In the Footsteps of William Wallace

by Alan Young

  The fact that Edward I gave full priority to warfare against the French in 1297 had repercussions for the manner in which the English governed Scotland. The English records of 1297 show how little attention (and regard) Edward I and his chief advisers gave to Scotland. In this context, the remark that Edward I is reported (by Thomas Gray in his Scalacronica) to have made as he gave custody of Scotland to John Warenne, Earl of Surrey, in 1296 may be accurate: ‘When you get rid of a turd, you do a good job.’ Lack of enthusiasm, and even contempt, for the detailed administrative consolidation that was necessary after the English victory over the Scots in 1296 was as evident in Warenne’s actions as Edward’s words. The Guisborough Chronicle provides us with some details about this:

  The earl of Warenne, to whom our king had committed the care and custody of the whole kingdom of Scotland, because of the awful weather said that he could not stay there and keep his health. He stayed in England, but in the northern part, and sluggishly pursued [the exiling of the] enemy, which was the root of our later difficulty . . .

  The Guisborough chronicler also notes that Hugh Cressingham, the King’s Treasurer in Scotland, had failed to construct the stone wall that the King had ordered to be built on the new rampart at Berwick, the headquarters of the English administration. The fact that many English officials did not want to be in Scotland may account for both the uncaring manner with which they implemented Edward I’s policies and also their complacency towards any apparent Scottish resistance. Certainly, Hugh Cressingham soon established a reputation as a man ‘who robbed too much’ (Guisborough Chronicle). Justiciar William Ormesby was accused by the same source of strenuously persecuting those who had not sworn fealty to Edward I; while William Heselrigg, Sheriff of Lanark, was also targeted (quite literally) by William Wallace for some offence committed against the Wallace family.

  Hugh Cressingham, whose frequent letters to Edward I are our main source for suggestions of the build-up of resistance in Scotland, reflects the English King’s opinion that the surrender of the forces led by James Stewart, Robert Wishart, Bishop of Glasgow, and Robert Bruce would be the key to the ending of Scottish resistance:

  Sire, the letter says that if you had the earl of Carrick [Bruce], the Steward of Scotland, and his brother (who, as you understand, are the supporters of the insurrection) . . . you would think your business done.

  This view seems to have been shared by Henry Percy and Robert Clifford who were in charge of the English forces to which Stewart, Wishart and Bruce capitulated at Irvine (Ayrshire) in July 1297. According to Cressingham’s letter to Edward I,

  . . . we would have made an expedition on the said Thursday, had it not been for Sir Henry Percy and Sir Robert Clifford, who arrived on the Wednesday evening in that town [Roxburgh], and made known to those of your people who were there, that they had received to your peace all the enemies on this side of the Scottish sea.

  Percy and Clifford ignored Cressingham’s advice to attack enemies of the English north of the Forth or pursue William Wallace who had ‘a large company in the forest of Selkirk’. The unsatisfactory outcome, as far as Cressingham was concerned, was that:

  . . . no expedition should be made until the earl’s [Warenne’s] arrival; and thus matters have gone to sleep, and each of us went away to his own residence . . .

  Cressingham’s increasing worries in this period of hectic letter-writing, i.e. the last week in July 1297, were further reflected in his next correspondence:

  . . . not a penny could be raised in your [realm of Scotland by any means] until my lord the earl of Warenne shall enter into your land and compel the people of the country by force and sentences of law.

  His statement that Scotland was, by this time, virtually ungovernable without speedy and decisive military action is forthright:

  But, sire, let it not displease you, by far the greater part of your counties of the realm of Scotland are still unprovided with keepers; and some have given up their bailiwicks, and others neither will nor dare return; and in some counties the Scots have appointed and established bailiffs and ministers, so that no county is in proper order, excepting Berwick and Roxburgh, and this only recently. But, sire, all this shall be speedily amended, by the grace of God, and the arrival of the lord earl, Sir Henry Percy, and Sir Robert Clifford, and the others of your council.

  This view shows an area that was once Rothbury Forest. This area together with Selkirk Forest (the ancient Ettrick Forest) in southern Scotland were of strategic importance to William Wallace as he prepared his army for the fight against the English.

  Further delay in English military action occurred, no doubt, in early August as a result of Edward I’s proposal for Earl Warenne to join him on the continent (clearly still the King’s priority) and be replaced in Scotland by Brian Fitz Alan at less cost. Edward I planned to move more senior figures and additional resources to his continental campaign. He clearly thought that Scottish opposition would scatter with a show of English force (however late), as it had done in 1296 at Dunbar and in 1297 at Irvine. Brian Fitz Alan, however, was as reluctant as Warenne to take on responsibility for Scotland, as detailed by him in a letter to Edward I, 5 August 1297:

  Castle Urquhart, situated on Strone Point on the western shore of Loch Ness.

  THE MORAYS

  The family of Moray (later Murray) was descended from a Fleming called Freskin, who was given Duffus near Elgin by David I (1124–53) as part of a planned crown settlement in this important region of Scotland. In the early thirteenth century, the family took the surname ‘Moray’ or ‘de Moravia’ as a result of their growing importance in the area. They were promoted into territorial, administrative and ecclesiastical offices to further royal interests and loosen the grip of the earls of Caithness. By the mid-thirteenth century the Morays held the earldom of Sutherland, the lordships of Duffus (near Elgin) and Petty (near Inverness) as well as lands in Strathspey. Given Alexander III’s anxiety to increase royal authority in the north in the second half of the thirteenth century, the Morays were more involved in royal service in this reign. Alexander Moray became Sheriff of Inverness, 1264–6 and Malcolm Moray was appointed Sheriff of Perth, 1257–89. Later, Andrew Moray was Sheriff of Ayr, and some time between 1289 and 1296 gained the office of Justiciar of Scotia, the most important political and administrative position in Scotland. The family were further empowered by marriage links with the Comyns, the most dominant political group in thirteenth-century Scotland. The Morays were powerful representatives of Scottish government and the Scottish kingship of John Balliol. It is intriguing to speculate what leadership role Andrew Moray, son of the Justiciar, would have played in the Scottish patriot movement if he had not been fatally wounded at the Battle of Stirling Bridge in 1297.

  Duffus Castle. Freskin, the founder of the family ‘Moray’, ‘de Moravia’ (a name adopted as a surname in the early thirteenth century), received Duffus near Elgin as part of his grant from David I in the twelfth century. His family was responsible for the initial ‘motte’ (mound) at Duffus.

  Fortrose Cathedral. Andrew Moray, joint leader of Scottish resistance in northern Scotland during 1297, was gravely injured in the Battle of Stirling Bridge (22 September 1297) and only survived for a few months. He was buried at Fortrose Cathedral.

  Loch Ness. Andrew Moray captured Urquhart Castle, on the western shore of Loch Ness, during his campaign of resistance in northern Scotland. Urquhart presided over the strategic route along the Great Glen to Inverness. Control over Loch Ness was important for authority over northern Scotland.

  Bothwell Castle, one of the most impressive fortifications of thirteenth-century Scotland. It was planned by Walter Moray after 1242 but was not completed before the start of the Scottish wars.

  I do not think that I in my poverty can be able either well or honourably to keep the land in peace to your profit and honour, when such a nobleman as the earl cannot well keep it in peace for what he receives from you.

  When Fitz Alan tried to bar
gain for a better financial deal – that he would take custody upon the same terms as Warenne had – Edward refused and Warenne eventually continued as Keeper of Scotland. Cressingham gave another warning early in August that

  . . . peace on the other side of the Scottish sea is still in obscurity, as it is said, as to the doings of the earls who are there [the Comyns, one Earl of Buchan and the other Lord of Badenoch, released from an English prison to pacify the north] . . .

  The fact, also, that Wallace was strong enough to lay siege to Dundee Castle and that he and Moray were able to move around large areas of the country that were not under firm English administrative control, still had little impact on the official English conduct of their campaign against Scottish resistance.

  By late August 1297, Warenne had at last reached Berwick and the forces of Cressingham and Warenne advanced from Berwick to Stirling, which was reached in the first week of September. It was important to consolidate control over Stirling, the most strategic crossing point of the Forth and to confront the forces of Andrew Moray and William Wallace, which were moving without restriction north of the Forth. According to the Lanercost Chronicle, the Scots ‘began to show themselves in rebellion’ by about 8 September and this may indicate that the forces of Moray and Wallace, hitherto engaged in individual action, had combined to form a large army of resistance. The joint strength of their two groups, as well as the success that they had enjoyed up to this point, seems to have persuaded Wallace and Moray to face the English army in pitched battle rather than employ the ‘hit and run’ tactics of the ambush. John of Fordun confirms the fact that Wallace led by fear as much as popular support. This is particularly reflected in his threat to the burgesses of Dundee who were left to continue to besiege the English in Dundee Castle:

  Stirling Castle, the key stronghold that linked northern and southern Scotland. Control over this castle was important for asserting authority over the whole of Scotland. This is reflected by the Battle of Stirling Bridge (1297), the three-month siege of 1304 and the Battle of Bannockburn (1314).

  William . . . straightway intrusted the care and charge of the siege of the castle to the burgesses of that town on pain of life and limb . . .

  Fordun also indicates that Wallace’s control had a much wider base:

  . . . in a short time, by force, and by dint of his prowess, [he] brought all the magnates of Scotland under his sway, whether they would or not. Such of the magnates, moreover, as did not thankfully obey his commands he took and browbeat . . .

  These sentiments seem to run counter to the notion that Wallace was, at this stage, a frontman acting on behalf of James Stewart and Bishop Robert Wishart. Who then was leader of Scottish resistance to the English in early September 1297?

  It has been seen that opposition to the English administration in Scotland was widespread in the north as well as the south. Individuals named in the sources as being actively involved in the revolt during 1297 were, apart from William Wallace, Andrew Moray, William Douglas, James Stewart, Robert Wishart, Bishop of Glasgow, Robert Bruce, Earl of Carrick, Duncan Macdougall, Macduff of Fife and his two sons, John Stewart and Alexander Lindsay. In addition, Hugh Cressingham and English chroniclers suspected that the leading members of the Comyns were not acting in Edward’s interests in helping to put down (as they had promised) the rebellions in Scotland following their release from English prisons. The English officials had no proof that the Comyns were siding openly with the Scots before Stirling Bridge, though Moray, a kinsman of the Comyns, would not have been able to gather as many supporters without, at least, the clandestine backing of the Comyn-dominated local administration of the north.

  Noble power bases in south-west Scotland.

  It could also be said to be true that without at least the tacit approval of the Stewarts and Bishop Wishart Wallace too would have struggled to gain local recruits in central and south-western Scotland. The Lanercost and Guisborough chroniclers assert throughout their narratives of the 1297 revolt that Wishart and Stewart masterminded the revolt and Wallace’s actions. In early July 1297, Robert Wishart, James Stewart and Robert Bruce, Earl of Carrick, came out in open opposi-tion to Edward I. In their company were James Stewart’s brother, John, Alexander Lindsay and William Douglas (who had participated with William Wallace in the attack on Justiciar William Ormesby at Scone). They were defeated – or more accurately, they capitulated to the English forces of Henry Percy and Robert Clifford at Irvine on 7 July.

  The fact that Wishart, Stewart and Bruce had not completed the terms of the surrender a month afterwards has suggested to historians that they were engaged in an exercise of deliberate procrastination in order to assist the other revolts in Scotland. It was clear from the negotiations that Wishart, Stewart and Bruce saw themselves as leaders of the Scottish political community and that Edward I and his officials also considered them to be the leaders of Scottish resistance. Perhaps this official view is reflected in the unambiguous verdict given by the English chroniclers. However, the accepted theory of political rule in Scotland was being tested by the reality of military leadership of a nationwide anti-English resistance movement. Traditional political leaders such as the Comyns and their allies in 1296 and Wishart, Stewart and Bruce in 1297 did not feel that they could match a large English army and, therefore, at Dunbar (1296) and Irvine (1297) surrender terms were soon sought. They had made a political point and were seeking a political solution. Andrew Moray, William Douglas and William Wallace had less to lose than Stewarts, Comyns and Bruces by taking a purely military, and certainly less vacillating, approach. Their aim was simply to remove the English from the country.

  The three most successful resistance leaders – Moray, Douglas and Wallace – had different backgrounds. Moray and Douglas were sons of noblemen from families linked by a relationship since the late twelfth century. Wallace, on the other hand, was the son of a knight. Moray had perhaps better credentials for leadership being from a family strongly associated with Scottish government and related by marriage to the Comyns who dominated that government. Wallace and Douglas had reputations as troublemakers. Wallace, though in the following of the Stewarts, had probably been an outlaw since 1296 and, unlike most of the Stewart retinue, had not sworn fealty to Edward I. William Douglas, though from an aristocratic family, had a reputation for rash actions and, despite having his goods restored to him after his surrender of Berwick Castle to Edward I, according to the Guisborough Chronicle he ‘turned robber working with a robber’. Douglas was present with Wallace during the attack on the Justiciar William Ormesby at Scone and was also with Stewart, Wishart and Bruce at Irvine. He was with Moray and Wallace at Stirling Bridge on 11 September 1297. Unlike Stewart, Wishart and Bruce after ceding at Irvine, Douglas remained uncooperative, as a letter to Edward I from Hugh Cressingham, 24 July 1297, reveals:

  Dear sire, because sir William Douglas has not kept the covenants which he made with sir Henry de Percy, he is in your castle of Berwick, in my keeping, and he is still very savage and abusive . . .

  After Irvine, only Moray and Wallace remained to lead Scottish resistance. The Guisborough chronicler’s description of William Wallace’s support probably applies equally to that of Moray:

  The common folk of the land followed him as their leader and ruler; the retainers of the great lords adhered to him; and even though the lords themselves were present with the English king in body, at heart they were on the opposite side.

  Rothbury Forest, Eddingham. This forest was used as a base by William Wallace as he organised the invasion of northern England in October 1297.

  In late July, Moray was described as having a ‘large body of rogues’ (letter of the Bishop of Aberdeen and others to Edward I, 25 July 1297) in Speyside, while at the same time, Wallace ‘lay there with a large company (and does so still) in the forest of Selkirk’ (letter from Hugh Cressingham to Edward I, 23 July 1297). The successes of Moray and Wallace, in northern and southern Scotland respectively, had separated the tradition
al political leaders from their retainers and followers. Could the Comyns, Stewarts and Bruce be anything more than supportive bystanders in early September as the English forces approached Stirling? How significant was the fact that Robert Wishart’s considerable influence had been removed by his imprisonment in Roxburgh Castle (he was released on parole only in spring 1298)? Indeed, the Lanercost Chronicle suggests that Wishart had primary responsibility for the rebellion of 1297, ahead of James Stewart, referring to the Bishop as ‘ever foremost in treason’. As Bishop of Glasgow, he had the most effective means, through the parish priests of his diocese, of disseminating the message of revolt. Certainly, Edward I’s subsequent complaint to the Pope that ‘it was by abetment and counsel of the prelates and clerks of their land that the Scots rose with William Wallace’ (cited in C. Kightly, Folk Heroes of Britain [London, Thames & Hudson, 1982]) and his later treatment of Wishart indicates that the Bishop bore a heavy responsibility for the inception of Scottish resistance.

  Cambuskenneth Abbey, Stirling. The ruins of the abbey, founded in about 1147 by David I of Scotland, are overlooked by Stirling Castle and the town. Edward I visited the abbey in 1303/4.

  The Battle of Stirling Bridge was fought on 11 September 1297. The English forces of Cressingham and Warenne had reached the English-held Stirling Castle during the first week of September. The Scottish force, led by Moray and Wallace, was at Dundee on about 8 September and had to march 50 miles to reach Stirling. On 9 September, before the Scots reached Stirling, James Stewart, Malcolm, Earl of Lennox, and other Scottish nobles approached the English army. According to the Guisborough Chronicle, the Scottish lords: