* * *
—
MARSHALL EXPLAINED THAT as a nation of farmers it was essential for the United States to trade with both France and Britain. The United States could not afford to become entangled in “all the future quarrels of Europe.”38 Marshall also implicitly suggested that to protect American virtue the United States had to keep its distance from European power politics.
France claimed that Jay’s Treaty and Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality violated America’s treaty obligations to France. In particular, France insisted that the United States had an obligation to defend French cargo on board U.S. merchant ships from seizure by the British navy. The 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between France and the United States recognized the right of all neutral nations’ vessels to resist capture by force of arms if necessary. This was known as the “right of armed neutrality.” Though a belligerent power had the right to seize military supplies as contraband, France complained that Jay’s Treaty gave the British rights to seize supplies and timber that were not, strictly speaking, “contraband.”
Marshall pointed out that Jay’s Treaty was silent on the right of armed neutrality. The British navy continued to assert its right to seize contraband on U.S. ships, and Jay’s Treaty had specifically listed naval provisions and timber as contraband subject to seizure on board neutral vessels.39 Marshall pointed to precedents from other countries’ treaties and foreign states’ practices that relied on a wider definition of contraband.40 He acknowledged that a rule that protected the free navigation of neutral countries was desirable, “[b]ut the wish to establish a principle is essentially different from a determination that it is already established.”41 Marshall was in the awkward position of having to defend a principle at odds with official U.S. policy.42 He knew that in the past decade most European countries had recognized the right of neutral parties to “free navigation” and armed neutrality. Many continental countries, including France, had endorsed this principle.43 Marshall’s point was that regardless of the views of the French and U.S. governments, Britain had rejected this principle. U.S. vessels had no choice but to accede to search and seizure of French goods.44 The United States could not defend itself against British naval power.
In this memorandum, Marshall was stating a legal position as if that would be sufficient to settle the question. France saw the issue very differently. The French were not interested in talking about legal rights; they were asserting their own interests. Marshall’s insistence on arguing the law rather than negotiate based on national interests was a sign to Talleyrand of American naïveté. Talleyrand concluded that the American commissioners did not understand power politics.
The Directory responded bluntly to Marshall’s legal memorandum: Not deigning to craft a legal response, it issued a decree to capture and condemn any neutral vessels carrying any products from Britain or its possessions.
When Marshall heard this news, his heart sank: The United States was caught between two world powers at war.
* * *
—
DECEMBER HAD BEEN relatively mild, but the weather turned sharply colder in January and February of 1798. The sun appeared rarely, and the winds picked up off the Seine. It had snowed only once during January, but in the mornings the streets were often glazed with ice. February was drier but still quite cold, and heavy clouds hung over the city ominously.45 Revolutionary Paris in the depths of winter was a dark and unsettling place: Even after the Reign of Terror ended, neighbors and police regarded one another with a toxic suspicion. An English-speaking stranger encountered that uncomprehending look that has long greeted tourists in the French capital. Paris did not welcome strangers even then.
On February 4, Gerry returned from a secret meeting with Talleyrand and informed his colleagues that he was “not at liberty” to tell them what the foreign minister had said. Marshall and Pinckney were furious. All Gerry would say was that the foreign minister would respond to him the next day, and upon his answer “depended peace or war.”46 It turned out that Gerry had been meeting secretly with Talleyrand and his agents for weeks.
When Talleyrand replied a few days later, Gerry proposed that the commissioners consider paying the bribe. At that, Marshall exploded. They had already agreed to refuse to pay the bribe. The United States could not accept a “humble state of dependent solicitation whilst [France] preserved a haughty and an angry distance.” Marshall warned that Talleyrand was dragging his feet to delay the United States from taking measures to defend itself against France.47
Gerry shot back that Marshall “could not judge of the propositions as they were not known to [him]” and that Gerry had a very different opinion of France.48
Marshall knew that further argument with Gerry would threaten their ability to continue to work together. It was late, and he was tired. He held his temper the best he could. “I wished very much that the Directory would order us off,” he told Gerry.49 Marshall could not have slept well that night.
Marshall judged—correctly—that Talleyrand had set out to divide the commissioners. He wondered “whether [France] will be content to leave us our Independence if she can cajole or frighten us out of it,” but he had no doubt that France intended to “keep and cherish” the Republican Party as her party. Marshall correctly suspected that the American Republicans were advising Talleyrand and that Talleyrand intended to send Marshall and Pinckney home and keep Gerry in Paris.50 Pinckney concurred.51 Marshall and Pinckney were convinced that Gerry had unwittingly become another of Talleyrand’s agents.
Marshall observed that France was unwilling to make peace with the United States so long as it believed it could defeat Britain, but it was also unwilling to go to war against the United States and so forge an Anglo-American alliance. Could the American commissioners compel Talleyrand to negotiate in good faith if they all threatened to quit France? In fact, the Americans could neither advance negotiations nor leave France so long as Talleyrand held their passports.52
They were trapped.
CHAPTER TWELVE
TOSSED INTO THE SEINE
After months of living in her home, Marshall had formed a close bond with Madame de Villette. He spent hours with de Villette every day, accompanied her to the theater, practiced his French with her, and traveled with her at least once. Whether he transgressed the bounds of marital fidelity is unknowable, but it would not be surprising. He had not heard from Polly for months, since he had departed Richmond. At forty-two, he was still a vigorous and attractive man with a tall, lean frame, dark features, and smiling eyes. Marshall loved women, and de Villette was an unattached dark beauty whose worldliness, vitality, and education contrasted with Polly’s sheltered experience and infirmities. Marshall had no close male friends other than Pinckney, who had his wife and daughter to amuse him, and he barely tolerated Gerry. It would be only natural that he, like so many other men, fell under the charm of La Belle et Bonne.
Madame de Villette loved to host parties as a way to introduce the American envoys to her French friends. She would typically invite a few French ladies and gentlemen in addition to Marshall, Gerry, Pinckney, and Pinckney’s wife, Mary. The evening usually began with a musical performance that included singers and a pianist. Then there might be some dancing before “tea” was served about midnight. The guests would move into the dining room, and de Villette would set out teapots and a large brioche in the middle of a round table surrounded by cups and saucers. There was a second table that would feature a towering pyramid of assorted cakes and flavored ices. On the sideboards were cold turkey, slices of veal with mint jelly, and baskets of oranges and pears. The gentlemen would assist Madame de Villette by serving the ladies and pouring abundant champagne and sweet liqueurs. After all that, she would serve quarters of orange peel filled with sweet orange jelly. Around one a.m., when everyone was loosened up by the alcohol and the late hour, the petits jeux would begin.1
On one particular evening, one of the F
rench ladies proposed a new game that the Americans were unfamiliar with. She explained that someone would be sent out of the room, and the rest would secretly decide on a mission that this person must perform when he or she returned. The mission might be something like placing a particular pillow at the foot of a lady or moving a chair to another location. Before the person reentered the room, one of the ladies would sit down to play on the piano very loudly, which was the signal for the person to return. When he or she entered the room, the piano would grow softer if the person moved toward the object of the mission and louder if he or she moved away from it. The only clue the person had was the music.2
Mrs. Pinckney later described in a letter to her cousin a certain unnamed “lady, & the most beautiful in the room,” who was very likely Madame de Villette. When she was sent out of the room, the guests decided that “she was to present her hand to a [particular] gentleman to kiss.” Mrs. Pinckney was being discreet in that there were only a few gentlemen present, and the only two men mentioned who were not accompanied by their wives were Marshall and Gerry. While we cannot be sure whom Mrs. Pinckney referred to, we know that Marshall loved games and was naturally genial and outgoing while Gerry was rather stiff and serious. It seems likely that Madame de Villette was intended to offer her hand to Marshall. She went all around the room as the music grew deafening until she stopped in front of the particular gentleman, who was at that moment standing. Then the music quieted a bit. But as she pondered what she was supposed to do with him, the music grew loud again. She was obviously embarrassed by not knowing what was expected of her, and he did nothing to assist her until she reached out and took his hand. She assumed she had to lead him back to his chair. But the gentleman surprised her by lifting her hand to his lips.3
Party games then, as now, were often ways of engaging in behavior that might otherwise be presumptuous. In organizing a game among a few single women and two unaccompanied men after everyone had consumed a fair amount of alcohol, one could expect flirtation to follow. If we are correct that Marshall kissed de Villette’s hand, then Mrs. Pinckney’s reluctance to name them may indicate that she thought that their kiss was more than a game.
* * *
—
THERE WERE MORE THAN one hundred American merchants doing business in Paris at the time, often with close ties to the French government. A large number of these men came to know Jefferson and Monroe during the time they were envoys to France and considered them friends. Many belonged to the Decadi Club, an informal network of American businessmen who would mingle over meals at an upscale restaurant in the Palais Royal. Most were solid Republicans who staunchly supported the French government even to the extent of criticizing their own. Numerous club members wrote or visited one or more of the American commissioners repeatedly to pressure them to accept Talleyrand’s demands. They also wrote letters back to Republican leaders in the United States that accused Pinckney and Marshall of trying to provoke a war with America’s oldest ally.4
One of these expatriates was Nathaniel Cutting, the U.S. consul in Le Havre, who had his own business interests in the French West Indies. Cutting wrote to the three American commissioners urging them to avoid a costly war by agreeing to finance France’s war against Britain and deferring any claims on behalf of captured American ships. Cutting advised them to set aside “the antiquated Face of Diplomatic etiquette” and any moral qualms about paying bribes: Those “who consult only their own liberal ideas of moral Rectitude and take offence to what they call ‘National Honor and Dignity,’ are doubtless disposed rather to ‘hurl back defiance in the teeth of France,’” he wrote. But “once we ‘let slip the Dogs of War,’ One hundred millions of Dollars would not enable us to enchain them again.”5
Cutting also wrote to James Monroe, then a U.S. senator from Virginia, that “the cold reception, bordering on contempt” with which Talleyrand received the Americans was “the most striking comment that can be given on the imbecile and supercilious conduct of many conspicuous characters in the government of the United States.” Cutting blamed Marshall and Pinckney and expressed sympathy for the difficult situation in which Gerry found himself, unable to negotiate with his colleagues.6
In addition, Cutting wrote to various Republican newspapers in the United States attacking Marshall. One letter called Marshall “an unequivocal enemy of France” and excoriated President Adams for appointing him.7
Another prominent expatriate businessman was Fulwar Skipwith, the consul general in Paris. Skipwith wrote to his friend Jefferson demanding that the U.S. government should “confess some of our errors” and lay the responsibility “upon the shoulders of a few persons who perpetrated them.” There was no doubt he meant the commissioners. He urged the United States to repudiate Jay’s Treaty and “lend France as much money, should she ask for it, as she lent us in our hour of distress.”8
These American expatriates in Paris were working with Talleyrand and the Republicans in the United States to discredit Marshall, Pinckney, and President Adams. The antagonism of his fellow Americans left Marshall isolated. The only person Marshall felt he could rely upon, besides Pinckney, was Madame de Villette.
* * *
—
SOME HISTORIANS HAVE SUGGESTED that de Villette was another agent working for Talleyrand.9 No one was better situated than she was to observe the American commissioners. She had known Talleyrand socially since Talleyrand first came to visit Voltaire. De Villette and Talleyrand shared a cultlike devotion to the writer’s memory.10 Talleyrand attended dinners in her home with the envoys on at least two occasions, though neither Marshall nor his colleagues kept any record of these informal meetings.11 The British ambassador had lived with de Villette at one time, and it’s inconceivable that she could have escaped the attention of the French government.
And it was not by chance that Marshall and Pinckney came to live with de Villette. Apparently, either Skipwith; James Mountflorence, Skipwith’s vice-counsel; Beaumarchais; or Joel Barlow, another expatriate, had arranged for Marshall and Gerry to move into de Villette’s home. All four had working relations with Talleyrand and actively tried to persuade the American commissioners to provide the loan that Talleyrand demanded. Skipwith was actively working with Jefferson to embarrass the commissioners. Mountflorence, a French national, introduced Hottinguer to the Americans. Mountflorence, who had earned his fortune selling worthless land in America to unsuspecting Frenchmen, was not the sort of man to be bothered by a conflict of loyalties.12 We know that Beaumarchais tried to facilitate the payment of a bribe to Talleyrand. Barlow was de Villette’s neighbor and a zealous supporter of French republicanism who collaborated with Talleyrand. He disparaged Pinckney and Marshall and thought that if Gerry had “not been shackled with the other two, the Directory would have negotiated with him without any difficulty.”13
Talleyrand, it seems, left little to chance. It seems more than coincidental that Gerry and Marshall were invited to move to de Villette’s home immediately after Pinckney had rebuffed repeated requests for a loan and a bribe on behalf of Talleyrand. It was at this point that Talleyrand realized that Pinckney was no longer useful to him, and he made the strategic decision to try to influence Marshall and Gerry instead. To accomplish this, he wanted to isolate Pinckney. Moving Marshall and Gerry to a more appealing location away from Pinckney where they were under the lovely, watchful eyes of Madame de Villette made sense.14
The French had long relied on a well-developed internal security network to glean information especially from foreign envoys. Every move that foreign diplomats made was reported to the Foreign Ministry. The Paris police also engaged in surveillance, which sometimes was inconsistent with the wishes of the ministry. Revolutionary France, and Paris in particular, was crawling with British agents. The British spies in France were far better informed about the activities and opinions of the American commissioners than was the U.S. government.15 Talleyrand knew all of this, and he himself had on
going contacts with British agents. (Talleyrand was always careful to keep one foot on either side of the fence.) The British would want to sabotage any talks with the Americans and prevent any loan to finance the French war effort. For these reasons, Talleyrand wanted a spy in the heart of the American operations to ensure he would know in advance of any American plans to aid the British.16
The Paris police had informants watching de Villette’s house at all times, and the police dossier on her refers to the envoys meeting at her home. These police reports were provided to Talleyrand at his request. One historian has argued that the fact that the Paris police were already spying on her home would have made it unnecessary for Talleyrand to employ her as a spy.17 However, it was common for the French and the British to have duplicate spies to corroborate intelligence. During the American Revolution, for example, French and British spies were strategically placed inside the American headquarters in the village of Passy, just outside Paris.18 Although no correspondence was ever recorded between Talleyrand and de Villette, the foreign minister probably destroyed any records of his own surveillance.
Over drinks in the salon or dinner in her large dining room, Madame de Villette encouraged the three envoys to extend credit to France. Pinckney reported discreetly to Secretary of State Pickering that a certain “unnamed lady” made them an offer: “If you were to make us a loan, all matters will be adjusted,” she assured them.19 “M. Talleyrand has mentioned to me (who am surely not in his confidence) the necessity of your making us a loan, and I know that he has mentioned it to two or three others; and that you have been informed of it; and I will assure you that, if you remain here six months longer, you will not advance a single step further in your negotiations without a loan.”20 We can reasonably assume that the lady in question was de Villette. We know that the envoys met at her home numerous times around December 20, 1797. Pinckney and Marshall did not record any meetings with another woman, and it makes sense that Pinckney would have wanted to protect de Villette’s identity. Indeed, Marshall made a point of omitting from his journal Beaumarchais’ name as well, indicating that he wanted to protect his friends.
Without Precedent Page 16