Another young Afghan man I came to know well, worked essentially as a Human Resources Assistant for a large contracting company, who hired a majority of the day laborers for the base. I will call this man Habib. The company maintained a day labor staff of over one thousand workers and Habib did an excellent job at maintaining organized employment records. The waiting list, at any given time, of those applying for jobs with the company was extensive. He knew nearly every employee (and often times their family members) by name, from memory. Habib’s English was excellent, as was his work ethic. Many times, he slept in the company office, on the floor, so he could stay late into the night to finish his day’s work.
As Habib remained in his position longer and longer, he became well known. Many local Afghans erroneously thought Habib was in charge of hiring and had ultimate control over who was offered a job and who was not. This was completely false, as Habib, being an Afghan citizen, was not allowed to play any part in the hiring process. It was required that this job be done by an American.
But, rumors fly fast and furious in local communities in Afghanistan, so the misconception spread. Men would approach Habib at the local market, asking for jobs. Every time, he explained the process, informing them that all he could do was add their name to the waiting list for the company. He was often called a liar and other hurtful names by those who believed he was showing preferential treatment. Most refused to believe that he did not have the power or influence to hire others.
The name calling eventually escalated to threatening letters and phone calls. Many times Habib appeared at my office with letters and phone numbers of unknown persons who had threatened him or his family. I always passed this information onto our military counterparts, so they could investigate. At some point, another rumor was started amongst the local community, stating that Habib could have a particular person hired, if they paid him a fee of the equivalent of two hundred U.S. dollars. Several times, locals approached Habib with money in hand, saying they were ready to go to work. He always refused.
This type of corruption and extortion was widespread throughout Afghanistan, but I know that Habib would not have risked losing his job, and a chance at obtaining a visa to the U.S. He made a significant amount of money each month, compared to the average Afghan, and he was thankful for the ability to provide for his large family. In addition to that no local Afghan ever complained to me about having to pay a fee for his job. If this rumored extortion had been real, I know some of the local workers would have filed complaints with my office. No one ever did.
As the extortion rumors continued, so did the animosity towards Habib. One evening, he called me, asking if I would come to his office. He explained that two local workers had threatened him and attempted to fight him that day after they were fired from their jobs. Although Habib played no role in their firings, they felt he was responsible somehow. In addition, being the lone Afghan in the Human Resources department, they may have felt he was the only one they could go up against. Habib was concerned that these men would be waiting for him outside the gate, with weapons, when he left for the night. I met up with him and took his statement. Anyone who was a threat to the base, or someone on the base, was of concern to us. Habib actually showed no fear for himself, but explained that if he died, his family would no longer have his income to help support them. Inside, I shook my head that someone was willing to lose his life over something so petty. But, that is the Pashtun way; never show a sign of weakness.
Ultimately, no harm came to Habib. Our soldiers at the gate were notified of the threat and kept close watch when Habib left the base. Habib is the one Afghan I still keep in touch with. If he eventually is awarded a visa to the U.S., it will be well-deserved. Although he did not fight with the Afghan Army, or patrol the streets with the police, he maintained his integrity and made a positive difference in many people’s lives. He continued to perform his daily duties, and risked his life to commute back and forth between the base and his home each day. In addition, he took strides to educate himself, expand his English language skills and save every penny possible, in preparation for possibly moving to the U.S. some day. He often relayed his excitement to me about living in a free country (he wanted to live in Texas), finding a safe job to go to each day and eventually marrying and having a family of his own. I hope his dreams become a reality one day soon.
At one time, on our base, there were three Afghan engineers, all who were well-educated and owned their own contracting/construction companies. All three oversaw numerous construction projects on base, and were paid handsomely for their work. But, two of them (Engineer A and Engineer B) were not satisfied with their income, despite the fact they made more money in a month, than most Afghans made in a year. Greed got the best of them, so the two engineers plotted against the third (Engineer C), and arrange for him to be fired, so they could take over his projects.
First, they tried, unsuccessfully, to have another low-level Afghan worker, smuggle some hash onto the base, and have it planted in Engineer C’s living quarters. U.S soldiers were periodically tasked with searching the Afghan living area. If any trace of drugs (or other contraband, such as weapons) were found, the person associated with them was fired on the spot. This plan was foiled however, when the designated smuggler was caught with the hash trying to enter the main gate. Because drugs of any kind are prohibited on base, the man was fired and Engineers A and B had to concoct a new plan.
The greedy engineers decided to start rumors stating that Engineer C’s workmanship was not up to par and that he cut corners on his construction projects. It was at this point that Engineer C approached one of my team members to voice his concerns about his fellow engineers and their attempts to discredit him. The rumors continued, and when they were not taken seriously by the U.S. military representatives responsible for overseeing the various projects, the rumors escalated into threats. Engineer C was reluctant to leave the base, fearful he would be attacked by relatives or friends of the other two engineers. It was clear Engineers A and B were hoping Engineer C would simply quit his job and leave the area, allowing them to take over his construction contracts on base. Fortunately, this was not the final outcome.
In the end, Engineer C reaped the rewards of the other engineers’ corruption efforts. After a lengthy investigation by several parties, Engineers A and B were eventually fired from their jobs. Enough proof had been gathered to confirm the attempted bribery, embezzlement and conspiring against another. They were escorted off base and prohibited from ever working with Coalition Forces again. Unfortunately, this outcome is the exception to the rule throughout Afghanistan. Statistics and research show most acts of corruption go unpunished, though not undetected.
The most memorable corruption case I witnessed involved an Afghan man, who headed up one of the largest contracting companies on our base. For purposes of this story, I will call him Sharif. His company held several construction, logistics and vehicles contracts, worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Sharif was extremely rich by Afghan standards, although he was very down to earth, in my opinion. He was well-known and respected, by both Afghans and Americans, around the base. I knew Sharif fairly well myself and routinely ran into him on base, checking up on his workers or attending meetings with American military representatives. His English was outstanding and he had a college degree, making him easy and enjoyable to talk to, as his intelligence level was high above most others. I got a positive vibe from Sharif and felt he was an honest businessman.
I, and my Counterintelligence colleagues, were stunned to come into work one day, to find out Sharif had been arrested by the National Directorate of Security (NDS), a government organization essentially equivalent the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the U.S. According to NDS officials, Sharif was suspected of working for the Pakistani ISI, providing them critical security information about our base.
My many years working in Counterintelligence around the world have taught me that gut instincts are important, but no
t always correct. I feared my gut had failed me with regards to Sharif. I wondered if he had really pulled the wool over all our eyes for so many years. I knew he did travel to Pakistan periodically to purchase supplies for his company, but so did many other local contractors. Afghanistan simply did not have the logistical items necessary for many construction projects. Pakistan, on the other hand, seemed to have a better stock of necessary resources, so it was common for business owners to travel there to make purchases. Had Sharif actually been working as an undercover ISI agent on our base? The thought sent chills down my spine and, quite frankly, scared me. Not only had he had full reign of the base, with overnight privileges, but he had passed many lie detector tests and interviews in my office.
Foreign intelligence services and spy agencies, such as the ISI, train their agents to successfully fool polygraph tests and adequately deceive persons such as myself. Although I was well-trained in deception recognition, I knew I was not above being misled or duped by a professionally-trained agent. Still, I was bothered at this prospect, knowing my team and I could have allowed an agent of a foreign intelligence service to operate on our base and possibly provide information critical to our national security to one of our adversaries.
Sharif was placed in a detention center run by the NDS, where he stayed for approximately two weeks. In the meantime, many different entities, myself included, scrambled to collect as much information about Sharif as possible and put the puzzle together. Initially, we were stumped. As the pieces began to fall into place, we suspected something was awry. The allegations put forth by the NDS did not appear to hold water and were unsubstantiated. Their claims of his travel records did not match up with his presence on our base. Often, when the NDS claimed he had been in Pakistan, there was proof Sharif had attended a meeting with base officials, in Afghanistan. The contradictions began to accumulate. Many of the details that pointed us in a certain direction are classified. However, we finally made a determination that we were comfortable with: Sharif was not working for the ISI. This conclusion was obviously an enormous relief.
The NDS released Sharif a couple weeks after his arrest, claiming they did not have enough evidence to hold him any longer, which was technically true. All their “evidence” had been fabricated. After sitting down with Sharif following his release, the truth became apparent. In reality, the entire situation had been a corruption scheme. Agents at the NDS knew Sharif was a rich businessman and they had concocted the false charges in order to imprison Sharif and then extort money from him, for their own self-interest. Sharif’s relatives claimed they were forced to pay the NDS employees the equivalent of approximately ten thousand dollars for his release. However, they were willing to pay rather than allow Sharif to remain in NDS custody for an indefinite amount of time. Because the NDS agents were government employees, and had ties to many other justice system representatives, they thought they could get away with the scam. In reality, they did, as they collected a nice sum of money that went straight in their pockets. It became a case of one man’s word versus another. NDS continued to insist Sharif had foreign ties and Sharif maintained his claims of innocence.
Sharif later asked me what I thought he could do to avoid such a situation in the future. I found myself lacking on solid advice to give him. Unfortunately, a good portion of Afghan government workers engage in corrupt activities and it is unlikely that will change any time soon. I advised Sharif to document his travels, whenever he needed to leave Afghanistan to buy supplies for his company. In addition, I reminded him to always report any threats he or his family received. Beyond that, there was little I could recommend for Sharif. In reality, he was lucky that he had suffered relatively little at the hands of his own government. A monetary loss was minimal compared to the possibility of a lifelong imprisonment on false charges.
Sadly, these types of extortion schemes are commonplace throughout Afghanistan. Not only do they affect rich businessmen, but also the poorest farmers, pushcart vendors and other day laborers. In many of the country’s provinces, these groups fall victim to unofficial “taxes”, imposed upon them by local law enforcement, municipal officers and/or insurgents. Refusing to pay the “tax” disallows them to sell their goods and operate in the local area. Furthermore, in some areas, this type of refusal might result in more brutal consequences, including kidnapping for ransom, torture or even death. Knowing this, I felt the outcome for Sharif was fortunate, though certainly not moral or just.
THE AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES
The Afghanistan security forces encompass several different groups. These include the military, Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Border Police (ABP). The military is composed of two branches: the Army and the Air Force. Approximately 180,000 officers and enlisted members comprise the Army, which falls under the Ministry of Defense based in Kabul, Afghanistan. The Air Force has a much smaller contingent of forces but is slowly expanding. The current Afghan Army was founded by President Hamid Karzai on December 1, 2002, and is funded by various NATO governments, primary the United States. Both American and British militaries have taken the lead in training and mentoring members of the Afghan security forces during the past decade, a daunting task considering Afghanistan has never had a traditional military.
Periodically I, and members of other Counterintelligence Support teams located throughout Afghanistan, was sent to another base for a few days. These missions were usually in response to an attack or intelligence indicating an imminent attack. Often, a team would be assembled within hours and we would be on the first possible flight, in order to address the incident as quickly as possible. During these missions, we interviewed persons of interest and other local national workers, to gain information regarding the specific event.
I headed up a team on one particular mission, in response to an incident where a homemade incendiary device detonated on a small base that housed both American military and Afghan Border Police (ABP) members. Fortunately, no one was injured in the blast, but local U.S. commanders were anxious to know how such a device made its way onto the base and who the target of the attack was. It was suspected that the explosive device was meant for the highest ranking Afghan police officer on the base, as the bomb had been placed outside his office. During our week at this base, we interviewed many Afghan police officers who were assigned there in an attempt to determine the origin and perpetrators behind the botched attack.
It was during this week that I met my first former Northern Alliance soldier. He was a fairly high-ranking non-commissioned officer (the equivalent of an E-7) in the ABP and exuded the confidence and knowledge of a true soldier. He was clearly well-weathered, evidenced by his gray hair, leathery skin and deep set wrinkles on his face and neck. He reminded me of a short version of Clint Eastwood. But, he was quick-witted and smart, despite his lack of any formal education. Clint spoke his honest opinion to me, which I appreicated. This was a trait not often found in Pashtuns. This man, however, was a Tajik, born into a different tribe and, by Afghan standards, a different ethnicity. Most Tajiks originated in the northern part of the country and tended to be better educated, both from a scholarly and worldly point of view.
Clint told me how he felt alienated in his police unit, as he was one of the only Tajiks, among dozens of Pashtuns. Despite the fact that they were all Afghan citizens, the Pashtuns looked down upon him and the few other Tajik soldiers and refused to socialize with them outside of work. On top of this, he was in a position of authority over the younger soldiers and had found it difficult to gain their respect because of his ethnic roots. Furthermore, when Clint left the local area, to travel to his home village in the northern part of the country, he was aware he was in constant danger. He knew the local police and insurgents would immediately recognize him as a Tajik, if he were stopped on the road. His look and accent gave this away immediately. Tajiks tend to look more Asian while Pashtuns are typically darker-skinned with larger eyes. This could be detrimental to his well-being, as outsiders were not well-
received in the Pashtun regions. A Tajik discovered in the Pashtun areas could easily be forced to pay a hefty fine, be robbed, kidnapped, or worse.
Despite the danger, Clint appeared wholeheartedly committed to serving his country until his death. He told me he had no plans to ever willingly leave the Border Police and said his tenure as a security force member would end the day he died, whether it was at the hands of the enemy or by natural causes.
In at least one way, I could relate to Clint because he never had the desire to be an officer on the police force. Despite my college education serving as a shoe-in for Officer Candidate School (OCS), I too, had joined the enlisted side of the Army. I wanted ground-level experience, and had no interest in managing troops from behind a desk. With this man’s background and years of experience, he could have easily secured a higher-paying position, possibly even as a Police Chief. But, he was content to remain the equivalent of a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) and clearly enjoyed leading younger, inexperienced policemen, even if they did not enjoy following. Clint loved to “beat the streets” and perform the ground work, so to speak. This was clearly the role that was defined for him when he fought with the Northern Alliance, many years prior.
While interviewing the Afghan Police at this remote base, most of us noticed that they were distant, somewhat unfriendly, and had a rather negative attitude towards the U.S. soldiers they worked with. Most were only mildly cooperative with us during our interviews and exerted an attitude of boredom. This was curious and fairly unusual, but none would reveal what the underlying cause of this disgruntlement was.
We finally got to the bottom of the mystery after I sat down with Clint. He was candid with me and explained a recent scenario that had occurred in the nearby mountains. His account was later confirmed by the U.S. military unit who occupied the base and it brought to light the enormity of the situation.
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