Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare From Stalingrad to Iraq
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German infantrymen dug into a fighting position. The infantryman in the foreground is armed with the standard German infantry rifle of World War II, the 7.62mm Kar98k. The German position is built next to a knocked-out Soviet T-34 tank. (Bundesarchiv)
German infantry preparing for one of the last assaults to clear the Soviet Army from the west bank of the Volga in late fall 1942. For the infantry, Stalingrad was an unrelenting battle with no respite. The exhaustion caused by intense urban combat is evident on the faces of these men as they ready themselves to attack once again. (Bundesarchiv)
A Sturmgeschütz IIIa (StuG IIIa) maneuvers through the dust of Stalingrad in September 1942. The Sturmgeschütz III was a tracked infantry support vehicle, not a tank, and specifically designed to assist infantry reduce fortifications. It did not have a turret but had very thick frontal armor and was ideal for urban warfare. (Bundesarchiv)
Russian aerial bombs loaded on a rail car outside Stalingrad’s tank factory in November 1942. The tank factory was one of several large industrial complexes big enough that armored vehicles could fight inside the building. (Bundesarchiv)
A StuG IIIa carrying infantry to battle in Stalingrad, October 1942. The StuG IIIs were not part of the panzer corps but rather part of the German artillery corps because of their unique role of directly supporting the infantry. As evidenced in this scene, two months into the battle the city infrastructure was essentially destroyed. (Bundesarchiv)
Panzerkampfwagen IIIj (PzKpfw IIIj) of the 24th Panzer Division during the march to Stalingrad in the summer of 1942. The track draped across the front is intended to add some additional armor protection. The PzKpfw III was notoriously outgunned and less armored than its Soviet counterparts, but it still was a formidable opponent due to superior command and crew abilities. Most of the Sixth Army’s tanks were committed to the city fighting in Stalingrad when the Soviets launched their powerful counterattack in November and the 24th Panzer Division was caught in the surrounded city. (Bundesarchiv)
Sherman tanks move carefully through a town near Aachen. In addition to its firepower, the tank, when working in close coordination with infantry, could provide mobile cover from small-arms fire and allow infantry to close on a building. (NARA)
Field Marshal Walter Model, commander of Army Group B which included the Aachen area. Known as “Hitler’s fireman” for his ability to save desperate situations, he gave Aachen high priority and committed some of the best German units available to its defense. (Bundesarchiv)
Colonel Gerhardt Wilck (front left), commander of the 246th Volksgrenadier Division and the Aachen garrison. He had very specific orders from Hitler to defend the city to the last man and if necessary allow himself to be buried under its ruins. (NARA)
The Americans reorganized their infantry companies as assault units by attaching special equipment, engineers, and tanks to the companies. These were then divided amongst the platoons, making each platoon an individual assault team. Machine guns covered the streets while infantry moved through the building interiors as much as possible. (US Army)
Sherman tanks of the 743rd Tank Battalion support the 30th Division as it attacks to isolate Aachen. Though the Sherman tank was not the best tank of the war, in urban operations any armored vehicle is a critical asset to the attacking force. (NARA)
An M12 155mm Gun Motor Carriage (self-propelled gun) in action in Aachen. Tank guns and ammunition were not always sufficiently powerful to have great effects on the concrete and stone buildings of Aachen. Although primarily designed as an indirect-fire artillery weapon, M12s were specifically requested by the 1st Infantry Division for direct-fire support against buildings and bunkers. The powerful gun could bring down an entire building with one shot. (NARA)
A 57mm antitank gun fires on German defenses. The 57mm guns were somewhat effective at suppressing German defenders in buildings, allowing infantry to close in and assault the position. (NARA)
A 3in. antitank gun of the 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion establishes a position outside Aachen to guard against German armor. The Germans committed a significant amount of armor, including King Tiger tanks, in counterattacks to attempt to keep access to Aachen open. (NARA)
An M-4 tank of the 745th Tank Battalion in Aachen. Tanks operating in Aachen had to be very careful not to remain exposed on the open street for too long and not to get separated from the infantry they were working with. The German Panzerfaust anti-armor weapon was widely distributed among German infantry, easy to use, and deadly to the Sherman tank. (NARA)
German prisoners marching into captivity. Over 3,000 prisoners were captured in the main part of Aachen, which was attacked by two battalions of the 26th Infantry Regiment. (NARA)
US Marine Corps F4U-5 Corsair of VMF-312. The 1st Marine Division’s air wing gave them and the entire X Corps great flexibility in supporting the attack into Seoul. When the corsairs moved to Kimpo airfield it was possible for pilots to drive by jeep and visit the forward regiments and then return to the airfield to fly missions the same day. (USMC)
Marines of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines scale the seawall on the northern side of Red Beach, as the second assault wave lands at Inchon, September 15, 1950. Wooden scaling ladders are in use to facilitate disembarkation from the landing craft. (USMC)
A Marine squad on the approach to Seoul. Dispersal was essential because, though the main North Korean defensive position could be easily spotted, hidden snipers were a constant threat. (USMC)
A Marine squad, supported by an M-26 General Pershing tank of the 1st Marine Tank Battalion, moves through Seoul under fire. (USMC)
A Marine squad in Seoul suppresses sniper fire with small arms. The Marines are armed with M1 carbines and the M1 Garrand semi-automatic rifle. Outside the building in the background, is a Marine M-26 tank. (US Army)
Marines evacuate a wounded comrade down a street in Seoul. (USMC)
A Marine raises the American flag above the US consulate in Seoul, September 27, 1950. (Getty)
A US M-4 Sherman tank pushes another Sherman tank onto a Landing Ship Tank (LST) at Inchon for evacuation to Japan and repair. In the Marine 1st Tank Battalion, Sherman tanks were used as flamethrower tanks and as dozer tanks because those capabilities had not yet been adapted to the M-26. (US Navy)
US Army General Douglas MacArthur (center) conceived and supervised the Inchon-Seoul campaign. Many analysts believe it was his finest operation. He clearly understood the important political symbolism of recapturing Seoul. (US Navy)
A USMC M-48 tank supporting the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, in the battle for the citadel in Northern Hue. (USMC)
USMC M-48 tank overlooking the Highway One bridge over the Phu Cam Canal. The PAVN destroyed the bridge late in the battle, too late to stop USMC reinforcements moving into the southern part of the city. (USMC)
Marine riflemen, armed with M-16 assault rifles, establish a second-floor position overwatching a walled garden in Hue. (USMC)
A Marine Ontos crewman lays exhausted across the front of his vehicle. The 106mm recoilless rifle, six of which were mounted on the Ontos’ lightly armored frame, was the perfect weapon for punching holes in the sides of Hue’s concrete buildings. The dust cloud raised by firing the weapon also provided concealment as the Marines rushed across streets to assault buildings. (NARA)
Another characteristic of the battle for Inchon–Seoul was the integration of South Korean forces into the battle. There is no doubt that South Korean forces were not necessary to the battle. However, General MacArthur insisted that the ROK Marine Regiment and the 17th ROKA Infantry Regiment be integrated into operations and participate in the recapture of Seoul. Again, this insistence demonstrated that the fight for a capital city such as Seoul was as much about perceptions and information operations, as it was about tactics. The role of ROK infantry and Marines in the battle was small, but the prestige incurred by the ROK government was huge, and the battle did much to boost the morale and confidence of the ROK military which eventually would assum
e the largest burden of combat operations in the war and would prove itself capable of fighting not just the KPA, but also the Chinese Army effectively.
A final characteristic of the campaign for Seoul and the battles for Inchon and Seoul was the nature of the assaulting force. The assault force, X Corps, was a unique organization. Though its composition was strongly influenced by the lack of available forces in the early days of the Korean conflict, it was also uniquely tailored to the needs of modern urban combat. The X Corps was a true joint-service force, and a combined allied force, and thus had capabilities not found in a typical army corps. As a joint force it had unique amphibious, naval support, and close air support capabilities which were all critically necessary to the strategic situation, and the tactical problems involved in the recapture of the Korean cities. The leveraging of the capabilities of air and naval power reduced the need for large numbers of infantry, and reduced the casualties among the attacking US and ROK Marines and infantry. The navy ensured strategic surprise and supported the force logistically, and with naval gunfire. The air component augmented artillery fires, protected the force from North Korean airpower, and helped isolate the urban battlefield. Both air and naval forces provided a psychological boost to the assaulting US and ROK Marines and infantry, and demoralized the KPA defenders. As a combined US and ROK force, X Corps represented the unique political nature of the Korean conflict, and maximized the strategic gains that the recapture of the ROK’s capital represented. Neither a single-service corps, nor a completely American corps, could have conducted the operation as effectively, or achieved the same strategic success that the uniquely joint and combined allied X Corps was able to achieve. In many ways X Corps represented an ideal urban fighting organization.
CHAPTER 5
COMPLEX URBAN WARFARE
The Battle for Hue, 1968
Almost 20 years would pass before American military forces found themselves involved in a situation where urban combat skills were again important. Ironically, the next major city fight involving US forces came during the Vietnam War, a war known for its sharp conflicts in the mountains, jungles, and rice paddies. Vietnam was not a war generally associated with urban fighting, but in the winter of 1968, when the North Vietnamese launched the famous Tet Offensive, one of the major objectives of the offensive was to bring the war into the major urban centers of South Vietnam. One of the most decisive, hard fought, and dramatic of the 1968 battles was the battle for the city of Hue which began in the early morning of January 31.
Hue was one of the oldest and most revered cities of Vietnam, North and South. It was the ancient imperial capital of Vietnam, and also the center of the Catholic church of Vietnam. It remained, under the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the capital of Thua Thien Province. It was South Vietnam’s second largest city, covering an area of 67km2 (26 square miles), and home to a population of approximately 280,000 people. Hue was a coastal city, positioned where the Perfume River empties into the East China Sea. The river bisected Hue from east to west, dividing it into a northern and southern half. The northern portion of the city was older, and was dominated by the 18th-century Imperial Palace and citadel. The southern portion of the city was more modern and consisted of the main government buildings as well as Hue University. The Perfume River was crossed north to south by two important bridges. One was a railway bridge located in the western portion of the city and the other was a highway bridge supporting Highway One, the primary north–south roadway. Though not a major port, Hue also included a US Navy facility that permitted the offloading of supplies. Because of the bridges, highway, and port, Hue was an important transportation center along the logistics line that connected the major military logistics bases further south and the important military positions such as Kha Shan, north of Hue along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Vietnam. Though there was no doubt that Hue was an important urban area to the South Vietnamese government because of its size, history, military significance, and governmental role, an agreement between the two opposing governments, the southern Republic of Vietnam and the northern Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), declared Hue an open city that would not be used for military purposes by either side. For this reason, despite some warning that a major North Vietnamese offensive might be looming, the South Vietnamese and American militaries were not overly concerned with defending Hue itself.
The Tet Offensive
Prior to the launching of the Tet Offensive, the American command in South Vietnam, under US Army General William Westmoreland, was satisfied with the progress of the war. The year 1967, the second full year of the major American military commitment to Vietnam, had been a year full of battles. American casualties were high, but intelligence estimates were that the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong had suffered significantly worse. As the year ended the US commander traveled back to the United States to give President Johnson a personal, upbeat assessment. It was thus in December 1967 that General Westmoreland declared that he “could see the light at the end of the tunnel,” implying that the end of the war was not far off. Because of this assessment, the Tet Offensive came as a complete strategic surprise to the US and South Vietnam, despite some military indicators of an impending attack.
North Vietnam also recognized that South Vietnamese and American military operations were generally achieving success in their efforts to expel the North Vietnamese military from South Vietnam, and subdue the Viet Cong. Because of this, the DRV determined that the situation in the South would continue to deteriorate unless they made a bold move. General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), received permission from the DRV government to launch a general offensive in the South in 1968, supported by a general uprising of South Vietnamese communists. The PAVN scheduled the offensive to begin during the Tet holiday, a time when much of the South Vietnamese army would be on home leave. The objective was to use a combination of PAVN regular troops, in conjunction with the Viet Cong, to strike at key targets, mostly urban areas, throughout the South. American and South Vietnamese army forces would be destroyed as they counterattacked. Simultaneously, a spontaneous general uprising of the South Vietnamese population against the RVN’s government would ensure the destruction of the South Vietnamese government.
The city of Hue was assigned as the objective of the Tri Thien Hue Front command. The North Vietnamese plan to take the city was relatively simple. Viet Cong guerrillas, in civilian garb, would infiltrate the city in the days before the attack. They would observe targets and position themselves for the attack. On the night of the attack, the Viet Cong would spearhead the attack on the civilian targets and join with two battalions of PAVN sappers to attack military and government positions in the city. Two full regiments of PAVN infantry would then flow into the city to prepare it for defense against the inevitable counterattack. A third PAVN infantry regiment had the task of ensuring that the PAVN line of communications into Hue remained secure.
A Battle in Four Phases
The Viet Cong and PAVN launched their attack in the early, dark hours of January 31, 1968. It was timed to coincide with hundreds of other attacks all over South Vietnam, and achieved complete surprise. The initial attacking force, numbering perhaps as many as 10,000 PAVN and Viet Cong troops, captured most of the city with virtually no resistance. The PAVN 6th Regiment entered and secured the Citadel area north of the river aided by Viet Cong in South Vietnamese army uniforms who overwhelmed the Citadel’s west gate guard detail. The PAVN 4th Regiment quickly secured the south side of the river. The PAVN troops had received special training in urban fighting and immediately began to dig in and prepare defenses. Outside of the city, the PAVN 5th Regiment set up defensive positions to protect the attackers’ line of communications and supply into the city. At the same time that regular troops prepared for the inevitable counterattack, a special cadre of political officers moved through the city with a list of several thousand individuals to be placed under arrest.
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Map 5.1 The PAVN Capture of Hue, January 1968
Though the attack to capture Hue was a remarkable feat of arms that used stealth, intelligence, and boldness to seize the city with almost no fight, the execution of the assault was not flawless. The North Vietnamese had identified literally hundreds of large and small objectives inside the city, but the three most important were the headquarters of the 1st Army of Vietnam (ARVN) Infantry Division in the northeast corner of the Citadel; Tay Loc airfield, also in the citadel just to the north of the Imperial Palace; and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) compound, which housed the 1st ARVN Division’s American advisors, located on the south side of the river. The commander of the South Vietnamese division, Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong, had had several indicators of an impending attack and therefore had his division on full alert. His headquarters was fully manned and operating, as were all of his units, although over half of the division’s strength had been released on leave for the Tet holiday. General Truong was mistaken in his assumption that the North Vietnamese attack would not be directed at Hue itself, because of the city’s unique status and importance. Nonetheless, when the PAVN attack came, Truong’s division was alert and ready to respond.