The Crusades: The Authoritative History of the War for the Holy Land

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by Thomas Asbridge


  Ibn al-Qalanisi, p. 303.

  William of Tyre, p. 903; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 62; C. F. Petry (ed.), Cambridge History of Egypt: Islamic Egypt, 640–1517 (Cambridge, 1998); Y. Lev, State and Society in Fatimid Egypt (Leiden, 1991); Y. Lev, ‘Regime, army and society in medieval Egypt, 9th–12th centuries’, War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th–15th Centuries, ed. Y. Lev (Leiden, 1997), pp. 115–52.

  Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 138; William of Tyre, pp. 864–8. For the Latin perspective on the Egyptian campaigns of the 1160s see: Mayer, The Crusades, pp. 117–22; Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land, pp. 140–67.

  William of Tyre, p. 871; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 144; M. C. Lyons and D. E. P. Jackson, Saladin. The Politics of the Holy War (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 6–9.

  Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, pp. 144, 163; William of Tyre, p. 922; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 9–25; Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. 183–5.

  Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, pp. 175, 177; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 25–9.

  Holt, The Age of the Crusades, pp. 48–52; Mayer, The Crusades, p. 122; Jotischky, Crusading and the Crusader States, pp. 115–16; Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades, p. 68. On Saladin’s rule in Egypt see: Y. Lev, Saladin in Egypt (Leiden, 1999); Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 31–69.

  This colourful story makes a fine tale and, while it could be factual, it is recorded only in Ayyubid sources and thus remains uncorroborated. It is possible that some of its details may have been fabricated to justify a clampdown on the Fatimid court. Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 33–4.

  Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 180. On Outremer’s relations with Byzantium and the West in this period see: J. L. La Monte, ‘To What Extent was the Byzantine Emperor the Suzerain of the Latin Crusading States?’, Byzantion, vol. 7 (1932), pp. 253–64; R. C. Smail, ‘Relations between Latin Syria and the West, 1149–1187’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series, vol. 19 (1969), pp. 1–20; Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States, pp. 198–209; Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land, pp. 168–224.

  One Arabic chronicler suggested that al-Adid was poisoned, but even if Saladin was indeed involved in engineering the caliph’s rather timely death, a subtler form of assassination had been preferred to the traditional Egyptian bloodbath. Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 44–8.

  Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 46–9, 61–5; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, pp. 197–200, 213–14.

  Baha al-Din Ibn Shaddad, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, trans. D. S. Richards (Aldershot, 2001), p. 49.

  Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, pp. 221–2; William of Tyre, p. 956.

  Baha al-Din, p. 28; Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, Conquête de la Syrie et de la Palestine par Saladin, trans. H. Massé (Paris, 1972); Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, pp. 223–409; Abu Shama, ‘Le Livre des Deux Jardins’, IV, p. 159–V, p. 109; Gabrieli, Arab Historians of the Crusades, pp. 87–252; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 435–6. On the sources for Saladin’s life see: H. A.R. Gibb, ‘The Arabic sources for the life of Saladin’, Speculum, vol. 25.1 (1950), pp. 58–74; D. S. Richards, ‘A consideration of two sources for the life of Saladin’, Journal of Semitic Studies, vol. 25 (1980), pp. 46–65. On Saladin’s career from 1174 onwards see: S. Lane-Poole, Saladin and the Fall of the Kingdom of Jerusalem (London, 1898); H. Gibb, ‘Saladin’, A History of the Crusades, vol. 1, ed. K. M. Setton and M. W. Baldwin (Philadelphia, 1958), pp. 563–89; H. A. R. Gibb, ‘The armies of Saladin’, Studies in the Civilization of Islam, ed. S. J. Shaw and W. R. Polk (London, 1962), pp. 74–90; H. A. R. Gibb, ‘The Achievement of Saladin’, Studies in the Civilization of Islam, ed. Shaw and Polk, pp. 91–107; H. A. R. Gibb, The Life of Saladin (Oxford, 2006); A. Ehrenkreutz, Saladin (Albany, 1972); Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 71–374; H. Möhring, ‘Saladins Politik des Heiligen Krieges’, Der Islam, vol. 61 (1984), pp. 322–6; H. Möhring, Saladin: The Sultan and His Times 1138–1193, trans. D. S. Bachrach (Baltimore, 2008); Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, pp. 171–95. On the adoption of the title ‘sultan’ see: P. M. Holt, ‘The sultan as idealised ruler: Ayyubid and Mamluk prototypes’, Suleyman the Magnificent and His Age, ed. M. Kunt and C. Woodhead (Harrow, 1995), pp. 122–37.

  Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 73–4.

  Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 79–84; Baha al-Din, p. 51; William of Tyre, p. 968.

  Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 85–6.

  The first truce was apparently concluded in secret with the count of Tripoli in spring 1175 (just before the first battle against the Aleppan–Mosuli coalition), to forestall the opening of a second front against the Christians. In July that same year, the sultan entered into a more public dialogue with a high-level diplomat from the kingdom of Jerusalem. Admittedly, Muslim and Latin sources seem to agree that Saladin got the better deal in these negotiations, promising to release some Frankish captives from Homs in return for firm assurances that there would be no moves to counter his campaigns against Aleppo. Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 86–110.

  William of Tyre, pp. 953–4.

  Lewis, The Assassins, pp. 116–17.

  Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, p. 130; S. B. Edgington, ‘The doves of war: the part played by carrier pigeons in the crusades’, Autour de la Première Croisade, ed. M. Balard (Paris, 1996), pp. 167–76; D. Jacoby, ‘The supply of war materials in Egypt in the crusader period’, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, vol. 25 (2001), pp. 102–32.

  William of Tyre, pp. 961–2.

  B. Hamilton, ‘Baldwin the leper as war leader’, From Clermont to Jerusalem, ed. A. V. Murray (Turnhout, 1998), pp. 119–30; B. Hamilton, The Leper King and His Heirs: Baldwin IV and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem (2000).

  William of Tyre, p. 961. Piers Mitchell published a useful study of Baldwin IV’s leprosy as an appendix to Bernard Hamilton’s biography of the leper king (Hamilton, The Leper King, pp. 245–58).

  Anonymi auctoris Chronicon ad AC 1234 pertinens, ed. I. B. Chabot, trans. A. Abouna, 2 vols (Louvain, 1952–74), p. 141.

  William of Tyre, p. 991; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 253; Baha al-Din, p. 54; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 121–6; Hamilton, The Leper King, pp. 132–6.

  Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 130–33.

  The excavation of the castle at Jacob’s Ford, pioneered by Professor Ronnie Ellenblum of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, represents a massive breakthrough in the field of crusader studies. This dig offers an astonishingly detailed glimpse of the crusading world–the equivalent of a freeze-frame image of the twelfth century–because Jacob’s Ford is the first castle to be discovered as it was in 1179, with its slaughtered garrison still within its walls. Many of the physical and material finds from the site can be dated with incredible precision to the morning of Thursday 29 August 1179, because they lay beneath buildings known to have burned and collapsed when the fortress fell. Somewhat ironically, the fact that the stronghold was incomplete actually adds to its archaeological value, because its remains provide an invaluable insight into the construction techniques of medieval castle builders. William of Tyre, p. 998; M. Barber, ‘Frontier warfare in the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem: the campaign of Jacob’s Ford, 1178–9’, The Crusades and Their Sources: Essay Presented to Bernard Hamilton, ed. J. France and W. G. Zajac (Aldershot, 1998), pp. 9–22; R. Ellenblum, ‘Frontier activities: the transformation of a Muslim sacred site into the Frankish castle of Vadum Jacob’, Crusades, vol. 2 (2003), pp. 83–97; Hamilton, The Leper King, pp. 142–7; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 133–43.

  50 Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States, pp. 211–30. Not surprisingly, given the obvious advantages accrued by Saladin at al-Salih’s death, some rumours circulated suggesting that Ayyubid agents had poisoned the Zangid heir. However, Saladin’s initially slow and relatively inept reaction to al-Salih’s demise (which allowed Imad al-Din Zangi to seize power in Aleppo) probably indicates that the sultan was not involved. Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 143–60.

  Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 165–70; Hamilton, The Leper King, pp.
172–5.

  Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 170–75; Hamilton, The Leper King, pp. 175–7.

  William of Tyre, p. 1037.

  This territorial expansion prompted Saladin to redistribute power and responsibility within his realm. His brother al-Adil, who since 1174 had governed Egypt, was summoned to Syria to take possession of Aleppo–perhaps with some suggestion that he might be able to pursue semi-independent expansion in the Jazira. The sultan’s nephew Taqi al-Din was promoted, taking over responsibility for the Nile region. Saladin’s other trusted nephew Farrukh-Shah had died of ill-health in late 1182; for the time being he was replaced in Damascus by Ibn al-Muqqadam. Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, p. 202.

  It was once popular to suggest that the kingdom of Jerusalem’s Latin nobility were, at this time, divided into two distinct and opposing factions, vying for power and influence as Baldwin IV’s health and authority waned. On the one hand, it was suggested, were the ‘Native Barons’, including Count Raymond III of Tripoli and the Ibelins, who were familiar with the political and military realities of life in the Levant and thus willing to adopt a cautious approach in their dealings with Saladin and Islam; and on the other, the aggressive upstart ‘Court Party’, including Guy of Lusignan and Sibylla, Agnes and Joscelin of Courtenay and Reynald of Châtillon, who were supposedly headstrong newcomers. The problem with this picture, enthusiastically presented by the likes of Steven Runciman in the 1950s, was that it bore little relation to reality. The make-up and policies of these ‘factions’ were never so clear-cut, nor were the members of the ‘Court Party’ ill-informed new arrivals–Reynald of Châtillon and the Courtenays, for example, were well-established figures in Outremer. This traditional image of endemic political factionalism in the 1180s is also suspect because it tends, uncritically, to incorporate the views and prejudices of William of Tyre, who was himself closely embroiled in events and an ardent supporter of Raymond of Tripoli. P. W. Edbury, ‘Propaganda and Faction in the Kingdom of Jerusalem: The Background to Hattin’, in Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria, ed. M. Shatzmiller (1993), pp. 173–89; Hamilton, The Leper King, pp. 139–41, 144–5, 149–58.

  Ernoul, La Chronique d’Ernoul, ed. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871), pp. 69–70; Abu Shama, p. 231; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 185–8; Hamilton, ‘The Elephant of Christ’, pp. 103–4; Hamilton, The Leper King, pp. 179–85.

  These included Raymond of Tripoli who, after the attempted coup of 1180, had spent two years in the county of Tripoli (effectively in a state of exile from Palestine) before being reconciled with Baldwin IV in spring 1182. William of Tyre, pp. 1048–9; R. C. Smail, ‘The predicaments of Guy of Lusignan, 1183–87’, Outremer, ed. B. Z. Kedar, H. E. Mayer and R. C. Smail (Jerusalem, 1982), pp. 159–76.

  William of Tyre, p. 1058.

  Ibn Jubayr also provided a detailed description of the commercial taxes imposed by both Muslims and Latins upon ‘foreign’ traders. Under normal circumstances Muslim merchants passing through either Transjordan or Galilee paid the Franks a toll. This raises the possibility that Saladin targeted these two regions, in part, to open them to commerce free from Christian levies. Ibn Jubayr, pp. 300–301.

  Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 234–9. According to Ibn al-Athir (vol. 2, p. 309), Nasir al-Din ‘drank wine, indulging excessively, and by the morning he was dead. Some have related–and the responsibility for this is theirs–that Saladin arranged for a man, called al-Nasih, who was from Damascus, to go to him, carouse with him and give him a poisoned drink. Come the morning, al-Nasih was nowhere to be seen.’

  Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 239–41; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, p. 237; Ellenblum, Crusader Castles and Modern Histories, pp. 275ff.

  William of Tyre, p. 968. Around the same time, Ibn Jubayr (p. 311) applauded Saladin’s ‘memorable deeds in the affairs of the world and of religion, and his zeal in waging holy war against the enemies of God’, noting that ‘his efforts for justice, and his stands in defence of Islamic lands are too numerous to count’. This evidence is significant because it was not coloured by later events.

  Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 243–6.

  P. Balog, The Coinage of the Ayyubids (London, 1980), p. 77; N. Jaspert, The Crusades, p. 73.

  Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 320; Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, pp. 175–85.

  Imad al-Din, p. 22; C. P. Melville and M. C. Lyons, ‘Saladin’s Hattin Letter’, The Horns of Hattin, ed. B. Z. Kedar (Jerusalem, 1992), pp. 208–12.

  Imad al-Din, p. 23. On Saladin’s defeat of the Franks see: Libellus de expugnatione Terrae Sanctae per Saladinum, Radulphi de Coggeshall Chronicon Anglicanum, ed. J. Stevenson, Rolls Series 66 (London, 1875), pp. 209–62. A translation of this text is available in: J. A. Brundage, The Crusades: A Documentary Survey (Milwaukee, 1962), pp. 153–63. On the Battle of Hattin see: Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. 189–97; P. Herde, ‘Die Kämpfe bei den Hörnen von Hittin und der Untergang des Kreuzritterheeres’, Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte, vol. 61 (1966), pp. 1–50; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 255–66; B. Z. Kedar, ‘The Battle of Hattin revisited’, The Horns of Hattin, ed. B. Z. Kedar (Jerusalem, 1992), pp. 190–207.

  Imad al-Din, p. 25. My own experience of walking through Israel from the Lebanese border to Jerusalem in July 1999 made me realise just how vital water would be during a midsummer campaign. My water consumption peaked at an extraordinary seventeen litres per day! Luckily I had plenty of opportunities to fill my water bottles–in 1187 the Latins were not so fortunate.

  Eracles, ‘L’Estoire de Eracles empereur et la conqueste de la Terre d’Outremer’, RHC Occ. II (Paris, 1859), pp. 62–5; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 321; Imad al-Din, p. 26.

  Imad al-Din, p. 26; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 322.

  Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 323; Imad al-Din, p. 26.

  Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, pp. 323–4. This famous episode was recorded in numerous Muslim and Christian accounts, with minor variations on Reynald’s attitude (with some western sources claiming that he remained defiant to the last) and on whether Saladin killed Reynald with his own hand. For example, see: Melville and Lyons, ‘Saladin’s Hattin Letter’, p. 212; Imad al-Din, pp. 27–8; Baha al-Din, pp. 74–5; La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184–1197), ed. M. R. Morgan (Paris, 1982), pp. 55–6.

  Imad al-Din, pp. 28–9; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 324.

  Imad al-Din, p. 31. A similarly horrific spectacle of clumsy butchery had been played out for the amusement of spectators in 1178. On that occasion Imad al-Din himself was asked by Saladin to participate in a mass execution of Christian captives, but turned aside when he discovered that his allotted victim was but a boy. Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 131–2. Melville and Lyons, ‘Saladin’s Hattin Letter’, pp. 210, 212; Z. Gal, ‘Saladin’s Dome of Victory at the Horns of Hattin’, The Horns of Hattin, ed. B. Z. Kedar (Jerusalem, 1992), pp. 213–15.

  ‘Historia de expeditione Friderici Imperatoris’, Quellen zur Geschichte der Kreuzzuges Kaiser Friedrichs I, ed. A. Chroust, Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum (Berlin, 1928), pp. 2–4; La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, pp. 56–8. Acre’s immense wealth and valuable landed estates were distributed among three of Saladin’s most prominent lieutenants–al-Afdal, Taqi al-Din and Isa–although even Imad al-Din later admitted that the sultan might have been better advised to retain at least some of this booty for his own treasury. On Saladin’s strategy after Hattin see: W. J. Hamblin, ‘Saladin and Muslim military theory’, The Horns of Hattin, ed. B. Z. Kedar (Jerusalem, 1992), pp. 228–38.

  Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 328; Runciman, A History of the Crusades, vol. 2, p. 471.

  These hugely influential ideas can be traced through modern scholarship. In the 1950s Hamilton Gibb wrote that Jerusalem surrendered ‘on terms that confirmed–if confirmation were needed–[Saladin’s] reputation for limitless courtesy and generosity’ (‘Saladin’, p. 586). Around the same time, Steven Runciman–whose thre
e-volume account of the crusades often is marred by historical imprecision, but remains widely read–argued that the sultan specifically mentioned the events of 1099 in his dealings with Balian. Runciman added that ‘Saladin, so long as his power was recognised, was ready to be generous, and he wished Jerusalem to suffer as little as possible’, and the historian went on to contrast the ‘humane’ Muslims with the Franks who had ‘waded through the blood of their victims’ (A History of the Crusades, vol. 2, pp. 465–6). In 1988 these sentiments were echoed by Hans Mayer, affirming that Jerusalem’s inhabitants ‘had reason to be grateful that they were at the mercy of a merciful enemy’ (The Crusades, pp. 135–6). And Carole Hillenbrand, in her benchmark study of the crusades from an Islamic perspective (1999), highlighted Saladin’s magnanimity, arguing that for Muslim chroniclers ‘the propaganda value of the bloodless conquest of Jerusalem by Saladin count[ed] for much more than the temptation, soon overcome, to exact vengeance’ (The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, p. 316).

 

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