Hitler's Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe

by Philip W. Blood

  6

  DAS

  BANDENKAMPFGEBIET

  The June 1943 order included Himmler’s self-appointed authority to declare a “combating-bandits area” (Bandenkampfgebiet). This authority does not seem to have been discussed during his meeting with Hitler on June 19, but the meeting almost certainly engineered it (refer to chapter 4). Himmler decided this would be a fitting senior command function of the Chef der Bandenbekämpfung, a post he retained until the end of the war. This instrument effectively placed Himmler in control over any or all territory experiencing intense partisan incursions or resistance activity. This control was administered either through the offices of the Chef der Bandenkampfverbände or another SS-Police office such as Karl Wolff’s in Italy (discussed in chapter 9). These offices would then decide upon the appropriate course of action. The Bandenkampfgebiet had wider operational implications. From the perspective of military history, it was not a major departure from the Etappengebiet introduced after 1872 and regularly utilized until the end of the First World War. During Operation “Barbarossa,” Hitler opted for four zones: the combat zone (Gefechtsgebiet), the immediate army area behind the front line (Armeegebiet), the security zone under the “army rear area” (Heeresgebiet), and the political zones under the Reichskommisariate.1 The Bandenkampfgebiet really affected only the political zones in Russia. Ideologically, the Bandenkampfgebiet originated from Himmler’s vision for Lebensraum as depicted in the “General Plan for the East.” This envisaged a network of colonial estates governing Russia. Thus, common threads linked the Bandenkampfgebiet to both German military traditions and Nazi ideology.

  The Bandenkampfgebiet became central to the Nazis’ prosecution of Bandenbekämpfung in the last years of the war. It was the Nazi counter to Stalin’s partisan challenge over the rightful ownership/control of Russian lands or “space” (Raum). In 1942, Himmler proposed eradicating “banditry” through attrition rather than dominating terrain. This represented a compromise to the army’s objections over the SS control of security. By the end of 1942, just as in 1918, the devastation of the German occupation had created a wasteland that both Vejas Liulevicius and Christian Gerlach described and that Hannes Heer painted as “death zones” (tote Zonen).2 The situation in the army rear areas continued to deteriorate into an existence dominated by the forces of exploitation and destruction.3 However, as yet the Bandenkampfgebiet has avoided academic scrutiny.

  In 1943, Himmler aligned Bandenbekämpfung policy to the task of dominating terrain for purposes enforcing security by exploitation; the Bandenkampfgebiet, therefore, was a manifestation of Hitler’s Fortress Europe strategy. In operational terms, the Bandenkampfgebiet was categorized into three threat levels. The highest threat level, the “bandit-diseased area” (bandenverseuchtes Gebiet), was an area wracked with bands or “bandits” openly supported by the indigenous population. If the area contained a military railway line or major road (Rollbahn) and the insurgency hindered theater military operations, then it was likely to become subject to a full-scale “cleansing action” (Säuberungsaktion). The mid-threat level, a “bandit-suspicious area” (banden-verdächtiges Gebiet), could expect a vigorous investigation of the local community by the SD/GFP. In addition, Jagdkommandos were likely to be dispatched to conduct patrols to gauge the level of “banditry.” The lowest threat level, the “bandit-free area” (bandenfreies Gebiet), was normally registered only after cleansing operations were completed and was subject to minimum-security scrutiny. In general security terms, the Bandenkampfgebiet signaled the adoption of intense preventative security measures (proposed in the 1942 Bandenbekämpfung manual), the deployment of manpower under training (Zenner’s proposal from 1942), and the fusion of both into Bandenbekämpfung operational training. In specific security terms, the difference between 1942 and 1943 was the central role of recruits and training to the prosecution of Bandenbekämpfung and in the domination of terrain.

  Preventative Measures

  Simple Bandenbekämpfung practice began with self-security or preventative measures. Himmler first approached this subject in his Bandenbekämpfung pamphlet (1942). The 1944 regulations continued to emphasize defense and protection. In practice, these principles encouraged a strict occupation and heightened an aggressive mood in the occupier. The Bandenkampfgebiet troops within installations, cities, and rural communities were forced into an automatic state of readiness. Regulations stipulated that prior to entering a “bandit-diseased area” the troops should be conditioned as to what awaited them and the bands’ location should be plotted on “bandit situation maps” (Bandenlagekarte). The advancing troops set patrols, established a skirmish order, and swept their entry points of mines. They entered an area under the cover of machine-guns, ready for combat. When building an encampment in a “bandit-diseased area,” they incorporated houses, workshops, and farms within the defensive complex. Strongpoints were stocked with machine guns, flare pistols, and hand grenades with fighting positions (Kampfstände) made easily accessible. They cleared strips of forests and scrubland up to 400-meter frontages, setting clear line-of-sight and enfilading killing zones.

  The first priority of preventative measures was the protection of lines of communications: railways, roads, and waterways. The civil administration and the SS determined the appropriate level of guardianship to protect the railway lines. Strongpoints were established in stations, at railway block sections or junctions, and at other important installations (bridges, water towers, pump stations, power stations, and railway work facilities). Security landscaping generated a lot of activity among competing Nazi agencies. Deciphered messages reveal that Himmler was active in landscaping: “He wants to know how quickly forestry along supply routes can be cut down as a defense measure,” recorded one British signal.4 In September 1943, Himmler signaled Fegelein, “I order for the building of your defensive task intensive building of positions; you will employ every man available,” meaning from the civilian population.5 After the war, one former German officer indicated that, in principle, they fortified railway installations for rapid defense.6 The regulations again required a 300-meter-wide exclusion zone, or no-man’s-land, on either side of the tracks. The Technische Nothilfe received orders to clear areas up to 500 meters wide on either side of railway lines.7 The long-distance telephone and signals cables were buried to protect them from attacks.8 The zone was cleared and posted with warning signs in all relevant languages. The railway command decided which parts of the forests were preserved to protect against snowdrifts. State foresters organized wood removal. Railway gardeners, under guard, attended to the weeds in the zones.

  The second priority involved securing the rural communities, economic installations, and important intelligence-connected facilities. Economic facilities, plants, and administration buildings that were important for the German war effort also came within the scope of preventative measures. The civilian authorities decided which buildings were protected. Strongpoint and obstacles were established around key factories. Again the question of loyalty arose in both rural and industrial communities as the Nazis expected civilians to prosecute passive Bandenbekämpfung. The attitude emphasized in the 1944 regulations was that, as a matter of duty (and proof of loyalty), natives granted survival through work should secure their places of work, even after long shifts.

  The third priority involved securing agriculture and forestry. The preferred method of securing farming areas was to garrison troops and conduct patrol sweeps. Crops designated for the Germans came under the Nazi civilian administration and its agricultural leaders. They planned and coordinated security levels with the priority of protection and collection of the harvest. Lieutenant General Schwarznecker in a post-war study implied that the SS-Police mission was limited to protecting political issues and the harvests. 9 Another German officer thought that crops, especially Indian corn and rye, were purposefully grown to restrict the movement of “bandits.”10 The “harvest security action” (Erntesicherungsaktion) was not only an SS prio
rity. These studies overlook the Wehrmacht and SS prioritization of agriculture as critical in their operational and strategic plans.

  The troops and local populace, including those working for the Germans, came face to face in the Bandenkampfgebiet. Civilian status was made more complex than the usual bystander-collaborator-resistor construct. Collaboration was forced on civilians; for example, troops conscripted local watchmen (Alarmein-heiten) to raise the alarm. The watchmen’s reliability was probably suspect, as they feared the bands more than German terror.11 Highway security patrols carried out spot checks, entering villages and hamlets to conduct searches. After the war, former German soldiers claimed that many civilians were peaceable, industrious, and uninterested in the conflict. However, the average soldier treated civilians with suspicion and contempt: “Every civilian, every highway and railway worker, especially if those who directed the traffic were natives, was required to have an identification card, the form of which was changed regularly.”12 The villages located in the way of death zones were evacuated and flattened. Native railway laborers (Eisenbahnhelfer) and other collaborators were given special consideration in locating a residence. Civilian railway workers received permit papers (Ausweise) from the transport duty officers in the town commander (Orts-kommandantur) or the territory commander (Gebietskommandant) for travel on the railways. Laborers were allowed to enter and to leave the death zones only along designated paths and under guard. Civilians were officially barred from strongpoints and encampments. The emphasis was on rigid social control irrespective of its psychological implications: “The morale of the population has been lowered a good deal by the labor allocation to Germany since the recruiting had to be carried on in most cases by imposing a forced quota on the various communities.”13

  The SS-Police erected complexes across occupied Europe that extended the network of preventative security. Installations were established in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia, and Holland—especially field recruit depots (SSFeldrekruten-Depot) and troop training grounds (Truppenübungsplätze). In Poland, SS facilities congregated around Warsaw and Debica. By March 1942, the SS-Führungshauptamt operated three Waffen-SS and police supply commands (Nachschubkommandanturen der Waffen-SS und Polizei) as the controlling agencies for reserves, supply, and operational training in the east.14 The Order Police also erected training facilities, including Truppenübungsplatz Kuznica near Grodno in Belorussia.15 In March, Himmler decided to extend these facilities as fortified central hubs handling recruits, reserves, and supplies. These were located in Riga, Bobruisk, and Dnepropetrovsk.16 The construction site of the Bobruisk complex was visited by Bach-Zelewski on his return to duty in May 1942.17

  In April, Himmler and Wolff discussed the question of Unruh’s visit to Warsaw, where SS installations included reserve and supply depots.18 In May 1942, Unruh conducted an investigation of rear-area functions of the Eastern Front. He visited the SS supply facility in Riga and recommended its closure alongside other SS facilities as wasteful duplication. The SS representative assigned to the party, SS-Sturmbannführer With, attempted to convince Unruh of the necessity for the HSSPF and Waffen-SS to manage their supply facilities independently. Unruh refused to accept any counter-arguments and, on May 11, ordered one company of police and two battalions of Schuma to be placed under Wehrmacht command. With urgently sent a message to Himmler warning him of the implications of the report Unruh intended to put before Hitler.19 Himmler intervened through Hitler and so prevented any further interference with his forces. Henceforth, Unruh and Himmler treated one another with due circumspection.20 In a meeting lasting nearly five hours, Hitler, Unruh, Keitel, and Himmler agreed to another rationalization assignment in the General Government of Poland. Himmler cautioned Unruh not to interfere in SS business. Yet some weeks later, Himmler instructed Krüger to provide Unruh with all the assistance necessary to complete his tasks.21 With’s efforts to limit Unruh were appreciated by Himmler, who transferred him to his personal staff to become an internal auditor of SS-Police affairs.22

  SS-Waldlager Bobruisk

  Himmler’s “General Plan for the East” envisaged the creation of colonial estates. This settlement policy (Siedlungspolitik) incorporated the vast construction of romanticized Germanic medieval-style burgs across Russia. These burgs were initially integrated into the security system as “armed villages” (Wehrdörfer), creating a self-defense network. Even generals of the Wehrmacht applied to Himmler for the right to own a farmstead.23 There were other SS complexes in the east with the sole purpose of administering security. In March 1943, the intelligence officer (Ic) of Nachschubkommandantur der Waffen-SS Russland-Mitte issued his fourth situation report (the first three are missing). The report concentrated on the “bandit-helpers,” the newspaper Bobruisker Partisanen, the use of mines as bombs by “bandits,” the situation of bandit camps, and heavy mortar attacks.24 There was little to indicate whether the base was central to SS operations. By the summer of 1943, the Nachschubkommandantur had been redesignated SS-Waldlager Bobruisk. This large, fortified complex straddled several camps in the middle of a forest and alongside the main railway line from Minsk to Bobruisk. Its multiple functions included training, provisioning (protecting the local harvests), and supply.25 The installation’s commander, SS-Standartenführer Rudolf Pannier, was a former businessman and a reserve police officer who had received the Knight’s Cross during the winter battles of 1941. By July 1943, the installation was fully operational, and its functions suggested a wider brief than that of an advanced supply and recruit depot. The Waldlager amalgamated headquarters functions and replicated staff positions typically found only within the army Wehrkreis system. The SS-Waldlager Bobruisk was an emerging SS-Wehrkreis (refer to diagram III). The existence of this installation, under Unruh’s scrutiny, indicates how Himmler had been able to circumvent OKW policy with minimal resources. Whether this was to become part of an extensive SS-Wehrkreis is open to pure speculation. The advance of the Red Army in the latter half of 1943 eventually led to its abandonment.26 Yet it demonstrates the extent of SS ambitions.

  According to Pannier, a Red Army barracks had formed part of the site, but further work extended and fortified the complex. This involved staggered artillery, infantry, and antitank defenses. The western flank of the complex was protected by flooded and impassable ground, deliberately caused by damming a stream. Recruits assigned to the complex were detailed to building and construction duties. Pannier reported that the men’s barracks were homely; the company of artisans had erected latrines and washrooms. Several barracks had been prepared for winter comfort, and cupboards lined the insides. The construction program included a barrack-block for female SS auxiliaries who erected stores for wood and peat, produced locally in Bobruisk. Ninety-two tons were supplied to the complex. A wood and pulp factory was included in the complex and supplied 2,700 cubic meters of construction timber. The recruits sunk a drinking water well of 2 meters, which was later increased to 20 meters with an extraction pump. The complex had sixty-four vehicles, all maintained in the local workshops. The maintenance teams converted some vehicles to use wood-gas, produced on site; this allowed for significant energy savings. The ordnance detachment repaired weapons for use by the installation. Their gunsmiths rebored three captured Pak 45mm antitank guns and replaced their range-finding equipment. In anticipation of winter, there was a program for making skis and snowshoes. The complex installed a central generator to allow the signals equipment to remain functioning even while under attack. In September, the recruits completed the construction a command bunker (Führer-Bunker).27 By October 1943, the Waldlager was a fully functioning and self-sufficient armed complex.

  Once the German armies began to retreat, operational and security zones collapsed on top of each other. In October 1943, Pannier observed that Army Group Centre was under pressure to erect defense lines. Clashes broke out between the SS and the army over control of installations and other bases in the Bobruisk area. There was a major disagreement over the S
S-Waldlager hospital and medical facilities. Pannier wrote to Field Marshal Model, commander of Army Group Centre, to explain the security situation but did not received a response. He advised Model of significant changes in the tactics of the “bandits” whom he said were no longer roaming independently but operating under military direction. Pannier suggested Model might determine the direction of Soviet attacks by tracking the direction of the “bandits.” The bands had exploited the rear-area chaos, and individual “bandits” had mingled with the mass exodus of refugees. The bands also exploited the fears of Hiwis working in headquarters and were able to gather security intelligence.28 Internal security was a constant problem. The August report mentioned spies within the installation and the arrest of five people for alleged contact with the bands. On August 27, a woman alleged to be a “bandit-helper” was discovered searching desks of an office in the Waldlager. The next day, two more “bandit helpers” were arrested while trying to pass information regarding German troop movements. In each case, they were known to be locals working in the Waldlager. On August 31, six “bandit helpers” were arrested for passing messages about the traffic movements on the Bobruisk-Brosha railway. Similar cases occurred in September as sabotage, espionage, and desertion to the bands increased.29

  The Utilization of Manpower

  An outline survey of SS-Police manpower indicates a lack of clarity and consistent policy initiatives. This lack stemmed in part from the inability of the SS-Police to take advantage of Germany’s conscription program. In 1937, Himmler announced, “I can carry out the all the former tasks of the Landsturm i.e. guarding munitions factories, railroad crossings etc. with civilians over 45, who would be drafted as auxiliary police as planned provided I have as a backbone a troop that is young. For this the Deaths Head Units are provided, ranging in age from 25–35, not older and not younger.”30 From 1939, the SS-Police made concerted efforts to recruit manpower below the German army age limits by offering non-combatant duties as alternatives to combat war service.31 By 1943–44, the age-range factor became a lottery played out between the Wehrmacht and the SS. In February 1944, all institutions received orders to enlist men in the 1906 age group and younger. The last assessment of police strengths, made under the Wehrmacht replacement plan of 1945, registered 323,300 men and 36,600 women, of which 118,700 were below thirty-eight years of age. 32