Would La Belle et Bonne, a woman known for her kindness, purity, and religious devotion, spy for the French government? De Villette had already spent ten terrifying months locked up by the Directory and narrowly escaped the guillotine. She had struggled with poverty as a young woman, endured a painful and humiliating marriage, and now in middle age found herself with two children to support with little income. It seems reasonable that de Villette would do whatever was necessary to protect her family and avoid offending the Directory. Providing her government with information about the activities and opinions of her houseguests would seem only prudent under the circumstances.
Did Marshall realize the danger in becoming involved with a foreign agent?21 Or did his heart deceive his head? And did Marshall’s relationship with de Villette incline him to continue negotiations longer than necessary? Or did the risk of falling in love cause him to leave France sooner than expected?
* * *
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AFTER FIVE MONTHS of waiting for negotiations to start, Marshall and Pinckney had decided to return to the United States—although the French foreign minister had not returned their passports. It was eight in the evening one night in February, and Marshall was packing when there was a knock at his door. Marshall was not anticipating this visit from Beaumarchais, who was visibly upset to hear about Marshall’s imminent departure. Beaumarchais tried to persuade Marshall that a loan would be unlikely to trigger war with Britain because Britain had too many commercial interests in the United States.22 Beaumarchais, a playwright who traded in irony, once made the same argument to Louis XVI: That if France aided the American Revolution, it would not lead to war with Britain.23 He was wrong then, and he was wrong now.
As a friend to America, Beaumarchais warned that France would “revolutionize” Britain and reduce it to the status of the Cisalpine Republic, a French satellite in northern Italy, while France would monopolize world commerce. “It behooved us as wise men,” he advised Marshall, “to balance these evils well in our minds and to take such measures as would secure the peace of our nation.”24
Marshall was well aware of the dangers that Beaumarchais mentioned, but compromising American independence was too high a price to pay. The demand for a loan was extortion, Marshall believed, and if the American commissioners succumbed, there would be no end to France’s demands.25 Beaumarchais left dispirited. The two revolutions he had played a role in were now on a collision course, and he could do nothing to stop it.
Marshall drafted one more letter to Talleyrand, repeating all their prior arguments and concluding that since “the demands of France render it entirely impracticable to effect the objects of their mission,” they therefore must “retire from France, til the government of the French republic shall be willing to consider and receive them as the representatives of their country.” They requested their passports and added one final request to meet with Talleyrand.26
It was probably no coincidence that just when the letter was translated and ready for their signature Marshall and Gerry were invited by Madame de Villette to join her and an unnamed Frenchwoman for a long weekend at her country estate thirty miles outside Paris. Gerry cautioned Marshall that if they signed the letter and delivered it to Talleyrand he would order them to leave France immediately, in which case they should send their regrets to Madame de Villette and prepare to leave France at once.27
Madame de Villette’s invitation offered Gerry a convenient excuse not to send the letter. This was clearly a clever ruse by Gerry and de Villette. Gerry knew that Marshall would rather delay sending the letter than miss a weekend away with Madame de Villette. Indeed, this incident suggests that Marshall’s relationship to de Villette was more than a friendship.
It is also curious that Marshall, who took detailed notes of all his engagements and conversations in France, did not record any mention of this weekend in his journal and that neither he nor Gerry wrote about it to anyone. Mrs. Pinckney, who was not present, wrote a detailed description of the weekend to her cousin. Out of discretion, she omitted Madame de Villette’s name, which added to the intrigue.
De Villette’s château was situated on a wooded estate fronting the Seine. She once described her country house as “charming without being magnificent,” according to Mary Pinckney. The pastoral setting was “delicious, & such as no traveller could pass without stopping to admire it, yet not so splendid as to make him hate the posessors.” De Villette liked to look out her window as travelers stopped to admire her château and imagine their thoughts: “What a sweet house, what a charming spot—nature has here taken pleasure in lavishing all her beauties. How happy the owners must be. If I had such a place I think sorrow could never approach me.” In fact, since her “reversal of fortune,” de Villette had suffered more than enough sorrow for a lifetime.28 Marshall spent three days here with this extraordinary woman. Whatever transpired between them, the moment must have been bittersweet. Marshall knew he would soon be leaving.
* * *
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THE PARTY RETURNED TO PARIS on February 24, and the next morning Gerry received a visit from Talleyrand’s clerk. Talleyrand had been tipped off as to the envoys’ intentions. The clerk made a new proposal: France might accept a promise that the United States would provide a loan after peace was achieved with Britain. Such a loan would avoid antagonizing Britain. Gerry found this idea appealing, and it gave him an excuse to refuse to sign the letter to Talleyrand demanding their passports.29
Marshall could not believe that Gerry was reneging on his promise. Their shared memories from a weekend in a sylvan paradise with Madame de Villette evaporated instantly in the heat of argument. Marshall reminded Gerry that they had no authority to authorize any loan—either before or after peace was declared.30 He pointed out that a promise to lend money in the future was no different than a loan in the present because France could borrow against it. Whatever funds France received would work to “aid the descent on England, to subjugate our own country and to forge chains with which to manacle ourselves.”31 Marshall was implicitly acknowledging that American independence was bound up with the fate of Britain.
Gerry admitted that Talleyrand’s demand was unreasonable, but he insisted that “we ought to consider the Actual state of things and do that which would conduce most to the interest of the nation.” War would cost “at least two-hundred million dollars and would inflict miseries and dangers which were incalculable.” What Gerry called “true wisdom” would be to “stand in the gap between our Country and France and prevent a war by the stipulation to lend 8 or 10,000,000.”
Gerry had a valid point, of course. Paying extortion would be cheaper than going to war. As a compromise, Gerry suggested that if there was any doubt that they were authorized to lend this amount one of them should return posthaste to Philadelphia and secure Congress’s approval. Gerry offered to return home to obtain fresh instructions for this purpose.32 Of course, this would only serve Talleyrand’s purpose of delaying negotiations until after the conquest of Britain.
Marshall retorted that a loan in any amount would be a surrender of national independence and would not spare America from being dragged into the European war. “France had made an unprovoked war upon our commerce as a mean by which to force our Government into measures it disapproved of and deemed highly injurious,” Marshall charged. If the United States “under the leash” acceded to France’s demands, “we no longer acted for ourselves.” Three times the foreign ministry had threatened to expel them, and nothing had happened. “This demonstrated the object of the Government to be to keep us here in our present abject state while every species of hostility should be practiced on our country, until France should be in a situation to strike us effectually.” Marshall argued that the envoys should return home at once to warn their countrymen to prepare for war.33
Marshall and Pinckney felt that Gerry had betrayed them. As their voices rose in anger, Marshall could barely contain himse
lf. Pinckney, nodding in agreement with Marshall, sat in stony silence, shocked by Gerry’s behavior. Gerry accused Marshall of being overly suspicious of France. He warned “that it was extremely unwise for a man to deliver himself up entirely to suspicion” and that for a statesman it endangered the whole nation. Marshall shot back that to assume France would honor its promises was no more justifiable than to suppose France would cheat them. “The best guide we could take for the future was the past,” Marshall reasoned, and France’s behavior had certainly given them no reason for confidence. Marshall doubted the French really cared about the loan. France was now making this proposition “merely to amuse us.”34 Marshall correctly assessed that Talleyrand’s real purpose was to delay negotiations as long as possible.35 Further discussion was pointless. Marshall went to bed, but he had another restless night. The rift between Gerry and his colleagues was irreparable.36
The following morning at ten o’clock, Marshall met again with Beaumarchais. By now Marshall must have realized that Beaumarchais was working for Talleyrand. Marshall had scolded Gerry numerous times for continuing private discussions with Talleyrand’s agents, but since Beaumarchais was also Marshall’s client in his claim against Virginia, Marshall could not refuse to meet with him.37
Beaumarchais’ message was stark: Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal were all compelled to help finance France’s war effort. “[T]he United States must also advance them money or take the consequences.”38 It was a disturbing warning from a man who counted himself a friend of America’s.
The three U.S. envoys continued to argue over the proposed loan for the next several days. Gerry warned his colleagues that if they failed to purchase peace with France, Americans might revolt against their own government rather than risk war with France.39 Marshall proposed that the envoys ask one last time for an interview with Talleyrand to see if there was any chance for negotiation without first promising to pay France or the foreign minister. Gerry, however, would not agree to any language that precluded the possibility of a loan to France. The envoys agreed not to raise the issue of a possible loan, but that if Talleyrand suggested it they would reply that they would “consider” it.40 This was a completely disingenuous compromise. Marshall and Pinckney had already made clear they would never consider lending France money.
To their surprise, Talleyrand promptly agreed to see them. This would be their first and only official negotiation with the foreign minister—after five months of delay.
The day before the scheduled meeting, Gerry was called to a private meeting with Talleyrand before the minister met with the other Americans.41 Gerry returned and informed his colleagues that Talleyrand had reaffirmed that he would not trouble the Directory with any American proposal until they agreed to a loan. Moreover, Gerry bluntly told them, Talleyrand preferred to conclude a treaty with Gerry on his own.42
At three in the afternoon on March 2, 1798, Talleyrand welcomed the three Americans in his office. Sunlight poured through the windows, and for the first time in months, it was warm enough to leave them open. The bright spring weather seemed at odds with the dark mood of the envoys.43 Pinckney, as the senior negotiator, began by saying that the United States was eager to remove any differences between the two countries and that they had received many informal proposals through various channels that they did not find practical to negotiate through.44
Talleyrand replied that the Directory was “extremely wounded” by President Washington’s Farewell Address eighteen months earlier and by President Adams’s speeches to Congress in May and November of the prior year. Incredibly, Talleyrand complained that the Americans had “not once waited on him,” which was manifestly false.45 The Directory needed some proof of a “friendly disposition” before they would agree to a treaty with the United States. He alluded to a loan as one way of demonstrating this. When Pinckney interjected that they had no authority to negotiate a loan, Talleyrand cut him off quickly. Talleyrand insisted that any diplomat at such a distance from his government would have such authority. Since their instructions were silent as to whether they could advance a loan, then nothing prohibited it. If the commissioners sincerely wanted to settle their differences with France, they would find a way to grant the loan. Otherwise France was not negotiating with “persons of a temper hostile to it.”46
At this point, Gerry, ignoring his promise not to raise the subject, suggested that a loan could be made payable after the war in supplies to Santo Domingo, in what is now the Dominican Republic. Talleyrand coyly signaled that this might be a solution. Gerry and Talleyrand had obviously discussed this idea in advance.47
Marshall ignored Gerry’s proposal and responded to the foreign minister that the United States was committed to maintaining its neutrality and therefore could never furnish money to France. However, the United States could perhaps negotiate a loan when the war was over.48 Marshall was willing to consider a future loan without putting it down on paper to prevent France from using a pledge of a future loan to obtain credit from another country.
Talleyrand insisted that there must be some “immediate aid” to prove America’s friendship. Alluding to France’s aid during the Revolutionary War, he added that “the principles of reciprocity would require it.” At the end of the hour, Talleyrand abruptly stood up. He coldly informed the envoys that since the Directory would not recognize them as diplomats they could see him in the future only as private individuals to discuss these matters further.49 After more than five months in Paris, the Americans had not advanced a single step.
Marshall felt crushed. He wrote in his journal that day, “I have cursed a thousand times the moment when a sense of duty inducd me to undertake this painful embassy.”50
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LATER THAT DAY, Gerry came to Marshall’s room at Madame de Villette’s thinking he might persuade his colleague to agree to a loan after the war. Marshall replied that he was no less sure “that I stood on my feet and not my head, than that our instructions would not permit us to make the loan required.” Marshall suggested that he and Gerry should return to Philadelphia at once and lay out the case to President Adams for and against a loan. That would leave Pinckney in Paris as the permanent envoy. Marshall feared that if Gerry was left in Paris on his own he would succumb to the influence of Talleyrand and his agents. To his surprise, Gerry agreed.51
But the matter was still not settled. The envoys arranged one last visit to Talleyrand on the morning of March 6. First, Gerry stopped by Marshall’s room with a new proposal: Since the Directory was offended by the speeches of Washington and Adams, the envoys should offer to insert into a new treaty a clause declaring that the presidents’ statements were “founded in mistake.” Marshall thought it would be presumptuous for three envoys, acting on their own, to tell a foreign government that their presidents were mistaken—and it would be “an absolute lie.”52
Gerry exploded. He “wished to God” that Marshall would suggest something “accommodating.” Marshall was shocked by Gerry’s tone, but rather than lash out at him, he chose not to reply.53
At their final meeting with Talleyrand, Pinckney reiterated that they had no authority to proceed with a loan. Talleyrand tried to persuade the commissioners that the loan could be “cloathed” in secrecy. If France acknowledged that it owed compensation to American citizens, would the United States not extend credit for two years before France paid them? Of course, the envoys agreed. Well, then, Talleyrand replied with a sly grin, that was “precisely the same thing” as giving France a loan.54
Marshall responded that the two cases were not at all alike: The former relied on the commissioners authorizing an action without permission; the latter depended on France recognizing their debt and then postponing the payment. The first case required the United States to act affirmatively to transfer money; the second case consisted of the French government denying restitution to Americans.55 The value of a commercial treaty to France would be much
greater than the face value of the loan proposed, Marshall pointed out. When he informed Talleyrand that he and Gerry would be returning to Philadelphia for further instructions, Talleyrand said nothing.56 The foreign minister already knew their intentions.
Late that night, Beaumarchais again visited Marshall. He had learned that the Directory would return passports to Pinckney and Marshall but would insist that Gerry remain to represent the United States. In effect, Talleyrand had chosen Gerry as the permanent U.S. commissioner to replace Pinckney. Since Marshall knew that Beaumarchais would report whatever he said to Talleyrand, he replied indifferently that he “did not wish to stay another day in France, and would as cheerfully depart the next day.”57
Beaumarchais offered to accompany Marshall back to the United States to provide testimony that Marshall had served the country well and dispute whatever libels the French government and their Republican allies might spread that would blame Marshall for bringing the two countries to the brink of war. Marshall appreciated the offer, but he thought he could defend himself against any lies. He “felt no sort of apprehension for consequences, as they regarded me personally: that in public life considerations of that sort never had and never would in any degree influence me.” Before they parted, Marshall assured Beaumarchais that even if their countries went to war, their personal “conduct would always manifest the firmness of men who were determined, and never the violence of passionate men.”58
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