In the Footsteps of William Wallace

by Alan Young

  The events of 1295 and 1296 proved Edward I wrong. It also showed that he could not ride roughshod over the strong feelings of national independence held by the Scottish government without provoking a reaction. Unfortunately, Edward I did not learn this lesson immediately, partly because of the deceptive ease with which Scotland had been conquered in 1296. After key Scottish castles such as Roxburgh, Edinburgh and Stirling had surrendered soon after Dunbar, Edward I marched north through Scotland via Perth, Montrose, Banff and Elgin to impose his authority. On 8 July 1296, at Montrose, King John Balliol formally submitted to Edward, resigning his kingdom to the English King and having his coat of royal arms stripped from his tabard in a public and humiliating manner. In July and August, Edward I visited royal centres such as Aberdeen, Banff and Elgin, which had been under Comyn influence, and sent commissioners to search more remote areas in the north such as the district of Badenoch, the lordship of the senior Comyn branch. Edward also took the homages of the leading men of Scotland during his progress through Scotland. This was followed by the swearing of fealty to Edward by every freeholder.

  Banff, an important royal centre in northern Scotland by the late twelfth century. However, it was removed from English possession by Andrew Moray during the successful summer of Scottish resistance in 1297.

  At first, after Dunbar, Edward I did seem willing to negotiate with those who exercised power and influence in Scotland. Initially, even with John Balliol, he was prepared to discuss terms. Apparently Anthony Bek and John Warenne, Earl of Surrey (Balliol had married Isabel, second daughter of Warenne in 1281), were sent with a compromise proposal – Balliol would receive an English earldom; in return Edward would be granted Scotland. Similarly, initially Edward accepted James Stewart’s early surrender in return for using him as one of his agents in Scotland. The Bruces also seemed to expect Edward I to bring them into power in Scotland. However, the expectations of both Bruces and Stewarts were soon to be dashed as Edward decided, instead of employing them in Scotland, to take charge himself. This significant toughening of stance undoubtedly influenced the roles of James Stewart and the younger Robert Bruce (the future King) in the 1297 revolt.

  Edward I’s assumption of direct control of Scottish government was seen in a number of his actions. His takeover was demonstrated most clearly by his removal of the Stone of Destiny, the most precious symbol of Scottish monarchy, from Scone Abbey to Westminster Abbey. Other Scottish muniments and government records were seized. This was a direct contravention of the rights of the Scots agreed in the Treaty of Birgham in 1290, ‘the relics, charters, privileges and other muniments which concern the royal dignity and realm of Scotland shall be deposited in a secure place within the realm of Scotland’. Though Edward I no longer regarded the terms of the treaty as valid, the leaders of the Scottish political community definitely did. The removal of the Scottish King and the mainstays of Scottish government, the Comyns and their allies, to England was part of the same English policy. It should be noted that Edward I’s twenty-one-week search through Scotland was concentrated in areas that were under the influence of the Comyn family and their allies in northern Scotland. No fewer than eight members of the Comyn family were committed to detention in England. Other powerful families in Scottish government were also imprisoned in England – members of the Moray family, including Andrew Moray who was Justiciar of Scotia, members of the Mowbray, Balliol, Macdougall, Graham and Randolph families who had been mainstays of government, similarly members of the Sinclair, Lochore, Cheyne, Ros and de la Hay families who held a number of sheriffdoms. Edward I hoped to teach the Comyns and their supporters, involved in both central and local government, a harsh lesson.

  The Stewarts tried to dissociate themselves from the Comyns and win English favour by an early submission to Edward I after Dunbar. The Bruces hoped they would be asked by Edward to start a Bruce dynasty and an alternative Scottish government, friendly to the English King. However, there was disappointment for both parties as Edward I refused to fill the political vacuum he had created. Instead, Edward gave responsibilities to his own officials, John Warenne, Earl of Surrey, as Lieutenant Keeper of Scotland, Hugh Cressingham as Treasurer and Walter Amersham as Chancellor. The headquarters for Edward I’s new government in Scotland was established at Berwick and the English pattern of administration was adopted with two escheators for north and south of the Forth. Edward hoped to achieve stability within Scotland by restoring lands to those who swore fealty to him and had not been involved in the war against him.

  Thus far, there is no mention in historical record of William Wallace or his family and the motivations of that family can only be guessed at in the context of their lords, the Stewarts. The background factors to take into consideration in understanding William Wallace’s emergence onto the military and political stage are: the development of an increasingly mature Scottish government by the end of the thirteenth century with a clear sense of identity and a keen desire for independence; the interplay between different aristocratic power groups both within government (the dominant Comyns and their associates, and the non-Comyn grouping including the Stewarts) and outside it (chiefly the Bruces); the increasingly interventionist policy of Edward I since 1289; and finally the implementation of Edward’s policy of direct rule in Scotland after the submission of John Balliol in July 1296 and the political exile in England of the Scottish families of government that followed.

  It has been seen that the Stewarts were a part of the aristocratic governing community that clearly articulated a policy of national independence in the difficult years after Alexander III’s death in 1286. They were not, however, allies of the Comyns and their associates who dominated most of the key government positions at the centre as well as in the localities. Indeed, the Stewarts had family sympathies with the Bruces and supported their claims to the Scottish kingship during the ‘Great Cause’ of 1291–2. The Stewarts supported war with England, although the exact nature of their involvement in the war efforts of 1296 is unclear. They did not, like their family allies the Bruces, side with Edward I before the outbreak of hostilities. The Stewarts were independent-minded enough within Scotland to make an early submission after English victory at Dunbar in the hope of preserving their power and influence in western Scotland under a new Scottish regime more greatly influenced by Edward I. As far as the Stewarts’ followers were concerned, it would seem natural, after James Stewart’s early swearing of fealty on 13 May 1296 and his brother John’s on 15 May, for them to do the same. That this happened is attested by Edward I’s employment of Stewart and his henchmen in receiving the surrender of the castles of Kirkintilloch and Dumbarton (the latter, of course, had formerly been in Stewart’s hands as Sheriff of Dumbarton) on about 10 June.

  A list of Stewart followers in the ‘Ragman Roll’ under the date of 28 August is impressively wide-ranging. There are a number of important absences, however. William Wallace is not mentioned, and even if he was in 1296 of insufficient age or status to be named, it is certainly odd that his elder brother, Malcolm, is not referred to. The Wallace name does, however, feature on the list – Alan Wallace, Adam le Wallace, John la Wallace Fitz Thomas le Wallace, Nicol le Wallace and John la Wallace of Over Etone. Evidence from William Wallace’s seal of 1297 suggests that this Alan Wallace may have been William Wallace’s father. All those who submitted to Edward I had their lands restored to them. As for the Stewarts’ tenants and sub-tenants, on 8 September the Sheriffs of Ayr and Lanark as well as those of Berwick, Edinburgh and Roxburgh were commanded to return the lands that had been confiscated. The evidence from the ‘Ragman Roll’ suggests that the Wallaces – if not William, his elder brother (or brothers) – had had their lands seized and did not recover them. They would have had the status of outlaws. William Wallace’s sense of family grievance would have been exacerbated if, as suggested by both Andrew Wyntoun and Blind Harry, William’s father and/or an elder brother had been slain by the English. The legal record of 8 August 1296 that refers
to a ‘William le Waleys, thief’ in Perth could tie in with William Wallace as a man on the run, though this may be stretching probability. A sense of injustice regarding land rather than the traditional tale referring to the capture and murder of his supposed mistress, Marion Braidfute, who is described as his wife by Blind Harry, seems to provide a more likely motivation for turning against the Sheriff of Lanark in 1297. It also seems probable, based on John of Fordun’s evidence, that William Wallace was already an outlaw before his attack on the Sheriff of Lanark.

  In terms of the debate about William Wallace being an individual adventurer or merely an agent of his overlord, the Stewarts, the evidence suggests that initially, at least, Wallace was operating on his own. Wallace and his elder brother, Malcolm, did not swear fealty to Edward I in 1296. Perhaps their father’s homage was deemed sufficient. James Stewart’s decision to seek alliance with Edward I in May 1296 may have been caused by Edward’s attempt to extend English influence in western Scotland in April 1296. In this month, he appointed Alexander Macdonald of Islay as Baillie of Kintyre, an area formerly under James Stewart’s jurisdiction. Edward I’s employment of Stewart and his supporters in June 1296 and the marriage of James Stewart into the Burgh family, close followers of the King, suggested that the Stewarts would retain their influence in western Scotland with the King’s support. However, Edward I’s policy towards Scotland itself, i.e. direct rule, and therefore his attitude towards the Stewarts, changed during the summer of 1296. Edward I nominated Henry Percy as English Warden of Ayr and Galloway in September 1296. This was a real blow to Stewart power and control in the region, especially after his loss of power in Kintyre earlier in the year. By September 1296, rather later than William Wallace, the Stewarts had developed a strong motivation for revolt.

  Concentration on the role of William Wallace and the Stewarts in the rebellion of 1297 has tended to distract attention from unrest in other parts of Scotland than the south-west. Indeed, it is probable that the revolt in northern Scotland involving the Moray and Macdougall families preceded the activities of William Wallace in the south. To understand why there was insurrection in both northern and southern Scotland in 1297, who spearheaded these uprisings and who supported them, it is necessary to look a little more closely at the activities of Edward I’s English administration in Scotland in 1296 and 1297.

  Recent research by Fiona Watson in Under the Hammer: Edward I and Scotland 1286–1306 (East Linton, Tuckwell Press, 1998) has shed more light on the English impact on Scotland and therefore the possible causes of resentment that contributed to the revolts of 1297. It is apparent that Edward I concentrated most of his resources south of the Forth, no doubt to consolidate English authority from his new centre of administration in Scotland, Berwick. In the north, there is little evidence of how he sought to impose English authority. Presumably he thought that Scotland north of the Forth would be suitably impressed (perhaps cowed) by his royal progress around the main royal castles, burghs and baronial centres there. Following this, English garrisons appear to have been placed at Aberdeen (under Henry Lathum) and at Urquhart (under William Fitz Warin). In the north, Edward seems to have used a mixture of English officials and Scots, apparently intimidated into acting on Edward’s behalf by the imprisonment of family members in England. In the latter category was Reginald Cheyne, senior, who was Sheriff of Inverness, Euphemia, the Countess of Ross, and Gartnait, son and heir of Donald, Earl of Mar. In addition, an Englishman, Henry Rye, was appointed escheator north of the Forth with custody of the royal castles of Elgin and Forres. Following Scottish administrative practice, another official, a justiciar of Scotland north of the Forth, was appointed – once again an Englishman, William Mortimer.

  Rather more evidence exists for a more thoroughly English administrative system south of the Forth. As well as Edward’s triumvirate of chief officials – John Warenne, Earl of Surrey (Lieutenant), Walter Amersham (Chancellor) and Hugh Cressingham (Treasurer) – that was based in southern Scotland, there was a Justiciar of Lothian (William of Ormesby) and a Justiciar of Galloway (Roger Skoter), an escheator south of the Forth (Peter Dunwich) and, after 8 September 1296, the Warden of Ayr and Galloway (Henry Percy). In addition, most of the new sheriffs in Scotland after 1296 would have lacked any connection with the local community or, indeed, Scotland in general and were probably unable to speak the local language. In the south-west of Scotland, for instance, it is unlikely that the new officials could communicate in Gaelic, as the Stewarts, Bruces and Wallaces probably could, and this would have reinforced the feeling that the area had been taken over in a hostile manner.

  Castle Urquhart. Situated on Strone Point on the western shore of Loch Ness, Urquhart controlled the strategic route along the Great Glen to Inverness. It was, therefore, a terrific boost to Scottish resistance when Andrew Moray recaptured this English-held castle in 1297.

  What was the impact of these English office-holders on Scottish communities? Certainly the attitudes of some of the more senior people must have caused resentment. Even the English chronicler, Walter of Guisborough, referred to Hugh Cressingham as ‘a self-important and proud man who loved money’. The collection of funds from the native population had been a feature of Edward’s policy in Ireland and Wales and the apparent lack of Scottish military resistance to English forces in 1296 may well have given Edward and his officials the impression that there would be relatively little resistance to financial exactions. Initially, a large sum, over £5,000, was raised and Walter of Guisborough’s description of Cressingham as a man ‘who robbed too much’ seemed justifiable. The fact that by late July 1297, this flow of money had practically stopped is surely a sign of general Scottish resistance to these demands. Cressingham wrote to Edward in late July that ‘no county is in proper order excepting Berwick and Roxburgh’, and slightly later,

  . . . from the time when I left you, not a penny could be raised in your realm by any means until my lord the earl of Warenne shall enter your land and compel the people of your country by force and sentences of law . . .

  According to the Guisborough Chronicle, persecution of those who did not swear fealty to Edward I was a particular fault of the Justiciar William Ormesby and another cause of resentment. The threat of military service overseas, on the part of ‘all the middle people of Scotland’, was a concern expressed during the surrender negotiations after one of the revolts in the south-west was halted. Such a fear would have affected most classes from the nobles, who might have to supply personal knight service, to the non-noble foot soldiers, who had sometimes been conscripted for campaigns from Ireland and especially Wales as well as from the English counties. There is no real proof that this was what Edward I intended, though there is evidence that fifty-seven Scottish nobles were summoned on 24 May 1297 to serve Edward I in Flanders. In addition, the compulsory seizure of wool, one of the chief economic assets of Scotland, must have been another source of both indignation and apprehension (of where the next appropriation or enforced sale would be). It is known that such confiscations took place at both Melrose Abbey and Sweetheart Abbey.

  There has been a natural tendency to focus on what the Scots were fighting against in 1297 rather than what they were fighting for and to give more attention to revolt in the south than the north. Yet rebellion in Scotland in 1297 probably started earlier in the north and involved two families who had something to fight for as well as against. The Macdougalls and the Morays had been stalwarts of Scottish government and in 1296 that regime’s figurehead was John Balliol. Both Macdougalls and Morays were related to the Comyns, the power behind the Scottish King (who was, of course, also related to the Comyns). Macdougalls and Morays had enjoyed the power that went with holding public office and it was unlikely that they would willingly consent to losing this. Macdougall control in the north-west was seriously threatened by Edward I’s appointment of Alexander Macdonald of Islay in April 1296 as Baillie in the sheriffdoms of Lorn, Ross and the Isles. Edward I presumably thought that with Alex
ander Macdougall of Argyll having done homage to him and being a prisoner in Berwick Castle the rest of the Macdougall family would cause him no problems. However, Alexander’s son, Duncan, who had never sworn loyalty to Edward I, led the Macdougall resistance to Macdonald’s attempt to control ‘their’ area using the strategic castle of their Comyn allies at Inverlochy to aid their fight.

  Even more important in the insurrections of 1297, however, were the Morays, another of Scotland’s ‘government’ families. A successful revolt in northern Scotland was led by Andrew Moray, son of Andrew Moray of Petty who had been Justiciar of Scotia during the Balliol kingship (to 1296) and deemed important enough to be imprisoned in the Tower of London. The younger Andrew had himself been imprisoned at Chester but had escaped to lead an impressively effective campaign against English bases across northern Scotland. The efforts of both Morays and Macdougalls in 1297 could both be seen as motivated by patriotism and self-interest. They were representatives of John Balliol’s government and were seeking to defend their privileged positions within it. They also symbolised a resistance to Edward I’s infringements of the rights of the kingdom and a defence of the principles encapsulated in the Treaty of Birgham (1290), ‘the rights, laws, liberties and customs of the same realms of Scotland to be preserved in every respect and in all time coming throughout the said realm and its borders completely and without being impaired . . .’. Such ideas epitomised the feelings of those families involved in the governing of Scotland in 1296 and the views of the same families who were able, in 1297, to translate theory into military action.