Hitler's Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe

by Philip W. Blood

  NACHTIGALL: July 29, 1944, twenty-three days of “hard” mountain fighting.

  STRASSBURG: September 5–October 5, 1944 (460 enemy dead and 295 prisoners).

  BERNI: October 5–November 4, 1944, in the mountains, where he was personally involved in leading the fighting (51 enemy dead and wounded 511 prisoners).

  AVANTI: October 9–November 4, 1944, handled the skills of the enemy in a severe bloody fight in the area of Cannobino, Viggerro, Ossolatal-Lago-Magiore development battle (565 enemy dead and 387 prisoners).

  KOBLENZ: November 15–December 22, 1944 (162 enemy dead and 1,628 prisoners).

  HOCHLAND: January 12, 1945, an ongoing operation (124 dead and 816 prisoners reported so far).

  The totals for all Tensfeld’s efforts were 1,254 enemy dead and 6,083 prisoners and the usual amount of booty.33

  Rösener’s Bandenstab

  Bandenstab Rösenor, based in Laibach, controlled the lynchpin province of the Alpenland in Hitler’s southern flank. Today Laibach is the Slovenian capital of Ljubljana, an important geo-political city at the confluence of Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia. In 1900, the major cities of this area were Salzburg, Agram (Zagreb), Laibach, and Trieste, and all were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Versailles settlement redrew the map of the region and ceded these cities to Italy, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, ignoring identities and the indigenous populations. Following the Austrian Anschluss, Germany absorbed this region. In June 1939, SS-Oberabschnitt Alpenland administered the southern alpine districts of Carinthia, Styria, and the Tyrol, headquartered in Salzburg.34 Himmler authorized the formation of the HSSPF Alpenland covering Salzburg and Laibach and the HSSPF Croatia based in Agram, in January 1942. This was part of the steadily growing SS operational jigsaw that encompassed Serbia, Greece, Vienna, and Budapest. By 1943, the strategic junctions and key cities were interwoven into a security network that covered Graz, Klagenfurt, Marburg, Laibach, Agram, and the peninsula of the Karst in Istria.35 Analysis of Bandenstab Laibach provides the only near complete record of a working Bandenstab operation.

  SS-Obergruppenführer Erwin Rösener joined the SS in 1929. In March 1933, he became police president of Aachen and reached a unique level of bureaucratic pedantry, even by Nazi standards, by issuing official orders to himself.36 Rösener was appointed HSSPF Alpenland on December 16, 1941. In keeping with many of his colleagues, Rösener suffered a catalog of health problems. Physically tall and lean and with great physical strength, his problems were all related to “nerves.” In 1938, Rösener was diagnosed with an ulcer. He was thirty-six years old and had worked himself into a state of psychological collapse. A workaholic, his condition was aggravated through a total lack of rest and recuperation. Marital problems also blotted Rösener’s copybook; he had three marriages in five years. Himmler ordered Rösener to make regular visits to his third wife, who lived in Berlin, a long journey from Alpenland. To make sure he followed these instructions, Wolff kept a log of each visit. Rösener included SS-Obergruppenführer Maximillian von Herff in his inner circle. Increasingly his duties as HSSPF Alpenland concentrated on Bandenbekämpfung, which proved stressful. In an attempt to escape these duties, Rösener tried, through Herff, to position himself for the HSSPF Vienna job after Kaltenbrunner moved to the RSHA. Rösener’s intrigues failed, and he was denied transfer because of his success in prosecuting Bandenbekämpfung. Rösener’s story was about success in Bandenbekämpfung in spite of health problems.

  The link between HSSPF Alpenland and Bandenbekämpfung had been formalized in June 1942 (refer to chapter 3). Insurgency had plagued the SS since 1941, and on October 5, 1942, what was to become the Bandenstab Laibach began the routines of coordinated reporting and responses.37 Rösener’s right-hand stooge in formulating procedures was SS-Standartenführer Otto Lurker, a long-serving SD officer. Lurker joined the SS in 1929 and moved in prestigious circles; his first superior was Prützmann. Lurker had perfect First World War credentials, was awarded the severe combat wound badge, and had joined the Freikorps. Among the details of his SS officer appraisal there is the comment, “probably the best leader of an SD section.” He was Hitler’s former prison warder and prison assistant, later writing the book Hitler Behind Prison Walls.38 The former jailer was a proponent of raising local armed militias for self-defense.39 As the wave of panic about the partisan threat swept over the region, one director of local mining operations wrote with concern to Rösener. He was fearful of “communist activity” against his mines not only because of the potential loss of production but also because it might undermine the morale of the workers (Arbeitsmoral).40 It was the kind of letter on which the SS thrived, and Lurker was quick to take advantage.

  From October 24, 1942, Lurker adopted common forms of Bandenbekämpfung reporting. In November, he organized a meeting of all the section chiefs in Marburg, but the proceedings were marred by a case of indiscipline. There had also been a “wild slaughter party” of farm animals by members of the Order Police, and meat had gone wasted. Himmler heard about it and responded immediately, warning that breaches in ration regulations would result in punishments without mercy. Months earlier, in February 1942, there was a serious breach of discipline in Veldes, Yugoslavia. Suspicion fell on the 4th Company of Police Battalion 181 of aiding local “bandits” and defacing a picture of Hitler in their mess canteen.41 The military governor initiated court-martial proceedings; the troopers were disarmed and imprisoned in Graz. This time, the BdO Alpenland was forced by Himmler to issue a standing order on December 17 on the punishments for abuses of local population rations.42 This problem only distracted Lurker and Rösener for a short time, because by the end of the month, British intercepts recorded the senior conference had taken place at the BdO headquarters.43 This was the beginning of the Bandenstab Laibach.

  Following the new year lull, serious partisan incursions began in February 1943. Many SS signals deciphered by the British indicated that three battalions of the 19th SS-Police Regiment were fully engaged in northern Yugoslavia. By March, the fighting had spilled over into the HSSPF Alpenland, as a tactical situation report from Lurker indicated. He warned of the presence of a band, fifty strong, fully armed with rifles and machine guns, and recommended full-scale operations to the north, south, east, and west: encirclement in all but name. He added that since March 2, bands up to thirty strong were streaming into the territory under Tito’s orders. The security commando “Karl” had arrested seven “bandits” and their leader, and through interrogations, it was discovered that another twenty “bandits” were raiding for food.44 “The outstanding feature of these operations,” the British observed, “has been the ability of partisans to keep the Germans continually on the move; no sooner has an area been cleared or an attack on a strong point beaten off than the partisans appear again in or near the same area. The Germans reckon that the partisans are short of arms but at the same time are always calling for help themselves.”45

  In his May report, Lurker concentrated on the increasing infiltrations into the Veldes area. “Bandit” activity had increased markedly. Large-scale Bandenbekämpfung operations had fractured the bands, but the “bandits” kept their numbers intact by press-ganging (Zwangsrekrutierungen) terrorized members of the local population. The bands had replenished their weapons and had donned a pseudo-German uniform. The May Day celebrations were interrupted by cases of arson in towns, ambushes, and bonfires on hilltops (beacons for the partisans). Lurker included a casualty record: “bandit” losses were twenty-three shot dead, eleven prisoners, and twenty-seven deserters. German casualties were twenty-nine dead, ten wounded, and one missing.46 That month, Rösener deployed two companies of Order Police to combat the Moraeutscher Bande. There followed 48 hours of intensive fighting in coordinated operations with the army, gendarmerie, and border troops (Zollgrenzschutz). General Brenner, the military district commander, and Rösener joined forces to increase the effectiveness of the operations. Rösener later complained that their actions were compromised by
a lack of an early warning system, allowing only short lead times to counter the bands. This indicated that civilians were becoming reluctant to raise the alarm over the presence of bands. He complained about the poor quality of his troops, who were ill prepared for such operations, causing mixed results. On May 19, Rösener, in an act of bureaucratic self-protection, reported to Himmler that the troops were still conducting Bandenbekämpfung against the Moraeutscher Bande. 47

  The intensity of partisan incursions continued through June 1943. A series of “bandit” attacks formed the centerpiece of an Order Police situation report. On June 2, eight battalions of “bandits” were identified preparing for an attack on the gendarmerie in St. Martin (Styria); allegedly their plan also involved plundering the Reich-Slovenia border. The gendarmerie was warned that support was unavailable, and on June 13, a superior “bandit” force surrounded them. The next day, “bandit” attacks were delivered against the strategic railway line near Lichtenwald station. The bands had removed track pins along a large section of line, disguising their actions by resting the rails in position, but causing a 15mm misalignment. This was enough to derail a passenger train. The locomotive and two carriages tumbled down an incline, injuring twelve soldiers. Police troops had patrolled that area two days before and found nothing out of the ordinary. The line was back in service the next day, and two battalions of the 19th SS-Police Regiment were ordered to patrol the line.48 The British identified further activity in Virovitica area on June 17. This time the sheer weight of German counter-attacks forced the partisans to withdraw.49

  By coincidence, the growing intensity of Tito’s incursions peaked just as Hitler and Himmler met to discuss the Bandenkampf- und Sicherheitslage (discussed in chapter 4). On June 21, 1943, Himmler declared the Alpenland a Bandenkampfgebiet, writing letters to all interested parties. He made Rösener deliver the confirmation documents to the Gauleiters personally.50 During the meeting with Hitler, Himmler was offered the vague promise that the SS-Police Mountain Regiment “Franz” might be returned to his command. On the strength of this, Himmler informed the Gauleiter Rainer of Carinthia that this regiment would be assigned to his district.51 In his general instructions on Bandenbekämpfung of June 1943, Himmler advised forming a Leadership Headquarters (Führungsstab) for all districts involved in Bandenbekämpfung. Thus the Bandenstab Laibach reported to Bach-Zelewski command staff and so Rösener became part of the Bandenkampfverbände by default. The Bandenstab Laibach became responsible for coordinating all Bandenbekämpfung in the Alpenland, Croatia, and the Karst (Istria) region. Tracking the constant organizational changes from September 1943 to May 1945 shows that Rösener came under the command of Bach-Zelewski, Wolff, and Prützmann at different times.

  In July, Rösener received a frosty letter from Himmler. He was accused of not informing the wife of a senior SS comrade, in person, of her husband’s death and was rebuked for his military shortfalls. Himmler wrote, “I am not at all happy with your Bandenbekämpfung. Please don’t try to calm me with your excuses of not enough troops.” He added, “Stay in your main district more and don’t drive so much to Berlin. Take care personally and things will improve. Please be reminded to keep up your marriage and be cautioned—I am not waiting for a third disaster.” Rösener was contrite, apologizing for everything, although his excuses were plausible. He replied that a senior SS officer had gone in his place, a man who had lost two sons to the war and who understood her grief. He explained away his absences as having to attend on Bach-Zelewski in Agram and being engaged in combat against the “bandits.” He also reminded Himmler that his trips to Berlin were part of his marital relations duties, ordered by the Reichsführer, and that they were still monitored by Wolff.52

  In comparison with the HSSPFs in the east, the HSSPF Alpenland operated under tight economies of troops, materials, and cooperation from the Wehrmacht. The Order Police use was prioritized, and Rösener’s command was rationed. He received packets of formations and equipment. For example, on August 6, 1943, the Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei organized an artillery company “Alpenland” to provide heavy weapon support for police operations.53 The unit was made up of career police officers and conscripts. The company commander, a career Oberleutnant, came from the Hamburg police department. The battery officer was a lieutenant from the Halle police department who was to command recruits from the 1st Police Weapons Training school (Polizei-Waffenschule I). In keeping with usual practice, this police company was assigned to Klagenfurt for its home depot.54 The company received eight pieces of field artillery: the 75mm Light Infantry Gun 18, produced by the Rheinmetall Company in Düsseldorf and configured for employment in mountain operations. Highly maneuverable, these guns could provide accurate fire support from restricted ground positions and were also simple to train gunners with. Again following usual procedures, the company joined the communications network organized by the 181st SS-Police Signals Company. This integrated its battery fire liaison communications to other police units.55

  The intensification of incursions, in May 1943, led Rösener’s staff to pressure General von Unruh into releasing two or three captured French armored vehicles. This caused the routine paper war involving the army’s inspector of armored troops (Heinz Guderian), Unruh’s personal staff, the KSRFSS, and Winkelmann at the Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei. Eventually, the vehicles, Hotchkiss armored cars and Renault tanks, were released but had to be engineered to conform with German munitions standards. The SS was also expected to collect the vehicles from Gien-on-the-Loire and transport them.56 The combination of manpower issues and Bandenbekämpfung guidelines gave rise to some strange decisions. In July 1943, following the guidelines to the letter, the district commissioner (Landrat) of Cilli telexed Rösener’s staff, to confirm three Jagdkommando teams had been raised and were operating in his area. They included an SD-Jagdkommando, an army Jagdkommando, and a civil-service (Beamten) Jagdkommando. Each Jagdkommando had been mustered through by rugged selection and were patrolling in six-week stints, avoiding contact with safe villages. No doubt Rösener was reassured that German civil servants (Beamten) were aggressively hunting down Tito’s partisans.57

  The Bandenstab Laibach’s overall situation changed after Italy’s surrender. The Italian army representative in the area of Laibach, General Ceruli, handed over his weapons to Tito’s partisans. This allowed Tito to renew his operations and incursions. A gendarmerie situation report from Styria in September recorded mayhem in the Warasdin-Toplitz area. On September 5, two Croatian women laden with peaches were accosted by partisans. The “bandits” ordered them to hand over the fruit to the poor; the women refused. The partisans shaved their heads and then released them; the next day, fighting broke out between German soldiers and “bandits.” Six hundred troops came under repeated attacks lasting for three hours with barrages from “bandit” artillery. The Germans were forced to retreat, suffering eight dead and six wounded; afterward, the “bandits” stripped the dead. At midnight on September 7, an air raid alarm served as a decoy for a mass breakout and desertion of officer cadets from a local cavalry depot. The cadets joined the partisans.58 A week later, the 19th SS-Police Regiment warned BdO Marburg that reconnaissance had identified the presence of the Kalniki-Bandit Brigade, reinforced by the 12th Slovenian Brigade. They estimated five thousand “bandits” approaching the Alpenland area. They carried heavy weapons, including four artillery pieces, and were “advancing toward the Reich border.” The “bandits” had not cut the telephone cables but had caused numerous train derailments. They stopped one locomotive, removed the crew, locked the passengers in the carriages, and sent the train hurtling down the line toward Laibach.59

  The impact and influence of Bach-Zelewski and Wolff on operations in the region can be contrasted with heightened operations from September 1943. One report discovered from a large-scale operation, conducted on the Italian border (September 21–23), is incomplete but provides a small but significant indication of the changes. The central fighting component, the 19th SS-Po
lice Regiment, was joined by several smaller auxiliary and collaboration troops. There were indicators of the coordination of ad hoc forces, including antitank detachments and squadrons of tanks—all working toward a common mission. Although casualties are not known, the report recorded that the bands used mortar barrages, while the “bandits” were emboldened to stand against the Germans.60 From September 30, 1943, thirteen thousand Slovenian partisans from the 2nd Partisan Corps, arranged into five brigades, attempted to surround Warasdin, and lay siege. The fighting forced them out of Styria only after pulverizing attacks by Stuka dive-bombers.61 Information passed by a “trusty” to the gendarmerie on October 1, 1943, indicated a large body of bandits, up to four thousand strong, entering the area.62

  On October 8, 1943, Bach-Zelewski attended a meeting with Rösener, SS-Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser, and Odilo Globocnik, in Trieste.63 The presence of the elite Waffen-SS commander indicated how determined the SS were to finally crush Tito. On October 15, Rösener assembled the troops for a cleansing action of a large “bandit” force concentrated by the Agram–Laibach railway. They crossed the Reich border by traveling along the River Save and came close to threatening the coal-mining districts. The “bandits” were reputed to have five thousand in number and be heavily armed with artillery. Rösener’s plan involved blockading the river, fighting free-form (freikämpfen) to liberate St. Georg, and finally destroying the “bandits,” or at least preventing them from entering Austria. Rösener’s main force was the 19th SS-Police Regiment; its 2nd Battalion was ordered to enforce a blockade and to place an armed reconnaissance on the heights overlooking St. Georg. The fighting escalated into running battles as the Germans struggled to comprehend that they were outnumbered and outgunned. The Luftwaffe was urgently requested to provide Stuka support to break up the “bandit” attacks.64 Efforts to pacify the vicinity of Laibach intensified, with the Wehrmacht and SS-Police employing armored forces. The partisan response was to hit back even harder. For seven days until November 14, a police battalion was surrounded in Rudolfswerth, a town lying between Laibach and Agram. The battalion was kept alive and fighting by regular resupply from the air. The presence of elite units made the difference. Troops from the 9th SS-Panzer Division and the 16th SS-Panzer Grenadier Division supported by Luftwaffe dive-bombers destroyed the partisans on November 15. Five days later, two battalions from the reconstituted 14th SS-Police Regiment destroyed five hundred partisans.65