Unintimidated
Page 14
Sheila Harsdorf looked like she was in trouble when she drew a schoolteacher named Shelly Moore as her opponent. Moore was an unknown, and portrayed herself as a uniter who would bring Wisconsin together. “We can solve any problem if we sit down and talk to each other,” she declared. She came across as soothing and appealing—until we found video of her screaming and pumping her fist at union rallies. “We are WEAC and they WILL respect us!” she yelled in one clip. “This is war!” she declared in another.5 Those were immediately turned into campaign ads. Her own words undermined the premise of her campaign. In the end, Harsdorf trounced her 58-42.
We shored up Rob Cowles early. A columnist tried to insinuate that I had threatened him to vote for the reform bill (a charge denied by both of us). But instead of focusing on Act 10, the unions ran ads accusing him of corruption—voting to sell Wisconsin power plants to political donors through no-bid contracts. The charge got a “pants on fire” rating from independent fact checkers, who called the accusation “ridiculous.”6 Cowles easily defeated his opponent, Nancy Nusbaum, 57-42.
Initially, Luther Olsen was trailing in his race, but he was aided by the fact that his opponent, Representative Fred Clark, had a penchant for reckless driving. Clark had received six speeding tickets, been caught driving with a suspended license,7 and had been ticketed twice in one week for rear-ending other drivers.8 Then, in 2009 Clark ran a red light and broadsided a bicyclist with his SUV, sending the rider flying through the air.9 Unfortunately for him, the event was caught on video by a street camera and replayed across the district.
To make matters worse, during the fight over Act 10, Clark took a call from a female constituent who was angry with his vote against our reforms. After he thought she had hung up, he said to an aide, “I feel like calling her back and smacking her around.”10 He did not realize she was still on the line . . . and recording the call. That became the centerpiece of a campaign ad.
In the final weeks, the Democrats ran ads linking Luther to me—declaring “Scott Walker’s cuts have gone too far and Luther Olsen supported him every step of the way.”11 We could not have run better ads if we had paid for them ourselves. The conservative base had been lukewarm on Luther because they saw him as lukewarm on Act 10. By linking him to me, the Democrats energized our base behind him and helped put Luther over the top. He ended up winning by four points, 52-48.
That left Alberta Darling’s District 10 race as the one that would decide control of the senate. Democratic Party of Wisconsin chairman Mike Tate had called the race the “crown jewel of our recall efforts.”12 Three years earlier, when President Obama carried her district, she had won on the same ballot by a narrow thousand-vote margin. The Democrats and their union allies believed she was vulnerable and spent more than $8 million (more than a typical congressional race in Wisconsin) to oust her. They ran negative ads accusing her of gutting education and voting to keep fired cops accused of crimes on the payroll. We ran positive ads with teachers talking about how she had stood up for them. Early returns showed a close race, but in the end she defeated her challenger Sandy Pasch by a comfortable 54-46 margin.
The night of the senate recalls, Tonette was in northern Wisconsin with one of her best friends, Candee Arndt, staying at a lodge in a remote area. She wanted to see the recall results, but the only channel that she could get up there with news of the recalls was MSNBC. So she ended up watching Ed Schultz, who had come to Madison to broadcast the Democrats’ victory live. At first, when it looked like the Democrats were prevailing, Schultz looked triumphant. But Tonette said she got a kick out of watching as the night went on and it became clear that Republicans were prevailing. She said Schultz grew more despondent. When Alberta Darling was declared the winner, he nearly lost his mind.
The unions had now failed to flip the supreme court, failed to flip the state senate, and they had secured not one victory at the polls on the merits of their arguments against collective bargaining reform. But the biggest fight was still to come.
Now they were coming after me.
CHAPTER 17
You’re Welcome, Madison!
I was confident that we would win the recall election, but truth be told I was extremely vulnerable. Our internal polls showed that 54 percent of voters viewed me unfavorably, and that my likely opponent, Milwaukee mayor Tom Barrett, would defeat me decisively in a head-to-head matchup.
But then, suddenly, my political fortunes changed. I can tell you precisely the moment it happened:
The first day of school.
During the August senate recalls, the unions had run ads charging that I had “cut $800 million from the state’s schools.”1 But as kids in Wisconsin prepared for the start of a new school year, stories started appearing in newspapers across the state reporting that, thanks to our reforms, dozens of school districts were able to balance their budgets for the first time—and do so without laying off teachers. Indeed, many were able to hire more teachers, reduce class sizes, and make long-delayed improvements.
News report after news report showed school districts saving millions thanks to our decision to break the union’s near monopoly over the provision of health insurance to local school districts.
Thanks to Act 10, health insurance was no longer subject to collective bargaining. For the first time, school districts could shop for health insurance on the open market. Suddenly, instead of being stuck with the WEA Trust, many districts had three or four insurers competing for their business. Some switched carriers and got deep discounts. Others stayed with the WEA Trust but saw the union insurer drastically drop its prices because it finally had to compete for their business.
This one reform saved school districts tens of millions of dollars—money they were able to put into classrooms instead of union coffers.
One of the best examples of how this worked was in the Port Washington–Saukville school district. The Ozaukee Press reported that the “WEA Trust, the longtime provider of insurance to the district, initially told school officials to expect an 8 percent increase in premiums this year. But when the company was informed the district was shopping for insurance it revised its proposal to show a 3.3 percent decrease in the premium.”2
In other words, the union insurer had been preparing to bilk the school district. But once our reforms gave Port Washington other options, suddenly the WEA Trust was ready to offer the exact same health plan at a steep discount.
But the story gets even better. Two other insurers submitted bids offering 7 percent decreases in health care premiums without plan changes. In other words, because we broke the union’s monopoly over health insurance, the Port Washington-Saukville school district went from facing an 8 percent increase in health insurance costs to enjoying a 7 percent decrease—saving a cool $1 million.
Sara Hames, an employee benefits adviser hired by the Port Washington-Saukville district to handle the competing bids, said the “decrease was due to competition alone with no changes to the plan.” According to the Ozaukee Press, thanks to our reforms, the school district was able to erase “a $1.9 million deficit without compromising educational programs or raising taxes.”3
Similar stories started appearing in newspapers in other school districts across the state.
For example, the Appleton Post-Crescent reported that “the [Appleton] school district bid out its health insurance for the first time in six years, as part of contract extensions with its employee unions. The result? It’s getting the same coverage it had been, from the same insurance carrier it had been, for $3.1 million less.” The district kept the WEA Trust as its insurer. But with other insurers bidding for Appleton’s business, the WEA Trust had to cut its prices dramatically.
The Appleton school district was also able to “recover more than $7 million by having its employees pay their share toward their pensions, plus an increased share of their health care premiums,”4 the Post Crescent reported. Our combined reforms resulte
d in a total of more than $10 million in savings. One school board official told the paper, “[W]e’ve pretty much made up most of the [reduced state aid] through the tools, if you will, that Governor Walker is giving us.”5
In the Muskego-Norway school district, superintendent Joe Schroeder told the Associated Press that, after twenty-eight years with the WEA Trust, “the district discovered it could now cut its $8.5 million bill for health insurance by about $2 million by switching to United Healthcare.” He added, “For whatever reason there’s a much more competitive environment now.”6
The reason is Act 10.
The same thing happened in Hudson, Oshkosh, Germantown, Superior, Hartford, Brown Deer, Milwaukee County, and dozens of other school districts across the state.
In all, according to the Wisconsin Taxpayers Alliance, the overall cost of employee health insurance for K–12 schools decreased by about $91 million, or 24 percent, in the 2011–2012 school year, the first school year under Act 10.7 That figure is the result of insurance changes alone.
In addition to savings from insurance changes, school districts were also able to save millions more by requiring employees to increase their contributions to health care premiums and contribute to their retirement plans—just like private sector workers.
In Fond du Lac, “School Board President Eric Everson recently announced an expected balanced budget due to Governor Scott Walker’s initiatives,” according to the Fond du Lac Reporter. “Our balanced budget is definitely because of [Act 10].”8
In Green Bay, assistant superintendent for finance and business Alan Wagner told the Green Bay Press-Gazette that the district saved about $12 million by using Act 10, adding, “There have been no reductions in programs.”9
And most satisfying of all, in Madison—the epicenter of the protests against Act 10—the Wisconsin State Journal reported that thanks to our reforms the school district had “avoided teacher layoffs, launched a four-year-old kindergarten program, opened a new middle school and gave teachers raises.” Not only that, the Journal noted that “thanks to Walker’s budget, homeowners are finally getting some property tax relief.”10
You’re welcome, Madison.
I saw the effects of Act 10 up close in my sons’ school district of Wauwatosa. There, school board officials were facing a $6.5 million shortfall and had planned to eliminate one hundred jobs. But they used the tools in Act 10 to save them all.11
I recall going to parents’ day with my oldest son, Matt, and visiting one of his classrooms. Matt had a very nice teacher who got up and explained to all the parents what was going on in his class. He shared some good news with us: In previous years, the school had been forced to limit the number of classes it offered and they were packed with kids. But this year, he said, they were able to offer more classes, and they would not have as many kids in each class because they were able to add another teacher. Parents across Wisconsin were hearing the same thing when they visited their children’s schools.
Oh, and remember that Milwaukee teacher, Megan Sampson, whom I told you about earlier—the one who had been named one of the best new teachers of the year in Wisconsin, only to receive a layoff notice soon after from the Milwaukee school district under the “last hired, first fired” rule? Well, as Paul Harvey would say, now you know the rest of the story: The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported that the Milwaukee school district attempted to rehire her, but she turned them down. She had already found a new job . . . in my sons’ school in Wauwatosa.12
Last semester, Ms. Sampson taught my son Alex. He told me that she was indeed an awesome teacher. I sat down with her for a parent-teacher conference, and could not agree more. It was the first time I had ever met her.
Act 10 never came up.
The opponents of Act 10 had warned that the law would mean fewer teachers, larger class sizes, devastating program cuts, and worse. The opposite was true. According to a survey by the Wisconsin Association of School District Administrators, new teacher hires across the state outnumbered layoffs and nonrenewals by 1,213 positions in the year following enactment of Act 10. They found little change in course offerings, sports programs, or the ratios of students to teachers, librarians, and counselors.
While most school districts benefitted from Act 10, in the interest of full disclosure, there were some prominent exceptions to the rule. Three of the largest school districts in the state—Milwaukee, Kenosha, and Janesville—were forced to lay off more than eight hundred teachers.13 Despite having 12.8 percent of Wisconsin students, those three districts together accounted for a whopping 68 percent of all teacher layoffs for the entire state.
They had something else in common as well: During the debate over collective bargaining, all three districts had rushed to lock themselves into long-term union contracts—and thus were unable to take advantage of the tools we made available in Act 10.
The Education Action Network did an analysis of the Milwaukee teachers’ contract and found that the school district could have saved as much as $61 million if they had been able to take advantage of the tools in Act 10.14 Instead, Milwaukee schools were forced to lay off more than 500 employees, including 345 teachers. Many of those layoffs could have been avoided if the school board had not locked itself into a contract and had allowed us to free them from the grip of collective bargaining.
If you want a picture of the state of education in Wisconsin without Act 10, look no further than the Milwaukee, Kenosha, and Janesville school districts.
The effects of Act 10 were delayed for these districts, but eventually even they began to benefit. For example, on June 30, 2013, the teachers contract that Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) rushed into before passage of Act 10 finally expired. Result? The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported that, according to an analysis by the Thomas B. Fordham Institute, “the Walker administration’s landmark union bargaining law helped MPS shave more than $1 billion from its long-term benefit obligations to retirees.”15
It was not just the school districts that benefitted from the changes in Act 10. Suddenly, newspapers were reporting that local governments were using Act 10 to improve services and put their towns and cities on a firmer financial footing.
In Marathon County, county administrator Brad Karger told the Wausau Daily Herald that our reforms allowed the county “to close a $1.1 million budget deficit without increasing property taxes, laying off employees, or significantly reducing services.” In Portage, County Supervisor John Tramburg told the Portage Daily Register that changing health care coverage for employees was saving the county more than $1.7 million.16 In Marquette County, our reforms allowed officials to balance their budget without having to cut personnel or programs. In Juneau County, board chairman Al Peterson told the Juneau County Star-Times that “with Governor Walker’s budget bill, we didn’t have to lay off anybody, which would have had to happen without it.”17
The tools in Act 10 did not just save money—they also helped make local government more efficient and allowed officials to deliver improved services at a lower cost. In Jefferson County, for example, administrator Gary Petre told the Wisconsin State Journal that thanks to our bill, “he no longer uses seniority to dictate who fills openings,” giving him “the ability to hire the very best workers.”18
But perhaps the best evidence that the tools worked is this: My opponent in both the 2010 election and the 2012 recall, Milwaukee mayor Tom Barrett, used our reforms to save his city millions of dollars.
Barrett had warned that Act 10 would make Milwaukee’s “structural deficit explode.”19 But six months after I signed the Act 10 into law, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported that “despite early criticism from city officials, new figures show Milwaukee will gain more than it will lose next year from the state’s controversial budget and budget repair legislation. The city projects it will save at least $25 million a year—and potentially as much as $36 million in 2012—from health care benefit c
hanges it didn’t have to negotiate with the unions, as a result of provisions in the . . . budget repair measure that ended most collective bargaining for most public employees.”
The paper reported that the city would come out with a net gain of at least $11 million for its 2012 budget, “reducing the spending cuts that Mayor Tom Barrett and the Common Council must impose.”20
Somehow he failed to mention this during the recall campaign.
Far from devastating public schools and local governments, our reforms were providing new ways to direct money to students in the classrooms, and improve public services, without asking for more money from taxpayers.
As they read stories like these, people began to think: Maybe there might be something to this collective bargaining reform after all.
CHAPTER 18
Ending the “Lemon Dance”
It was now clear to the people of Wisconsin that the dire predictions that Act 10 would decimate education had not come true. But failing to decimate education is not, on its own, a compelling case for reelection. To win the recall, I had to do more than prove that our reforms had helped balance budgets without hurting schools—I had to show our reforms had in fact allowed school districts to offer students a better education.
That is precisely what they did.
Around the time I was elected governor in the fall of 2010, a remarkable documentary hit theaters called Waiting for Superman. The film, by liberal director Davis Guggenheim (the man behind Al Gore’s global warming documentary, An Inconvenient Truth), was a searing indictment of our nation’s failing public schools—including those in Milwaukee.