When I served as head of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in 2003, I was reminded that the commission, like the United Nations itself, is a mélange of every region, every people, and every culture—and sometimes of radically contradictory values. As a result of this diversity, some members of the Human Rights Commission can barely understand other members. In my experience, in fact, it seemed that many of the members had no interest in understanding one another. It was apparent that not all nations were primarily concerned with ensuring the freedom of their people or were eager to devise constructive solutions to problems. Rather, many of them wanted to impose their own will on other regions, nations, and lives. The United States and the Western Group seek constructive solutions to problems. At least we think we do. The resulting clashes at the UNHRC were, indeed, often clashes between vastly different civilizations.
However, it is important to note that the principles of the Human Rights Commission were designed to protect the governed, even though many of the members of the commission do not. To quote the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948:
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind….
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.
The rule of law is the foundation of our constitutional government—that is, of government based on consent. Government based on consent is government by the governed. That is a crucial distinction between democracy and all other forms of government. On that distinction, too, the UN was grounded from its inception. Democratic principles can influence the dialogue among nations as long as the UN remains true to its Charter. There is hope in that, as well.
Today, as we confront these new challenges, Americans must acknowledge that not all governments we deal with are governed based on consent, even as we know that the historic role of our own government has been to promote democracy. Here, again, cultures clash, but the lessons of the post–cold war years must guide our future course if we are to remain a free and stable nation in the coming century. One such lesson is that the rule of law and the sovereign rights of nations are cornerstones for world order. Another is that national security must not take a backseat to our desire to promote democracy to cultures unable or unwilling to accept our overture. A third such lesson is that sanctions and other means may achieve ends more slowly than military force, but preserving our military to wage war only when our national security is at risk is perhaps the best way to keep peace.
The past fifteen years have seen violence perpetuated by coercive elements whose goal is not peace. Throughout history, such groups have sought to impose their will on others. Where these forces have surfaced in the modern world, there has seldom been a peace to keep. Yet we have dispersed peacekeepers to help alleviate the situations, and these peacekeeping operations have gradually expanded to include a variety of activities. They monitored human rights practices, oversaw elections, maintained cease-fires, separated adversaries, delivered humanitarian aid, and repatriated refugees, to name a few. Their duties have become so diverse that the concept of peacekeeping today might be taken to refer to almost any activity, in any region, at any time.
Yet, as these peacekeeping efforts expanded in scope and across the globe, a critical element seems to have been overlooked: too often the peacekeepers’ initial mission was subsumed by a multitude of other tasks, which often lacked objective and cohesion. Sometimes the peacekeeping forces themselves have been left defenseless, and even in need of rescue themselves, as their environment devolved further into warfare. Eventually, the new realities of peacekeeping included kidnapping, starvation, and death—all the result of military forces being deployed not to wage war but to “keep peace” in a region where there was no peace from the start.
It is not surprising that the will of the nations providing such peacekeepers has sometimes wavered, and that these nations or their military leaders have sometimes proved unwilling to risk lives in such circumstances. In the 1990s, by a twist of policy nuance, we began to deploy peacekeepers into these challenging new circumstances, assigning them to build nations as a way of ensuring lasting peace. Because the ideal of human rights is at the core of our view of law and culture, we took upon ourselves the task of building democratic nations where there were no institutions to bolster the societies against the chaos inherent in democratic rule—or, more so, in the march toward democracy. Nation building became a military activity rather than one reserved for more gradual influences from market and cultural forces, and so the arrival of democracy in some nations came at the end of a sword, not the end of a cultural and political evolution instigated by the governed themselves.
In the process, our own military has too often been turned away from its main purpose—to wage war to keep peace, a peace in which more transformational forces would be freed to resurrect societies from the ruins of decay and war. In practice, the practice of nation building further distracted the UN from its own mission and opened the door for an expansionist UN and Secretariat. Our future foreign policy need not tempt the UN to challenge our sovereign rights to self-defense or to seek legitimacy in anything other than the will of its collective of nations. Neither our foreign policy nor our international role requires the use of our remarkable military simply because they are capable of enduring a crucible without an objective. Our military needs and deserves to remain dedicated to its true and singular role: to preserve peace and security by waging and winning war.
Our Declaration of Independence expresses a dream and a doctrine of government by consent. An important part of our history has been devoted to making a reality of this dream for all Americans. As the world has shrunk, we have, rightly or wrongly, sought to share the dream beyond our borders. We need to take stock and revisit this impulse, however well intentioned it may be.
For the United States, the enjoyment and protection of the rights stipulated in our Declaration of Independence and institutionalized in our Constitution lie at the heart of our identity as a nation. The struggle to ensure that those rights are enjoyed by each and every one of our citizens—a struggle that is still in progress—has been the engine of our history and our development as a nation. Of course, it is reasonable that those of us who enjoy the benefits of freedom are motivated to remember the millions who do not, the millions who are vulnerable to coercive forces of domination and injustice.
Yet it is a different matter entirely to commit military resources to keep peace in such areas, where often no peace can be kept, or to build nations in our own image before they are ready for our freedoms—or even want them. The military need not do the work of sanctions and diplomacy. As we carry on in this new century, we would do well to remember the importance of balancing the twin goals of our foreign policy: preserving national security and promoting democratic principles. And we must remember that historic conflicts between enemies can be won on moral force, without firing a single bullet or missile; that cultural, market, political, and perhaps religious forces can be far more transformative in areas of the world where chaos and violence reign; and that America can contribute to the building of nations by any and all of these means—while preserving our military and reserving our sovereign right to wage war to maintain true peace.
POSTSCRIPT
Allan Gerson
Reflecting on her work at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations from 1981 to 1985, Jeane Kirkpatrick later published the most definitive articulation of her views in an anthology of essays published by the Council on Foreign Relations in 1989: Right v. Might: International Law and the Use of Force. I was her counsel at the UN post during these years, and I served as her coauthor on the essay entitled, “The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and International Law.”
That article demonstrated her innate affinity
to the ideas of John Stuart Mill, whom she quoted liberally to the effect that the first principle of law is necessarily the equal application of the law, or reciprocity, and that unilateral compliance was unacceptable. Secondly, she drew her cue from Mill in distinguishing intervention that is rightful from that which is not, while recognizing that what is right may not always be prudent.
The Reagan Doctrine, she wrote, “is, as we understand it, above all concerned with the moral legitimacy of U.S. support—including military support—for insurgencies under certain circumstances.” She never saw a legitimate basis for the direct use of U.S. force in support of democracy. Rather, the use of force was legitimate when it was wielded to support indigenous insurgents in opposition to a government maintained by force and not democratic consent. As she put it, “The Reagan Administration did not create these resistance movements”; nor did it initiate the policy of providing support. This was in contrast to what the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Carter administrations had done, respectively, in Vietnam and Cambodia; Southeast Asia and Angola; and Afghanistan. In short, the Reagan Doctrine permitted assistance in self-defense, and as a means of counterintervention where an enemy like the Soviet Union was using military support to keep in power governments that had no popular consent. As such, the Reagan Doctrine was one that expressed solidarity with democracy, but was prudent and conservative in the use of military force to support democracy. It was a doctrine of counterintervention. As she put it, “In Kant’s view, intervention to bring down despotic governments was to be encouraged. The Reagan Doctrine does not go this far, but it has the same philosophical underpinnings.”
Today, the future of U.S. foreign policy is essentially a debate between when and in what sequence security and promotion of democracy can occur. For Jeane Kirkpatrick, the choice was always clear. The sequence, if force was to be used at all, was first to gain security, and only then to encourage freedom. If there could be no security, there could be no freedom. By that token, if Iraq could not be secure, there could be no thought of promotion of democracy. And Iraq could only be made secure if U.S. force was established on the basis of legitimacy.
It is sad that the Bush administration, in its conduct of the Iraq war, did little to pursue the same standards of informed analysis that Jeane Kirkpatrick had tried to foster. The failure to do so has made matters worse, not better. Kirkpatrick understood the limitations of humanitarianism. She believed deeply in what she had learned as a student at Columbia in the 1950s, where she was deeply affected by the disclosures of the horrors of the Holocaust. She saw in what had occurred vindication of Sigmund Freud’s thesis in Civilization and its Discontents, that we are born not as angels, but more like animals, and that the task of civilization is to civilize and to defend against barbarism. She applauded Ronald Reagan for declaring to the world that the American people had the necessary energy and conviction to defend itself, as well as a deep commitment to peace and democracy. But she believed most of all in being careful, very careful, before ever descending down the path of direct use of military might. As a nation, and as individuals, we have, she believed, a civic duty to articulate that direct resort to force should always be undertaken as a last resort, in a manner compatible with our nation’s ideals and our understanding of international law.
APPENDIX
SUMMARY OF DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT
The Dayton talks culminated in the initialing of a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The parties were the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Contact Group of Nations (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Germany) and the European Union special negotiator witnessed the agreement.
GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Croatia agree to respect the sovereignty of one another and settle future disputes by peaceful means.
The parties agree to fully respect the commitments made in the four annexes of the agreement and to respect the human rights of the habitants in the region and the rights of refugees and displaced persons.
The parties agree to implement the peace settlement and cooperate with the entities authorized by the United Nations to carry out this task. They also agree to collaborate in the prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.
ANNEX 1-A: MILITARY ASPECTS
The parties commit themselves to re-create as quickly as possible normal conditions of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to respect the cease-fire that began on October 5, 1995.
Foreign forces that are present in Bosnia will leave its territory within thirty days.
The parties invite into Bosnia and Herzegovina a multinational military implementation force (IFOR) that will be under the authority of the United Nations (UN) and under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The tasks of this force will include monitoring and helping ensure compliance with the military aspects of this agreement. To achieve this, IFOR will have unimpeded freedom of movement by land and control over airspace; if necessary, it will have the right to use violence.
ANNEX 1-B: REGIONAL STABILIZATION
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation, and the Bosnian Serb Republic will begin negotiation within the next seven days with the objective of agreeing on measures that will build confidence within forty-five days. These may include the exchange of information between the parties and the implementation of restrictions for carrying out military exercises. These conversations will take place under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
The parties, as well as Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, must begin negotiations within thirty days to agree on limits on the holding of military armament, including combat vehicles, aircraft, helicopters, and tanks.
If the parties do not establish limits in these categories within the next thirty days, the agreement provides numerical limits with which all parties will comply.
The OSCE will conduct negotiations with the parties to establish a regional balance in the former Yugoslavia.
ANNEX 2: INTER-ENTITY BOUNDARY
An inter-entity boundary line between the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic will be established.
Sarajevo will be reunified within the Federation and will be open to all people of the country.
Gorazde will be linked to the Federation by a land corridor composed of two roads.
ANNEX 3: ELECTIONS
The parties agree to create the conditions necessary for organizing free and fair elections; these include ensuring the right of citizens to vote in secret without being intimidated, freedom of expression in the press, and freedom of association.
Elections will be conducted within six to nine months for the presidency and House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the House of Representatives of the Federation, the National Assembly and presidency of the Bosnian Serb Republic, and, where possible, for local offices. International organizations will supervise the electoral process.
Refugees and all those who were displaced by the conflict will have the right to vote in their original place of residence.
ANNEX 4: CONSTITUTION
Bosnia and Herzegovina will adopt a new constitution that protects the human rights and freedom of movement of its citizens throughout the territory. The country will consist in two entities: the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic.
The central government will include a president, two legislative chambers, and a constitutional court. Direct elections should be conducted to elect the president and one of the legislative chambers. The central government will be responsible for monetary policy, law enforcement, and foreign policy.
ANNEX 5: ARBITRATION
The Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic agree to resolve disputes between them through a system of arbitration and to establish the necessary mechanisms for arbitration to
take place.
ANNEX 6: HUMAN RIGHTS
A commission on human rights will be established with the objective of protecting the fundamental freedoms of all persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The commission will be composed of a human rights ombudsman who will be in charge of investigating human rights violations and a human rights chamber that will issue decisions.
UN human rights agencies, the OSCE, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia will monitor the situation regarding human rights violations.
ANNEX 7: REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS
The parties agree to allow refugees and displaced persons to return safely to their homes and to permit the free movement of persons throughout the country.
A Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees will be created with the objective of returning property or giving just compensation for its loss.
ANNEX 11: INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE
The parties request the establishment by the UN of an international police task force (IPTF) with the objective of providing advice and training to the members of local law enforcement organizations. A commissioner appointed by the UN will be in charge of the IPTF.
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
1. Mikhail Gorbachev, National Museum of American History Archives, January 1992, http:/www.americanhistory.si.edu/subs/history/timeline/end@2000, The National Museum of American History.
2. President Ronald Reagan, Address to members of the British Parliament, June 8, 1982.
3. President George W. Bush, President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy, October 6, 2005.
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