Rorke's Drift

by Adrian Greaves

  Almost overlooked, as it came at the end of the dispatch, came the news that on the very same day, and within sight of the British massacre at Isandlwana, another vicious engagement had been fought. At the tiny Mission Station at Rorke’s Drift, a company of soldiers from the same regiment had beaten off a determined Zulu attack, the British having been outnumbered in the ratio of 40:1. In the absence of a full report from Rorke’s Drift it was too soon for Lord Chelmsford and the establishment to realize the significant political advantages that could be wrung out of this separate engagement.

  The reaction to the defeat at Isandlwana came immediately. ‘The dead could not be brought to life’ affirmed the leading English newspaper The Times, at that period usually referred to as The Thunderer. The newspaper reported:

  Their names would be imperishably inscribed on the Death Roll of England’s illustrious heroes, but swift and terrible retribution must be exacted. It was clear that the Zulus were even more formidable than the military authorities anticipated. It was known they were well drilled and that numbers of them were armed with modern breech-loaders and that they could fight courageously, but it was only now realised how large a force they could mass at one point. Sad as the loss of a British regiment was, still graver peril would arise to the colonists in Natal if immediate action were not taken to forward adequate reinforcements.

  The Standard opined that the British would not renew the war until reinforcements were available. Although the actual British losses amounted to scarcely one twentieth of the troops on the spot, such a success for the Zulus, together with their acquisition of guns, rifles and ammunition, was bound to hearten the Zulus and materially improve their defensive strength. In the House of Lords that same evening the Earl of Beaconsfield responded:

  It is a military disaster, a terrible military disaster, but I think we may say it is no more. It is not a military defeat which arises either from the failing energies or resources of the country, but it arises accidentally, and, at this moment, we do not accurately understand the circumstances which have occurred in the course of the campaign.

  Nothing indeed is certain at this moment respecting this disaster, except the valour of our troops. They have shown, as they have ever shown, the utmost devotion. Those who have fallen will be remembered, but we must not forget also that there has been an exhibition of heroic valour by those who have been spared, and the recollection of the conduct of those eighty men, who for twelve hours, in a forlorn post, kept at bay four thousand of the enemy, and ultimately repulsed them, will prove that the stamina of the English soldiery has not diminished or deteriorated. (Cheers.)

  We have taken steps, such as any persons entrusted with the management of the affairs of this great country would necessarily and promptly take, to send reinforcements to the Cape. These reinforcements are far beyond the number which the General in command thought was required: and I hope that the measures which have been taken, and the valour of our troops, will soon put a different aspect upon the conditions of affairs in South Africa to that which they assume at the present moment.3

  South Africa 1878

  During the sixty-four year reign of Queen Victoria the British Army, with its ubiquitous red-jacketed soldiers, had fought in sixty-three campaigns throughout the British Empire. Military defeat was virtually unknown to the English-speaking world and, with two further disastrous British defeats at the hands of the Zulus at Ntombe Drift and Hlobane about to occur, the Zulu War thereafter dominated the attention of the press and public imagination. In a determined endeavour to salve the nation’s prestige, more famous British regiments were mobilized throughout the country and empire and dispatched to fight Britain’s former ally, King Cetshwayo and his most ferocious and feared Zulu army. Further political disaster followed with the death of the heir to the Napoleonic dynasty, Louis Napoleon, the Prince Imperial. This young prince had been exiled to England with his father, Napoleon III (who died in 1873) and his mother, Empress Eugénie. Both the empress and the young prince continued to enjoy the protection and patronage of Queen Victoria; then, at the age of 21, the prince volunteered to fight with the British in Zululand, only to be killed by a Zulu scouting party. Britain had to act; her reputation of invincibility was rapidly becoming tarnished.

  The Zulu people

  By the time of his death in 1828, King Shaka of the Zulus had successfully trained the nation’s warriors in the art of tactical warfare. This tradition had been passed down to his brother, King Mpande, who had two principal sons, Mbulazi and Cetshwayo. Mbulazi was intellectually inclined while the more flamboyant Cetshwayo had moulded himself on Shaka and had carefully studied the art of war. These two princes had strong followings and each regarded himself as heir apparent but Mpande favoured Mbulazi, which was curious as he lacked any leadership qualities.

  On 3 December 1856 the faction that supported Cetshwayo made a raid on European traders in Zululand, confiscating all their goods and other possessions and murdering their native servants. This molestation of Europeans was highly provocative and challenged King Mpande’s authority, now vested in Mbulazi who rallied his followers. What followed was probably the greatest battle for supremacy that Africa has ever witnessed. The battle took place at Ndondakusuka on the Zulu side of the Tugela river. Cetshwayo, who had inherited the military ability and savage ferocity of his uncle Shaka, overcame his brother’s army and slew Mbulazi and five of his relatives who supported his cause, together with, it has been estimated, more than 30,000 men, women and children. Thousands of their bodies were thrown into the fast-flowing river and for weeks afterwards, the ocean beaches from the mouth of the Tugela were strewn with the innumerable corpses of Cetshwayo’s victims.

  After this brutal exhibition of power by Cetshwayo King Mpande relinquished the reins of active authority to his victorious son, and on his demise in 1872 Cetshwayo proclaimed himself King of Zululand. Probably to gain favour with his British neighbours, Cetshwayo conceived the idea of soliciting the assistance of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, to perform the coronation ceremony.

  Shepstone, presumably on the advice or instruction of Sir Henry Bulwer, Lieutenant Governor of Natal, acceded to Cetshwayo’s request. In August 1872 Shepstone proceeded to the royal palace to carry out the investment and in the presence of a vast assemblage of Zulu warriors, the Secretary for Native Affairs proclaimed Cetshwayo as King of Zululand in the name of Her Majesty Queen Victoria. The ‘coronation’ was a farce with Shepstone placing a golden cape and a tinsel crown, made for the occasion by a tailor of the 75th Regiment, on Cetshwayo’s head and the firing of a salute, which bore no resemblance to that required for a monarch.

  During the ceremony Shepstone, who was a fluent Zulu speaker, had made a series of requests, ostensibly for the king’s guidance in his future relations with his subjects. Cetshwayo should prohibit indiscriminate bloodshed, no person should be condemned without open trial and condemned persons had the right of appeal to the king; none of his subjects’ lives should be sacrificed without the king’s personal sanction, and fines should be imposed in the place of death sentences for all minor offences. To these requests the king and his councillors apparently acquiesced and, being well satisfied with the ‘agreement’, Shepstone returned to Natal. The British authorities thereafter ignored the matter and in any event, they had no effect on Cetshwayo. Zululand was left to the Zulus and Britain concentrated its attention on the commercial development of Natal.

  On a broader scale during the 1870s, Britain had successfully developed the policy of confederation as a means of self-financing and administering her numerous colonies around the world. Previously, Britain supplied her colonies with troops from within the British Army and also bore the heavy financial and administrative burden. Under the new policy the defence and laws of each colony were brought under one accepted form of administration. Local administrators were trained and soldiers recruited, though the military system was supervised and commanded by British officers. T
he system was highly successful and relieved Britain of the expensive responsibility for maintaining British military garrisons worldwide. During the years immediately leading up to the Zulu War, this policy was seen as the obvious solution in uniting southern Africa’s fragile colonies into one cohesive country, including the Boer Republics and Zululand.

  In October 1867 the discovery of diamonds in the Boer Orange Free State saw thousands of prospectors from all over the world converge on the area. In 1871, after several years of chaos, and with obvious wealth still to be won, Britain annexed the whole area to the British Crown, including Basutoland. The total cost to the Crown was the sum of £90,000 – paid in the form of compensation. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Carnarvon, then appointed Sir Henry Bartle Edward Frere (popularly known as Sir Bartle Frere) as High Commissioner to South Africa and Governor of the Cape. Although the Boers actively disliked the British, the threat, real or imagined, of a Zulu uprising had long dominated Boer thinking. It was this deep-seated Boer fear, based on years of bloodshed and conflict with the Zulus, that gave Britain the opportunity to coerce the Boer leaders into accepting British rule.

  The 1830s saw a great trek of Boers away from British domination in the Cape; thousands of Boer families loaded their possessions into columns of heavy ox-drawn wagons to undertake the quest for the Promised Land. They sought new lands that would be free from British rule with its stifling legislation – particularly with regard to keeping slaves – and punitive taxation. The trek was an undertaking of biblical proportions and Boer wagon trains spread far and wide across and beyond southern Africa in their quest for freedom. The first party of Boers crossed the Drakensberg Mountains in 1837 and discovered the lush green pastures and hills of Zululand. The word quickly spread and hundreds of Boer families rapidly followed to settle the area. There were savage conflicts between the Boers and Zulus but little could be done to prevent the steady settlement across Zululand, limited only by the natural boundary that crossed the country, the Tugela river. By the mid 1870s the pressure for more farming land encouraged Boer settlers to move even further into Zululand, a process that the Zulus successfully resisted with increasing vigour and violence.

  The area of greatest tension lay between the Buffalo and Blood rivers immediately north of the river crossing point known locally as Rorke’s Drift. In the meantime, the Zulu king, Cetshwayo, was growing increasingly agitated by the violent land-hungry Boers; due to their constant seizure of tracts of Zululand for their farms, Cetshwayo naturally viewed them as an invading enemy. Cetshwayo had never experienced any difficulty with his British neighbours whom he regarded as allies. During August 1876, as crisis loomed along the Boer border, Theophilus Shepstone, Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, was on home leave in London to receive a knighthood for his loyal services. He then travelled to Wales for a holiday where he learned from a newspaper that a force of Boers had been defeated by Chief Sekhukune of the baPedi people who lived to the north of Zululand. Having crowned Cetshwayo in 1873, Shepstone realized the political and military implications for Britain of the Boer defeat; namely that Germany, France and Holland might arm the Boers thus upsetting British military domination in South Africa and thwart Britain’s desire to gain the Transvaal goldfields. Shepstone immediately returned to London where he received an unsigned draft charter to annex the Transvaal. He was also given certain orders, the exact contents of which remain a mystery; on the following day he set sail for South Africa with the intention of annexing the Transvaal to Britain.

  His written charter was unambiguous; he was to secure the Transvaal, but only after he had gained the consent of the majority of the Transvaalers. Upon Shepstone’s arrival in South Africa, his superior, Sir Bartle Frere, the Governor General for Native Affairs and High Commissioner to South Africa, revised Shepstone’s orders and gave him permission to make the annexation without this consent – if the circumstances of the case were such that in his opinion made it necessary to issue a proclamation forthwith. Shepstone then travelled to neighbouring Natal where he made secret plans for the annexation of the Transvaal. He delayed his plans for several months while he waited for the revised authority from London to reach him; he also reflected on his good relationship with King Cetshwayo and pondered the implications of the proposed annexation on the Zulu king.

  By early 1877 relationships between the Zulus and Boers deteriorated still further as Boer trekkers forced their way onto traditional Zulu farmland, displacing the local Zulus by force. Out of sheer frustration at this blatant theft of Zulu grazing land, Cetshwayo decided to attack the Boers and openly sent his combined impis, amounting to over 30,000 warriors, to the Boers’ Transvaal border. It is documented in official British records that there was already intense political activity between Shepstone and King Cetshwayo to defuse the situation.4 With only days to go before the Zulus were expected to launch their attack against the Boers, Shepstone arrived in Pretoria with an escort of twenty-four members of the Natal Mounted Police together with eight administrators. It is therefore highly probable that Shepstone was fully aware of the Zulus’ intention to attack the Boers and that they were poised ready to attack the Transvaal. Shepstone certainly used this knowledge to terrify the Boer leaders into agreeing to succumb to British rule and its concomitant protection. However, before Cetshwayo could give the order to attack, the principle of British annexation of the Transvaal was agreed. Shepstone immediately ordered Cetshwayo to withdraw his army; Cetshwayo reluctantly complied. To this day, the Zulus believe that Shepstone duped them into massing on the Boer border, thus facilitating the annexation.

  Zululand 1878

  The intention of Cetshwayo to make an attack on the Transvaal, in the absence of annexation, is evidenced by a number of official British documents: Cetshwayo’s patience with the Boers’ illegal encroachment into Zululand ran out and he accordingly moved his army to the Transvaal border with the intention of making a punitive strike.5

  On 12 April 1877, using the excuse of an impending Zulu attack, coupled with the fact that the Transvaal exchequer was bankrupt, Shepstone annexed the Transvaal Republic to the British Crown. At the time of the annexation, the debentures debt of the republic amounted to £156,883, the national debt was £138,238 and the salaried staffs were owed more than £3,000. There was less than £1 in the treasury and the republic’s banknotes were rapidly becoming worthless. In representing the British Crown, Shepstone was viewed by the Boer administrators and pro-British element of Pretoria as their saviour from financial ruin; he also represented desperately needed commercial stability together with law and order. Credit and commerce were immediately restored, the railway bonds that were worth nothing in Holland rose with one bound to par and the value of domestic and commercial property doubled by the end of that week. Nevertheless, while the Boer bankers and tradesmen accepted the agreement with relief, annexation was not a popular move with the Boer people. In years to come they would once again simmer with discontent under British rule, but only until after the coming Zulu War when they would rebel with ferocity against the British Crown in a series of vicious Anglo–Boer Wars.

  At home, the government was well aware of the effect of the annexation on British relations with the Zulus. A Colonial Office confidential memo, No. 164, states:

  It will be urged in Parliament that the present difficulty with the Zulus, and the necessity (if necessity there was) of coercing them, are due to the annexation of the Transvaal Republic by Sir Theophilus Shepstone on the 12th of April 1877, without the consent of the Republican Government, a step which, though not perhaps contemplated by the Government at home, was ratified and approved by the Secretary of State on behalf of the Government in a despatch, dated 21st June 1877. (Blue Books C–1883)

  With the Transvaal now constitutionally annexed to the Crown, British support for the Zulus began to wane. Likewise, by annexing the Transvaal, Britain destroyed the very motive that formally prompted Cetshwayo to be Britain’s friend, namely, his desire t
o play the British off against the Boers. Within days of the annexation it was widely realized that Britain had inadvertently assumed responsibility for the long-running border conflict between the numerous Boer settlers and Zulu farmers. Boer citizens were now legally British subjects and they were quick to demand that the British authorities should act offensively on their behalf. Faced with the deteriorating situation between the Boers and Zulus, the British allied themselves with the Boers and ordered King Cetshwayo to abandon his claim to the ‘disputed territory’. The Zulu king was distressed by the British action; he had naively believed that British annexation of the Transvaal would protect Zululand from further Boer settlement. He had poignantly written to Shepstone: ‘I am glad to know now that the Transvaal is English ground; perhaps now there may be rest’.

  On the contrary, there was to be no rest and it was not long before the Boers took advantage of the situation. In early 1878 a number of Boer and displaced native settlers joined those Boer families already occupying the area directly to the north of Rorke’s Drift. The Zulus especially prized this well-watered land for its winter grazing, especially after the serious droughts of 1877 and 1878. It was clear that King Cetshwayo would not accept the increasing flow of settlers and time was running out for the British: urgent action was required.

  The British High Commissioner to South Africa, Sir Bartle Frere, had previously been a highly respected Governor of Bombay and he had long since come to the conclusion that the Zulus were a threat and should be absorbed by confederation, at least as a British protectorate and by war if necessary. Direction from the British government was weak and Frere was given a free hand to use his initiative. Frere’s communications with the British Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks Beach (who had succeeded Lord Carnarvon), were vague and led the Colonial Secretary to believe Frere would solve any problems without recourse to military action. This situation is understandable as Britain was on the verge of war in Afghanistan and the long-running series of frontier wars against the Xhosa people around the South African Cape were finally coming to an end, due in no small part to the determination and skill of the British military commander, Lord Chelmsford. A memorandum in July of 1878 from Chelmsford to the Duke of Cambridge at the War Office should have alerted the British government to the threat of war against the Zulus. He wrote: ‘It is more than probable that active steps will have to be taken to check the arrogance of Cetywayo, Chief of the Zulus’.