RN

by Richard Nixon

  On December 9, with only this one remaining item to negotiate, I allowed myself to begin feeling optimistic about the possibility of having an agreement before Christmas. It would be painful if Thieu refused to go along, but there was no question that we had done everything possible to help him and that now we had to look to our own interests and conclude an agreement if the terms were acceptable. I thought back over the roller-coaster events of the past week, which had begun with Kissinger’s recommending breaking off the talks and bombing, and which seemed to be ending with a settlement in sight.

  Diary

  In essence, as Haldeman and I add things up we think what happened here is that Henry went back to Paris firmly convinced that he would quickly, within a matter of two days, reach agreement with the North Vietnamese. As a matter of fact, he told me that the meetings would only last two days—Monday and Tuesday.

  The North Vietnamese surprised him by slapping him in the face with a wet fish.

  The North wants to humiliate the South and us as well if possible. The South wants to drive the North out of South Vietnam and get us to stick with them until this goal is accomplished. As far as we are concerned, we must bring the war to an end on an honorable basis as quickly as possible.

  Expectations have been built so high now that our failing to bring the war to an end would have a terribly depressing effect on this country, and no television speech is ever going to rally the people, despite Henry’s feelings based on past performances that this could be the case. As I have pointed out in previous memos, and as I see it now very clearly, the country can be rallied when it’s on its back and when you ask it to get up and fight. On the other hand, when the country is already very optimistic, to go in and tell them that things are in a hell of a shape doesn’t rally them—it simply rallies our opponents and depresses our friends.

  For better or for worse, we are on a course now where we have no choice but to make the very best settlement that we can and then to do the best that we can to see that it is enforced.

  On December 10 the North Vietnamese replied to my cable, saying that they considered their position on the DMZ to be very reasonable. It seemed clear that they had made a decision to stall the negotiations.

  That afternoon I decided to stir things up and remove any doubts about our resolution. I telephoned Dobrynin and told him that I personally did not favor any of the compromise language that Kissinger was suggesting regarding the DMZ. I said that Hanoi should abide by the language it had already agreed to, and I told him bluntly that it was definitely in Moscow’s interest to aid the negotiations and get them over with since we both had bigger fish to fry. As it stood, I said, Hanoi’s preoccupation with changing the DMZ arrangement could risk concluding an agreement that had now been largely achieved. Dobrynin asked for some time to communicate with Moscow.

  At the meeting on Monday, December 11, the North Vietnamese were totally inflexible on the DMZ issue. Kissinger’s report characterized their conduct as composed of equal parts of insolence, guile, and stalling.

  They were somewhat more forthcoming the next day, but there was still no real progress. That night Kissinger reported that he had come to the conclusion that Hanoi had decided to play for time: Le Duc Tho was purposely trying to prevent either a settlement of the war or a break-off of the talks. It was possible that they simply planned to exploit the increasingly obvious split between us and Saigon, and I could not help thinking it was ironic that the North Vietnamese intransigence at the negotiating table may have been at least in part a result of our unsuccessful attempts to pressure Thieu into accepting an agreement. There was no doubt that the Communists had infiltrated the Saigon government, and that Hanoi was therefore aware of our warnings of congressional fund cutoffs in January. I noted in a diary entry a week later on December 18: “We are right on a tightrope here and I fear that as a result of the infiltration of the South Vietnamese that the North Vietnamese figure that they have us where the hair is short and are going to continue to squeeze us. That is why we had to take our strong action.”

  Of course it was also possible that the leaders in Hanoi were divided and were still making up their minds about whether to conclude the agreement. In any case, the result was the same: stalemate. Kissinger described the situation in his cable:

  Their consistent pattern is to give us just enough each day to keep us going but nothing decisive which could conclude an agreement. . . .

  On the other hand, they wish to ensure that we have no solid pretext for taking tough actions. They keep matters low key to prevent a resumption of bombing.

  They could have settled in three hours anytime these past few days if they wanted to, but they have deliberately avoided this. For every one of their semi-concessions they introduce a counterdemand. . . .

  The North Vietnamese strategy seems to me to be as follows: they have reduced the issues to a point where settlement can be reached with one exchange of telegrams. I do not think they will send this telegram, however, in the absence of strong pressures.

  At the next meeting, on December 13, Le Duc Tho made it clear that he had no intention of reaching an agreement. He was scheduled to return to Hanoi for consultations the next day, so Kissinger suggested that the talks be recessed and no more meetings be held until after Christmas. That night I noted, “As I had somewhat anticipated, this day, December 13, is really one of the toughest days we have had during the administration.”

  Kissinger and I completely agreed on the cynicism and perfidy of the North Vietnamese. He even thought that Le Duc Tho’s occasional fainting spells during the talks had been contrivances aimed at gaining a negotiating advantage by eliciting sympathy for him. Gritting his teeth and clenching his fists, Kissinger said, “They’re just a bunch of shits. Tawdry, filthy shits. They make the Russians look good, compared to the way the Russians make the Chinese look good when it comes to negotiating in a responsible and decent way!”

  I had reluctantly decided that we had now reached the point where only the strongest action would have any effect in convincing Hanoi that negotiating a fair settlement with us was a better option for them than continuing the war. Kissinger and I agreed that this meant stepping up the bombing. The only question was how much bombing would be needed to force Hanoi to settle. Kissinger recommended reseeding the mines of Haiphong Harbor, resuming full-scale bombing south of the 20th parallel, and intensifying bombing in southern Laos. My intuition was that something far more extensive was required. When I checked and found that the area south of the 20th parallel was largely rice paddies and jungle, I told Kissinger, “We’ll take the same heat for big blows as for little blows. If we renew the bombing, it will have to be something new, and that means we will have to make the big decision to hit Hanoi and Haiphong with B-52s. Anything less will only make the enemy contemptuous.”

  Kissinger pointed out that Hanoi and Haiphong were heavily defended with Soviet surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. If we attacked them, we would have to be prepared for new losses and casualties and POWs. “I know,” I said, “but if we’re convinced that this is the right thing to do, then we will have to do it right.”

  On December 14 I issued an order, to become effective three days hence, for the reseeding of the mines in Haiphong Harbor, for resumed aerial reconnaissance, and for B-52 strikes against military targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong complex. The bombing plan included sixteen major transportation, power, and Radio Hanoi transmitter targets in Hanoi, as well as six communications command and control targets in the outlying area. There were thirteen targets in the Haiphong area, including shipyards and docks. When the first plans came in for the bombing, I was appalled to find that the planes had to be borrowed from different commands, involving complicated logistics and large amounts of red tape. The day after the bombing began, I think I shook Admiral Moorer when I called him and said, “I don’t want any more of this crap about the fact that we couldn’t hit this target or that one. This is your chance to use military power effectively to wi
n this war, and if you don’t, I’ll consider you responsible.” I stressed that we must hit and hit hard or there was no point in doing it at all. If the enemy detected any reticence in our actions, they would discount the whole exercise.

  The order to renew bombing the week before Christmas was the most difficult decision I made during the entire war; at the same time, however, it was also one of the most clear-cut and necessary ones.

  Diary

  Henry talked rather emotionally about the fact that this was a very courageous decision, but I pointed out to him that there was no other choice—that we were going to be here for four years and that even though we made a good, cheap peace now, to have it break within a matter of a year or two would leave us with nothing to be proud of and beyond that would leave us with terrible choices—much worse choices—later than we would have at the present time. We are going to face up to the music at this time with the hope that this will gain their attention and keep them from reacting to us later.

  We decided that Kissinger would conduct a public briefing on the state of the negotiations. It was vitally important that we lay responsibility for the current impasse where it belonged—squarely on the North Vietnamese. I met with him several times to review what he would say; I also dictated two long memoranda covering the points I considered it important for him to make. I felt that we had to get across that the North Vietnamese had agreed to a settlement, then reneged on a number of points, and now were refusing to negotiate seriously. I also said that Kissinger should criticize Thieu for insisting on total victory when what we wanted was a just peace that both sides would be able to keep and live with.

  In the early morning hours of Sunday, December 17, our planes reseeded the mines in Haiphong Harbor. Within twenty-four hours 129 B-52s took part in bombing raids over North Vietnam.

  Diary

  The tough decision has now been made and is under way with regard to the bombing around Haiphong. I have just learned about one B-52 shot down. Henry said they expected as many as three. Of course, there are two more waves to go, but they expect on the second and third waves the amount of SAM opposition to be down or at least suppressed. At least, we can only pray that that will be the case and hope that it is the case.

  Two more B-52s were shot down during the day.

  Diary

  I suppose all the decisions are hard—the May 8 one in retrospect may have been the most difficult one, although Cambodia was just as difficult in its way, and November 3 was difficult. But this one was heartrending due to the fact that everything was moving along in the right direction. And, also, because there is such great uncertainty as to what reaction there will be as a result of what we have done.

  In any event, the decision is made and we cannot turn back. Henry has been up and down, understandably. For example, this morning he seems to be down more than up. I have called Moorer to be sure to stiffen his back with regard to the need to follow through on these attacks. I suppose that we may be pressing him too hard, but I fear that the Air Force and the Navy may in carrying out orders have been too cautious at times in the past, and that our political objectives have not been achieved because of too much caution on the military side. We simply have to take losses if we are going to accomplish our objectives.

  I remember Churchill’s admonition in his book on World War I, that one can have a policy of audacity or one can follow a policy of caution, but it is disastrous to try to follow a policy of audacity and caution at the same time. It must be one or the other. We have now gone down the audacious line and we must continue until we get some sort of a break.

  Many people could not understand why I did not “go public” with the reasons for the December bombing. As I have already indicated, I did not feel that the American people were ready to be rallied at this time as they had been on November 3 and on May 8. But more important, I was convinced that any public statements on my part would have been directly counterproductive to the possibility of resumed negotiations. If I had announced that we were resuming bombing for the purpose of forcing the North Vietnamese to negotiate, their national pride and their ideological fanaticism would never have allowed them to accept the international loss of face involved in caving to such an ultimatum. So I did it with the minimum amount of rhetoric and publicity, and it succeeded exactly as I had intended. Our brief but massive use of force got the message through to Hanoi while still allowing them to back off their intransigent position without having to acknowledge that they were doing so because of military pressure from us.

  On the morning of December 18, in a message to the North Vietnamese in Paris, we said that after having carefully reviewed the record of the recent negotiations, we had decided that they were deliberately and frivolously delaying the talks. We proposed returning to the text of the agreement as it had stood after the November 23 session, with the addition of one or two subsequently negotiated changes. On this basis we would be prepared to meet again at any time after December 26 to conclude an agreement.

  I decided that we would also make every possible effort to convince Thieu that in the event the North Vietnamese agreed to resume negotiations, it was imperative that he join us in offering reasonable terms Hanoi would be willing to accept. We considered Agnew, Laird, and Connally for this unenviable job, but finally I said, “Haig is still the man to carry the message to Garcia.”

  Haig arrived in Saigon on December 19, carrying the strongest letter I had yet written to Thieu. In it I stated: “General Haig’s mission now represents my final effort to point out to you the necessity for joint action and to convey my irrevocable intention to proceed, preferably with your cooperation but, if necessary, alone. . . . I have asked General Haig to obtain your answer to this absolutely final offer on my part for us to work together in seeking a settlement along the lines I have approved or to go our separate ways.” Haig told Thieu that I had dictated the letter personally and that no one else in our government had seen it. After Thieu had read the letter through twice, he looked up and said that it was obvious that he was not being asked to sign an agreement for peace but rather an agreement for continued American support. Haig replied that as a soldier and as someone completely familiar with Communist treachery, he agreed with Thieu’s assessment.

  Thieu seemed almost desperate. He argued that the cease-fire would not last more than three months: then, when the last American had gone, the Communists would resume their guerrilla warfare. But this time they would fight with knives and bayonets, being careful not to do anything sufficient to justify American retaliation. In this way my guarantees to enforce the agreement would never be put to the test, and the Communists would have a free hand against him and his government.

  After this meeting Thieu leaked word to reporters that we had tried to force him to accept an ultimatum and that he had refused. I was shocked when I learned this, and I felt we would now be justified in breaking with him and making a separate peace with Hanoi. But I was still reluctant to allow our annoyance with him to lead us to do anything that might bring about Communist domination of South Vietnam.

  December 20 was the third day of heavy air strikes over North Vietnam. Ninety B-52s flew three waves of attacks against eleven targets. Six planes were lost. On December 21 there were thirty B-52 sorties flown against three new targets. Two planes were lost.

  My major concern during the first week of bombing was not the sharp wave of domestic and international criticism, which I had expected, but the high losses of B-52s. I noted on December 23, “I raised holy hell about the fact that they kept going over the same targets at the same time. I was, therefore, not surprised, although deeply disappointed, when we lost five planes on the second or third day. Finally, we got the military to change their minds.” The Pentagon began scheduling the strikes at different times and on different routes, thus denying the enemy the knowledge of when and where the strikes would take place and thereby reducing their ability to shoot down our planes.

  On December 22 we sent a messag
e to the North Vietnamese requesting a meeting for January 3. If they accepted, we offered to stop the bombing north of the 20th parallel on December 31 and suspend it for the duration of the meeting.

  The media reaction to the December bombing was predictable. The Washington Post editorialized that it caused millions of Americans “to cringe in shame and to wonder at their President’s very sanity.” Joseph Kraft called it an action “of senseless terror which stains the good name of America.” James Reston called it “war by tantrum,” and Anthony Lewis charged that I was acting “like a maddened tyrant.” In Congress there were similarly critical outbursts from members of both parties. Republican Senator William Saxbe of Ohio said that “President Nixon . . . appears to have left his senses on this issue.” And Mike Mansfield said that it was a “stone-age tactic.”

  Diary

  On the negative side, the columnists and the media broke down about the way they had during the election and on all the Vietnam decisions previously.

  The record of the liberal left media on Vietnam is perhaps one of the most disgraceful in the whole history of communications in this country. I am not referring to the honest pacifists who have been against the war from the beginning, but to those in the media who simply cannot bear the thought of this administration under my leadership bringing off the peace on an honorable basis which they have so long predicted would be impossible.

  The election was a terrible blow to them and this is their first opportunity to recover from the election and to strike back.