NOVEMBER 1917
End of November, I returned to Moscow under Lt-Col. Maund RFC.
DECEMBER 1917
Early December, I was lent by General Poole to Lt-Col. J. W. Boyle of the Canadian service.
At this time, Colonel Boyle had been working for some weeks with the Soviet government that had just come into power. Previously under the provisional government he was employed in the Russian General Staff on railroad construction and organisation of traffic. The work consisted in clearing the congestion caused by internal affairs (October Revolution) at the Moscow knot.
By virtue of this congestion, the South Western and Western Armies were cut off from their supplies, and starvation was felt causing mass desertion, which was further blocking the sorely tried traffic. With Colonel Boyle on this work was Major du Castelle of the French Army, and some Americans.
The knot was successfully cleared and supplies were got through to the starving armies.
MIDDLE DECEMBER
In connection with the Russian Roumanian Protocol, Colonel Boyle left for Jasi, taking with the Roumanian Foreign Office archives, which had been deposited in the Kremlin during the evacuation of Roumania in 1916, the Roumanian Crown Jewels, and some millions of Lei for the Treasury. Permission to transport these had to be wrung from the Bolshevik, and the task was by no means then accomplished as our route lay directly through the armed and fighting parties of the white and Bolshevik Guards of south Russia.
SITUATION IN ROUMANIA
The Roumanian government, faced by starvation that was being accentuated by the non-fulfilment of the Russo-Roumanian Protocol on the part of the Russians, was being pressed by the Germans to follow the lead of the Soviet government in signing the Armistice. Internally, while still feeding their army and civil population with great difficulty, they were able to maintain an excellent discipline. Their ally, however, the Russians, were causing every kind of trouble, and had just taken to demobilising themselves. In doing so they disorganised the railroads, used up reserve supply rations, and finally, when retreating by road, pillaged, and plundered, to say nothing of often destroying villages they passed through on their way. The Roumanian government at once took measures to protect their people from the Russian marauders, being ably assisted in doing this by the loyal troops of General Tcherbatchoff.
In restoring order very much friction arose between the Roumanian officials and Russians with Bolshevik leanings, and on a number of occasions fighting took place. This fighting caused trouble on the railways, especially at those points where the Russian removing gangs met, and the transference of stores was held up, causing a shortage of stores in the front. Added to this the Bolshevik had agents on all stations deliberately spending their efforts on sabotage. The first effort therefore was to get improved conditions on the railroads. Accompanied by Russian and Roumanian transport officers, the Sokola Kischinev and other knots were visited. All local disputes were settled on the spot, and friction allayed between the Russian and Roumanian knot controllers. In places where much labour was needed, and wholesale desertion had taken place from the railroad battalions, Roumanian labour companies supplemented by Austrian prisoners were sent to fill up the gaps and thus a great improvement followed. The 4th Russian Army (General Andreanoff?) had been giving much trouble, and at the direct request of General Tcherbatchoff it was visited. For some time past this Army had been under the full control of its Committee, which was Bolshevik. They had been deliberately starving the Army with a view to producing revolution and had brought their horse transport to a standstill, owing to cutting off the fodder. This sabotage was easily stopped. We had half the Army horses shot, and the meat frozen, and the civil and military population rationed on it. The hides were used at once, while the remaining horses were quickly got into a fit condition, owing to their [sic] being sufficient fodder.
COMMUNICATIONS
The construction on the Binderi–Unghany, Bielzi–Unghany and Bessarabakoj lines, had practically ceased owing to constant labour trouble. As the rationing of these gangs was a great difficulty, and the funds for payment had run dry, it was decided to completely shut down construction.
END OF DECEMBER 1917
The political situation between the Soviet and Roumania was becoming more critical every day. The Bolsheviks, with Dr Rakovski (the Roumanian) (Bulgarian?) (socialist) at their head, were financing and running a strong agitation against the government and with their large mass of more or less uncontrolled Russians, were putting a very strong lever on the Roumanian Army. The Soviet wanted to force an issue quickly with Roumania, as they greatly feared an arrangement with Ukrainia, who was throwing off the Soviet yoke.
M. Bratiano, the Roumanian Prime Minister, wishing to avoid trouble with the Soviet, requested Colonel Boyle, in the name of the Roumanian government, to visit Petrograd and explain Roumania’s position to Trotsky, and her great desire to avoid all friction and misunderstanding. M. Bratiano, in his message, enumerated the following four points:—
1) That they could not and would not allow the Russian troops to leave their positions on the front, march through Roumania armed and pillage as they had done. All Russian troops would be allowed to leave Roumania as soon as transport was available for systematic evacuation. They would leave their arms behind which would be returned as soon as transport could be arranged.
2) The Roumanian government had not arrested any of the Soviet delegates or Committees, and any arrests of Russian subjects had been carried out by the order of General Tcherbatchoff.
3) They could not, however, in future, allow any agitation against themselves to pass without taking steps to check it.
4) That it was imperative for Roumania to negotiate with Ukrainia, as geographically, the former depended for supplies upon the latter.
JANUARY 1918
On the 1st January Colonel Boyle and staff left for Petrograd via Kieff. While in Roumania Colonel Boyle was in close touch with the Allied Diplomatic Corps and conferred, before leaving, with General Ballard of the British Mission and General Berthelot of the French Mission. On our journey North the condition of the southern railheads was beyond description. The civil war that had raged in the Donnets Basin had stopped the export of coal supplies, the meagre stores were fast being used up, and the disorderly evacuation of the Armies from the south-western fronts had brought the traffic to a standstill.
On arrival in Petrograd Colonel Boyle saw the Diplomatic Corps, who informed him that their colleague M. Diamandi, the Roumanian Ambassador, had that day been arrested and thrown into the fortress of St Peter and St Paul, with all his staff.
As a result of a strong protest on the part of the Diplomatic Corps M. Diamandi and his staff were set free on the day following the outrage. On the Ministers [sic] release, Colonel Boyle went to deliver M. Bratiano’s message to the Soviet Foreign Office. This, however, was too late, as their policy was to make war on Roumania at any price, and M. Zalkind, the then acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, made no disguise of their plans. ‘Starve Roumania into revolution’ was the motto.
A few days later a plot was hatched to murder M. Diamandi with one or two members of the Constitutional assembly. This we heard from an Agent, and M. Diamandi was warned. It is interesting to note that Messers Chingareff and Kokoshin were murdered the day after in the hospital they were in.
Shortly afterwards war was declared on Roumania by the Soviet government.
A new staff was formed to take charge of the Roumanian front, at the head of which was placed Dr Rakovski. He had for his Chief of Staff a Colonel Muravieff (SR) and M. Spiro (SR) with a Doctor Bronshavon. This staff left at once for the south.
POLITICAL SITUATION AT END OF JANUARY 1918
Everything was extremely critical for the Bolsheviks, and they were daily becoming more unpopular.
Starvation and anarchy reigned in the Capital and the extremely unpopular negotiations of the Brest-Litovsk meeting were in progress. Added to this came a new war with Roumani
a.
With a view to relieving Roumania from her isolated position, Colonel Boyle determined to go down and effect a peace between the Roumanian and Soviet governments.
Permission for Allied Couriers to go south had been withheld for some time, and heavy bags had accumulated at all the Embassies. A direct offer to go as mediator between Russia and Roumania would certainly not have met with any success, and would have caused suspicion. However, knowing the great chaos that was reigning in the Donnets Basin, Colonel Boyle offered his services to Nevski, Commissar of Ways of Communication, to go down to do what he could. This offer was not only gladly accepted, but Podvoiski and the Food Controller gave us carte blanche for all work we undertook in the Donnets Basin.
Leaving Petrograd with the Jassey and the Odessa bags, and two officers being sent to the Caucasus by General Poole (Lts Nash and Crutchley), we took to the Moscow–Kursk–Kharkoff route. Our journey was delayed some time, as our train ran into a railroad smash, and much damage was done to our car.
Kharkoff was the Headquarters of the Bolshevik Army, operating against Korniloff and Kaledin. The Commander in Chief was a powerful revolutionary named Antonoff.
Heavy fighting was still going on south of Kharkoff and the whole district was in disorder. Antonoff proved friendly and passed and executed Colonel Boyle’s suggestions. At our recommendation he also had many of the old traffic experts reinstated and Superintendants [sic] and railroad managers given a freer hand in technical matters, and freed them from their ever-suspicious, insolent and very ignorant Committees. In twelve days the food supplies going to the northern and western fronts, and the cities of Petrograd and Moscow were increased by 47%.
Measures were also passed which dealt with the movements of troops, and these measures to a certain extent relieved the railroads.
From Antonoff we heard that part of the Supreme Council for the anti-Roumanian campaign was in Sevastopol, and that trouble was expected there, as recruiting among the sailors for the Roumanian front was unpopular. Antonoff had been more or less convinced by Colonel Boyle of the mistaken policy of the Soviet leaders in declaring war on Roumania.
This, and the great need for crude oils for railroads and Mechanical Transport (rumours of vast quantities purported to
SEVASTOPOL
Owing to German circulated news that 79 British pennants had forced the Dardanelles and a Squadron was on its way to smash up the Bolshevik fleet, we were extremely badly received on our arrival at Sevastopol. Agitation was rife to murder the British party. Unpleasantness everywhere we went. The Black Sea Congress was sitting, and after a lot of trouble, our party and Captain Le Page RN (who was stationed here) managed to get in touch with the leaders.
It did not take us long to allay their suspicions and win over their goodwill, and then to run the anti-intervention Roumanian propaganda. Recruiting was stopped in the Black Sea fleet. M. Spiro (Internationalist and SR) requested us to go and see Dr Rakovski at Odessa, and to do what was possible to stop the Roumanian war. Rumour already had it (early February) that the Germans were advancing in the North, and Spiro with a few others who feared the Germans, were keen to turn their Southern force, with the Roumanian Army, against the invader.
Before leaving Sevastopol it was arranged that Lts Nash and Crutchley should leave in a special transport for Batum.
ODESSA
The Supreme Council consisted of Dr Rakovski (the leader), Colonel Murovioff, Commander of the operating armies, and Messers Spiro, Bronchevan and Workman’s and Soldiers Council. This Council’s motto seemed to be to down Roumania at any price, and therefore force her into the hands of Germany. On arrival at Odessa, Colonel Boyle called a Conference of the allied officers French – Colonel Arquier and staff; American – the Consul General; British – Captain Pitts, General Service, the British Consul Mr Lowden. This Conference opened negotiations with the Supreme Council, with a view to their sending a note, the foundation of which might be the basis of a peace between Russia and Roumania.
After five days’ discussion, the Supreme Council, thoroughly discouraged by lack of recruits and general unpopularity of their war, sent a reasonable Note to Roumania, and transferred their attention to their new enemy, the Germans marching on Kieff. Their Note was carried by aeroplane and car to Jassey and except for a few alterations was accepted by the Roumanian government.
Colonel Boyle was flown back to Odessa and the Treaty was signed by the Council, then in great fear of the German advance.
Colonel Boyle returned to Jassey to make final preparations for the carrying out of the Treaty and the exchange of prisoners.
My orders from Colonel Boyle were to take charge of his train, staff and baggage, and that I was to carry on to the best of my judgment. I was also to evacuate north and eastwards on [sic] the event of the Germans coming to Odessa.
END OF FEBRUARY
I waited at Odessa as long as I could, and then moved on to Nicolaievsk and Kherson to evade the rush of Germans. I took two of MI1c people with me from Odessa as they had orders to leave there.
At Nicolaievsk the Mission joined up with Colonel Muravieff (the Bolshevik leader) and fostered his desire to offend Germany. During the first week in March his army did make a stand, but was hopelessly outnumbered in guns and men, and his rabble came back in great disorder.
However a fair amount of destruction was indulged in and one or two small bridges destroyed.
At Kherson and Nicolaievsk the British Consuls were most active and seemed to realise the importance of agitating the destruction of military material; Hon. Vice Consul — of Nicolaievsk and Hon. Vice Consul Curouana of Kherson.
It is interesting to note that the Red Guards did take a few prisoners, but killed them all, stole their clothes before interrogating them so that their staff had no idea what troops were against them. We got orders issued that all prisoners should be brought to Headquarters, but after that prisoners were not taken.
Travelled with Muravieff to join Antonoff, at Kharkoff who were getting ready to put up a defence of the Donnets Basin. Antonoff’s forces were a hopeless proposition, as half of them had turned from Bolshevik to Anarchist and were in favour of allowing their ‘German brothers’ to come and take what they wanted as there was enough for everyone!
M. Spiro had in the meantime elected himself Commissar of the Black Sea Fleet, and Dictator (or Minister) of the new Taurida Republic, and were [sic] feverishly organising sailors into a fighting unit for use against the Germans. M. Spiro formed the backbone of the Muravieff–Antonoff Army, and it was hoped that something might be done, if not in checking the German advance, then in the destruction of material – an art in which the Red Guards excel.
Mr Blakey, the British Consul at Kharkoff, and his assistant Mr Gillespie (now MI1c) were working hard and introduced me to some of the prominent French miners, with a view to arranging destruction of property and mines.
I also got into contact with the District Mine Owners Union and with one of their representatives, Engineer X, of the Donnets District Miners Federation, arranged the destruction and sabotage of certain mines.
Arranged for the clear passage of five echelons of Allied Military Missions evacuating from Roumania.
MIDDLE OF MARCH
Hearing that the 4th All-Russian Assembly of Soviets was about to meet in Moscow, to vote on the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, I decided to leave with my Mission in order to attend same, and arrived on the eve of the opening of the Congress.
On arrival at Moscow I found that our Aviation Mission had already left with the Embassy Staff and Petrograd Military Mission and MI1c officers. A few went to Vologda and Archangel, the others returned to England.
I then got into touch with M. Fritcher, Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and M. Muraloff, the Bolshevik Commander of the Moscow Area, and from them I obtained permits to attend the Congress.
Before attending the Assembly I called on the Consul General M. Wardrop, who concurred that it was advisable to attend the Con
gress, and he introduced me to Lt Reid (MI1c) who had decided to remain behind and was also attending the Congress. This Conference which opened on the 14th March lasted five days, and the Assembly after very stormy sittings ratified the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty.
Mr Lockhart and his Mission arrived about the 20th of March.
At the conclusion of the Assembly I got into close touch with Mr Lockhart, Colonel Robbins, of the American Red Cross, the American and French Military Missions. Also with the following Soviet Departments:—
War:— M. Trotsky (new Minister of War), MM. Muraloff, Podvoisky, Analoff, and their respective Military Staffs;
Foreign Affairs:— Messers Tchetcherin, Karakhan, and Rodak (for Central Empires), and later M. Voznisneski (for Eastern Affairs), and M. Vorovski (now Ambassador at Stockholm), and a large number of their Secretaries.
Evacuation:— M. Mechonoshin and others;
Trade & Commerce:— M. Bronsky and members of the Central Executive Committee.
I also kept in touch with the Railroad Controllers and Technical Institutions.
END OF MARCH
The Austro-German advance into South Russia and Ukrainia seemed complete; Kieff, Odessa, Kherson and Nicolaievsk had fallen, and the road to Roumania was cut off. Despite the difficulties of communication I had kept more or less in touch with Colonel Boyle, though it would naturally be a long time before he could return to the north, so I telegraphed to General Poole and to the War Office for permission to carry on the work in hand in Russia as long as possible.
Adventures of a British Master Spy Page 21