General Poole gave me permission to stay in Russia and instructed me that, until his return, I would be under Captain McAlpine, then in Archangel, who would shortly be coming to Moscow.
After conversations with Mr Lockhart and Colonel Robbins, of the American Red Cross, I gathered that it was just possible that the Allies would recognise the Soviet government. I therefore decided that my Mission would make its policy to be a special study of all secondary Bolshevik leaders, and to those who would very likely incline naturally towards Great Britain.
APRIL
The general situation was, however, so uncertain, and enemy agents were so active, that drastic action in evacuation matters was imperative.
Lt Pinder, of the British supply Mission to Russia, was working on a commercial scheme of evacuation in conjunction with French and British interests, which were preventing the buying up of certain materials by the agents of the ‘Alliance’.
At that time the Bolsheviks were evacuating some of their towns and stations to the west of Moscow, without any order or judgment, but with such activity that they blocked the lines, not only to the west, but also to the east of Moscow, with the rubbish they were saving.
It therefore seemed that a great deal of material in the Moscow Aviation parks might be saved if only the government could be made to start and prevented from blocking the lines by carting away old limbers and wooden furniture.
The chief difficulties in front of the Evacuation Committees were:—
1) Lack of order and direction.
2) Lack of fuel and transport.
3) Lack of organisation between the Evacuation Committees and the railroad controllers.
To facilitate our effect on evacuation I got into very close touch with Trotsky and was appointed by him as ‘Inspector of Aviation’ and given extensive powers in that Department. This brought me into close touch with the Aviation personnel, and gave me an entrée into Aviation Parks and Evacuation Committees.
IDENTIFICATIONS (DMI)
This work commenced during the last days of March and developed during April.
PROPAGANDA
Towards the end of April propaganda was started.
END OF APRIL
I got into touch with Captain McAlpine and [was] instructed to carry on.
MAY
1) Evacuation continued with great difficulty.
2) Identification (DMI) continued. Amalgamated with MI1c Department for Identifications and they sent their material to DMI.
3) Aviation. Much work among Corps who were getting restless.
4) Instructed during the month to look into motor and other trades, by Captain McAlpine, this was done.
5) Propaganda.
6) Captain McAlpine visited Moscow.
JUNE
1) Evacuation continued.
2) Identifications end of the month sent to MI1c instead of DMI.
3) Aviation General work continued. Request for hydroplanes and personnel. Personnel sent; hydroplanes unobtainable.
4) Got into touch with Tcheko-Slovaks and sent messages to them.
5) Russian invention section organised, and worked in conjunction with Propaganda.
6) Recruiting started.
JULY
1) Evacuation continued, but towards end of the month with very little effect.
2) Identifications continued and linked up with the south and Tcheko-Slovak fronts.
3) Aviation Sabotage and judicious evacuation fostered.
4) Systematic Recruiting started.
5) Courier service started.
6) Station control in Moscow organised.
7) Attended Congress of All-Russian Assembly of Soviets.
8) Preparations for remaining behind.
9) Passports, etc.
AUGUST
1) Evacuation. Wound up early part of work.
2) Identifications. Official channels closed, opened my own.
3) Aviation Sabotage.
4) Recruiting discontinued.
5) DMI and MI1c work.
SEPTEMBER
DMI and MI1c work.
OCTOBER
Left Moscow 2nd October 1918.
EVACUATION
By the beginning of April good progress had been made and the first truckloads of metal were shipped east.
Our work consisted in:—
1) Showing the Evacuation Committee what material should be evacuated first; and to get them to pass stringent rules against unnecessary evacuation.
2) Allaying the friction arising between the Evacuation Committees and the transport controllers. Cases were constantly arising where the sectional engineers, in their efforts to sabotage, refused cars despite Bolshevik Evacuation Committees. In all this sort of strife the Mission stepped in and took over control as a neutral.
3) Constantly keeping all hands up to their work.
During April we also took over the sorting of material coming from Smolensk, and west of there, as this was blocking our lines.
All material from Moscow went east, and the following places were selected from the main dumps:— Kotelnitch, Viatka, Nishni-Novogorod, Kazan, Sarapol and Penza.
It was decided that there should be a rush, the new line, Kazan–Sarapol, would be filled with rolling stock, and lines destroyed west of Kazan.
• • •
During April, Flax transport was taken up, but later this was turned back to the Commercial Agent of NBM Consulate at Moscow.
• • •
ESCAPED PRISONERS OF WAR
During May, July and August three British prisoners escaped from German hands into Russia, and were taken charge of and forwarded on to England.
• • •
The Aviation people were persuaded to send a small group of men to Kharkoff, and nearly all the aviation material was saved or destroyed here before the Germans took possession. The first Japanese descent at Vladivostok, however, brought all our work to a standstill and evacuation to the east was forbidden. Later this was counteracted by the arrival of Count Mirbach (of Germany) and the German occupation of Finland, and our work was recommenced.
The month of May opened disastrously, as what with Socialist Day, and the three days holiday that followed it, Church holidays and a small strike, very little was got away until the middle of the month. June evacuation opened under the dampening effect of the Tcheko-Slovak affair, but proved to be the best month for material evacuated. Besides metal, a great deal was done to move out aviation units from Moscow and get them well scattered over the country, north-east and south-east of Moscow.
JULY
Much sabotage done by Bolshevik Committees and agents and also by German agents, and little material was got away, although many aviation units were sent out to the Tcheko-Slovak fronts. As most of the unit commanders were of our orientation, and in league with myself, this was very much encouraged, as we hoped to get whole squadrons deserting to the Tcheko-Slovaks.
AUGUST
Very little done, but continued to take an interest in squadrons that were being sent to the front. Closed all connection with the various Departments on the 5th August.
• The following are the approximate material evacuated:—
• 84,000 poods of Aluminium
• 29,000 poods of Steel
• 10,000 poods of Other metallic materials.
• 62 Fiat 200 h.p. engines,
• And about 22 squadrons, all complete with spares, to the east.
It should be clearly understood that this evacuation was done by the Bolsheviks and their Committees and that apart from entertaining and feasting certain dignitaries of theirs, our part was to bully them and to constantly be on the spot, exhorting, arranging and persuading them into notion [sic].
The Mission owes great thanks to Messers Utchenko, Chief of the Railway Department, and their staff, for their constant support and willingness to concur in our suggestions and requirements. Muraloff, the Commander of Moscow, a true hater of Germany, did all he coul
d to aid us until the Tcheko-Slovak affair started in full. Great thanks are also due to many loyal aviation officers, and members of the aerial staffs and Commissar of the Aviation Park.
AVIATION
During the whole of the time we were in Moscow very close relations were kept with the Air Forces. This was partly due to the necessity of my working under Trotsky’s cover as ‘Inspector’, and partly that I had good connections with them through Colonel Maund.
It proved very advantageous, and later nearly all my confidential men were from the ranks.
When the recruits were wanted, about 450 were sent to the north; the first party, under Colonel Kazakoff, consisted of six or seven officers. It was also through the Aviation that close relations were maintained with the Cadets and their organisations.
COMMERCIAL
In June I received instructions to gain information and details on the Moscow industries. The large motor, aeroplane and electric manufactures were visited, and much general information obtained.
PROPAGANDA
I tried to do publicity and general information work. Sent out war news (when obtainable) to various departments. Kept closely in touch with those of Allied orientations, and spent much spare time with Bolsheviks, all of which meant some sort of entertaining. Considering the very limited material at our disposal fair results were obtained.
Russian Inventions Section
In conjunction with propaganda this section was started in the hope that some useful inventions might be picked up, and to prevent Russians hawking their inventions to the Germans.
Most of these inventions were for ‘Anti-Aircraft Fire Control’ and sighting systems for same.
Next in order, aeroplanes, new machines, ideas and gadgets.
Then followed hosts of automatic rifles, protector shields etc. Of all the things examined nothing of great interest was discovered, and one felt that all exhibits had long been out on the retired list at home.
DMI WORK
It was found at the end of March that very little enemy identifications were going to London. This was due to the departure of the British Embassy and Military Mission from Petrograd, and the Mission in the north, owing to the disorganisation caused by the rapid evacuation from Petrograd, were unable to pick up the old threads of information. At the time there were great possibilities of picking up information and having done this work in Salonica, I started a small section for DMI in Moscow:—
1) To start with sent three men to the Russo-German front for direct identifications.
2) Got the Moscow District Military Commander to organise a Bolshevik identifications section, and promised them every assistance from England.
The reason for forming this section was that the MI Section of the Russian General Staff had been completely thrown out of action by the Bolsheviks and although still existing, were practically unable to do any work, owing to the lack of support from the Bolshevik.
After the Bolshevik identification section in Moscow had been fairly established, the Bolsheviks realised at once the importance of the information they were getting, and re-established the MI Section of the General Staff, and then brought them from Petrograd to Moscow so that one received a very good summary every few days.
During the demobilisation of all the Armies and Staffs all the German handbooks were lost, the Russian General Headquarters had one copy dated 1915, and the M.A. of the United States had a copy dated 1916, and although constantly asking for them from London these valuable books never reached us.
From April on, every few days identifications were sent to London, and I was instructed to carry on this work. At the end of the month Lt Boyce MI1c sent Lieutenants Urmston and Small to get in touch with the old General Staff ‘I’ Section. This at first resulted in the overlapping of our work, as they sent all information to MI1c London. To prevent this it was agreed between Lts Boyce and Urmston and myself that we should amalgamate, and thereby syphering [sic] would become simplified, and the very heavy expense on duplicate telegrams would be saved. From then on all cables went to DMI. We pooled our staff and officers, and continued to get good information.
Besides matter coming from the old General Staff ‘I’ Section, and the Bolshevik Section Lt Urmston had naval and personal agents, and I had free lances on the fronts. At the end of June we had some excellent information through Lt Riley [Reilly]’s channels. In July MI1c insisted that Lt Urmston (being MI1c) should cable direct to them. I informed London of this, and asked if they would be willing for my information to go through the same channel, as if not I would have to increase my staff to cope with the extra work; it also meant needless telegraphing. DMI agreed to this change, and from July onwards my information went to MI1c.
HYDROPLANES
Early in June I received messages from General Poole asking that hydroplanes and personnel might be obtained from the Soviet government for the protection of the ports from German submarines. After consulting with Mr Lockhart it was decided that it would be extremely difficult to obtain anything from Mr Trotsky (Minister of War), as relations were then very strained owing to our occupation of Murmansk. The only chance of getting hydroplanes was to find them, buy them from the owners, and send them by rail or ship them, through the connivance of one of the Railroad Control Boards. To achieve this I went to Petrograd, but found that all hydroplanes had been evacuated from there, and even the schools had left for the Volga district. It therefore seemed extremely unlikely that we could arrange for transport of the planes, with any hope of success, from there.
I communicated with General Poole and informed him that I was sending up Russian personnel who were experienced enough to acquaint themselves quickly with the British machines.
RECRUITS
Early in July it had become evident that recruits would be wanted very shortly for the north, and therefore a new sub-section to deal with this work was formed.
A number of officers of all services were selected and given advances to enable them to reach the north.
It was realised that all recruiting would have to be on a very limited scale until we had established a front, but it seemed that once that were done a large number of recruits could be dispatched.
Experience had shown that Russian organisations (benefiting from our funds) had entailed great wastage with small results, therefore preparations were commenced to enable one or two British officers to stay behind ‘after hostilities had commenced’ in order to organise the recruiting.
The idea of course was to combine identifications with destruction and recruiting. I found MI1c were also making preparations to leave an officer behind (S.T.). However, at a conference with Lt Boyce RNVR (MI1c) and S.T., they pointed out how likely it was the recruiting and organisations would be traced soon after it commenced to function and that this should, despite past experience, be handled by a Russian organisation, but they suggested that the courier service already organised by myself should be developed, and that I should remain behind. Recruiting went on, but it was intended to drop it as soon as we went underground.
COURIER SERVICE
About 7th July an order was published prohibiting Allied officers from
1) Leaving the towns they occupied and freedom of movement;
2) Wearing their uniforms;
3) Stoppage of code telegrams, consular or otherwise (about the 12th) to the north.
The Courier Service, already started to meet this eventuality, was put into motion and the first couriers left on the 8th July for the north by two routes:—
1) Moscow–Nishni Novgorod–Viatka–Kotlass
2) By the canal route via Petrograd, Petrosavodsk and the north.
I estimated that 20 to 25 couriers would be sufficient to carry on constant communications with our Army in the north. Results proved that more would be required.
Courier 1 returned after 12 days; he reported a difficult passage north, was twice arrested and searched. He returned by trickery direct from Archangel by train and so cut the journey
in half. He said the nervous strain was very great and a good rest would be needed after every journey.
Courier 2 went out on the Petrosavodsk route; he was away 20 days, and had similar experiences to No. 1. His journey was however more expensive, as he had to use horses in certain places.
The service was therefore increased on the 1st of August.
STATION CONTROL
As much movement of troops was expected in the Moscow knot, it was decided, in addition to the information got from various sources, to put special agents on all the stations for control.
DESTRUCTION GANGS
A small destruction gang was organised in July.
PASSES
A small section for obtaining false passports, passes and documents was started in July.
AUGUST 1918
At a conference with Lieutenants Boyce and Riley I agreed to stay behind and arrange:—
Adventures of a British Master Spy Page 22