Shadow Warriors

by Dick Camp

  As VP-71 cleared the area, three flights from VSB-6 (Scout Bombing Squadron) off the USS Enterprise bombed and strafed the two islands. The first strike, eighteen Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers with 1000-pound bombs, took off just after dawn. Seven aircraft hit Gavutu and three bombed Tanambogo. Two hours later, nine dive bombers loaded with 500-pound bombs strafed targets on both islands and at 1000, twelve VSBs dropped 1,000-pound bombs on the islands. As a result of the air attacks, most of the above-ground structures were destroyed or severely damaged, including the concrete seaplane ramp, which was to have serious consequences on the parachute battalion’s landing plan.

  Defend to the Last Man

  Captain Miyazaki stared in horror at the flaming pyres marking the wreckage of his command—“It was a horrifying sight,” he said—and vowed to take vengeance on the Americans. “We will defend to the last man. Pray for our success,” he radioed the 25th Air Flotilla headquarters on Rabaul. As the last of the American planes flew off, Miyazaki ordered his men to come out of the shelters they had taken cover in during the attack and take up arms. He knew it was only a matter of time until the Americans landed on the island. Despite the violence of the attack most of his men had survived the air assault. To defend the twin islets, Miyazaki had a total of 536 men—over twice the number of the American intelligence report—the 54-man Mitsuwa antiaircraft unit (two 13mm antiaircraft guns) under Sp. Lt. (j.g.) Toshichi Mitsuwa, a unit of the Kure 3rd Special Naval Landing Force (Kaigun Tokubetsu Rikusentai), 342 men of Miyazaki’s Yokohama Air Group, and 144 civilian technicians and laborers from the 14th Construction Unit, commanded by Lt. Cmdr. Kiyoshi Iida. The Rikusentai platoon was the only trained infantry but the others could certainly handle light infantry weapons.

  The Japanese defenders were armed with a variety of weapons, including rifles, light and heavy machine guns, two 13mm antiaircraft guns, and the ubiquitous 50mm grenade discharger (knee mortar). They occupied dozens of caves, bunkers, and tunnels positioned throughout the islets but their primary defensive positions were organized around two heights: Hill 148 on Gavutu and Tanambogo’s Hill 121. The Japanese had honeycombed the hills with tunnels and rock-hewn chambers, some as big as twenty feet by twenty feet. The two heights were within machine gun range of each other, giving the Japanese excellent defensive ground to stop an attack against either hill. The Japanese were past masters at camouflage. Their rifle pits and machine gun positions were dug into the sides of the hills and carefully camouflaged with rocks and soil. Barrels were often filled with debris and placed around the openings to provide extra protection from direct fire. Finally, the positions were constructed with narrow embrasures, making them extremely difficult to spot. Often a Marine was right on the position before he saw it. Snipers were often positioned in trees and other expected locations to kill unit leaders and to limit movement. One particularly effective sniper managed to swim to one of the partially destroyed seaplanes on the coral reef and use it as his firing position. The garrison was well prepared to defend the islands and to defeat the invaders on the beach or die in the attempt—surrender was absolutely unacceptable.

  The Landing Force

  The 1st Marine Parachute Battalion, under the command of Maj. Robert H. Williams, embarked on the attack transport USS Heywood (APA-6), was scheduled to land on Gavutu’s northeast coast at four hours after the landing on Tulagi (H+4 hours, 1200 7 August, 1942). The four-hour delay was the result of a shortage of landing craft. There were not sufficient craft for simultaneous landings on Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo. Parachutist Private First Class Leonard Kiesel recalled, “The Raiders [1st Raider Battalion] had got use of the landing barges first, and we had to stay on board ’til they made their landing on Tulagi Island. And then the barges come back to us. And by that time the Japanese on Gavutu were alerted.” Major Williams’s landing plan called for a two company assault—Company “A” and Company “B” in that order—across the seaplane ramp, with Company “C” in reserve, prepared to support either of the assault companies. The initial assault was directed against the north and southeast faces of Hill 148, while the third company passed around the right flank to take a position on the Gavutu end of the causeway to interdict any flanking fire from Tanambogo. After Gavutu was captured, Company “C” was to seize Tanambogo. The Parachute Battalion numbered 397 men, including 30 naval personnel (24 Corpsmen, 5 doctors, and a U.S. Navy chaplain).

  At 0800 three minesweepers, USS Hovey (DMS-11), USS Hopkins (DMS-13), and USS Trever (DMS-16) moved in to support the Raider landing on Tulagi. As they passed Gavutu, Lieutenant Mitsuwa’s 13mm gun on Hill 148 opened fire, straddling the American formation but without causing damage or casualties. Hopkins and Trever responded with their three-inch main battery and 20mm cannon. Trever gunners scored a close hit and temporarily put the gun out of action. A short time later, a flight of SBD Douglas dive-bombers dropped several 500-pound bombs but failed to knock it out. The antiaircraft cruiser USS San Juan (CL-54) and destroyers USS Monssen (DD-436) and Buchanan (DD-484) bombarded Gavutu, causing heavy damage to all the above ground structures but causing very few casualties among the garrison. The battalion’s after-action report noted, “Although these prepared fires gave all the appearance of really ‘softening up’ the objectives and giving all the members of this battalion a feeling that the objectives would be easily taken, this did not prove to be the case. … [T]he dugouts and gun positions were exceedingly well and build and disposed. … [T]he enemy suffered few casualties as a result of the preliminary bombardment.”

  1ST MARINE PARACHUTE BATTALION

  The 1st Marine Parachute Battalion came into existence on 28 May 1941, with the formation of Company “A,” at Quantico, Virginia, with Capt. Marcellus J. Howard as its first commanding officer. In the summer of 1941, the 2nd Parachute Company was transferred from the West Coast to Quantico and merged into the 1st Battalion. Captain Robert H. Williams assumed command of the two-company organization. At the end of March 1942, a third company was formed, giving the battalion an overall strength of 332 officers and men, less than 60 percent of its table of organization strength. The concentration of the companies at Quantico gave them an opportunity for tactical training but a shortage of transport aircraft kept the battalion from executing large-scale parachute jumps. Captain Williams felt that “paratroopers are simply a new form of infantry.”and took advantage of his battalion’s ground time to train accordingly: hand-to-hand fighting, hikes, and callisthenics filled their days. A reporter from Time magazine noted that the parachutists were a “tough-looking outfit among Marines, who all look tough.” With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the battalion prepared for deployment, and in May and June 1942, it sailed to New Zealand as part of the 1st Marine Division. Upon arrival, Captain Williams learned that it had been assigned to seize the islands of Gavutu-Tanambogo in the Solomon Islands.

  Leonard Kiesel stood on deck waiting for the order to go over the side. “We were all lined up on the railing of the Heywood watching the Navy planes strafe the two target islands. I remember seeing a Japanese gas and oil storage unit go up in smoke. … [W]e were all anxious and excited, but had to wait our turn to board the Higgins boats.” At 1000 the men started climbing down the cargo nets into the pitching boats. Ground swells were causing the landing craft to rise and fall as much as several feet making a jump from the cargo net into the boat a risky proposition for the heavily loaded Parachutists. Kiesel recalled, “When we finally climbed down the [cargo] net into the barges, the water had turned a bit rough. The barges were bouncing up and down and when I attempted to drop off the net into a waiting Higgins boat, my knees were almost driven up to my shoulder blades!” The loaded boats (twelve Heywood boats and one ramp boat from the Neville) formed three waves, corresponding to the landing plan:

  • First wave—Navy Lt. R. E. Bennink, Company “A,” 130 Marines, 4 Higgins boats

  • Second wave—Navy Ensign G. C. Brown, Company “B,” 130 Marines, 4 Higgins boats

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nbsp; • Third wave—Navy Lt. D. W. Ellis Jr., Company “C” and Headquarters, 140 Marines, 4 Higgins boats and 1 ramp boat.

  The boats proceeded to an assembly area where they formed a circle and waited for the signal to proceed to the line of departure (LOD). Private First Class Lawrence Moran recalled, “We left Heywood around 1000 and circled her for about two hours … I got seasick from all the bouncing around.” Lieutenant Bennink received word at 1141 to start the seven-mile run to the line of departure. The second and third waves (Ensign Brown and Lieutenant Ellis) followed at five minute intervals. The Higgins boats rolled heavily in the choppy water, allowing sea water to come over the sides, drenching men and equipment. The boats gathered at the line of departure for their difficult run to the beach. Because the island was almost surrounded by coral shoals, the landing had to be made on the northeastern side of Gavutu, not far from the causeway connecting it with Tanambogo. “Consequently our boats had to pass along the eastern shore of the island, between it and the promontory of Florida on which Halavo lay, then turn sharply in toward the beach,” Moran explained. “During this turn we were exposed to fire from Tanambogo.”

  As the wave made its way to the beach, the San Juan opened fire, bombarding Gavutu with 280 rounds of five-inch high-capacity shells in four minutes. The destroyer Monssen closed to within five hundred yards of the island and unleashed 92 rounds of five-inch against suspected Japanese positions. Private First Class Robert W. Moore was in the second wave. “As we approached the cement dock [Lever’s pier] Marine Gunner Robert Manning looked over the bow of the landing craft and said, ‘There couldn’t possibly be anyone alive there.’ It had been blasted and shelled from one end to the other and the island was absolutely bare except for a few coconut trees that seemed to have survived.”

  As the last shells of the naval bombardment exploded, the first wave approached their designated landing spot. “These boats intended to land at the concrete seaplane ramp,” General Vandegrift noted, “but the heavy naval gunfire and bombing preparations had tumbled huge blocks of cement in the path of the leading waves.…” A coral reef surrounded the two islands except for a narrow channel leading to the seaplane ramp. The landing plan called for the three waves to land over or in the vicinity of the ramp but the bombing and naval gunfire had reduced it to a mass of rubble, forcing the boats to land slightly north in a more exposed location on a nearby small beach and concrete pier standing some six feet out of the water. As the boats approached the channel they presented a lucrative target for the Japanese machine gunners. Colonel Joseph H. Alexander wrote in Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific, “The intermittent reef surrounding Gavutu-Tanambogo had served to channelize the American assault landing into one open sector, which proved to be well covered by Japanese Nambu machine guns.” Their heavy caliber slugs punched holes completely through the boats’ one-inch thick plywood hull, killing and wounding several Marines. “They [landing craft] were painted gray to look like steel [but] you could shoot a .22 bullet right through them,” Kiesel said.

  The first wave beached about twenty-five yards apart and the men went over the sides—the early Higgins boats did not have ramps—and started pushing inland. The battalion’s after-action report noted, “The leading wave (Company “A”) was permitted to land without being fired upon. As soon as this wave hit the beach, it was taken under rifle and machine gun fire. Stanley Jersey wrote, “… [W]hen the Americans were within range, the order came: Hassha o hajime!—commence firing!” The battalion after-action noted: “…[T]he second and third waves were subjected to rifle and machine gun fire while still embarked in the boats.” The History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal stated that, “The second wave, at the request of the senior Marine officer, came in closely behind the first and touched the beach only a minute and a half later. Three Marines were hit before they could leave the boat and others were shot down in the water as they splashed ashore. While the boats were backing off one was hit and sunk, apparently by a hand grenade thrown from shore, and two of its crew were killed. The third wave followed in closely and landed at 1206, eight minutes ahead of the scheduled time. Again several Marines were hit in the boats and the rest rushed ashore in the face of heavy fire.”

  Private First Class Kiesel recalled, “One of our coxswains was hit and killed instantly. His assistant took over and hunched down in the bottom of the boat, steering by reaching his hand up to the wheel. About fifty yards out he uttered, ‘This is as far as I go boys.’ We had to bail over the sides … [into] chest deep water, bullets singing by … I considered ducking under the water and going in that way … Another ‘Chute’ just in front of me stumbled and went down. I thought he had slipped; after catching him by the shoulders, I dropped him instantly, half his face was gone!” Because of the heavy sniper fire, the boats had to withdraw some thousand yards before making a rendezvous to treat the wounded. Lieutenant Ellis, third wave commander, brought his boat in and transferred the wounded to a damaged boat and sent them to the Neville. While his boat was withdrawing, two of his crew were wounded. During this time enemy fire from both Florida and Gavutu had become so heavy that the boats at the rendezvous had been forced to withdraw farther down the channel.

  Private First Class Moran was in the second wave. “We landed … on a concrete ramp at about a 45-degree angle. I had a hell of a time getting out … the Japs were not zeroing in on our boat or I would have been a goner.…” Private First Class Moore’s boat didn’t even make it to the beach. “As we approached the sea wall and dock [about seventy-five yards out] we hit a coral reef and the bow of the boat swung to the left … [W]e all plunged into the water, not realizing it was up to our necks … [B]ullets were whizzing around us and heavy fire hitting the water—you could hear the sound of shells flying by.” Private First Class Kiesel was hit in the water. “I was finally able to move better, when ‘Wham,’ I was knocked off my feet. I knew I was hit. I managed to crawl up to the beach and … got behind a piece of concrete … and applied a tourniquet to my leg to stop the bleeding.” Private First Class Moore reached the seawall. “We commenced firing, that is, everyone but me. My piece [Reising sub-machine gun] would not fire … I tried everything I knew to get it to operate. No luck. I was weaponless with the enemy firing at the Marines, including yours truly!”

  The battalion after-action report noted, “This fire came from Hill 148, Hill 121, the small island, Gaomi, and it is strongly suspected, from the wrecked four-motor seaplane. … In addition to these fires the enemy is believed to have had time to send snipers up predetermined trees on all these islands.” Lt. Ronald F. Adams, a platoon commander in Company “C” recalled, “As we headed for the point where we were to land, all thirty men in my platoon were lying down, but I was standing in the middle of them with my binoculars. Standing in the stem was my captain, Capt. Richard Huerth. About three hundred yards off-shore, we were hit by a round of bullets. I looked forward and the coxswain was slumped over dead. I looked behind me and there was Captain Huerth sitting on gear of some kind and blood was gushing out his nose and mouth, and of course he, too, never reached the shore. As we approached the shore, the boat ran into some underwater concrete piling. We had to bail out over the side, and we waded in to shore through water up to our chests.” Captain Huerth was evacuated to a ship with a doctor but he could not be saved.

  The battalion after-action noted, “When the leading wave landed it pushed inland about seventy-five yards where it was pinned down by fire from Hill 148 and Hill 121. The 2nd and 3rd waves upon landing found themselves subjected to an intense fire. It was evident that the enemy had every intention of fighting to the last man.” Heywood’s commanding officer, Capt. Herbert B. Knowles said, “From daylight to noon this little island was subjected to repeated bombing attacks and bombardment from cruisers and destroyers. The results have been most disappointing …” Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl wrote in The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War,
Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific that, “… the defenders opened up … Those on Tanambogo joined, taking the Marines under a raking enfilade fire … [T]he pier was swept by a stream of lead … [T]en percent of those set ashore by the first boats were casualties.”

  Japanese snipers caused a number of casualties and disrupted the advance. Private Robert M. Howard, a member of the division intelligence section, was pinned down near the wharf.

  The enemy kept us confined to a small area for some time, due to many well placed snipers, and machine guns on top of the two hills. The snipers were well camouflaged, with clothes made of palm tree leaves and bark. They were so well camouflaged in many cases that they could not be seen unless you were directly under the tree. These snipers were usually tied in the trees, and sometimes had light machine guns, but usually a .25-caliber rifle. They covered the sound of their weapons with the sound of our machine guns, and they sometimes got off two shots during one machine gun burst. Due to the fact that they fired when there was noise to cover their own rifle fire, and to their being well camouflaged, they were very effective. Their choices were sergeants and officers whose insignia were exposed.

  Private First Class Moore recalled, “We faced a murderous fire from Hill 148. We attempted to make ourselves the smallest target you could imagine and finally managed to reach the base of the hill. There was some sort of a small wash running from its base. … [I]t was there that I saw my first dead Marine, Cpl. Harold E. Johns, who was a [parachute] rigger in Headquarters Company. I have never forgotten it.” Private First Class Kiesel could not move because of his leg wound. “Every time I moved to change the tourniquet, the Japs would pepper the area. … [T]here were Japanese all around … underground, in caves … [T]hey were right close.” He finally spotted the troublesome enemy position about seventy yards away. “They were busy manning the one gun that was still working. I quickly took aim and fired three shots. I know I killed one and wounded another. … [N]o more firing from that pesthole, thank God!”