In the Footsteps of William Wallace

by Alan Young

  The Robroyston Monument. This cross was erected to commemorate the capture of William Wallace at Robroyston. It was unveiled in 1900.

  The plaque on the Robroyston Monument gives details of William Wallace’s capture.

  There are no specific contemporary details about his business at the papal court but it is apparent that Wallace, self-appointed or otherwise, played a key role in putting diplomatic pressure on both the French and papal courts to secure both military aid and the restoration of John Balliol to Scotland. With Balliol’s release into the custody of the papacy in July 1299, it was an obvious next step for Wallace to move from the French to the papal court to secure the freedom of John Balliol and counter the diplomatic efforts of the English. Wallace, of course, cannot be given all or even the major credit for the success of the Scottish pleas at the papal court during this period. Master Baldred Bissett probably deserves the most acclaim for the revival of John Balliol’s fortunes there. Balliol’s reinstatement as King of Scotland seemed a growing possibility in 1301. In the summer of that year he was released from papal custody and, no doubt, with Philip IV’s support was returned to his ancestral home at Bailleul-en-Vimeu, in Picardy. The Truce of Asnières, negotiated in France and ratified by King Philip, granted a truce to the Scots in the war with England to last from 26 January to 1 November 1302 but there was no agreement about the future of John Balliol. According to this settlement, the French were to hold certain lands in the south-west of Scotland during the truce.

  These developments on the continent had a significant impact on the leadership of the Scottish political community. The years 1298 to 1304 saw many changes in the composition of the Guardianship, the presence of the Comyns being the one constant factor, simply due to their dominant landowning and political power and their network of allies and castles. The tense joint leadership of John Comyn and Robert Bruce in 1298 gave way to a triumvirate in which Bishop Lamberton acted as a stabilising influence. By May 1300, however, Robert Bruce had resigned to be replaced by the pro-Comyn, Ingram Umphraville. This new triumvirate lasted until early 1301 when they were, apparently, superseded by John Soules, appointed by John Balliol directly as his agent in Scotland, pending his return. A number of official documents issued between 10 July 1301 and 23 November 1302 refer either to John Soules acting in the name of (not on behalf of) King John or are royal acts issued by King John himself. There is no doubting his special role in Scotland from 1301 but it is probable that John Soules was acting with Comyn rather than instead of him. He was the representative of Balliol, perhaps nominated as a result of French influence, and seen as the link between Balliol and the Comyn-led Scottish political community. Anyone who wanted to make an impact on Scotland in the 1290s and 1300s had to seek some accommodation with the Comyns because of their landed, political and military power. This was true for John Balliol in 1301, as it had been for Edward I in the 1290s and as it would be for Robert Bruce in 1306. This was also the case for William Wallace but, as has been seen, Wallace was an uncompromising individual.

  Fear of the imminent return of John Balliol to Scotland caused Robert Bruce to leave the Scottish patriot side and return to an alliance with Edward I by February 1302 (as quoted in E.L.G. Stones, Anlgo-Scottish Relations 1174–1328, Some Selected Documents [Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970]):

  Because Robert . . . fears that the . . . realm of Scotland might be removed from the hands of the king, which God forbid, and delivered to John Balliol, or to his son, or that the right [landed rights or his claim to the throne?] might be put in question or reversed . . .

  However, just as the diplomatic efforts of Wallace and others in Paris seemed set to restore Balliol to Scotland, the French army suffered a devastating defeat at the hands of Flemish forces at Courtrai on 11 July 1302. This meant that Philip IV was forced to concentrate on Flanders rather than Scotland. An Anglo-French peace followed (made on 20 May 1303) which excluded the Scots, who were thus effectively abandoned as allies, despite the intervention of John Soules, William Lamberton, James Stewart and John Comyn, Earl of Buchan, in Paris. It must also have been a bitter blow to William Wallace’s diplomatic efforts. Scottish hopes of valuable assistance from the continent were further dashed when Pope Boniface VIII abandoned his support for the Scottish patriot cause in 1302, ordering the bishops of Scotland, in a letter of 13 August, to make every effort to promote peace with Edward I, and accusing Robert Wishart, Bishop of Glasgow, of encouraging Scottish resistance against the English King. The events of 1302, undoubtedly, persuaded William Wallace to return to Scotland and renew his military career fighting the English in Scotland. His work at the French and papal courts between 1299 and 1302 has, because of fragmentary evidence, been underestimated as part of his overall contribution to the patriot causes. It is possible that he also tried to win support from King Hakon V of Norway – when he was captured in 1305 a safe conduct from the Norwegian King was among the documents found on him – and this may explain his absence from record between the Battle of Falkirk and the summer of 1299.

  Solway Firth, near Caerlaverock. The Solway Firth was the main crossing into Scotland for Scottish campaigns in the southwest, and for this reason Edward I could not afford the strategically important castle of Caerlaverock to remain in Scottish hands.

  Caerlaverock Castle. Caerlaverock was ‘in shape like a shield’ according to a contemporary ballad about the siege of 1300. Its capture by the English strengthened their position in the south-west.

  What was the situation in Scotland when William Wallace returned, sometime in late 1302 or early 1303? Edward I had not consolidated his victory at Falkirk with a follow-up campaign in 1299 because of political problems in England. He was unable to lead a military expedition into southern Scotland until the summer of 1300. Only in the south-east of Scotland was English authority reasonably secure between 1298 and 1303, and most of the fighting took place in the south-west where the English only controlled parts. The Scottish cavalry again took flight at the Cree in August 1300 but, in general, the Scots showed that they had learnt something from Falkirk by adopting more harrying tactics. The Scots mastery of the surrounding countryside enabled them to capture Stirling late in 1299 as a result of the English garrison’s lack of provisions. The main achievement of Edward I’s 1300 campaign was the capture of Caerlaverock Castle in July of that year. The siege was graphically described in the poem the Song of Caerlaverock:

  But their courage was considerably lowered during the attack by brother Robert who sent numerous stones from the ‘robinet’ . . . Moreover, on the other side he was setting up three other very large engines, of great power and very destructive, which cut down and break through whatever they strike . . . nothing is safe from their strokes . . . And when they saw they could not hold out any longer or endure more, they begged for peace and put out a pennon but the man who displayed it was shot through the hand into the face with an arrow by some archer . . . the whole army rejoiced at the news of the capture of the castle which was so noble a prize.

  Lochindorb Castle, Badenoch. This castle was the main base of the Comyn lords of Badenoch, leaders of the political community of Scotland for most of the period of the Scottish wars, 1296–1304. Their importance is attested by Edward I’s use of Lochindorb Castle as a base in 1303 to receive the formal submission of northern Scotland.

  Edward’s son largely led the English offensive of 1301. Scottish tactics were the same as the Lanercost Chronicle described them in 1300 and consequently little was achieved, ‘. . . because they [the Scots] always fled before him, skulking in moors and woods.’ The English, however, took the important Scottish castles at Bothwell and Turnberry (Bruce’s headquarters in Carrick), but supply problems and general lack of progress led to Edward agreeing a truce from 26 January to November 1302. It is possible that Wallace returned to Scotland sometime in late 1302 or early 1303 but not as the Scots ‘chief leader and commander’, as claimed in the Rishanger Chronicle. It is clear that John Comyn, the younger, was
sole political and military leader of the Scots from the autumn of 1302. It was in this capacity that he led a Scottish force (along with Simon Fraser) on a successful, surprise raid against the forces of Sir John Segrave at Roslin (south-west of Edinburgh) on 24 February 1303. There is no mention of William Wallace’s involvement, though Blind Harry gives Wallace the credit for the victory. This achievement was recognised as a great boost to morale by the Scots in Paris, who wrote to Comyn on 25 May:

  For God’s sake do not despair . . . it would gladden your hearts if you would know how much your honour has increased in every part of the world as the result of your recent battle with the English.

  The letter also expressed a rather naïve belief that the King of France would still look after the interests of the Scots and bring Scotland into the peace agreement. Bishop Lamberton sent a similar letter of encouragement – perhaps written at the same time – to his ally, William Wallace. Lamberton urged Wallace to help the Scottish political community to fight against Edward I. Practical help was offered in the form of revenues from his bishopric, which his officials were ordered to supply to Wallace.

  Spurred on by the English defeat at Roslin, Edward I launched the first English campaign against northern Scotland since 1296. It is notable that the offensive targeted Comyn power in Scotland north of the Forth. Edward’s route, bypassing the key castle of Stirling (using three floating bridges), took in major centres of Comyn influence in the north – Aberdeen, Banff and the private Comyn castles of Lochindorb (which he used as a base to receive the submission of the north) and Balvenie (Mortlach) – during August and September 1303. There was little resistance as the Scots sought to avoid a pitched battle. It is possible that Wallace was involved in the raid with other Scots (Comyn and Fraser) on Annandale and down to south Cumberland in June 1303 – this may have been a diversionary attack to stretch Edward I’s supply lines.

  Having returned to Scotland to reinforce military efforts, Wallace must have been disturbed by the steady flow of Scottish support to Edward I. The Macdougalls had submitted in 1301, as did Alexander Balliol, Robert Bruce had submitted by early February 1302, Alexander Abernethy also in 1302 and William, Earl of Ross, in September 1303 (when he was released from prison in England). In February 1304, John Comyn, accepted political leader of Scottish resistance, was trying to secure the best terms for those Scots who had not yet surrendered to Edward. He also seemed to be acting for the Scots delegation in France. Again Wallace and Comyn disagreed, fundamentally, on the methods used to preserve the country’s independence. Comyn, as ever the pragmatist, sought to negotiate from a position of military strength – the Scottish army had not been defeated in 1303 and had won some status by the victory at Roslin. The preliminary terms of submission set out by Comyn required, in return, that all the laws, usages, customs and franchises should be kept as they were in Alexander III’s time. In keeping with his uncompromising approach to the patriot cause (whether by fighting or diplomacy), Wallace decided (along with Simon Fraser) to fight on.

  Selkirk near Happrew. Selkirk Forest again provided cover for William Wallace (with Simon Fraser) in early 1304 when the English forces tried to track him down. He was nearly captured at Happrew, west of Peebles.

  Comyn, acting on behalf of the community of the realm in Scotland, surrendered at Strathord, near Perth, on 9 February 1304, and discussions for a settlement commenced. In late February 1304, Edward, at Dunfermline, dispatched a mounted force under John Segrave, William Latimer and Robert Clifford on a secret mission into Selkirk Forest where Wallace and Simon Fraser were thought to be lurking (J. Bain [ed.], Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, II, no. 1432 [Edinburgh, 1881]):

  . . . when these officers come to the water of Forth, they are to search strictly their followers, and if they find any strangers, to arrest them with horses and harnesses . . .

  This unit did come upon and defeat Fraser and Wallace’s forces at Happrew in Stobo, just to the west of Peebles, but the Scots managed to escape. In the English party was Robert Bruce, the future King, who had been active in Edward’s service for two years. Despite the failure to capture Wallace, Bruce, Segrave and their soldiers were commended by Edward (J. Bain [ed.], Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, II, no. 1432 [Edinburgh, 1881]):

  . . . [Edward] applauds their diligence in his affairs, and begs them to complete the business they have begun so well and to bring matters to a close before they leave the parts on that side [the Forth]. He urges them earnestly ‘as the cloak is well made, also to make the hood’.

  Edward I had failed to consolidate his military victories over the Scots at Dunbar in 1296, Irvine in 1297 and Falkirk in 1298 – he had been unable to eradicate resistance. This fact may have preyed on his mind as he sought to bring a final end to the war in 1304, following another successful military campaign in 1303. This seems to have revealed itself in a harsher attitude towards those who had not submitted to him by February 1304. When Alexander Abernethy (who had surrendered to Edward I in 1302) was, like Bruce and Segrave, trying to track down William Wallace, he enquired how Wallace was to be treated, if taken. Edward I’s reply (3 March 1304) is forthright (J. Stevenson [ed.], Documents Illustrative of the History of Scotland 1286–1306, II):

  And in reply to the matter wherein you have asked us to let you know whether it is our pleasure that you should hold out to William le Waleys any words of peace, know this, that it is not our pleasure by any means that either to him, or to any of his company, you hold out any word of peace, unless they place themselves absolutely and in all things at our will, without any exception whatsoever.

  In March 1304, Edward I convened Parliament in Scotland (at St Andrews) at which a declaration of outlawry was passed on those – William Wallace, Simon Fraser and the Stirling garrison – who held out against him. Edward’s conduct of the three-month siege (May–July 1304) at Stirling Castle is indicative of his growing desire to make examples of those who defied him. The garrison at Stirling was not allowed to surrender with honour on 20 July but was rather cruelly subjected to some target practice for one of Edward’s new siege-weapons, ‘the Warwolf’. The following extract is taken from J. Bain, Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, II, no. 1560:

  Stirling castle was absolutely surrendered to the King . . . without conditions; but the King wills that none of his people enter till it is struck with the ‘Warwolf’; and that those within defend themselves from the said ‘Wolf’ as they best can.

  Main events, 1298–1305.

  Lindores Abbey, Fife. Wallace’s last-known armed conflict took place in September 1304 at Black Earnside (Ironside). This was between Abernethy and Lindores.

  The terms agreed in the surrender negotiations, which started in February 1304 and were not finalised until 1305, are a further indication of Edward’s desire to punish those who continued to resist him. When Simon Fraser submitted in July 1304, William Wallace became even more the symbol of resistance to Edward. On the day after the siege of Stirling had ended, Edward I ordered John Comyn, Alexander Lindsay, David Graham and Simon Fraser, all with sentences of exile hanging over them at this stage in the surrender negotiations (F. Palgrave [ed.], Documents and Records Illustrating the History of Scotland [London, 1837]),

  Earnside (Ironside), site of the last skirmish in which William Wallace is known to have participated (September 1304). In medieval times this was a heavily wooded area, a suitable refuge for a hunted outlaw. Once again Wallace was lucky to escape.

  . . . to make an effort between now and the twentieth day of Christmas 13th January 1305 to take Sire William Wallace and hand him over to the king so that he can see how each one bears himself whereby he can have better regard towards the one who takes him, with regard to exile or ransom or amend of trespass or anything else in which they are obliged to the king.

  Edward was stepping up the pressure on Wallace’s former ‘allies’ in the patriot party. He therefore refused to admit James Stewart, John Soules and Ingram de Umphrav
ille to his peace until Wallace was captured. Edward clearly linked Stewart and Bishop Wishart with support for Wallace’s activities. In the initial surrender terms of 4 February 1304, Wishart was due to be punished with two or three years’ exile from Scotland ‘for the great evils he has brought about’. James Stewart’s lands were not restored to him until November 1305. Wallace’s special place in Scottish resistance was recognised from the outset of the discussions: ‘Item about William Wallace, the king intends that he be received to his will and ordinance.’ There was to be no compromise regarding the coercion of the leaders of the ‘patriot’ party, and financial rewards – the man who first discovered Wallace was promised 40 marks, his following would share 60 marks – still did not lead to the arrest of William Wallace in 1304. He was almost apprehended, once again, in a skirmish at Earnside (Lindores, Fife) in September 1304.