A Line in the Sand

by Ray Wiss

  Claymore mines are specifically excluded from the treaty. Why?

  Our Claymores are placed at strategic sites all around our FOB. These sites can be seen by our OPs. They are not linked to pressure plates, trip wires or any other mechanism that would make them explode if someone walked by or even directly onto them. The Claymores can only be detonated by an intentional electrical signal sent by the FOB’s defenders.

  Claymores do not function as mines, but rather as a close-in defensive system for the OP, to be used if we are faced with a ground attack by foot soldiers. In other words, we use a Claymore the same way we would use a shotgun—a very large shotgun. The correct term for these devices is “defensive command detonated weapons.”

  We know exactly how many Claymores we have placed around the FOB and we know exactly where they are. When the time comes for us to leave the FOB, we will deactivate them and take them back with us. Nothing harmful will be left behind.*

  AUGUST 8 | A Canadian Achievement

  I was woken up at 0400, by yet another Afghan soldier with abdominal pain. The history and physical exam this time were much more suggestive of gastroenteritis. We kept the patient in the UMS for several hours, rehydrated him with intravenous fluids and gave him medication for the pain and nausea. By 1200 he was feeling much better and was able to go back to his barracks. The only medic remaining on the FOB, Corporal Martin Pelletier, took care of the patient from beginning to end.

  That was the sum total of the visits to the UMS today, so there was not much for me to do. This makes it a good day to discuss something I have wanted to talk about for some time. I have nothing but contempt for Barack Obama’s predecessor, and I totally disagree with the American invasion of Iraq. It follows that I could not agree more with the current president’s decision to wind down the war in Iraq while ramping up American efforts here. I like to say that it is never too late to stop making a mistake, and I think that precisely describes what President Obama is doing in both places.

  We are beginning to see the impact of his decision on the ground. Apart from the three main FOBs encountered in this diary, Canada has also built two smaller combat outposts. FOB Frontenac is located northeast of here, in the Shah Wali Khot district; FOB Spin Boldak is to the southeast, almost at the Pakistani border, beside a small town of the same name.

  The Shah Wali Khot and Arghandab districts have always been “the other places the Canadians went.” There was less combat activity in those districts, so you may well have never heard of them. They were far from the main focus of our operations in Zhari-Panjwayi, but until this roto there had been no other Coalition troops to cover them. The same could be said about Spin Boldak.

  While these FOBs occasionally hosted several dozen Canadian soldiers, we never had enough long-term combat power deployed there to enable us to pacify the area. All that has changed with the increased American presence. We are therefore pulling out of these FOBs and turning them over to much larger groups of U.S. soldiers.

  But whereas our withdrawal from FOB Frontenac and FOB Spin Boldak had been announced months ago, we were surprised a couple of weeks ago when it was announced that we would also be turning FOB Wilson over to our allies. Major Tim Arsenault and Bravo Company will be moving into FOB Ma’Sum Ghar. The FOB Wilson UMS staff will go back to KAF.

  This makes eminent military sense. FOB Wilson is being dramatically expanded and will house a full American battalion. This is at least six times as many soldiers as we had deployed there. The Americans will concentrate on Zhari district while we focus our efforts in the Panjwayi.

  This concentration of firepower will make life very difficult for the Taliban in Zhari-Panjwayi. Until now, we have been able to keep the enemy at bay. Anytime they gathered in groups of any size, we would detect them, pursue them and usually destroy them.

  But we were trapped in a quandary in which counterinsurgency forces often find themselves: we could defeat the enemy on the battlefield and chase them out of any particular sector, but we did not have enough “boots on the ground” to prevent them from filtering back in once the fighting was over. Thanks to the vastly increased American presence, Zhari-Panjwayi is about to be inundated with Coalition troops.

  As good as that news is, I admit that it leaves me with a twinge of worry. For three long years now, Canada has held the line in Kandahar province. In 2006, we pushed the Taliban out of what had been their homeland and denied them easy access to Kandahar City. Since then, we have kept them on the run in this, their native ground. If the Coalition is victorious in Kandahar province, it will be a victory built on that Canadian achievement. It will be a grave injustice if the histories that will be written about this war do not acknowledge that.

  AUGUST 9 | Where Are They Now?

  The combat team returned to the FOB early this morning. The place is bustling again and, even if it means that I have to wait in line for my meals and take my turn on the Internet, I like this better.

  There was no contact with the enemy. Not a single shot was fired in anger. This is not to say that the mission was not a success. Two noteworthy events took place.

  First, a mid- to high-level Taliban leader was captured. He was captured by a conjoined group of Afghan and Canadian soldiers. This particular leader had been in command of a group that had recently captured a number of Afghan soldiers. All the captured soldiers were executed near a village in the area, as a warning to the locals not to cooperate with the government. The Afghan soldiers were in the mood for some serious payback, and for a while it looked like the Taliban leader would be lynched on the spot. But the Canadians strenuously objected, and the Afghan soldiers backed off.

  I have heard of other similar situations, where Canadian soldiers make it clear to their Afghan allies that we do not fight dirty wars and that we will not be a party to their fighting one either. This is again education in the purest sense: exposing individuals to different world views and trusting that, overall, groups will make wise and humane decisions.

  The other important result of the operation was the discovery of a well-equipped lab for converting marijuana into hashish, along with eight hundred kilograms of the finished product. The ANA blew up the former and burned the latter. Canadian soldiers—quite wisely, I think—do not get involved in drug eradication programs. These programs mostly penalize poor farmers who are trying to feed their families. But destroying the product after the Taliban has bought it is almost as good as destroying an arms cache. The Taliban fund much of their war effort with drug money, so this operation made a big dent in their budget. Beyond that, the results of this operation have left an enormous question mark hanging in the air. In my first month on the FOB during Roto 4, our troops inflicted a couple of stinging defeats on the Taliban, killing over one hundred of them in two battles in December 2007. Then we launched an operation where we encountered no enemy. As I described in the July 31 entry, we hurt them badly for several days in a row at the end of the last month. Again, around a hundred enemy soldiers have been killed in under two weeks. And again, they seem to have ceded the battlefield to our forces.

  Are they bringing in new recruits, tending to their wounded and regrouping? Or had they always planned to pull back at this time, to be able to hit the country hard on election day? That will be on August 20, a week and a half from now.

  It is vital that these elections take place in a free and fair manner, but the chances of that happening are looking poorer every day. Despite their losses, the Taliban have done a good job of derailing the democratic process in Zhari-Panjwayi. They have murdered so many government representatives that few candidates or party workers have come here. There are not even any election posters on the walls.

  Of far more concern is that I have been unable to learn where the people around FOB Sperwan Ghar will be able to vote. Some sources claim there will be a polling station a few hundred metres north of the FOB. Others insist that the people will have to go to Bazaar-e-Panjwayi (the village beside FOB Ma’Sum Ghar) to vot
e.

  The next ten days will be tense.

  AUGUST 11 | Election Perception

  Just as I did at Ma’Sum Ghar, I run to the top of the hill here three or four times before breakfast to get my blood pumping. I was coming down the hill for the last time this morning when I noticed one of our patrols coming back in. We came into the barracks at the same time, and I asked the patrol leader how things had gone. There has been very little contact with the enemy lately, and the patrols had been able to get into some good conversations with the locals about the upcoming election.

  I have read extensively about the tribal nature of Afghan culture, and yet I still have trouble fully grasping the power these bonds have over ordinary Afghan people. The way the local villagers perceive the election is a case in point.

  When the villagers are questioned about the election, there seems to be little comprehension of what the exercise is meant to achieve. Democracy is foreign to rural Afghan culture, and the Taliban have made it difficult for the government to educate the people of Zhari-Panjwayi with regards to this. The people have therefore remained attached to what they know well. What they have told our patrols is that they are happy with their leader and that they see no need to vote.

  That leader is none other than Haji Baran, the district leader. This is an appointed post, not an elected one. Haji Baran has also presented himself for election to the post of representative of the area (the equivalent of a member of Parliament). This would be like a senior manager in a city running for mayor. Nothing wrong with that; it happens in Canada all the time.

  The complication comes when you learn that Haji Baran had told the CIMIC people that he was expecting very little voter turnout in the election—in the order of 10 to 20 per cent. The conflict of interest is evident. If the district turned out in force to elect a representative other than Haji Baran, there could be a real threat to his power base. I can only wonder how enthusiastically he encouraged his people to get involved in the elections. I doubt he threatened anybody, the way the Taliban did; all he would have had to do is tell his people that voting was not necessary and that he would continue to take care of them as he had always done. The people would probably be pleased with that.

  They would be somewhat less pleased if they knew that, in 2008, Haji Baran was caught doing something that looked irregular with the pay of the local police. The American police mentoring team that had dropped off the funds in question took the money back. Haji Baran responded by having the building the Americans were in surrounded by gunmen loyal to him. A three-hour standoff ensued. Only the arrival of the Canadian quick reaction force convinced everybody to calm down.

  Haji Baran was fired from his post after this incident. Somehow, like politicians all over the world, he has managed to insinuate himself back into the body politic. The CIMIC people tell me that he seems to have turned over a new leaf of late, but you have to wonder . . .

  Regardless of his failings, however, Haji Baran supports at least the concept of democracy. And it must be recognized that being part of the local government has marked him for death. Major Patrick Robi-chaud, who was the combat team commander at FOB Sperwan Ghar the last time I was here, remembers the local leader well. He had to deal with him several times at regional shuras. In spite of Haji Baran’s obvious corruption, Major Robichaud felt he genuinely wanted to protect and help the people of the area.

  The Taliban, for their part, have made their opposition to the very idea of democracy perfectly clear. Their official position, as stated on their website, is that the election must be boycotted. They are enforcing this position by declaring a twenty-four-hour curfew on election day. Anyone caught outside their home during this period will be killed.

  AUGUST 12 | Leadership

  Through the ages, leaders have generally been physically imposing individuals. Kings were warriors who led their nations in the most direct manner possible: into battle at the head of their armies. Even today, those who have been genetically blessed with a six-foot-three muscular frame are more likely to be successful, even in fields where size and strength do not matter.

  The combat team commander here at FOB Sperwan Ghar, Major Steve Jourdain, breaks this pattern. Nonetheless, he commands the same respect as Major Tim Arsenault (see the June 20 entry).

  I can already perceive that there are many things Major Jourdain does well in the military sphere. He is a sound tactician. His knowledge of the weapons and equipment of his combat team is encyclopedic. He has a good appreciation of the enemy’s capabilities and likely intentions. He cares deeply about his men, puts their welfare before his own and is mindful of their safety. Rather than describing his skills as a combat leader, however, I thought it would be more entertaining to show you how his leadership is displayed in a much different setting.

  The combat troopers enjoy the occasional bit of gambling. The current popularity of poker in North American society is reflected here: one rarely sees anything else being played. But nowhere is it as organized as it is here at FOB Sperwan Ghar. If the combat team is not out on an operation, a dozen or more of them will congregate every night around two large poker tables for a tournament. Desperate for a new distraction, I have joined them for several evenings.

  Major Jourdain is an outstanding poker player. Though soft-spoken, he is very much an alpha male. Yet somehow he manages to suppress his desire to win to give constant tips both to newcomers and to the more experienced players in the group. I fall into the former category. Major Jourdain feels that his wise words are falling on deaf ears, but I can honestly say I have never had so much fun losing money quickly as I have had over the past few nights.

  Major Steve Jourdain (and prospective victim)

  Major Jourdain’s leadership goes well beyond that. There is not a lot to do on the FOB. It would be easy for troopers to lose inordinate amounts of money while gambling, just to pass the time. Major Jourdain prevents this by imposing a strict $5 limit on the amount anyone can lose in a single night. Even someone as hopeless as I am cannot lose more than a day’s pay over the course of the tour.

  Major Jourdain’s understanding of human nature is evident in the way he has structured the tournament. First, he has made the action emotionally satisfying. Your $5 entry fee buys you $12,000 worth of chips. The tough combat trooper who would feel foolish saying “I raise you 35 cents” looks quite satisfied as he tosses a green chip onto the table and says, “Raise you $1,000.” Silly, but it works. Also, depending on the number of players, the games have three or four winners. Each one will go home (well, back to his room) with $10 to $40. No big winners, no big losers. No regrets, no animosity.

  But there is more to the nightly poker games than creating an environment in which the troopers can have some fun without losing their shirts. Major Jourdain also uses these games to take the pulse of the company. He is always attuned to who shows up and who doesn’t, what people are talking about, who seems down. He also uses these occasions to dispel (or sometimes confirm) the rumours that are an inevitable part of military life, especially on a FOB. Even when it looks like he is relaxing, he is thinking about his men and how to best looKAFter their interests.

  That’s leadership.

  Ten minutes into the game, the correct poker term for my position is “a chip and a chair.” There goes Grandma’s chemotherapy money.

  Soldiers in a war zone playing poker. A stereotype, but fun!

  AUGUST 13 | The Patient Mentor

  While our army is mostly composed of men and women in their twenties and thirties, those in the combat arms are drawn from the younger part of that spectrum. The tasks are too physical for most older people. This is borne out by our casualties: as of today, the average age of our dead is twenty-five.

  These young Canadians are much better informed about the Afghan mission than their fellow citizens are. Many of them can speak eloquently about the need to confront the Taliban. While they sometimes try to appear cynical (something the young often mistake for maturity), one
can see that their motivation comes from a sincere commitment to defend human rights.

  For most of them, however, this deployment is their first prolonged exposure to a foreign culture. It is also the first time they have been in contact with this level of poverty. Taken together, these elements make the Afghan villagers around here so different that most of the young troopers have a great deal of trouble relating to them.

  I have noticed very little overt racism, but it is clear that most of these kids feel uncomfortable in situations of social interaction with the Afghans. Individuals like Corporal Bouthillier, the FOB Ma’Sum Ghar medic who sought out and indeed treasured her daily contacts with Afghan civilians, are rare and striking exceptions.

  The Canadian soldiers who interact most with the Afghans are the ones we have assigned to train the Afghan army. These soldiers serve on Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), living and working among the Afghan soldiers. Maturity, a broad world view, strong teaching skills and experience with at least one culture other than their own would seem to be the minimum prerequisites for such a task. You would think that the people assigned to this mission would be chosen very carefully. That is not the case. Despite the vital nature of their work, the OMLTs are so small (just a few soldiers per team) that they are not high on the battle group’s priority lists. Teams are sometimes put together on the fly at the last minute.

  That is what happened here at Sperwan Ghar. The FOB is home to a company of ANA infantry soldiers who operate under the guidance of a Canadian OMLT team. The team commander is Captain Manuel Pelletier-Bédard.

  Captain Pelletier-Bédard came to this posting by an unusual route. He has been in the army a bit more than two years. During that time, he has been posted to the Douzième Régiment Blindé du Canada (the 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment, the Québécois tank regiment). For the better part of a year, he trained on tanks and was scheduled to deploy with the Leopards at Ma’Sum Ghar. A few weeks before he was to leave for Afghanistan, the army decided to transfer him to the infantry. The infantry made him a mentor.