Hitler's Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe

by Philip W. Blood

  In July 1943, Himmler issued a general order for the monthly return of casualty figures. These instructions stipulated the manner in which reports had to be completed following an action. The monthly collection of casualties included the formal manner in which reports were to be produced following an action.65 The original format for reporting casualties begun by listing German losses, divided into officers and men, dead, wounded, and missing; collaborator and Axis forces followed the same format but included deserters. Then came enemies killed in combat, executed “bandit helpers” and “bandit suspects,” prisoners, and wounded; finally all booty was listed to complete the form. In July 1943, there had been a discrepancy over the collection and reporting figures. It had led to a number of allegations of deliberate false accounting. Bach-Zelewski had been forced to conduct an investigation that had led to the introduction of a new format for recording figures. The intention behind the new report form was to prevent “double counting” (Doppelerfassung) or fraud. The field commanders were expected to identify the intentions of the bands, details of their leaders, the strength of band forces, equipment, details of how and when they were combated, and how casualties were caused. While there may have been an indication of discrepancy in figures before July 1943, this was hardly the case afterward and confirmed the rising level of terror.66

  “Hermann” (July 13–August 11, 1943) was an example of a larger-scale operation embracing the complete range of Bandenbekämpfung tasks. Each participating unit compiled a report for the central accounting. The 31st SS-Police Rifle Regiment killed twelve bandits in combat and shot another two for no losses. It managed to capture 44 rifles and registered 101 men, 111 women, 102 children, 4 horses, 3 cows, and a calf, though apparently most of the sheep were lost in the swamp. Agricultural experts later collected 95 cows, 12 horses, 6 calves, and 256 sheep. The Gendarmerie-Einsatzkommando z.b.V posted a report on August 6, 1943. They accounted for 14 large camps destroyed, 66 other camps destroyed, 98 “bandits” killed in action, 23 “bandits” shot, and 11 prisoners. They captured mortars, machine guns, and rifles, but alleged they had destroyed this booty because of the difficult terrain. Their registration included 1,878 people (listed without age or sex), 89 horses, 378 beef cattle, 47 pigs, and 413 sheep. The commander, a Hauptmann, added congratulations for his men for a job well done. Dirlewanger scored the highest number. His command killed 1,067 in fighting, finished off a further 550, and took 33 prisoners. They destroyed 64 camps, 48 fighting positions, 11 bunkers, and 2 medical facilities. The battalion captured 5 artillery pieces, 5 mortars, 17 machine guns, and over 250 rifles and pistols. They destroyed a further 39 machine guns, 3 mortars, 169 rifles, and a variety of other equipment, including a field kitchen and radios. Dirlewanger also registered 929 men, 1,631 women, 395 children, 588 cows, 178 horses, 477 sheep, 8 pigs, and 115 vehicles. The reporting of figures at the operational level was not quite as clear-cut as has been led to believe. In the reports made by the SS formation Dirlewanger following “Hermann,” new figures were being reported two weeks after its close.67

  In March 1943, General Schmundt wrote to Himmler to confirm Hitler’s decision that certain medals could be issued in his capacity as Chef der Bandenbekämpfung. This authority was limited to the Iron Cross (Second Class), applicable only to the east and confined to junior officers, army, and SS-Police troopers. For the Iron Cross (First Class), he still had to receive confirmation from OKH. Probably a little unconvinced that Bandenbekämpfung deserved medals, Schmundt stressed that “we indicate the measurement of awards against measurements used for troops on the eastern front.” Himmler was required to report all medal confirmations by the twentieth of each month.68 In his final report of January 1943, Daluege announced that frontline and operational success was demonstrated by the issue of military awards, a plentiful collection of 716 Iron Crosses (First Class), 7,819 Iron Crosses (Second Class), and 2,200 Infantry Assault Badges.69 On January 30, 1944, Hitler agreed to the issue of the “combating-bandits badge” (Bandenkampfabzeichen) as an official military award. It was struck as a merit badge of evidence of “courage and achievement and proof of fighting against bandits” and was given based on the number of days in combat. All members of the Wehrmacht and SS could receive the badge; the issuing authorities were Himmler, the Ch.BKV, the HSSPFs, division commanders, Wehrkreis and Luftgau senior officers, and the Kriegsmarine high command. After May 1, 1944, days counted toward this badge were not allowed to be accounted for other military awards such as the infantry combat badges; but they could be combined with individual bravery badges like the destruction of tanks if they occurred within the same operation.70

  The Bandenkampfabzeichen came in bronze, silver, or gold and was worn on the left breast. The designer of the award remains unknown, but the symbolic intentions behind the medal are clear. The badge portrayed a many-headed hydra, coiled around the blade of a sword, with a swastika on the hilt, that had been driven into its heart. The hydra represented the bandits. The snakes and the hydra had been commonly used to depict, especially in Freikorps medals, the enemy from hell. The basic depiction of a sword pointing downward with a swastika on the grip came from the Thule Society. The sword used in the badge was styled on those used by the Vikings but was also commonly used in heraldry to denote the instrument of execution. The swastika on the hilt of the sword and the skull lying on the oak leaf were intended to complete the symbolism. There were sun wheels on the hand guard to divine the beginning and end of life. The sword placed in a vertical position pointing downward represented the juxtaposition between heaven and earth, and the elixir of life and death of the hero. The sword is wielded even in the face of dangerous and dark powers. The sword is the one Siegfried used to kill the dragon. The links between earlier memorabilia and the Bandenkampfabzeichen make its political meaning all too clear. Between 1914 and 1916, a monument was erected to Siegfried’s sword denoting the new and the reborn. The sword and the circular swastika had been the central symbols of the Thule Society, a forerunner to the Nazi Party. The fight against the snake had been a dominant theme in Nazi myth, projected by Arno Breker, a significant artist of the Third Reich. Finally, the sword and shield of similar proportions had been heraldic symbols of the Silesian Freikorps medal of 1919. This medal used the sword to signify death brought to the troops of hell.71 At the same time, the newspapers portrayed the recipients of Germany’s highest medals as the nation’s new heroes.

  Bandenbekämpfung accreditation was critical to the participants’ war records. Medals were also recommended for the troops involved in Bandenbekämpfung. Pannier highlighted in his reports especially outstanding performances during operations. The award of medals sometimes came with a sense of irony. Bach-Zelewski’s record as the commander of the Bandenkampfverbände makes interesting reading (Table 7.5). On July 3, 1944, he was awarded the Bandenkampfabzeichen in Bronze based on twenty-eight days of accredited combat. Realizing that Bach-Zelewski would take this as an affront, Himmler wrote of his courage and selfless acts as rewards themselves.72 On June 28, 1944, Himmler’s personal staff received a message from Field Marshal Busch, the commander of Army Group Centre, recommending the Knights Cross for von Gottberg. Busch commended von Gottberg for “his leadership of the Kampfgruppe, formed from police and a multitude of subordinate forces from the army, he was outstanding, in planning, participation and execution of the operations.” He also congratulated him for capturing large amounts of enemy equipment and plunder, releasing troops to fight at the front (owing to his success) and his ruthless (rücksichtslos) perseverance of victory.73 Some medals were of greater value than just a campaign badge.

  Table 7.5: Bach-Zelewski’s Command Record

  Political Ramifications

  On April 25, 1943, Bach-Zelewski joined Schenckendorff and his chief of staff, Colonel Hielscher, to plan the large-scale operation designated “Cottbus.”74 In the final stages of “Cottbus,” a set of partial results found their way into the hands of the Generalkommissar Weissruthenien,
Gauleiter Wilhelm Kube. They were interim figures and came from Curt von Gottberg’s SSPF Weissruthenien headquarters staff. Under Himmler’s first rules for post-operational reporting, the protocols for the official release of figures normally followed a series of informal confidence tests and confirmations. These were raw and unconfirmed figures. Without inquiring into their validity, on June 5, 1943, Kube felt compelled to write to Gauleiter Hinrich Lohse, Reichskommissar Ostland and his Nazi superior. Kube titled the letter “Results of police operation ‘Cottbus’ as reported so far for the period June 22 to July 3, 1943.” The figures listed 4,500 “bandits” killed, 5,000 “bandit suspects” executed, 2,412 men and women rounded up for labor, and 250 imprisoned. The casualties were 59 dead and 267 wounded Germans with 22 dead and 120 wounded Schuma. There were lists of booty including 530 horses, 67 wagons, an airplane, 12 gliders, 10 large field guns, antitank guns, and so forth. The town of Begoml, in spite of its reputation for collaboration, suffered the full impact of deportation and was bombed to destruction by the Luftwaffe. Kube singled out Dirlewanger’s reputation for “destroying many human lives”; among those executed as suspects were women and children.75 Lohse passed the report to Reichsminister Alfred Rosenberg, his Nazi boss in Berlin. His covering letter complained that the incident might draw unfavorable parallels with the Katyn atrocity. Rhetorically, he pondered what would happen if the Allied powers found out the true nature of security operations.76 “The fact that the Jews receive special treatment requires no further discussion,” he continued. “However it appears hardly believable that this is done in the way described in the report of the Generalkommissar of 1 June 1943! What is Katyn against that?”77

  The paper trail came to an end with Himmler through his senior SS liaison officer to Rosenberg, Gottlob Berger. After the war, Berger testified to the effect that he forced Rosenberg to conduct an investigation. Berger’s evidence pointed at the brutality of Bandenbekämpfung:

  I know that over there in the East people were fighting severely, and particularly one thing happened several times, that civilian population was chased into barns and were all shot, and it repeatedly happened that the barns were set on fire.78

  Berger, however, confessed there was a discrepancy in the figures of “Cottbus” with 492 rifles counted among the six thousand “bandit” dead. The Rosenberg investigation focused on the validity of the figures, but according to Berger, the real issue was the tension between the SS and the Nazis within Rosenberg’s administration. Berger claimed that “Cottbus” was a politically disastrous operation, although Bach-Zelewski hailed it as a success. Berger insisted the Nazi officials request that Schenckendorff intervene and conduct an investigation in his capacity as the senior army commander. Berger believed Schen-ckendorff found that the German casualties were deliberately reduced. There were not 28 but 50 Germans killed and 140 wounded. Schenckendorff also discovered irregularities in the transmission of figures, and Berger felt compelled to lay the blame with the SS: “the figures that were all made up by these HSSPFs, you cannot imagine.”79

  The local planning for “Cottbus” was conducted by HSSPF Russia-Centre, SS-Gruppenführer Gerret Korsemann. On March 24, 1943, Korsemann replaced Carl Graf von Pückler-Burghaus, a temporary substitute. Prior to his posting, Korsemann had served as SSPF Stanislav-Rostov, under the command of Prützmann, HSSPF Russia-South. On June 1, Oberstleutnant der Schutzpolizei Ernst Korn requested a transfer from Korsemann’s command staff.80 Korn had established a respectable police career since the First World War. Between December 16, 1941, and January 18, 1942, Korn was a battalion commander of the 1st Police Rifle Regiment of the SS-Polizei Division. He became HSSPF Russia-Centre’s operations officer (Ia), and in September 1942, he was regularly issuing operational instructions for Bandenbekämpfung. On January 11, 1943, six months short of his forty-fourth birthday, he was turned down from frontline service with the Waffen-SS. However, some weeks later, he was promoted Oberstleutnant der Schutzpolizei (February 1, 1943) and was Bach-Zelewski’s temporary chief of staff until March 27. On May 17, Korn received the conciliation of career confirmation of his police leadership ability.81 His resignation from Korsemann did not blight his career because he was promoted to operations officer (Ia) for the KSRFSS. On June 21, he returned to Bach-Zelewski’s realm, as discussed in chapter 4. The resignation pointed to problems with Korsemann. Under Himmler’s direct orders, Korn became director of the staff section responsible for the production of statistics and maps (Amt für Statistik und Kartographie). We cannot prove any connection between Korn’s posting and Himmler’s reaction to the controversy over the falsification of figures, but it does appear more than a coincidence.82 Korn left neither a “Cottbus” report nor testimonial evidence at Nuremberg.83

  Following Korn’s resignation, Korsemann’s problems appeared to spiral out of control. On June 30, 1943, against Bach-Zelewski’s advice, Korsemann wrote a letter of complaint to Field Marshal von Kleist about the Wehrmacht rumor mill and protesting accusations that he was a drunk.84 We know little either of the content or of Kleist’s response, but the tone of the letter caused Himmler to take offense with Korsemann. On July 4, Himmler ordered Bach-Zelewski, as the commanding officer, to prepare a report on Korsemann. The next day, Korsemann was suspended from all his positions. Himmler wrote to the chief of SS personnel, Maximillian von Herff, on July 6, requesting details of other incidents said to have arisen during Korsemann’s time in the Caucasus. Korsemann’s seniority drew to a close in September 1943 when Himmler finally cast his decision:

  Too much alcohol in his life, too much fraternising with regular German army officers, too many parties with alcohol and regular army officers, too lazy in his duties as Chief of Police, too quick to retreat from the Caucasus when trouble arose and all together he is now degraded to the Waffen-SS.85

  During interrogations in Nuremberg, Ernst Rode referred to Himmler’s preference for getting rid of people by playing one off against another. He indicated that this was the case with Korsemann.86 The threads did not end there. In a signal deciphered by the British in October 1943, there was evidence of ill-feelings about this case lingering within the corps. The intercept showed Rudolf Pannier criticizing Gottberg regarding the Korsemann case, as “he [Gottberg] has already once tried to worm his way into the structure, when I should have been made chief of staff to [Korsemann] the officer body to which I belong, have to keep silent in the face of naked reality.”87

  Evidence of Gottberg’s role in the case is limited and largely circumstantial. On June 28, 1943, SS-Gruppenführer Korsemann issued the final details for “Günther,” an operation that placed Kampfgruppe Korsemann in overall command. The records show that since the beginning of January 1943, SSPF Weissruthenien, under SS-Brigadeführer Curt von Gottberg, had been leading operations with Kampfgruppe Gottberg. The internal politics involved a clear line of seniority with Gruppenführer Korsemann (HSSPF) senior to Brigadeführer Gottberg (SSPF). Korsemann had not slated Gottberg to participate in “Günther,” but following Korsemann’s departure, Kampfgruppe Gottberg took over the operation. The HSSPF controlled the central formations such as the SS-Sonderkommando Dirlewanger and the SS-Police Regiments. Therefore, line officers like Dirlewanger had more than a passing interest in their senior officers. Dirlewanger’s impression of what was happening to Korsemann raises some interesting evidence.

  “Zauberflöte” exposed the ill feelings between Dirlewanger and Korsemann. Korsemann had openly circulated precise instructions to Dirlewanger and his men. The order then warned against plundering, which would be punishable with the severest means (schärfsten Mitteln geahndeten). All participants in the operation read this order, which snubbed Dirlewanger’s command as a group of uncontrollable plunderers.88 Following “Cottbus” but prior to “Günther,” Korsemann issued specific orders again to Dirlewanger warning him against any repeat of the destruction of suspected “bandit villages” (Banditendörfer) that had occurred before, most probably during “Cottbus.”
Later, Dirlewanger issued a most illuminating experience report (Erfahrungsbericht) on July 14, 1943, that left no doubt about his contempt for Korsemann. Writing under the heading of “Günther,” Dirlewanger responded to the criticism raised about his performance during “Cottbus.” In preparation for “Günther,” Korsemann had ordered that certain “peaceable peasant villages” to be spared. Reconnaissance had proved that the villages were rife with resistance. An alleged SD report had also confirmed this, according to Dirlewanger, stating the villages were “full of bandits and the roads and fields littered with mines.” The SD requested that the order to stay action against the villages be rescinded. Korsemann sent an unclear reply to spare the villages, even though the SD had been shot at and the roads were littered with mines. Dirlewanger’s 2nd Company had approached one of the villages and was fired on from all the houses, sustaining two dead and two wounded. Dirlewanger stated that such losses could have been prevented if his one year of unquestioned experience of bandit fighting had been trusted. Dirlewanger’s swipe at Korsemann concluded, “It seems, therefore, appropriate to employ leaders with Bandenbekämpfung experience to issue decisive orders, to prevent unnecessary losses.”89

  In the heat of security politics, Dirlewanger was not content to comment solely about Korsemann. The deportation measures required the involvement of officials from Sauckel’s GBA. These rarely conformed to the will of either civilian administrators or the army high command, and deported labor at will. Once labor officials joined security operations, they attracted criticism. On July 14, 1943, Dirlewanger reported the performance of labor officials attached to his command during the “harvesting” (Erfassung) phase of “Günther” after its “military” phase. He caustically remarked, “we have made a new experience, the uniformed Beamten…. They like to boast that they receive 15 Reichsmark per day. This harmfully reduces the mood of the troops.” The report described how Dirlewanger’s troops had rounded up two thousand to three thousand people, hundreds of horses and cattle, but no collection camp or transport had been organized. In the absence of labor officials, the armed forces and the SS-Police were forced to process the deportees and arrange their transportation. The arrangement of these facilities was supposed to be made in advance. Concluding on a venomous note, Dirlewanger pondered whether Erfassung operations in the future might be conducted on Saturday afternoons or Sundays when the labor officials were off duty.