). The United States also contributed 1,167 troops for the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). Both Force Headquarters Command and total strength had been progressively built up, and about 8,000 more troops were expected, including 5,000 from India, bringing the force strength to the authorized level of 28,000—though these forces would prove neither well armed nor integrated.98

  Meanwhile, the situation in Somalia had become more dangerous. Warfare among the clans had intensified, and attacks on UN troops had multiplied. The changes in the composition of UN forces and in the command structure affected the relationships among Somali combatants, the UN, and various national groups. As Robert Oakley noted, the relationship between Aideed and the United Nations was deteriorating. “Aideed made it clear he didn’t trust Boutros-Ghali in particular or the United Nations in general,” he observed. “We kept saying, ‘You have to work with him’…I think the administration at the top level did not fully appreciate the significance of what was going on.”99

  The Massacre of Pakistanis

  Aideed’s forces possessed heavier weapons than anticipated and were more aggressive and effective than expected, especially after they had become convinced that the UN favored their rivals. On June 5, 1993, Aideed’s men ambushed and killed at least twenty-three Pakistani soldiers. Ten were reported missing and fifty-four wounded100 in two attacks—one as Pakistani forces left a radio station they had been sent to investigate, the other on lightly armed Pakistani soldiers who were attempting to deliver food. On June 6, the Security Council passed a U.S.-drafted Resolution 837, which condemned the murder of the Pakistani soldi
ers and announced that UN forces would identify, arrest, and punish the responsible parties. Oakley again noted the lack of communication between the White House and the Pentagon:

  Mrs. Albright felt very, very strongly about [Resolution 837]. As best I can figure out, the resolution was drafted over a weekend between New York and the White House, I’d say, and done in a hurry. General Powell tells people that the first thing he saw about the resolution was when he read about it in the newspapers Monday morning. Therefore, the Pentagon was not properly brought into the loop, in terms of measuring the consequences of this resolution, which declared those responsible to be the enemy in Somalia.101

  Boutros-Ghali appointed Tom Farer, a professor of international law at American University, to investigate the massacre of the Pakistanis. Farer’s report concluded that only Aideed had the “requisite means, motive, and opportunity” to carry out these attacks. Farer was impressed by the military sophistication, planning, firepower, discipline, and first-class weapons employed by Aideed’s forces.102

  Mohammed Farah Aideed saw himself as a principal leader in Somalia—a future ruler and a legitimate competitor for primacy—and he came to see the UN as an obstacle to his status and power. Western opinion about Aideed varied widely. Oakley believed it was important to “play on his pride rather than to try to humiliate him.”103 He observed later that the environment was tense because “the Somalis are very xenophobic, aggressive people.” He saw Aideed as “a cunning man of violence,” especially volatile when offended. “I would treat him as if he were a vial of nitroglycerine that could go off in my hands.” General Anthony Zinni, UNITAF’s director of operations, had a more positive view of Aideed’s status and role. He saw Aideed as “probably the most successful general in the Somali army, the only one who had tactical successes in the war with Ethiopia…. He was very bright; he was an ambassador from Somalia to India. He served in the cabinet there; he was respected by his clan. There was a very strong case to be made on his behalf by his followers.”104

  On the basis of the Farer report and Resolution 837, the immediate mission in Somalia changed again. The Clinton administration and Boutros-Ghali decided that UN forces must capture Aideed, whom they blamed for the escalating violence.105 But after the attacks on the Pakistani troops, other forces became progressively more unwilling to leave their safe havens and risk danger.

  The new mission to capture Aideed, and the flawed logic of the Clinton administration’s assertive multilateralism and nation-building theories, put U.S. forces increasingly at risk. Some of the other national units in UNOSOM II defied the U.S.-led mission to capture Aideed and made their own separate peace with him. One of Aideed’s officers, Captain Haad, later said, “The Italians were not happy about the war the Americans were fighting against us. We knew that the UN forces were too many for us to confront. So what we did was to concentrate our attacks on the Americans and the forces who were taking their orders from the Americans, such as the Pakistanis. We had an understanding with some UN contingents that we would not attack them, and they would not attack us.”106

  One U.S. Ranger thought the Aideed-Italian “arrangement” far more sinister: “The Italian compound was on the far end of the airfield from us. Every time the profile flights would take off, you would see lights flash. And what we perceived to be going on was that they were signaling the Somalis that we were coming. It definitely left you wondering which side they were actually on.”107

  Targeting Aideed

  On June 17, 1993, Admiral T. Howe called for Aideed’s arrest, offering a reward of $25,000. U.S. commander Thomas Montgomery later said on Frontline, “I didn’t have a problem with putting a price on his head…because Aideed was a real tyrant, a very, very dangerous man.”108 General Zinni, who had no role in the decision but knew the situation well, disagreed: “I think that the resolution to declare Aideed a criminal and put a price on his head was…ridiculous,” he said. Such a move meant that the UN forces were “no longer in a peace enforcement or peacekeeping [role],” Zinni felt, but in “a counterinsurgency operation or in some form of war.”109

  Determined to make Mogadishu more secure, UN forces began a systematic drive to collect weapons. Factional retaliation led to the deaths of more UN peacekeeping troops—five Moroccan soldiers on June 17, two Pakistanis on June 28, three Italians on July 2; and then four journalists were murdered. Most of these casualties occurred in confrontations with Somali militias that shielded themselves behind large, disorderly crowds of women and children bearing guns and grenades. Although UN forces retaliated with guns, ships, and planes, the armed Somalis grew increasingly aggressive and the casualties mounted.

  Howe urged Washington to send the Delta Force to hunt for Aideed. The request initially met with resistance from Secretary of Defense Aspin and Joint Chiefs chairman Colin Powell, both of whom were reluctant to send more troops and doubted that this assignment was right for the elite force. But Powell changed his mind and convinced Aspin, and U.S. Rangers were dispatched with orders to capture or kill Aideed.110

  UN intelligence was clearly inadequate, with crucial delays in getting information from collectors to consumers. According to Gene Cullen, the CIA officer in charge of intelligence coordination in Somalia, information had to be transmitted back to headquarters, who would “determine what would be disseminated and what would not”—a process that could take from twelve to seventy-two hours.111 There were also questions about the reliability of Somali intelligence sources. According to Abdi Hassan Awaleh, Aideed’s defense minister, the Rangers “did not have good intelligence for locating General Aideed. They never came close to him…. We used the same Somali informers that they used. We knew who they were.”112

  From the time they arrived, U.S. commanders in Somalia had requested heavier armor, tanks, and other vehicles—requests that were turned down by Aspin himself on the grounds that it made no sense to build up and build down simultaneously. But the violence continued to escalate, and events quickly demonstrated why more armor was needed.

  On August 8, four American soldiers were killed when their jeep was blown up by a sophisticated remote-controlled mine. Then seven Nigerian soldiers were killed. On August 22, President Clinton himself issued an order to capture and try Aideed.113 In August and September, the Rangers staged several raids and captured a number of Aideed’s aides. (During one raid, they “captured” the astonished staff of a UN development program, who were released with apologies as soon as they were identified.) Curiously, at the same time that Clinton declared Aideed a criminal and ordered his capture, he secretly opened an initiative to negotiate with Aideed, with former president Jimmy Carter as an intermediary.114 General Montgomery, the deputy UN commander at the time, said that his command “had no idea” about the back-channel effort. “I wish…that somebody…had told the military chain of command to cease and desist this effort to bring Aideed to justice,” Montgomery complained.115

  Congress sensed the growing danger in the situation. On September 9, the Senate voted 90 to 7 in favor of an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill that would require the administration to report to Congress on the Somalia operation no later than October 15 and seek congressional authorization no later than November 15. However, before that deadline arrived, there was more action on the ground.

  By the beginning of October, the Rangers were closing in on Aideed and his staff. They had identified their meeting place and arrested twenty-four United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) leaders. Yet Aideed had determined that helicopters were the Rangers’ chief vulnerability, and on October 3, his forces targeted two helicopters in Mogadishu. The first helicopter was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and crashed; the second, a Blackhawk Super 6-1, which had provided cover for the evacuation of some of Aideed’s officers, was also hit. The two pilots were killed, and their bodies and others were pinned in the helicopters. The Rangers, committed to never leaving a fallen comrade, took heavy casualties as they fought thei
r way to the helicopters to extract the bodies.116 No contingency plans had been made for reinforcements.

  In describing the events of that day, General Montgomery described a dangerously cumbersome command structure: “I had a base officer from General Garrison at my side; I had my hand on communications to talk to the QRF and to the Rangers; I had the ability to talk to UN forces.” He needed men and tanks. First he sent in the QRF, the Rangers, and the Delta Force. There were only four operational tanks in Mogadishu, and they were Pakistani tanks without night vision. The Malaysians had old but functional armored personnel carriers (APCs) and provided drivers. For eleven hours, the Rangers, the QRF, and the 10th Mountain Division fought their way into and out of the crash scene.

  Ultimately, two U.S. helicopters were downed, eighteen Rangers were killed, seventy-five wounded, and one went missing. Cheering Somalis dragged a dead American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu, and a videotape was later distributed showing Somalis capturing and mauling another wounded soldier.

  In Washington and Somalia, spokesmen for the Rangers sought to make clear that they had not been overwhelmed. Major General William Garrison, commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, explained later to the Senate Armed Forces Committee that, despite heavy losses, “what we had were helicopter pilots that were trapped inside of the helicopter, and we were going to stay with them until such time as we could extract them. We were not pinned down; we could have fought our way out anytime we chose to do so.”117

  But Congressional impatience with the ambiguity of the Somali mission and its remote relationship to U.S. interests had been growing even before this incident, and impatience turned to outrage when word arrived in Washington that eighteen U.S. servicemen had been killed and more than seventy wounded in an ambush in the Somali capital. Outrage turned to fury when it was learned that the ninety Rangers and others were pinned down for nine hours, during which at least one Ranger bled to death before they were finally rescued by an unprepared, uncoordinated force.