Stalin, Volume 1

by Stephen Kotkin

  FIRST RECOGNITION

  On the recommendation of doctors, Trotsky was granted a six-week holiday from January 6, 1923, but he stayed in Moscow. That same day, Stalin addressed a letter to the Central Committee proposing that Trotsky be made chairman of the Supreme Council of the Economy and a deputy chairman of the government, a proposal Stalin attributed, properly, to Lenin.89 Trotsky declined. On January 15, Trotsky detailed why he had already refused to become deputy prime minister at Lenin’s suggestion back in September 1922, writing that he disliked both the practice of a “deputies’ collegium,” which took people away from running their respective commissariats, and the policies of the party apparatus (under Stalin). For example, decisions on military affairs were being taken “de facto against the interests of the institution and even behind its back,” so “I do not consider it possible to take on still more responsibility for still other institutions.” Trotsky claimed that Lenin had proposed forming a commission to examine the selection, training, and promotion of cadres—Stalin’s bailiwick—but it had never been formed because Lenin’s illness worsened.90 On January 17, Stalin proposed that Trotsky become head of the state planning commission as well as deputy chairman of the government.91 Trotsky refused this, too.92 By refusing to become Lenin’s top deputy with Lenin seriously ill, Trotsky in effect was refusing to take over the government. It seems inexplicable. One part of the explanation consists of Trotsky’s continued insistence on replacing Sokolnikov’s “dictatorship of finances” (as Trotsky wrote in this exchange of letters) with a “dictatorship of industry,” which, however, Lenin adamantly refused. No less fundamentally, Trotsky understood that Stalin, as head of the party, could control the government (through the nomenklatura process, among other levers), and he was just not going to take a position subordinated to Stalin, even if Trotsky refrained from saying as much explicitly.

  Trotsky’s desire for a dictatorship of industry and an end to the party’s oversight of the economy had both a policy aspect (planning, super industrialization) and a political aspect: it was his answer to Stalin’s dictatorship of the party apparatus. But Stalin, who did not like the NEP any more than Trotsky did, crucially, like Lenin, and because of Lenin, understood the necessity of flexible tactics for the greater cause: Stalin accepted the NEP. To put the matter another way, in 1922, Stalin could have his party dictatorship and Lenin’s NEP. Trotsky could not have his economic dictatorship and the NEP. This means that the charges of Trotskyism that Stalin would level, with all manner of distortions, nonetheless had some basis: Trotsky on the economy was forcefully pushing against Lenin’s foundational policy. This episode also shows that, with Lenin incapacitated, Trotsky recognized the sudden vastness of Stalin’s power.

  But Stalin suddenly became vulnerable over that slap in Tiflis. Lenin now saw his bête noire—Great Russian chauvinism—in the persons of a Georgian (Orjonikidze) and a Pole (Dzierzynski), whom he suspected of whitewashing Georgian events.93 On January 25, 1923, without Lenin, the rest of the politburo met—even Trotsky took part, though on holiday—and heard from the Dzierzynski commission as well as Mdivani, then voted to approve Dzierzynski’s findings exonerating Orjonikidze and removing the four leading Georgian Communists from Georgia.94 No one was supposed to be keeping Lenin informed about party affairs, on doctors’ orders, but on January 24, Lenin’s secretariat recorded that he directed Maria Volodicheva to request the materials of the Dzierzynski Commission from Stalin or Dzierzynski, so that his secretariat could study them and report to him in order that he could prepare a report to the upcoming 12th Party Congress (scheduled for spring 1923).95 His innate suspiciousness was intensified by his illness and prescribed treatment of reduced political involvement. He began to accuse Fotiyeva, his head secretary, of “intriguing” against him, according to the doctors, because she had discovered that Dzierzynski was away from Moscow but reported that when he returned, she would ask him for the dossier.96 Sometime around now, in late January, Stalin and Krupskaya had a confrontation over the telephone. The sources indicate the conflict was sparked by the request for the Dzierzynski report, which Lenin’s secretariat formally made to Stalin on January 29.97

  The request struck Stalin as prima facie evidence that someone, presumably Krupskaya, had been informing Lenin about party and state affairs against the strict prohibition set down by the politburo at the instruction of the doctors. Molotov, who knew Stalin extremely well, recalled late in life that “Stalin was irritated: ‘Why should I get up on my hind legs for her? To sleep with Lenin does not necessarily mean to understand Leninism!’ Stalin told me something like this: ‘Just because she uses the same bathroom as Lenin, do I have to appreciate and respect her as if she were Lenin?’ He was too coarse and rude.”98 Krupskaya would characterize Stalin’s rudeness over the phone as extraordinary, but this is not corroborated by any other source. Maria Ulyanova, an eyewitness—the telephone was in the corridor just outside Lenin’s room in Gorki—would recall that Stalin had pointed out Krupskaya’s violation of the politburo decision “in a rather sharp manner” and that Krupskaya had descended into hysterics: “She completely did not resemble herself, she screamed out, she rolled around on the floor, and so on.” Perhaps Krupskaya was deliberately trying to stage a memorable incident. Ulyanova would further recall that Krupskaya had told Lenin about the incident “after several days” and that she (Krupskaya) and Stalin had reconciled.99

  The fact that the rudeness incident took place in late January—not, as most accounts assert, on December 22—helps explain why, on February 1, 1923, Stalin read out a statement at the politburo requesting to be “relieved of the responsibility for overseeing the regime established by the doctors for comrade Lenin.” The politburo unanimously rebuffed his request.100 That same day, Stalin also turned over the Dzierzynski Commission materials to Lenin’s secretariat. The request was unorthodox, given that the materials were supposed to be re-examined by a new “commission,” which no party body had authorized, and which was made up of mere technical personnel with no standing.101 The next day, the politburo discussed, once again, Trotsky’s insistence on concentrating economic authority in the state planning commission and opening the sluices to finance industry; the issue was tabled.102 His proposals were turned over to the whole Central Committee and, ultimately, the 12th Party Congress.103 Trotsky persisted in his quest for economic dictatorship as a counter to Stalin’s party dictatorship.

  SUSPICIOUS DICTATION

  Maria Glasser, Lenin’s secretary who handled politburo matters, recalled that between December 1922 and March 1923, the Bolshevik leader, “having only a half hour each day, rarely more, and sometimes less, hurried frightfully to say and do everything necessary.”104 But Professor Kramer, in February 1923, noted that “Vladimir Ilich was finding it hard to recall either a word he wanted or he was unable to read what he had dictated to the secretary, or he would begin to say something completely incoherent.”105 Despite the strict prohibition on conveying political information to him, all regime materials were still being sent to his secretariat, and Lenin, confined to his small room in the Kremlin apartment, cajoled his secretaries into divulging information about current events and making phone calls on his behalf. It was these loyal women, Fotiyeva, Volodicheva, and above all Krupskaya, who assumed the task of interpreting his nearly unintelligible words and half-paralyzed pantomime.106 On February 14, he was said to have instructed a secretary to “convey to someone of the insulted [Georgians] that he is on their side.” Lenin added, “Did Stalin know? Why did he not respond?”107 The doctors recorded that on February 20 Krupskaya withheld from Lenin the protocols of the Tenth Congress of Soviets, which happened to show that Stalin had implemented Lenin’s will.108 Fotiyeva recorded on March 3, that she passed to Lenin their dossier on Georgia, which refuted the Dzierzynski Commission report article by article.109

  The counterdossier was blatantly tendentious. Just one example: it omitted the salient fact that Pilipe Makahradze’s sec
ret letter to the Central Committee, with Kamenev’s response, had been leaked to the emigre Menshevik Socialist Herald—i.e., the Georgians had divulged state secrets.110 The counterdossier also rendered political judgments about the slap in Tiflis (“the differences carry a political character and should be raised at the next Party Congress”). Who inserted these assessments remains unclear. Trotsky’s involvement has been suggested.111 But feeling under the weather, he was holed up in his Kremlin apartment, in a different building from Lenin’s. “Neither Lenin nor I could reach the telephone; furthermore, the doctors strictly forbade Lenin to hold any telephone conversations,” Trotsky would write, adding that Lenin’s secretaries shuttled back and forth between the two with messages. The latter included a note, dated March 5, 1923, which purported to be from Lenin, beseeching Trotsky’s “to undertake the defense of the Georgian affair at the Central Committee of the party. That affair is now under ‘prosecution’ at the hands of Stalin and Dzierzynski and I cannot rely on their impartiality. Indeed, quite the contrary!”112 That same day, Trotsky called Lenin’s secretariat and spoke to Volodicheva, complaining he was too ill to do as Lenin requested. Trotsky added that Orjonikidze’s behavior in the incident was an aberration.113

  The circumstances point to Krupskaya as the shaper of the anti-Dzierzynski dossier and of the note to Trotsky. Another purported Lenin dictation, also said to be have been taken by Volodicheva, was for Stalin and reached him the next day.114 It was typed; no stenographic handwritten copy survives. Nor did the staff of Lenin’s secretariat make the usual obligatory notation that a letter had been dispatched. The typescript demanded an apology for mistreatment of Krupskaya and threatened a break in relations. Copies, for some reason, went to Zinoviev and Kamenev. Stalin had already apologized to Krupskaya, but the incident was now revived. On March 7, Stalin answered in writing: “Around five weeks ago [i.e., late January] I had a conversation with comrade N. Konstantinova, whom I consider not only your wife but also my old party comrade, and told her (over the telephone) approximately the following: ‘Doctors forbid giving Ilich political information, considering that such a regimen was a very important means of healing him, and you, Nadezhda Konstantinova, turn out to violate that regimen; it’s not allowed to play with Ilich’s life’ and so on.” Stalin continued: “I do not consider that one could find something rude or impermissible undertaken ‘against’ you in these words, for I pursued no goal other than your returning to health. Moreover, I considered it my duty to oversee implementation of the regime. My explanations with N. Kon[staninova] confirmed there was nothing here, and could be nothing here, other than a trivial misunderstanding. Still if you consider that in order to maintain ‘relations’ I must ‘take back’ the words I said as above, I can take them back, but I refuse to understand what it was about, where my ‘guilt’ lies, and what is really wanted of me.”115

  Yet another purported dictation from Lenin, this one a telegram dated March 6, was addressed to Mdivani and Makharadze: “I am with you in this matter with all my heart. I am outraged at the rudeness of Orjonikidze and the connivance of Stalin and Dzierzynski. I am preparing notes and a speech for you.”116 Only a few months before, Lenin was admonishing Mdivani and Makharadze sternly. It was not clear Lenin was in any condition to dictate letters. On March 6, the physicians recorded the following: “When he awoke, he summoned a nurse, but he could almost not converse with her, he wanted the nurse to summon Nadzehda Konstantinova, but he could not say her name. . . . Vladimir Ilich lay with a confused visage, the expression on his face was frightening, his eyes were sad, his look questioning, tears came down from his eyes. Vladimir Ilich is agitated, he tries to speak, but cannot find the words, and he adds: ‘Ah the devil, ah the devil, such an illness, this is a return to the old illness’ and so on. After measures were taken, ‘his speech improved,’ V.I. Lenin calmed down and fell asleep.”117

  It is noteworthy that Trotsky later would write that “Lenin entered into clandestine contact with the leaders of the Georgian opposition (Mdivani, Makharadze, and others) against the faction of Stalin, Orjonikidze, Dzierzynski, through Krupskaya” (italics added).118 Perhaps Krupskaya, interpolating Lenin’s intentions, concocted all three March letters. Perhaps she first mouthed the words to Lenin and he mouthed them back. Perhaps he mumbled versions of them himself. We shall likely never know. Whatever their provenance, the letters had consequences. On March 7, Kamenev, writing to Stalin, divulged Lenin’s support for the “national deviationists” in Georgia; writing to Zinoviev, Kamenev assigned himself the role of peacemaker.119 By this time, Lenin’s illness had taken a sharp turn for the worse: he suffered a seizure on the night of March 6–7.120 (The journal kept by Lenin’s secretaries ends in midsentence on March 6.)121 Stalin’s March 7 apologetic response to Lenin over Krupskaya was recorded as “not read” by Lenin. These three March letters were the last documents that would be attributed to Lenin by the dates assigned to them, but not the last ones that would emerge in his name.

  THIRD STROKE AND FAKE ARTICLE

  On the night of March 9–10, 1923, Lenin suffered another massive stroke, which resulted in “complete loss of speech and complete paralysis of the right extremities,” according to Professor Kramer, the neurologist.122 The physicians’ duty journal for March 11 recorded that “he kept trying to say something, but only quiet, disjointed sounds emerged. . . . Today, especially towards evening, his comprehension of what was being said to him was worse, sometimes he replied ‘no’ when he should have said ‘yes.’” The next day the physicians wrote: “He cannot understand what he is asked to do. He was shown a pen, his spectacles, and a paper-knife. When he was asked to give the spectacles, he gave them, when he was asked for the pen, he gave the spectacles again.”123 On March 11, Stalin sent a cipher to all provincial and republic party organizations: “More than ever, the provincial committees need to be informed about the moods of the masses so as to allow no confusion.” Moscow in the 1920s was generally roiled by rumors and leaks and Soviet newspapers conducted polemics with emigre periodicals, so keeping anything totally under wraps was out of the question. Lenin’s illness was publicly disclosed in a special edition of Pravda on March 12, albeit with utmost caution: “some weakening of the movement functions of his right hand and leg,” “some upset in his speech.”124 This published note, signed by German doctors, was enough for sharp readers to deduce that Lenin had suffered partial paralysis.125

  That same day the OGPU sent ciphers to the regional branches instructing them to intensify activity: “The state of comrade Lenin’s health is critical. A fatal end is possible. Immediately set up a secret ‘troika’ in order to take all necessary measures to prevent anti-Soviet disturbances.”126 Dzierzynski worried that emigres in France would lobby that country and perhaps Poland to take advantage with a military intervention. The politburo contemplated introducing martial law. A partial mobilization occurred on March 14. Of the discussion to disclose Lenin’s illness to the public, Trotsky would soon state in a speech, “I think, comrades, you can imagine the mood in which this meeting of the politburo took place. . . . We asked ourselves with genuine alarm how those outside the party would receive the news—the peasant, the Red Army man.”127

  Everything was being filtered through the prism of the succession. Pravda began issuing special bulletins concerning Lenin’s health from March 14, 1923. That issue happened to be the twenty-fifth anniversary of the party’s official founding, and the twentieth of the 2nd Party Congress, when the Bolshevik faction had been constituted, and it carried commemorative essays. One stood out: “Lev Trotsky—Organizer of Victory,” by Karl Radek, who deemed Trotsky “the first leader [vozhd’],” and used soaring language to laud Trotsky’s “genius,” praising even controversial subjects, such as “his courageous determination to utilize military specialists for creating the army.”128 Rumors circulated that Lenin had designated Trotsky his successor.129 Within a short period the OGPU submitted a report on eavesdropped conversa
tions, with coverage of workers in cities and peasants right near cities or along the rail lines, because “the news about Lenin’s illness had barely begun to penetrate the genuine village.” Some people did not believe the reports of illness, others expressed concern for Lenin. According to the OGPU, people discussed possible successors for Lenin by name, mentioning Trotsky, purportedly “without particular sympathy,” which the OGPU attributed to “anti-Semitism of the masses.” Others named as possibilities to become chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars included Kamenev, Bukharin, Zinoviev, and Dzierzynski.130 Stalin was not mentioned. In the country at large, in spring 1923, he was poorly known. But the OGPU report was submitted to him.

  Lenin was frantically trying to get the nurses to give him cyanide or summon Stalin to do so. On Saturday, March 17, Krupskaya herself summoned Stalin, telling him Lenin was in a “horrible” state and demanding poison again.131 Stalin went over to Lenin’s Kremlin apartment, and that same day wrote an explanatory note to Kamenev and Zinoviev, following up four days later with a note to the full politburo. Stalin was not admitted to Lenin’s room; Krupskaya transmitted Lenin’s poison request and Stalin’s answer, a vague promise that “at the necessary time, I will implement your request without vacillating.” But he told the politburo that “I do not have the strength to fulfill this request of V. Ilich and must refuse the mission, since it is not humane and necessary.” The politburo members supported Stalin’s stalling tactics.132 Also on March 21, Lenin’s secretariat ceased to receive regime documents, a cutoff only Stalin could have ordered.133