The base we were at was extremely close to the Pakistan border. From our vantage point, we could literally see Pakistan. Part of the steep, mountainous nearby area was across the border in Pakistani territory. Militants from the Pakistani side were fond of shooting rockets at the joint American and Afghan base from their positions in the adjacent mountains. They understood that the U.S. military's Rules of Engagement prohibited our soldiers and Afghan security forces from crossing the border in pursuit of an attacker. It was clear that they used this knowledge to their advantage when firing their rockets from what they assessed to be a safe, untouchable distance.
Despite this, the American troops had an advantage in this situation as well. Although they could not cross the border on foot, nothing was stopping them from launching artillery towards the mountains, in response to a rocket attack. There was no specific border line that was visible from the base, so artillery was acceptable, so long as the base commander approved its use.
According to Clint, on one particular day, after a failed rocket attack by insurgents from Pakistani terrain, the U.S. military on the base returned fire with several rounds of heavy artillery. The response was a success, injuring several insurgents and killing at least one. Viewing through high-tech cameras, the soldiers watched as the suspected attackers picked their way down the mountain, to retrieve the body of one of their fellow insurgents, killed by the artillery. There was no question that these men were now in Afghan territory and, therefore, were susceptible to arrest by U.S. or Afghan forces. The base commander ordered an immediate joint (U.S. and Afghan) mission to retrieve the insurgents and transport them to the nearest detention facility.
Clint explained what happened next. Approximately twelve of Clint's policemen accompanied ten or so U.S. troops into the mountains. The Afghan police were ordered to lead the mission, ahead of the American soldiers. Orders like this were ostensibly meant to train the Afghan security members to operate independently and on their own. The militants, who were still trying to reach their fellow fighter's body, alerted to the movement and began firing weapons at the Afghan police. This initiated a short, but bloody firefight between the two groups. The insurgents were all killed. Unfortunately, in the exchange, two Afghan police were struck by bullets and one died right there on the mountain. The second Afghan, who had been shot and was badly wounded, was transported off the mountain to receive medical treatment. The Americans ordered everyone to immediately evacuate the area and return to base. However, the deceased Afghan policeman's body was still in place, where he had fallen. The order to return to base enraged the Afghans as they did not want to leave the body of their comrade on the mountain. However, in the end, they were forced to, and were not allowed to retrieve the body until the next day. This goes against the Muslim tradition of burying a body within twenty-four hours of death. The Afghan troops felt tremendously offended that they were not allowed to properly deal with the body, according to Islamic tradition.
This alone would have explained the disgruntled attitude we noticed amongst the Afghans, but the tale did not end there. After the Afghan policeman’s body was retrieved and brought to base, the two bullets that killed the him were removed from his corpse prior to burial. As in any death case, forensic evaluation was conducted on the evidence. Everyone was shocked to discover that both bullets found in the Afghan’s body were .556 caliber, used only by the U.S. military. Therefore, it became a case of fratricide or in layman's terms, “friendly fire”. Apparently, when the Afghans were headed up the mountain and involved in the firefight, the U.S. soldiers behind them were also firing at the insurgents. One can deduce exactly what happened next. It all made sense to us now and the story made my heart heavy with empathy and guilt. I could not blame these Afghans for hating us, even though situations like this are inevitable in times of war.
What made this whole incident more horrific was the fact that the offending U.S. military unit left Afghanistan and returned to their home base in the U.S. shortly after. Their commander never briefed his replacement on any part of the incident and clearly tried to leave country without this black mark on his record. So, the incoming U.S. unit bore the burden of the predecessors’ mistakes. Their relationship with their Afghan partners had been destroyed before they even met. But, because of Clint's candidacy with me, the Americans had a foundation from which they could begin rebuilding that tattered relationship.
I have several fond memories of my interviews and interactions with ABP forces. One day, while driving back to my office from an errand on base, I saw a convoy lined up near the front gate, preparing to leave the base on a mission. There were both American and ABP vehicles lined up in the convoy. This was nothing out of the ordinary, but a strange movement caught my eye as I drove past. Initially, I told myself what I saw as impossible. I circled back around to check my sanity and found that my eyes had not misled me…on the back of one of the ABP vehicles was a monkey!!
The sight of the monkey piqued my curiosity and I quickly drove to my office to grab my interpreter. We returned to the convoy to find out what the story was with the monkey. The ABP men were extremely friendly and cordial. They explained that they had “adopted” the monkey from the wilderness near Jalalabad, up north. According to them, the monkey was a sort of lookout or guard for them. When they went on missions outside the base, and were forced to leave their vehicle unattended, the monkey stood guard and was trained to attack anyone who might try to steal the vehicle or the equipment inside it. Allegedly, they had also taught the monkey to fire the machine gun mounted on top of their vehicle. I would have loved a demonstration but that was impossible inside the base perimeter. The border police asked us questions about ourselves, posed with us for pictures along with the monkey and fed him a banana, much to our delight. While taking photos, the monkey patted my head and ran his fingers along my hair, as if to say he had it all handled. Unfortunately, I never saw Mr. Monkey again, but I smile every time I think of him providing support to some of our allied security forces. (Readers can view a photo of the monkey in a later chapter of this book or on my website.)
In addition to Clint, I met one other man who previously served with the Northern Alliance. He, too, was a senior NCO in his Afghan Army unit and had obviously seen a lot in his time. Like Clint, he was also a Tajik, from the northern part of Afghanistan and felt the same alienation from his fellow Pashtun soldiers. This man, who I will refer to as Farouq, worked in the same unit as a soldier I nicknamed “Napoleon”, who I will introduce readers to later in this chapter. Farouq actually approached me with concerns about Napoleon and suspected his Executive Officer was not all he appeared to be. As Clint had been, Farouq was also forthcoming and candid with me. He made it clear his priorities were the safety of his soldiers on the battlefield and protection of their unit’s missions.
Farouq told me a horrific story of torture and persecution his father and brother endured at the hands of the Taliban. The story took place a couple of decades prior, when the Taliban were in their full throws of commanding Afghanistan and involved in heated battles with the Northern Alliance. Farouq, and the other male members of his family, served under Ahmad Massoud in the Northern Alliance, fighting for peace and justice in the northwestern part of the country.
One day, during the fighting, this man’s father and brother were injured. Although their injuries were not life-threatening, they were debilitating enough that Taliban members were able to capture both men. They were hauled off to an unknown location and subjected to days of beatings, starvation and various forms of torture. Their battlefield wounds were worsened by the maltreatment and became horribly infected. In the meantime, no one knew of these men’s location or whether they were even alive. Naturally, Farouq’s family was worried sick during their absence. Everyone knew the Taliban followed no rules when it came to prisoners and that the likelihood of a positive outcome was minimal.
After many weeks, The Taliban must have become bored with Farouq’s father and brother and
finally released them. They were left on the side of an unknown road, in the middle of the night, many kilometers from their home. They had no food and could hardly move because of their injuries. At daybreak, a local villager discovered Farouq’s father and brother and, as quickly as possible, herded them into his home. His wife prepared a meal for them and the gentleman attempted to tend to their wounds as best he could. They stayed with the kind strangers for several days, eventually gaining back some strength.
Together, they formulated a plan for the men to return home. Traveling between villages was extremely difficult during that time, as the Taliban were on the lookout for their next prey and there were constant battles ongoing in the local area. In addition, traveling by vehicle, if one was even available, was out of the question. The Taliban had men posted at various random points along the roads, checking for persons who they considered to be their enemy.
The man who initially took in Farouq’s father and brother walked with them one night to a nearby village, where he introduced them to another friendly family. They took the men in for the night and then passed them to another family in the next village. This routine kept on over the course of a couple weeks. Eventually, Farouq’s father and brother made it back to their home village, traveling by foot under the cover of darkness for several nights, with the help of many locals along the way. Several Tajik-Afghan families allowed the men into their homes during the day, to rest and avoid the daylight. If they had been discovered by the Taliban, they surely would have been re-captured and returned to prison, to meet their ultimate fate.
Even when Farouq’s father and brother returned home, all was not well. Obviously, the family was overly relieved, but both had suffered critical injuries that had become infected and healed improperly. The father lost one of his legs as a result. Neither one could return to the Northern Alliance and both were stricken with symptoms (undiagnosed, of course) of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) for the rest of their lives. Farouq explained to me that his father and brother experienced horrible nightmares, insomnia and paranoid behavior. For the most part, both refused to speak of the atrocities they witnessed in the Taliban prison and essentially lived a life of disability from that time forward. I can only imagine how many others suffered a similar fate at the hands of the Taliban.
Towards the end of my time in Afghanistan, a unit of approximately 100 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers arrived at our base. They were straight out of basic training and our base was their first duty assignment. They were to be paired with U.S. military units, who were tasked with mentoring the young Afghan soldiers and teaching how to operate independently (without guidance from Coalition Forces). This was in preparation for the planned handover of security operations from NATO to the Afghans in 2014. Because these soldiers were new to the base, it was my team’s job to interview all of them and assess them for potential insider threats. There had been numerous incidents throughout Afghanistan of ANA soldiers opening fire on Coalition Forces and/or participating in bombing attacks on Coalition bases. Many U.S. soldiers expressed their concerns to me, regarding the new ANA unit. Although it was stereotypical of them to be suspicious, their concerns were valid.
Nearly every month there was a report of a man, dressed in an Afghan military or police uniform, who opened fire and killed one or more foreign troops, many of them Americans. I strongly believe a majority of these shooters were actually insurgents who joined/infiltrated the Army or police force, to place themselves in close proximity to foreign soldiers. Some officials argue the stress of war and/or coercion by insurgents is the main cause for these attacks. However, knowing the Afghan culture as intimately as I do, I tend not to agree. Aside from a couple cases of possible PTSD, I rarely saw any manifestation of severe stress in Afghan soldiers. A few may have been coerced into attacking their American counterparts, but I believe the inclination to do so was already there.
Reportedly, the Department of Defense attempted to keep secret the actual number of U.S. soldiers killed by their Afghan counterparts in what are nicknamed "Green-on-Blue" incidents. The nickname is rooted in the decades-old NATO tradition that “Green forces” are friendly national troops (i.e. citizens of the country in which a conflict being fought) and “Blue forces” are international forces. However, as the number of such attacks surged in 2012, the numbers became public. By the end of 2012, the number of incidents had well surpassed the number from the previous year. According to data released from government sources [4], in 2012, there were forty-four recorded incidents resulting in the death of sixty-one members of the Coalition Forces. This number accounted for fifteen percent of deaths of American soldiers in Afghanistan in 2012. By contrast, in 2011 "Green- on-Blue" attacks accounted for only six percent of American deaths. [4] It is a very disturbing trend and one that is difficult to control.
Prior to 2012, there were no official background checks conducted on new Afghan military recruits. And even if there were, the ease of forging national identification paperwork, combined with the lack of official record keeping, would have made a check nearly fruitless. Now, there is a newly-instituted eight-step vetting process in place for all applicants to the Afghan Security Forces. However, details on the actual steps are sketchy. Having one’s local village or tribal leader vouch for them is one known step of the process. I am unsure as to how much weight such a recommendation should hold, especially when the applicant is related to the village elder. Imagine asking your brother to write you a job recommendation. In most cases, he is going to write a positive statement, whether you are a church-going choir boy or a felon with a mile-long criminal record. Reportedly, forensics and biometrics are now in place, but I wonder how effective these strategies can be in a country with no past official record keeping. In August of 2012, U.S. troops were given a directive to carry their weapons loaded, even while on base. This was in contrast to the previous rule that soldiers must unload their weapons when entering any Coalition base. The order was in response to the rash of “Green-on-Blue” incidents, but came too late to possibly save dozens of American lives.
The consequence of these “Green-on-Blue” attacks has widespread effects, like ripples in a pond. The rash of incidents drives a solid wedge between NATO and Afghan troops, resulting in a lack of trust on both sides. Even some Afghan soldiers told me they were fearful that someone in their unit might be a Taliban member in disguise. American soldiers constantly confided in me how apprehensive they were to train the Afghans and go on patrol with them. Not only were they facing dangers from the known enemy on the battlefield, but they also had to consider the possibility of the adversary sitting in the seat next to them in a vehicle. It created additional mental stress for our soldiers, who had to be on even higher alert whenever in the presence of their “Afghan partners”.
Just prior to my departure from Afghanistan, information began circulating about the formation of a pseudo Internal Affairs unit within the Afghan military. Reportedly, its purpose was to train educated military recruits to seek out potential infiltrators within the Army ranks. The concept was great, in theory. However, I knew tribal loyalties would likely come into play and hinder the effectiveness of such a unit. Although one of the undercover operators might detect an insurgent infiltrator, if they happened to be from the same tribe, I had my doubts as to whether the informant would report the other man. Tribal loyalties run that deep in Afghanistan and I suspect not even an impending attack might break that bond. My other concern was that an insurgent infiltrator might land one of these special positions, giving him even more inside knowledge of a sensitive military department. In addition to this, these informants were prone to being discovered simply because of their education and training. This alone would make them stand out amongst the typical, uneducated soldier.
When the new unit of Afghan soldiers arrived on our base, I was actually excited to interview them. I imagined they might be smarter and more courageous than the typical Afghan I was used to. What I found was a very mixed bunch.
A few met my expectations, but sadly, most did not. A majority appeared nearly as uneducated and lacking in common sense, as persons from the most rural areas of the country. As expected, many of these Afghan soldiers were themselves, from very small villages, located far from a city of any decent size. So, it was fairly easy to understand their shortcomings.
One soldier, a first lieutenant, who was one of the most memorable soldiers I dealt with, reminded me of Napoleon. He stood approximately 5’4” and probably weighed 100 pounds. Despite his tiny stature, he was able to put the fear of Allah in his troops. All of his soldiers were intimidated by him and scared to say anything negative about their company Executive Officer. Napoleon was as arrogant as one could be, gushing about his rich family, high-ranking military father and his own college education. He took vacation whenever he felt like it and would disappear for days on end, showing up again unannounced. His selfishness was obvious as he rarely allowed his soldiers to take any time off to visit their families.
The problem with Napoleon was that he continually lied to us. He failed his lie detector test and was caught with an unauthorized and undeclared cell phone in his room. These two red flags alone were enough for me to consider recommending him for removal from our base. He was allowed cell phone privileges, so I knew he had something to hide by denying the existence of a second cell phone. When I discussed shameful activities with him, as I did with everyone, the example he gave me of a shameful activity was “helping the insurgents”. This response bothered me. Most guys talked about lying or maybe stealing something when they discussed shame. There was obviously a memory(ies) that triggered something in his mind, bringing this example to the forefront. My gut said something was not right with Napoleon.
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