Memoirs

by David Rockefeller

  I talked at some length with Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, President Nicolae Ceauşescu of Romania, General Wojciech Jaruzelski of Poland, and General Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay. I sat for extended discussions with all the modern leaders of racist South Africa: Henrik Verwoerd, B. J. Vorster, P. W. Botha, and, later, the more enlightened F. W. de Klerk. I persevered through lengthy meetings with Zhou Enlai and other senior members of the Chinese Communist hierarchy while the Cultural Revolution still raged. I debated virtually every leader of the Soviet Union from Nikita Khrushchev through Mikhail Gorbachev, and, even more recently, confronted Fidel Castro during his 1996 visit to New York.

  Critics from both the left and the right have vilified me for doing this. Indeed, mine has not been a particularly popular or well-understood position. My critics claim that “David Rockefeller has never met a dictator he didn’t like.” But at no time in more than four decades of private meetings with foreign leaders have I ever deferred to their point of view when I disagreed with them. On the contrary, I have used these meetings to point out respectfully but firmly the flaws in their systems as I saw them and to defend the virtues of my own. I pursued these opportunities because I believed that even the most entrenched authoritarian systems would succumb eventually to the superior values of our system.

  BEGINNING THE DIALOGUE

  My contacts with the Soviets began in 1962 when I was invited to attend an American-Soviet citizens conference. Initiated by Norman Cousins, publisher of the Saturday Review, the “Dartmouth Conference,” as these meetings came to be called, was one of several Cold War efforts designed to improve understanding between the two superpowers through face-to-face meetings and dialogue. The value of the meetings was proven at the first one I attended in Andover, Massachusetts, in late October 1962.

  In the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the participants continued their sessions even as our two nations faced each other in an unprecedented and terrifying nuclear confrontation. Both sides saw that the time had come to step back from the threshold of atomic annihilation and seek other ways to pursue our rivalry. The next Dartmouth Conference took place two summers later in Leningrad, and it was on this trip that my daughter Neva and I met Nikita Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. The idea for the meeting had actually come from U Thant, the secretary-general of the United Nations, who mentioned it to me at a reception I hosted for the U.N.’s senior staff at Pocantico. When I told him I was planning a trip to Leningrad, the Secretary-General said he thought the top Soviet leadership would benefit from exposure to an American banker. A personal meeting with Khrushchev during my trip to Russia might help in a small way to improve relations between the two superpowers.

  U Thant agreed to send word to him, but I heard nothing definite about the meeting before leaving for Leningrad in late July. The day after the Dartmouth delegation arrived, however, I received a message from the Kremlin summoning me to a meeting the following day in Moscow. In order to get there in time, Neva and I took the overnight train—watched carefully by a KGB agent who had attended the conference itself.

  Moscow in those days was a study in contrasts. Khrushchev had claimed that the USSR would surpass the United States in terms of gross domestic product, but he had issued this pronouncement from a city mired in economic stagnation and suffering from decades of neglect. Elegant buildings from the Czarist days stood unpainted and in disrepair; offices and apartment houses built during the more recent Stalinist era looked shabby and uninviting. There were few automobiles, but the center lanes on the broad main boulevards were kept open to accommodate the speeding Russian-built Zil limousines carrying members of the Politburo on official business. People queued on long lines to buy meager quantities of poor-quality food, and in department stores the shelves were virtually empty of goods. On this, my first trip to the heart of the Soviet Empire, I found myself wondering about the economic strength of the country that was the subject of Khrushchev’s bluster.

  THE EMBODIMENT OF CAPITALISM

  To the Soviet propaganda machine the Rockefeller family had always been “capitalist enemy number one.” Some years before, Pravda had published a book on me and my four brothers entitled Ever Knee Deep in Blood, Ever Trampling Corpses. An article at about the same time in the English-language New Times magazine explained that “of all the billionaire dynasties reigning in the world, the most powerful is that of the Rockefellers.” The thesis was that, having made exorbitant profits on oil during World War II, we then plowed the money into armaments and took control of the manufacture of atomic weapons. The fact that the Rockefeller Foundation had helped rescue Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard, and Edward Teller from European Fascist regimes in the 1930s was provided as supporting evidence of our family’s intent to fuel the Cold War to increase our own profits.

  Just a few months before I arrived in Moscow, Izvestiya editorialized that as chairman of the Museum of Modern Art I was promoting decadence in order to corrupt the population at large: “Under the Rockefellers’ tutelage, abstract art is summoned to play a definite political role, to distract the attention of thinking Americans from real life and to make them stupid.”

  I met many Russians over the years who were convinced my brothers and I were a cabal, pulling strings behind the scenes to shape American foreign policy. The Soviets had no conception of how a pluralistic democracy works and believed elected officials, up to and including the president of the United States, were only figureheads acting out the roles dictated to them by the real “powers that be”—in this case, my family. Not infrequently Soviet officials would admonish me to “tell your president to grant most-favored-nation trading status to us,” or some other thing on their minds, as if it were just a question of my saying so, and it would be done. I would try to explain that the United States had a different kind of government and that I didn’t wield that kind of power, but it was clear they didn’t believe me.

  UNDER LENIN’S GAZE

  In the midafternoon of July 29 a battered Russian-built Fiat collected Neva and me from our hotel and drove us through the high, red, crenelated walls of the Kremlin to a rather simple and sparsely furnished room in a modest building that had been used by Lenin. His successors had maintained offices there, trying, I suppose, to convey the impression that they were making sacrifices on behalf of the proletariat.

  The interview had been granted to me alone, but when Khrushchev greeted us in the anteroom, I asked if Neva could remain to act as note taker. I thought it would be important for me to have a record of the conversation and a memorable experience for her. Khrushchev graciously assented.

  There were only four of us present: Neva, me, Khrushchev, and his excellent interpreter Victor Syhodrev, who was born in Brooklyn and translated for the Soviet leaders. We sat on hard wooden straight-backed chairs around a large, varnished oak table, Khrushchev on one side, and Neva and I across from him. Syhodrev sat at the end of the table between us. There was little decoration in the room apart from a large portrait of Lenin that dominated the room. Once or twice during the conversation that followed I glanced up to find Lenin staring at me in disapproval.

  THE CONVERSATION

  While there had been a definite thaw in the Soviet Union’s internal repression under Khrushchev—a welcome change from Stalin’s incredible brutality—his image was still that of the crude bully who had taken his shoe off in the U.N. to pound his desk, interrupting British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s condemnation of Soviet actions. There was a question in my mind as to how Khrushchev would behave in our meeting since it would not be without strong symbolic meaning; the “prince of capitalism,” as some labeled me, confronting the modern “Czar of all the Russias.” I began with a few pleasantries and offered him as a gift two etchings by Grant Wood, thinking them appropriately American and close enough to approved Soviet tastes that he wouldn’t take offense. There were no telephone calls or other interruptions during our meeting, which lasted well over two hours.

 
; Almost immediately Khrushchev challenged me. He claimed that Nelson, through the Rockefeller Brothers Fund study America at Mid-Century, had called for a massive increase in U.S. defense expenditures to counter the growing Soviet military threat. “I believe,” Khrushchev said, “that had your brother Nelson been elected, his policies would differ little if at all from those presently followed by President Johnson.”

  In an attempt to be diplomatic I spoke of the importance of high-level contacts and said I hoped he and President Johnson would be able to establish close relations, but in a non sequitur, Khrushchev complained bitterly about U.S. interference in Soviet internal affairs. Russians, I found, were surprisingly sensitive to U.S. criticism of their regime.

  After that our conversation began in earnest. The interview, as transcribed by Neva, who was scribbling furiously at my side, captures the thinking of Khrushchev at a crucial time in U.S.-Soviet relations and also a crucial moment in his career: Barely two months later, in mid-October 1964, Khrushchev was deposed. What follows is largely verbatim, although I have paraphrased some sections and added personal comments in parentheses.

  NK: As regards all internal matters [referring to third world countries], we believe that they are and must be resolved from within by the people of that country. We conduct all our relations with any state as it exists and with the internal order of that country, which is the sole reasonable basis for peaceful negotiations.

  DR: That is one of the areas that gives me cause for concern. In recent cases, particularly in Latin America, we feel that you make use of local Communist parties to bring into power governments that favor the Soviet Union. When this happens, it endangers the existing power structure and is opposed to the interests of the United States. So I am pleased to hear that this is not your policy. [The Secretary appeared to be irritated.]

  NK: Nyet. A revolution cannot be organized or instigated just at anybody’s will. The people of the country must accomplish it themselves. When the revolution occurred in Russia, Lenin wasn’t even in the country. The revolution took place because our people accomplished it themselves. Hungry women went out into the streets of Leningrad, and the government fell. This is the case in other countries. It is the people who cause a revolution; it can never be accomplished by another state or party. Examples are South Korea and South Vietnam. In South Vietnam there is terrible strife, while in Korea the situation is relatively calm. Doesn’t that show that revolutions are not dependent on anyone’s wish or will? They depend on the maturity of conditions. We do believe that revolutions will occur in all countries, even in the United States. When, one can’t say, but when it does occur, it will be accomplished by the people of your country. Meanwhile, we want peace, good relations, and good business contacts with the United States.

  When the revolution triumphed in Cuba, Castro wasn’t even a member of the Communist Party. Even after victory he didn’t recognize this country for one or one and a half years. But the revolution developed further, resulting in the present government in that country. We recognized that the revolution had fulfilled itself. We recognize every people’s right to establish a system of its own choice in its own country, without interference in internal affairs. Such interference can only result in chaos.

  DR: I would draw different conclusions than you did from the examples of history which you cited. South Vietnam is the cause of chaos today, as I see it, because the Vietcong have received massive support from North Vietnam and, more importantly, from the People’s Republic of China. All the United States seeks to accomplish there is to stop the aggressive policies of North Vietnam and the People’s Republic whose efforts to take over South Vietnam are inimical to our vital interests. The United States would welcome a chance to get out of Vietnam and to see it neutral. Perhaps this could be done through the United Nations, but as the situation is now, I don’t see how neutral independence can be accomplished, other than with our assistance.

  [At this point Khrushchev took a paperweight in his hand and began to thump it on the table.]

  In Southeast Asia the interests of our two countries are one and the same. I can hardly imagine that it is in the interest of the Soviet Union to see the People’s Republic of China sweep over the whole of Asia, but I fear there is a danger of this without your continuing participation with us in the stabilization of Vietnam, and in Laos through the International Control Commission you set up with President Kennedy. There must be cooperation between us so that Southeast Asia is not a threat to the whole world.

  NK: [The Secretary continued thumping.] You’re mistaken. You’re mistaken because you think the Chinese are interfering in Vietnam. The Chinese are no less interested in South Korea, and yet nothing of the kind has happened there, which goes to show that a desire alone is not enough. China is the neighbor of both countries, but the situations in them are different. So you see it is the objective situation and not the subjective one that counts. So don’t try to put all the blame on the neighbors.

  DR: No, not all—only ninety-five percent! There has been no popular uprising in South Vietnam, but the People’s Republic has been successful in sending in a large amount of arms and in stirring up trouble. I’m afraid I can’t agree with the Chairman in his interpretation of the case.

  NK: [Apparently irritated.] Here we have a basic difference. But if you say that China is the main factor there, surely the United States could send in more arms. But the Vietnamese don’t want to take those arms because the guerrillas will take the arms away from them. Arms sent into the country from the outside are certainly not a factor.

  [Khrushchev’s voice had been rising, and the thumping got louder. I felt I should probably change the topic, but then I thought of one more thing I had to say.]

  DR: I appreciate the Chairman’s views and am glad to hear him speak on this subject. I think our basic differences are such that nothing will be gained from pursuing this particular subject. I would like to say one more word on Cuba. I agree with you that it was the corrupt Batista regime which made possible an internally generated revolution in Cuba. But it was not at first—not until Cuba received massive economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union—that the character of the government was changed. And here the Soviet Union did interfere in internal matters for her government’s betterment and to the detriment of our government. This is precisely the sort of situation that creates so much concern and apprehension on the part of the people of the United States.

  NK: That is a very profound delusion! As I said, Castro only recognized our country diplomatically about twelve or eighteen months after the revolution, so the revolution was won when we didn’t even know the leader of the revolution, and then—well, to think that Cuba could at any time be a bridgehead for an attack on the United States by the Soviet Union is ridiculous. Cuba is separated from the Soviet Union by eleven thousand kilometers, and all these communication lines are completely controlled by the United States. And even assuming we wanted to make war on the United States from Cuba, we have no means. You were in the Army, I know; you will understand this. We haven’t the transportation to supply food and ammunition to troops based in Cuba.

  Now we do have rockets, we have nuclear weapons, with which we keep the United States covered, but we can do that from our own country. If at one time we placed rockets on Cuba, it was only in order to deter the United States from attacking Cuba. And we then reached an understanding with the President, and we took out our rockets—we had forty-two or forty-four there, I believe. In return, Kennedy gave his word that neither he nor his allies would invade Cuba. Should this agreement at any time be violated, we could support Cuba from our own country. We have rockets and nuclear weapons. For this purpose we don’t need Cuba’s territory. And then your understanding is completely counter to ours. You believe the Soviet Union wants to subordinate countries, but that is no longer possible.

  [I thought it preposterous at the time that Khrushchev could say this with a straight face after the brutal Soviet repressio
n of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the continued presence of Soviet military forces from Estonia in the north to Bulgaria in the south.]

  NK: The colonial system has toppled; the remnants of it are now falling. I believe each people should be free to have its own setup. This is the reason we support Cuba. Cuba has nothing we don’t have in our own country—

  DR: Except, perhaps, proximity to the United States!

  NK: [The Secretary was now quite agitated.] What does that give us? Do you really believe all that rot, that we want to seize the United States? If you think that is possible, tell me how, tell me by what means. We can destroy the United States, but why? As for Cuba, it makes much sugar, but so does the Soviet Union.

  DR: I suppose, judging from what I’ve seen, that you use Cuba as a base to activate the Communist movements in other parts of Latin America. There is no thought of an attack on the United States—serious-thinking Americans don’t feel you want to take us over by force. Our fear is that by the kind of activity I have suggested you would cripple the United States, weaken our position. [At this point I thought it might be a good idea to shift the conversation to less controversial ground.]

  I don’t want to take too much of your time, but I feel this is directly connected with the question of trade, and I would like to speak to you on this matter if you would permit me.

  [Khrushchev perked up when I mentioned the subject of trade and began to listen very intently.]

  In relation to trade and all other relationships between our countries—rightly or wrongly—we feel our position to be jeopardized by the actions of the Soviet Union. Naturally, we are not eager to take steps which will lead to the facilitation or the hastening of that process. All of the relations between our countries must be based on confidence, and at present that confidence is lacking.