Rorke's Drift

by Adrian Greaves

  On 11 January the Centre Column crossed into Zululand at Rorke’s Drift and established a camp on the Zulu bank. On the 12th it saw its first taste of action when it attacked the followers of Chief Sihayo kaXongo, who lived in the Batshe valley, a few miles further along the track into Zululand. On the 20th the entire column moved up to Isandlwana.

  Who then were the men left at Rorke’s Drift? On the 14th a detachment of the NNC raised in Klip River County arrived to join the column, and a company was apparently left to guard the ponts at the Drift. These men were officially part of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment NNC, but it should be noted that they had not received any of the training given to the rest of the 3rd Regiment, nor had they had any time to develop a sense of belonging to their unit. Their numbers remain obscure – in theory a company consisted of nine white leaders (a captain, two lieutenants, and six NCOs) and 101 Africans (a black officer, ten NCOs and ninety privates) – but it seems probable that this company was over-strength, due to the casual way the Klip River levy had been deployed. Moreover they seem to have been lacking in white NCOs, probably as a result of their hasty formation. They were commanded by Captain William Stephenson, ‘a gentleman from the Cape Colony [who] spoke the language perfectly’, but seems to have had no lieutenants or sergeants present, and only three corporals. It is unlikely, therefore, that their morale and military effectiveness can have been up to much even before news broke mid afternoon on the 22nd that the Centre Column had been shattered at Isandlwana, and that the Zulu were approaching Rorke’s Drift.

  When the Contingent first heard the news, they reacted in traditional manner, singing war songs and probably attempting to complete the necessary ritual preparations. Chard asked them to help build the barricades, and Stephenson did ‘good service in getting his men to work’. At about 3.30, however, a party of mounted auxiliaries rode up from the Drift. These were some of Colonel Durnford’s command, which had survived Isandlwana; they were mostly followers of the Basuto chief, Hlubi, and they were under the command of a Lieutenant Henderson. While most of the mounted Native Contingent who had survived the disaster had crossed the Mzinyathi (Buffalo) river downstream, at the place now known as Fugitives’ Drift, these seem to have cut through the Zulu cordon and reached Rorke’s Drift. Henderson reported to Chard, who asked him to deploy his men beyond Shiyane hill, in the direction of the Zulu advance, to delay the Zulu attack as long as possible. They had been gone perhaps forty-five minutes when the garrison heard a smatter of shots, and they came into sight, riding off towards Helpmekaar.

  Henderson had escaped in the company of a civilian meat contractor, R.J. ‘Bob’ Hall, who had been in the camp discussing business with the army. According to one of the garrison, Harry Lugg, it was Hall who shouted that the Zulu were approaching, as he described it, ‘as black as hell and as thick as grass’. By Hall’s account, he and Henderson lingered in the bush at the front of the post to fire a few shots at the Zulus as they swung into view of the mission station, before riding off to Helpmekaar. No one seems to have blamed them; even Chard commented that he saw the same men fight well later in the war, and he seems to have accepted that they were demoralized by Durnford’s death. No action was later taken against Henderson.

  But the sight of the mounted Contingent in full flight was too much for Stephenson’s NNC, whose martial spirit promptly evaporated. The men threw down the mealie bags, biscuit boxes or weapons they had in their hands, and simply jumped over the barricades, heading for Helpmekaar. While the garrison had clearly not expected much from the rank and file, they were infuriated by the sight of the white NCOs in flight, and someone from B Company shot and killed one of the NNC’s white NCOs. The dead man is generally accepted as being Corporal Anderson, the only man of the NNC who was killed in the battle whose death is not accounted for by other evidence.

  Colour Sergeant Bourne perhaps summed up the reaction of the garrison to this desertion when he commented, ‘the desertion of these detachments of 200 men appeared at first sight to be a great loss, with only a hundred of us left, but the feeling afterwards was that we could not have trusted them, and also that our defences were too small to accommodate them anyhow’. Whether he meant that the men could not be relied upon to stand and fight, or whether he suspected the Contingent might desert to the Zulu (which was highly unlikely), he does not say.

  With their desertion the NNC pass out of the Rorke’s Drift story, save for a few white NCOs, not from Stevenson’s company, who were patients in the makeshift hospital, and who distinguished themselves in the fight.

  Corporal Christian Ferdinand Scheiss (see p.319)

  Corporal Dougherty M.

  Corporal Mayer J.H.

  Corporal Scammell C.

  Corporal Wilson J.

  Private Soldier – name unknown

  Reverend Otto Witt

  Witt purchased the Rorke’s Drift farm on behalf of the Church of Sweden Mission in 1878 and, having sent his wife and children to friends near Umsinga, had stayed at the post when the British occupied it on the eve of the war. He was still there on 22 January, although he departed just before the battle began. His actions received a good deal of criticism at the time, and his reputation has suffered as a result, partly because he was publicly critical of the attitude of white settlers in Natal to the Africans, and partly because his claim to have been present at both Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift has been held up to ridicule.

  Yet history has not treated Witt fairly. In fact, what he actually said was that he had seen something of the battle of Isandlwana from the top of the Oskarsberg hill, which overlooks Rorke’s Drift, and that, as he was riding away from Rorke’s Drift, he witnessed the first Zulu assault on the post.

  Were these claims as ridiculous as they have sometimes seemed? Witt climbed the hill in the company of Chaplain Smith and Surgeon Reynolds shortly after noon, when the battle was just beginning at Isandlwana. By the time they reached the peak of the hill the battle would have been well under way. From the summit of the Oskarsberg there is a magnificent view of the entire theatre of operations of the Centre Column, from the crossing point at Rorke’s Drift on the left towards Isandlwana, and the Isipezi mountain beyond. Only where the river enters the gorge above Fugitives’ Drift is the view lost. Isandlwana itself blots out the plain in front of it, where much of the battle took place, but the spurs of the iNyoni ridge, where Mostyn and Cavaye’s companies were deployed, are clearly visible. So, too, as the Manzimyama valley, where the Zulu right horn descended, and the near slope of the nek below Isandlwana itself, where many of the 24th stands were broken up and overwhelmed. Is there anything improbable, then, about Witt’s account of what he actually saw that day? He wrote:

  My position was on a hill on the other side of the river from where the fight was raging. I watched the Zulus descend and draw themselves in long lines between the camp and the river. From where I stood I could see the English forces advancing to attack; but I could not see any hand-to-hand fighting. I observed that the Zulus were fighting heavily, and presently I saw that the English were surrounded in a kraal some little distance from the camp ... As the fight progressed, and I saw that the English were beaten ... I noticed that the Zulus were crossing the river.

  In a long and admittedly rather confused account, Witt went on to add more details, all of them quite plausible. Once he realized he was in danger, he ‘saw there was no time to be lost, and I dashed away on horseback as hard as I could go.’ There was no reason for him to stay; as a civilian and a missionary, he had no duty to support the British troops, nor does anyone seem to have expected him to. He claimed that he was ‘chased by the Zulus, who did their best to catch me, but failed’. His account of Rorke’s Drift is clearly a mixture of his own observations, and reports published after the events. He probably paused to look back at the battle when he was a safe distance away; moreover, the site of the battle would have been visible for several miles as he rode towards Helpmekaar:

  Before I started I saw
a Zulu alone at the barricade, kneeling and firing. The whole force drew nearer, and the battle drew on heavier. Soon the hospital was on fire. Our people found it impossible to defend themselves inside the barricade. They must retire within the walls, thus entering the commissariat store. The sick people were brought here, except five who could not be removed, and who were stabbed by the Zulus and burnt. That the hospital was set on fire was certainly a great personal loss for me, as all my property was burnt; but it was of great importance for the whole colony, and especially for the people in the commissariat stores, as the flames of the burning house enabled them to aim properly on the Zulus and thus keep them at a fair distance. If the Zulus had known what they ought they should never have put fire to the house, and the heavy darkness of that dreadful night would have made our troops unable to defend themselves as they did.

  There is nothing in this account to cause us to question Witt’s veracity. It seems that his marginal role in the eyes of the successive generation of British commentators has caused his reputation to suffer unfairly – a situation perhaps not helped by his conducting (unsuccessfully) legal action for £600 compensation against the British government for the destruction of his mission station.

  CHAPTER 14

  An Examination of the Rolls of Rorke’s Drift Defenders

  The defenders of Rorke’s Drift were comparatively few in number; furthermore the garrison mainly consisted of soldiers belonging to B Company of the 2nd Battalion, the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment. On the basis of these facts the accurate identification of the individual men present during the action on 22 and 23 January 1879 would appear to be a relatively simple task; however, such is not the case.

  During the years 1964–71, Zulu War historian Norman Holme researched various records in order to publish a definitive list of Rorke’s Drift defenders, the results of which appeared in published form in 19711 and was based on two contemporary rolls of Rorke’s Drift defenders, attributed to Lieutenant Chard and Colour Sergeant Bourne respectively. It was considered that these two documents represented the only authoritative sources of information, despite the fact that the lists failed to agree in a number of instances. In addition to the inaccuracies contained in both rolls, the fact that two such lists existed represented a puzzling anomaly. Neither roll was considered totally accurate, and in view of the conflicting information Holme undertook a complete re-investigation in respect of the Rorke’s Drift defenders belonging to the 24th Regiment. Various documentary sources were used in this new work, with the result that several names have been amended and others excluded from the revised roll. The roll published earlier in this book is therefore an amended combination based upon the original lists accredited to Chard and Bourne.

  The apparently original rolls of Rorke’s Drift defenders were initially accepted, with reservations, in respect of a number of factors. Chard was a Royal Engineers officer and he had not spent any significant time at the mission station. He first arrived at Rorke’s Drift late on 19 January and his acquaintance with Bromhead was therefore brief and informal; after all, it was Bromhead who was the officer commanding B Company, Chard merely had command of his handful of sappers who were based half a mile away at the river crossing into Zululand. Due to his seniority over Bromhead, Chard first assumed nominal responsibility for the mission station during the afternoon of 22 January to cover the temporary absence of the officer commanding, Major Spalding; this responsibility then became significant for the duration of the battle as Spalding had failed to return before the Zulus attacked.

  Like many researchers and historians before him, Holme presumed that Chard had personally undertaken the compilation of the roll bearing his name; the fact that it was generally believed Chard had signed the document tended to impart a degree of authority to it. The roll is dated ‘3rd February 1879’ and although this date may not be correct, it may be assumed that the document was compiled prior to the award of decorations for gallantry since the roll does not contain references to any of these awards. The general acceptance of the origin and authenticity of this roll is clearly not without justification, and had there been no other source of comparison, then the contents and authenticity would doubtless never have been disputed. A most important point relates to the fact that a large copy of the roll is mounted in a frame and displayed in the regimental museum of the South Wales Borderers (24th Foot). A facsimile of the roll is reproduced in The South Wales Borderers 24th Foot 1689–1937 by Professor C.T. Atkinson (1937). Holme considered it unusual for Atkinson to have included the roll without making any reference to it in the text of his book. Records of the 24th Regiment by Paton, Glennie and Penn Symons, published in 1892, contains a list of casualties at Isandlwana, yet Chard’s list of Rorke’s Drift defenders is, curiously, neither included nor even mentioned. It seemed at the time impossible to account for the omission of this important roll, particularly in view of the fact that it had supposedly been in existence since 1879, and presumably would have been available to the authors of the book.

  Similar problems exist in respect of the subsequent roll compiled by Frank Bourne. Bourne’s document is dated 4 July 1910 and contains a reference to the effect:

  By Special Request, And In Order To Preserve A Record Of Those Who Took Part In The Defence, This Roll Was Prepared By Major F. Bourne (Late Colour-Sergeant ‘B’Company) From The Regimental Pay List For January 1879, Kindly Placed At His Disposal By The Public Record Office.

  As the former senior Non-Commissioned Officer of B Company, Bourne was eminently qualified to compile such a roll; he must necessarily have known many of the soldiers on a personal basis. In view of this, Holme considered it unusual that Bourne had not been called upon to provide information, at least in respect of his own company, for inclusion in Chard’s roll. It is evident that Bourne cannot have been consulted in this matter; otherwise he would surely not have undertaken to compile a second list of defenders, as this would have represented a contradiction of information previously submitted by himself.

  Bourne’s knowledge of at least some of his men is confirmed by his reference to 1524 Private Joseph Bromwich as ‘Bromatch’. This appears to have been the pronunciation used by the man himself when giving his name, as verified by his attestation document. Similarly Bourne was aware, when others were not, that 972 Private George Edwards had enlisted under an alias, his true name being Orchard. After a lapse of so many years it was thought unreasonable that Bourne would have remembered each and every man belonging to B Company. The pay list, which should have encompassed several months prior to January 1879, could have provided him with only slight assistance when preparing the roll as soldiers were frequently transferred on a temporary basis for other duties. Bourne’s list of defenders is far less comprehensive than Chard’s roll. This was thought to be the reason that Professor Atkinson included Chard’s roll in his book. Obviously the roll compiled by Bourne could not have been included in Historical Records of the 24th Regiment as this publication pre-dated the roll by some eighteen years. It has proved impossible to determine the source of the ‘Special Request’ that prompted Bourne to prepare his list, and it has been conjectured that the request may have been made as a result of dissatisfaction with Chard’s roll.

  Interestingly, a ledger Records of the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment (Regimental Archive) states that: ‘On the 14th October 1910, 4 copies of the Roll of B Company 2nd Battalion, who took part in the Defence of Rorke’s Drift, were sent to the Officer i/c Records, Shrewsbury, for safe custody’. These copies were presumably copies of the newly compiled Roll by Major Bourne.

  The above anomalies represented a series of interesting problems and Holme made only a brief mention of these factors in his original published work, since any elaboration would have provoked a number of questions for which Holme was unable to provide satisfactory answers. Having resolved to undertake further investigations in respect of these matters, Holme’s preliminary investigations involved a re-examination of Chard’s roll contained
in the regimental museum at Brecon. First it was necessary to establish the date on which this document had come into the possession of the museum, and of equal importance, the provenance of the roll. The answer to these questions is contained in The Journal of The South Wales Borderers issue 7, dated 1935. The entry reads as follows:

  This roll [the ‘Chard’ roll] has been brought to light through the services of two gentlemen in South Africa, who have been indefatigable in their efforts to obtain it. The thanks of the Regiment are accorded to them for their trouble. The gentlemen in question are – Mr F. Avon of Malvern, Natal, and Colonel G.Molyneaux, CMG, DSO, of Natal.

  Additional information concerning the roll was found in the museum accession book and this eventually yielded the following information in respect of the year 1935: