Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare From Stalingrad to Iraq
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CONCRETE
HELL
URBAN WARFARE FROM STALINGRAD TO IRAQ
Louis A. DiMarco
DEDICATION
Over the course of a lifetime associated with the military and traveling around the world I have had the good fortune of working and serving with some of the finest soldiers anywhere. Three of them stand out as representing the soldierly virtues of tactical and technical excellence, scholarship, and most important, leadership. This book is dedicated to them and their inspiring example. I would follow them anywhere. They are: Colonel French L. MacLean, Colonel Thomas A. Dials, and Colonel Peter Wells.
CONTENTS
Foreword
List of Maps
List of Plates
1 Urban Warfare, Past and Future
2 An Operational Debacle
Stalingrad, 1942
3 American Urban Warfare
Aachen, 1944
4 Urban Warfare from the Sea
Inchon and Seoul, 1950
5 Complex Urban Warfare
The Battle for Hue, 1968
6 War in the Casbah
The Battle of Algiers, 1956–57
7 The Long Urban War
Operation Banner, 1969–2007
8 Urban Death Trap
The Russian Army in Grozny, 1995
9 Invading the Urban Sanctuary
Operation Defensive Shield and the Battle for Jenin, 2002
10 Systematic Urban Warfare
“Ready First” in Ramadi, 2006–07
11 Urban Combat in the 21st century
Bibliography
Glossary
About the Author
FOREWORD
This short history is meant to describe the urban battlefield as it evolved over the last half of the 20th century and into the first decade of the 21st. In describing the past, I believe, it also describes the future. Regardless of the basis of one’s view of the future, whether it be focused on competition between major world powers such as the US and China, or a persistent struggle between the forces of radical Islam and the west, the 21st century is going to be a century of conflict. I believe that conflict will largely occur in cities, and the keys to understanding the conflicts of the future are illustrated in the urban battlefields of the past.
Urban areas are often absolutely critical strategic objectives. They gain the attention of the political leaders of both sides in a conflict, and often of the civilian population as well. They often have a political value that is of much greater strategic importance than the purely material military advantage they provide to either side. Thus, before and during urban combat, there must be close coordination between the tactical actions and requirements and the strategic goals and objectives. Operational-level commanders provide the link between the tactical and strategic level of war and often their understanding and integration of the two very different levels of war is critical to success on the urban battlefield.
The past illustrates many of the essential tactics of urban conflict. Many urban tactical techniques essential for success have been developed over the last half century. These include the requirement for the battle to be an all arms conflict that includes a host of equally important capabilities as diverse as the need for armor and the requirement for well-trained snipers. Another more recent tactical need that has shown itself critical in the complex urban environment is a comprehensive intelligence system adapt at analyzing and understanding the human component of the environment.
Past urban battles also describe operational and strategic requirements for successful urban battle. One of the basic operational essentials of urban battle success is isolating the enemy combatants inside the city. The history of urban combat makes plain that when the enemy is isolated then success follows. When the enemy in the urban battle is not isolated from outside support, success may be much more difficult or impossible. A corollary to this historical observation is that often the battles outside the city to isolate it from support are more difficult, consume more resources, and are more decisive, than the actual house-to-house fighting inside the city.
The battle histories described in this work are the result of research in primary sources and the most authoritative secondary sources available. Many of the battles described here, such as the battle for Stalingrad, have been the subject of multiple excellent histories by some of the finest military historians. This work in no way is a substitute for those superbly researched detailed battle histories. My intent in this work is to make three contributions. First, provide a basic understanding of the multiple dimensions of the urban battlefield, the battlefield which I believe will dominate warfare for the next century. Second, provide analytical insights regarding the urban battlefield based on the historical record of urban combat. That is, to point out critical tactical, operational, and strategic considerations which have relevance to the battlefields of today and tomorrow. Finally, this work, by examining the evolution of the military experience on the urban battlefield since 1942, will show how the urban battlefield has evolved from relatively simplistic conventional battlefield of Stalingrad and Aachen, to the purely insurgency war of Algeria and Northern Ireland, and finally to the highly complex hybrid mixture of conventional and insurgent combat found in places like the occupied territories, Chechnya, and Iraq. Thus, the goal of this book is to use military history to better understand the military affairs of today and tomorrow. American Civil War General William T. Sherman famously described war as hell. This book does not challenge his description, but makes the simple point that in the recent past and in the coming future war has been and will be not just hell, but concrete hell.
LIST OF MAPS
2.1 German Summer Offensive, 1942
2.2 The Sixth Army Attack into Stalingrad, September–November 1942
2.3 The Soviet Counteroffensive, November 1942
3.1 The Battle for Aachen, October 1944
4.1 The Inchon Landings, September 1950
4.2 The Capture of Seoul, September 1950
5.1 The PAVN Capture of Hue, January 1968
5.2 The Battle for Southern Hue, January–February 1968
5.3 The Battle for Northern Hue, January–Feburary 1968
6.1 Major Events in Algiers, 1956–57
6.2 Deployment and Actions of the 10th Para Division, Algiers, 1957
7.1 British Army Deployment and Major Events, Northern Ireland, 1969–2007
8.1 The Initial Russian Attack into Grozny, December 1994
9.1 Operation Defensive Shield, March–April 2002
9.2 The IDF Attacks Nablus, April 2002
9.3 The IDF Attacks Jenin, April 2002
10.1 Al-Anbar Province, Iraq, 2006
10.2 Deployment of 1BCT in Ramadi, Iraq, 2006–07
LIST OF PLATES
1 A siege tower. (istockphoto)
2 Siege of Orleans, 15th century. (David Nicolle)
3 Fortress of Neuf-Brisach. (Getty)
4 German infantryman at Stalingrad. (Bundesarchiv)
5 JU-87 Stuka over Stalingrad. (Bundesarchiv)
6 German infantry captain with sub-machine gun. (Bundesarchiv)
7 German infantry dug in, Stalingrad. (Bundesarchiv)
8 German assault, Stalingrad. (Bundesarchiv)
9 StuG IIIa, Stalingrad. (Bundesarchiv)
10 Tank factory, Stalingrad. (Bundesarchiv)
11 German StuG IIIa and infantry, Stalingrad. (Bundesarchiv)
12 German PzKpfw IIIj, advancing to Stalingrad. (Bundesarchiv)
13 US Sherman tank in town n
ear Aachen. (NARA)
14 Field Marshal Walter Model. (Bundesarchiv)
15 Colonel Gerhardt Wilck. (NARA)
16 US infantry fighting, Aachen. (US Army)
17 US Sherman tanks supporting infantry, Aachen. (NARA)
18 US M12 155mm Gun Motor Carriage, Aachen. (NARA)
19 US 75mm antitank gun, Aachen. (NARA)
20 US antitank position, Aachen. (NARA)
21 US M-4 tank, Aachen. (NARA)
22 German prisoners, Aachen. (NARA)
23 USMC F4U-5 Corsair, Korea. (USMC)
24 US Marines assault Inchon. (USMC)
25 US Marine squad on approach to Seoul. (USMC)
26 US Marine squad moving through Seoul. (USMC)
27 US Marine squad suppressing sniper fire, Seoul. (US Army)
28 US Marines evacuate wounded comrade, Seoul. (USMC)
29 Raising of American flag in Seoul. (Getty)
30 US Sherman tanks after Seoul. (US Navy)
31 General Douglas MacArthur. (US Navy)
32 US M-48 tank supporting Marines, Hue. (USMC)
33 US M-48 tank overlooking bridge, Hue. (USMC)
34 US Marines overwatching a walled garden, Hue. (USMC)
35 US Marine Ontos crewman, Hue. (NARA)
36 US Marines wearing gas masks, Hue. (Getty)
37 US Marines fighting house to house, Hue. (Topfoto)
38 General Jacques Massu. (Getty)
39 Larbi Ben M’Hidi. (Getty)
40 Casbah, Algiers. (Topfoto)
41 French paras enter Algiers. (Getty)
42 Saadi Yacef. (Getty)
43 Patroling soldier in Belfast, Northern Ireland. (IWM, MH30550)
44 British soldiers fire at rioters, Northern Ireland. (IWM, HU41939)
45 British soldiers patrol in Belfast, Northern Ireland. (IWM, TR32986)
46 British soldiers marching to control riot in Londonderry. (IWM, HU43396)
47 British troops guard a barricade, Northern Ireland. (Topfoto)
48 Aftermath of PIRA bombing, Belfast, Northern Ireland. (Fred Hoare)
49 Russian soldier in Grozny. (Topfoto)
50 Chechen fighter in Grozny. (Getty)
51 Destroyed Russian BMP2 armored personnel carrier, Grozny. (Getty)
52 Chechen fighters, Grozny. (Getty)
53 Ruins of Grozny. (Topfoto)
54 Israeli infantrymen, Jenin. (IDF)
55 Israeli Merkava tanks, Jenin. (IDF)
56 Israeli infantry, West Bank. (IDF)
57 Israeli infantry enter building, Jenin. (IDF)
58 Israeli Merkava tank observing Jenin. (IDF)
59 US soldier senter Ramadi hospital. (Defense Mil)
60 Euphrates River, Ramadi.
61 US infantry providing security, Ramadi. (US Military)
62 US Marines in urban combat in Iraq. (USMC)
63 US M-1A1 tank in firefight, Iraq. (USMC)
64 USMC infantryman, Ramadi. (USMC)
65 Rebel forces, Libya. (Getty)
66 Libyan rebel army, Tripoli, Libya. (Getty)
67 Syrian rebel forces, Aleppo, Syria. (Getty)
CHAPTER 1
URBAN WARFARE, PAST AND FUTURE
Urban Warfare – a military term that received unprecedented attention just prior to and after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 – describes the conduct of military operations in cities. As the US military entered combat in Iraq in 2003, the American military and public were both in awe of urban combat and made nervous by the challenges it posed. Supremely confident in their ability to fight and win a battle of armored vehicle maneuver, the US Army was much less confident about urban warfare. To the US Army it was a new, mysterious, and particularly nefarious type of warfare for which the US military was historically unprepared, and of which the US military was particularly wary.
That such a view prevailed in 2003 is not surprising given the generally poor knowledge of history within the general public and even among some of the professional military. The facts are, however, that urban warfare is not a new phenomenon; the US military has quite a bit of experience with urban warfare; and though, like all war, urban warfare can be brutal and costly, it is not unusually more so than warfare in many other environments. Urban warfare became the norm for US military operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. The nature of those operations in Iraq, including tactics, and operational and strategic context, was a natural extension of the type of urban warfare that developed over the latter half of the 20th century, since World War II. Modern urban warfare, in many respects, is not too different from urban warfare as practiced throughout the history of warfare. Given how warfare has evolved in the last decades of the 20th century, many experts believe that the complex urban battlefield will be the common environment for warfare in the 21st century. If that is the case, then military history is going “back to the future,” as an examination of military history reveals that urban warfare is common, and in fact is more common in the history of warfare than classic battle in the open field.
Urban warfare has existed since men began to wage war on other men. War is fundamentally about one group imposing its will on another group. The 19th-century German military philosopher, General Carl von Clausewitz, defined war as pursuing politics by other means. The word politics comes from the Greek word politika. Aristotle described politics as “affairs of the city.” In Greek the word for city is polis. In the modern world, as in the ancient, political discourse mostly takes place in large urban areas. Cities are where laws are passed and leadership resides. Logically then, to use force to impose political will on a group of people often requires that that force be exercised where the people live, where their leadership resides, and where they carry out their political activities – in cities. Politics, cities, and warfare are inextricably linked, and because of that connection, military forces through history have devoted much of their capability and effort to fighting for, in, and around cities.
Beyond the general nature of politics, there have been, and to this day remain, real, important military reasons for fighting in and for cities. One of the most important reasons for attacking a city was to capture the enemy’s political, economic, or cultural center, thereby destroying his morale, his ability to sustain a war, and his capability to govern. In other words, the city was attacked because it was the enemy’s center of gravity. This resulted in numerous battles for capital cities such as Rome and Paris. In ancient times, the Persian Empire’s efforts to subdue the independent Greek city-states centered on the most important city-state and its capital, Athens. Between 492 and 479 BC, the Persians mounted three separate unsuccessful campaigns to capture the Greek cultural and economic center. The Greeks succeeded in defending Athens in a series of brilliant battles fought not in the city but on its land and sea approaches. These victories were central to the Greeks’ successful resistance to the Persian invasions. In 1453, the successful siege and capture of the Byzantine capital of Constantinople by Muslim forces not only spelled the end of the Byzantine Empire but also ended Christian efforts to dominate theMiddle East. Thus, the successful attack or defense of a key city could decide the outcome of the campaign, the war, or the fate of an empire.
Attacking the urban political center of an opponent was often, but not always, decisive. The Persians eventually did capture an abandoned Athens but it did not lead to the success of their campaign. The capture of Mexico City by US forces in 1847 did not compel the surrender of Mexico. Napoleon’s successful capture of Moscow in 1812 did not compel the capitulation of Russia for, as historian David Chandler explained, the French capture of Moscow allowed the Russians to seize the initiative in the campaign and then wait for “General Winter” to wreak havoc on the French army. Napoleon’s focus on capturing the enemy capital and not on destroying the enemy’s field army contributed directly to the failure of his Russian campaign and his disastrous retreat. Attacking an urban area as a means to defeat a nation required careful evaluation of the military situation, geopoli
tical factors, culture, and economics before executing operations. An incomplete understanding of the role and importance of the urban area to the opponent could lead to an extensive expenditure of time and resources with little operational or strategic gain.
A compelling reason to attack urban areas was military operational necessity. Commanders sometimes attacked an urban area to destroy an enemy force located there or because of the strategic location of the urban area. Often the urban area contained a capability that was necessary for future operations. When defending, a commander often located his forces in an urban area because of his inferior capability and the increase in combat power provided by the inherent defensive qualities of the urban terrain. These reasons compelled commanders to engage in urban operations for purely military reasons. Strategic geographic position was an important reason for deciding to attack or defend a city. Wellington’s bloody siege of Badajoz in 1812 was necessary to secure the primary invasion route into Spain. During the American Civil War, General Ulysses Grant’s decision to capture Vicksburg was primarily motivated by that city’s strategic location on the Mississippi River. When Vicksburg surrendered on July 4, 1863, the Union gained unchallenged control of the river and divided the Confederacy geographically. This success greatly inhibited support and communications between the eastern and western Confederate states and was a devastating blow to the South’s morale and prestige.
Often urban operations were required to acquire a capability for future operations. This capability may have been an advance base, logistics facilities, or a harbor. In June and July 1758 during the Seven Years’ War, a 14,000-man British army under General Jeffery Amherst captured the French fortress city of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island. This city was important as a North Atlantic base for the fleet and facilitated the blockade of French Canada. The capture of the city enabled British land and sea operations and greatly inhibited the operations of the French fleet in North America.
When defending, an army that was outnumbered often took advantage of the inherent defensive qualities of urban areas to compensate for its lack of numbers and to offset other advantages enjoyed by an enemy. In 1683, an outnumbered Christian force of approximately 20,000, under the command of the Holy Roman Empire, took shelter in, and defended, Vienna rather than meet an Ottoman army of 75,000 in open battle. The fortifications of the city permitted the outnumbered and less mobile European army to avoid defeat for two months until a relief force of 20,000 arrived to lift the siege and drive off the Turks. As the examples of Mexico City and Moscow indicate, urban operations did not always result in the desired outcome, even when tactical success was achieved and the city occupied. And, as the Turks found out at Vienna, offensive operations against cities often were not successful despite a significant commitment of resources. Thus, it behooved a commander to consider carefully whether urban operations were absolutely essential to the overall operation or campaign.