In the Footsteps of Private Lynch

by Will Davies

  Nevertheless, there are still reminders of the events of 1918. It is amazing for Australians to find a collective remembrance to their sacrifice so long ago, to see a sign in the schoolyard in letters a metre high: 'DO NOT FORGET AUSTRALIA' and, as is found in other parts of the Somme: 'Never Forget Australia' or the French 'Nous n'oublions pas l'Australie' (We do not forget Australia). Given the huge British effort in the Great War, why is there not some recognition of the enormous English sacrifice in saving France?

  The demolition of the Red Chateau perhaps removed the last major edifice that linked Australian troops to the town, but there is of course the Adelaide Cemetery on the road to Amiens. It is the final resting place of 522 Australians and was where the Unknown Soldier had lain until he was taken for re-interment at the Australian War Memorial in 1993. Today the gravesite – plot III, row M, grave 13 – has a headstone that reads:

  The remains of an Unknown Australian Soldier lay in this grave for 75 years. On 2nd November 1993 they were exhumed and now rest in the Tomb of the Unknown Australian Soldier at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra.

  FIFTEEN

  Hammering

  at Hamel

  The success of the counter-attack at Villers-Bretonneux not only halted the German advance towards Amiens, but drove the Germans back to a new line to the west of the tiny village of Le Hamel, 6 kilometres to the northeast of Villers-Bretonneux. To the north lay the river Somme and to the south the old Roman road between Péronne and Amiens. To the east, on the outskirts of Villers-Bretonneux along the N29, stands one of the few remaining demarcation stones placed after the war to mark the furthest extent of the German advance into France in the Great War. This stone is a significant and popular stop-off for Australian battlefield visitors.

  Though Lynch's 45th Battalion had seen little action during two periods in and around Villers-Bretonneux, 13 of their men had been killed and a further 52 wounded, of which three were officers. As Nulla puts it, 'Just the rats of war forever gnawing precious lives away.' After their second period in the line of eight days, the men were sent to Rivery, today a suburb of Amiens, where they were able to rest, get clean clothes and prepare themselves for their next stint in the line. At Rivery, men of the 47th Battalion joined the 45th. Almost four years into the war and with a dwindling supply of recruits coming from Australia, there were not enough reinforcements to keep the battalions of the 12th Brigade up to full strength, so the 47th was disbanded and the men spread among the three other battalions. The move was opposed by the men of the 47th, who naturally wished to retain their battalion as a serving unit, but the redistribution of men was inevitable. It was beginning to happen across all brigades of the AIF.

  As the 45th Battalion history states:

  It was a sad fate for so fine a corps as the 47th to lose its identity, but it had already happened to other Australian battalions for the same reason. In order to ascertain which battalion of the brigade the officers and other ranks of the 47th Bn. wished to go to, a ballot was taken. It was a gratifying indication of the popularity of the 45th Bn. to find that 75% of the 47th voted to transfer to the 45th.1

  It was summer and the men were able to swim in the river Somme, the canals and the waterways that pass quietly through this area. They were able to enjoy the countryside, particularly the orchards of ripe fruit. The men also wandered the streets of Amiens, a city dominated by its beautiful medieval cathedral. The battalion history describes it thus:

  This famous city ... was almost deserted. It resembled a city of the dead for there were thousands of empty houses and closed shops and not a living soul to be seen.2

  A few bistros bravely stayed open and the men no doubt enjoyed those, and perhaps other earthly pleasures that the ruined city could offer.

  Amiens was regularly shelled by German railway guns, large, heavy long-range guns mounted on railway rolling stock. One of these, the 'Amiens Gun', was located on the railway line at Wiencourt, about 25 kilometres to the east of Amiens, and was capable of firing twelve 28-centimetre shells an hour, each weighing 302 kilograms, to a maximum distance of 31 kilometres. It would be captured by men of the 31st Battalion on 8 August and, after some argument as to who could actually lay claim to its capture and ultimate fate, is today displayed in the grounds of the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. Another of the guns that fired on Amiens was to be captured in Arcy Wood near Proyart after being destroyed by the retreating Germans on 8 August. With a calibre of 35.6 centimetres, it was the largest gun to fire on the city and had done so since May 1918.

  The Germans also bombed Amiens from the air day and night, starting many fires. The main target was the railway station and the adjoining rail junction and yards, which were the end of the railway line for Allied troops going to the front and for supplies including the new Mark V tanks. The city suffered widespread damage and even the cathedral, although protected by sandbags, did not escape unharmed.

  In early June, the 45th Battalion was split in half and two companies were sent to the south side of the Somme, near Daours, and the other two companies, including Private Lynch's D Company, went to occupy the support trenches between Villers-Bretonneux and Corbie, about 7 kilometres north of Villers-Bretonneux. But they were soon moved into the frontline near Vaire-sur-Corbie, a beautiful little village on the banks of the river. This was the site of the ferry crossing immortalised in a well-known photograph from the war, where Australians had painted 'Circular Quay' in large letters across the wall of the ferryman's cottage. The house has long ago been demolished and replaced by a bridge which crosses the Somme at the same point.

  While the battalion was in the line at Vaire-sur-Corbie, they were joined by officers and NCOs from the American 33rd Division, which had arrived in the back areas during May. An Australian had written in his diary that the Americans were 'very big men – some tremendous men among them', while General Haig noted that the Americans were 'fine big men; reminded me of tall Australians'.3 Vast numbers of Americans were arriving at the front, and although well equipped, they were generally not well trained or ready for the fighting that lay ahead of them. Bean says that when they arrived the Americans were 'as yet too crudely trained to count for much more than cannon-fodder in fighting'. Yet their bearing and their keenness impressed the Australians, especially the fact that they did not brag. Bean quotes an Australian soldier who, probably stirring, asked a newly arrived American on the Somme, 'Are you going to win the war for us?' to which the American quickly answered, 'Well, we hope we'll fight like the Australians.'4

  To assist the Americans to get acclimatised to the war in France and prepare them for battle, they were sent to Allied units to spend time in frontline positions and participate in training. According to the 45th Battalion history, 'The outstanding features of these attachments of the Americans were their ignorance of modern warfare and their keenness to remedy this defect.'5 The Americans were popular with the Australians, who were keen to pass on their battle experience and to make them welcome in their camps and in their offensive operations.

  The Australian 2nd Division were driving the Germans eastward on the north bank of the Somme at Sailly-Le-Sec and Morlancourt, to the northeast. This meant that the German artillery to the south of the Somme around Le Hamel could enfilade their flank. To eliminate this threat, various options were discussed for advancing the Allied frontline that ran southwest from the river to the Roman road east of Villers-Bretonneux. There was lengthy consultation between the Australian command, General Rawlinson and the British High Command. The Australians believed that a complete Australian division would be needed to make the attack on a front of nearly 6 kilometres to capture the village of Le Hamel and the heights above the town known by the Germans as the Wolfsberg. They feared that should the attack fail, a whole Australian division might well be wiped out.

  Then something happened to change the logistics of the attack: the arrival at the front of the new model of British tanks, the Mark V. The commander of the British Tank
Corps, Brigadier General Hugh Elles, had long espoused the value of the tank as an offensive weapon to support the infantry, but he realised that suitable tactics needed to be developed to maximise the operational capabilities of the tank when working with the infantry. Although artillery could knock out a tank, the Germans did not have an effective infantry counter measure to the British tanks, and the German tanks that had appeared at Villers-Bretonneux were unreliable, heavy and cumbersome. Elles' message was to take advantage of the situation, as once the Germans armed themselves with a tank of equal worth to the new British model, the opportunity would be lost.

  The Australians had little faith in tanks after their disastrous involvement at Bullecourt in April 1917 when the AIF was badly let down by them. If they were to be used at Le Hamel, the British would first have to convince General Monash and his chief-of-staff, Brigadier General Blamey. As an incentive, they offered Monash two battalions of tanks – a total of 72. With Monash behind the idea, now the Australian officers and men would need a lot of convincing and a better understanding of how tanks operated, their strengths and weaknesses and how they could be used in an offensive operation. So, late in June they received demonstrations of the tanks' capabilities and were sent to practise – and picnic – with the tank crews at Vaux-en-Amiénois, in a quiet valley northwest of Amiens. The men were able to climb over the tanks and even drive them; some chalked their pet names on the sides.

  In the chapter titled 'Hammering at Hamel', Nulla notes that the officers believe the attack has been planned for 4 July, American Independence Day, for symbolic reasons. Indeed General Rawlinson did choose that date for the attack because it was the first time American troops would be fighting with the Australians. The Allies would attack on a front stretching 5,500 metres from the Somme in the north to near the Roman road at Lamotte-Warfusée in the south. There were three main areas that would need to be captured in the attack, before the Allies could make it to their objective, the ridge east of Le Hamel and the German positions on the Wolfsberg. First, the village of Le Hamel, second, the defensive trench system known as Pear Trench and further east to Kidney Trench and, finally, the German positions in Hamel and Vaire Woods.

  Monash's planning was meticulous and detailed. Armed with Mark V tanks, a further four carrier tanks, a squadron of big Handley Page bombers, 326 light field artillery pieces, plus 313 pieces of heavy artillery, he had the hardware necessary for a successful attack. Most importantly, Monash also had the authority to plan his own attack using his own Australian Corps plus the Americans – the first time in the war this had happened. Monash was anxious about further losses to his already under-strength corps and his planning for the attack reflected his concern for preventing casualties and ensuring the welfare of the men.

  From the start of the planning, Monash maintained the highest secrecy. He was careful to restrict unnecessary movement until after dark and to thoroughly camouflage artillery positions and stores dumps brought up for the attack. Each night, preparations continued; by day, conferences were held with all participating units, including the flying corps, to work through likely problems. Despite the high level of secrecy, gradually word leaked out to the men that a major offensive was planned.

  Knowing that the infantry would be exposed to snipers on the open ground behind Vaire Wood, prior to the attack Monash directed a battery of 9.2-inch howitzers to shell the area to make holes for the infantry to lie in.

  The battery has been firing in a desultory way at odd times in order to avoid arousing suspicion. We have had these shell holes mapped and the infantry know where they are.6

  Annotated aerial photographs were issued to NCOs and a 'message map' was provided to each man, an innovation at the time. This was a small map of the battlefield with form messages printed on the back that could be filled in to save time and ensure accuracy should a message need to be sent to a commander during the attack.

  In another first, the Allies planned to drop ammunition from the air. This was made possible by the invention of a special parachute by Wing Commander L. J. Wackett, who would go on to design a locally built training aircraft in Australia during the Second World War. His parachute allowed the delivery of small arms ammunition to machine-gun detachments on the frontline; all they needed to do was signal to the planes by laying out a special large 'V' on the ground using white cloth.

  Monash secured four carrier tanks to dump large loads of supplies at four pre-determined points on the battlefield, which would save 1,200 men from doing that dangerous and strenuous work. The plan was that the locations of wounded men would be marked with rifles stuck into the ground with special white tape attached, eliminating the Diggers' fears that they might be run over by a tank while lying wounded in the waist-high crops in the fields. The tanks would look for the white tapes and collect the wounded men on their way back to the Allied lines.

  On the morning before the attack, word came that the commander-in-chief of the American forces, General Pershing, had ordered that American troops not take part in the attack because they had not had enough training yet. First the message came through that six of the American companies must be withdrawn. This caused a major disruption to Monash's carefully laid plans and it was an enormous disappointment to the American officers and men. Then, later in the day, came the word that Pershing required the remaining four companies to be pulled from the attack too. Monash and Rawlinson opposed Pershing's decision and Monash ruled that the attack would have to be cancelled if those four American companies were taken out. Some Americans planned to dress as Australians and join the attack anyway, but in the end, Haig agreed with Monash and Rawlinson that it was too late to pull out the Americans without jeopardising the attack. He wrote in his diary: 'The first essential is to improve our position east of Amiens as soon as possible. The attack must therefore be launched as prepared'.7 So, for the first time, American soldiers fought alongside Australians.

  Zero hour was 3.10 a.m. on 4 July 1918. In the hours before, the wire in front of the Australian line had been cut and tapes marking the start line had been laid out. The tanks had moved up from the rear; to ensure the element of surprise in the attack, the sound of their engines was covered by that of Allied aircraft flying low along the German front, bombing the town of Le Hamel and the valleys behind it. At 3.02 a.m., the Allies started their nightly shelling, which they had been doing for an hour at this time each day for the last two weeks. The Germans expected it and dealt with it by putting on their gas masks and going back to sleep.

  In Somme Mud, Nulla is acting as the OC's runner and joins him on high ground – or in Nulla's more colourful turn of phrase, 'the OC's gallery seats' – to watch the attack. The site Lynch was referring to is possibly the heights on the north side of the Somme just east of Corbie and about 6 kilometres behind Hamel and the northern end of the attack. (The 45th were being held in reserve, at La Neuville, just west of Corbie.) Nulla sees the tremendous barrage, which included gas shells and shells designed to create a smoke screen, crash along the German frontline and upon their artillery in the rear. What military planners had realised by this stage of the war was that in an attack it was vital to not only capture the first few lines of enemy trenches, but also take out the enemy's artillery, because otherwise it could quickly range effective fire on the captured trenches. Added to the Allies' artillery barrage was a machine-gun barrage, fired skywards at a steep angle to rain down bullets upon the German line. At the same time, in the words of the official history:

  Along nearly the whole line the infantry at once rose and, lighting their cigarettes and with rifles slung, as if on a march, moved up to the line of shells which in four minutes would make its first jump.8

  The troops were to follow the Allied barrage, which had been carefully calculated so that the shells would fall just ahead of them as they advanced, exploding within 30 metres of the leading men. The theory was that by 'hugging' the barrage, the attacking troops could get right up to the German defensive line and tak
e the trenches or pillboxes before the Germans were able to set up their machine-guns. Detailed planning went into producing 'barrage maps' that co-ordinated the artillery. The light artillery's shells were to land just ahead of the advancing Australians and the shells of the heavier guns were to fall onto the German rear. At predetermined intervals that allowed the men to advance, the guns would 'jump' or lift, their shells now falling perhaps another 100 metres deeper into the enemy's territory. Each type of gun was to lift at the same time in a carefully orchestrated way.

  However, due to the secrecy of the Hamel operation, the Allied artillery were forced to rely on map co-ordinates as they were not given the chance to register the range of their guns. Due to this, some Australians and Americans were killed when shells fell short and into their advancing ranks.

  Heavy German machine-gun fire came from Pear Trench, but the Queenslanders of the 15th Battalion, 'whose own losses had been heavy, killed right and left in both the trench and the sunken road'.9 One, a 25-year-old private from Atherton in far north Queensland, Henry Dalziel, drew his revolver and, rushing the German machine-gun, shot two gunners and captured the post. During this action, his trigger finger had been shot away so Dalziel was ordered back to the rear for medical treatment, but he stayed with the attack as the men moved forward to their next objective. He was again ordered to the rear to seek medical assistance, but instead stayed on to help with the distribution of ammunition dropped by British aircraft. While doing so, he was shot in the head and finally received medical treatment. Dalziel was awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions that day and later attained the rank of sergeant.

  To the south, the 16th Battalion attacked their objective: Vaire and Hamel woods, and the kidney-shaped trench that lay at the top of the slope leading to the woods. The front wave of the battalion made it through the wire, but then a machine-gun began firing, killing a company commander and his sergeant major and wiping out a team of Lewis gunners. Lance Corporal Thomas Axford, a 24-year-old labourer from Coolgardie, Western Australia, is described in the official history: