RN

by Richard Nixon

  On the plus side, the 181/2-minute-gap matter I think is being resolved fairly satisfactorily, although we never know what Jaworski may do.

  Bebe is going through another intensive going over with, he said, about a hundred subpoenas to his restaurants, the yacht club, etc. What this poor man has gone through is really unbelievable and it is amazing that he has been able to stand up as well as he has.

  I saw Don and Eddie after the luncheon for [Prince] Fahd [of Saudi Arabia]. Both brothers have stood up splendidly under torturous conditions. Don has about forty thousand dollars in legal bills. Eddie has one of twenty thousand for legal fees.

  Al Haig told me that the Senate Watergate Committee had a pretty devastating report on Humphrey and also one on Mills. The Republicans have it, but no one of the Republicans, of course, will leak it. The trouble is that the Republicans, like conservatives generally, are responsible and play with Marquis of Queensberry rules, whereas the liberals go just the other way.

  The irony of this whole situation is that we are being accused of playing a foul game during the election and so forth, whereas what we have done as compared with previous administrations is hardly worth mentioning, but with the double standard that exists in the media, anything that comes out that hurts the conservatives, and particularly the President, gets enormous play—anything that comes out against one of the Democrats gets a one-day play and then is dropped.

  I think one thing that seems to disturb our opponents in the media, in the Congress, and in partisan circles the most is that I have hung on. As I look back over the year, I don’t know quite how I have done it. I have had times of considerable discouragement although I have pretty generally been able to cover it so people are unable to see it.

  I remember, looking clear back, in May 1973 I think it was, while we were in the swimming pool in Florida, and David was sitting in the Jacuzzi, and he said that he had been thinking about all these things and he felt that all that was necessary was for me to “persevere,” as he put it. And that is, of course, about all we’ve been doing—persevering.

  Looking back over the year and just highlighting the events, the mistakes are quite apparent. First, the April 30 speech. Possibly the decision on Haldeman-Ehrlichman was right, although I am not absolutely sure that it was under the circumstances now.

  But going on from there, certainly the first major mistake was the appointment of Richardson as Attorney General. Richardson’s weakness, which came to light during the Cox firing, should have been apparent.

  Then, of course, came the bombshell of the tapes. This occurred, unfortunately, while I was out at the hospital, and I remember when Haig came in and told me about it and we discussed it. Later Agnew came in and said, maybe you ought to destroy them. Frankly, we thought about it. We should have done it, because none had been subpoenaed at that time. But here Garment, I think primarily, stepped in with the idea that it would be a destruction of evidence or what have you. But all the sorrow and difficulties we have had about the eighteen minutes and the so-called two missing tapes, and, of course, then the tapes themselves and the Supreme Court case would have been avoided had we just bitten the bullet then. But having failed to do so we went on down the line.

  The Agnew resignation was necessary although a very serious blow, because while some thought that his stepping aside would take some of the pressure off the effort to get the President, all it did was to open the way to put pressure on the President to resign as well. This is something we have to realize: that any accommodation with opponents in this kind of a fight does not satisfy—it only brings on demands for more.

  Of course, the Cox firing probably was the right thing to do even with all the pain and suffering that it caused because, according to Buzhardt and others, Cox was ready to indict the President at that time and that could have been at a time that it could have had a fatal effect with the House, even though our public standing then was probably somewhat higher than it is now.

  I think what has irritated me the most has been the handling of my personal finances. We have an excellent case, but we simply couldn’t get a proper hearing on it.

  On May 20, 1974, the district court hearing Jaworski’s suit for the sixty-four new tapes ruled in his favor. I decided to appeal the decision. Jaworski immediately moved to bypass the court of appeals, requesting that the Supreme Court take the case directly. On May 31 the Supreme Court agreed to Jaworski’s unusual request. This meant that a final decision could come in as little as a month.

  By the end of May Kissinger had spent thirty-two days traveling back and forth between Jerusalem and Damascus in the long and often frustrating attempt to achieve a disengagement between Syrian and Israeli troops. The Egyptian-Israeli disengagement had been easier because Sadat had adopted the attitude that if the major issues could be resolved, the minor ones could be settled at the ongoing Geneva Conference. But the hatred between the Syrians and the Israelis went too deep for them to be able to think this way.

  Kissinger was at his finest in these sessions, probing like a surgeon the concerns that separated the two parties, indefatigably seeking the areas of mutual interest that would make an accord possible.

  But on May 16 Scowcroft brought Haig a message from Kissinger that he was coming back; he had done the superhuman and it still was not enough. I sent back a firm message of encouragement directing that he give it one more try. I knew he was exhausted, but he was too close to a settlement to let the momentum slacken.

  On May 22 I wrote Mrs. Meir to “urge that you and your Cabinet make a supreme effort to seek a compromise which would permit an agreement on the disengagement of forces on the Golan Heights and enable us to move another step away from strife and bloodshed.”

  On May 29 the prize was won. The impossible had been achieved. Both Israel and Syria accepted the terms, and the disengagement agreement was signed on May 31.

  The next step in the American effort had to be an attempt to consolidate the new trust and extend the new dialogue. It was important to move fast while the momentum was still fresh. Plans were therefore activated for a series of major summits in the Mideast. I decided to make personal visits to Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to help firm up the gains we had made and to lay the groundwork for more progress in the future.

  While Kissinger was forging the Syrian-Israeli disengagement, the House Judiciary Committee turned to the topics of wiretaps and the Plumbers. Kissinger had already testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about both subjects, but now the House Judiciary Committee had been given the materials on the case and was treating them with characteristic irresponsibility. The committee began a systematic series of leaks implying that there were discrepancies in Kissinger’s statements. Several Foreign Relations Committee members reaffirmed their belief in Kissinger’s veracity, but the press would not let up. Early in his first press conference after his shuttle tour de force the questions took an ugly and accusatory turn. He was asked about reports that he had given false testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee and whether he had obtained a lawyer because of the prospect of perjury. His jaw angrily set, Kissinger fired back, “I do not conduct my office as a conspiracy.”

  This sudden attack on his character and truthfulness, added to the strains of a month of tense shuttling between Israel and Syria, set Kissinger’s nerves on edge. He kept his composure during the press conference, but afterward he was shaken and disillusioned. As he analyzed the situation, he was the major symbol of the positive foreign policy accomplishments of the Nixon administration; even while the full-scale attempt to impeach me was under way, he had had the effrontery to show the nation and the world that the United States under my leadership was still able to command respect in the world and achieve significant results despite the drag of Watergate. I agreed with this analysis completely: the voracious forces of the opposition could not allow that to continue.

  THE MIDEAST TRIP

  Shortly before leaving for the Mideast on June
10, 1974, I dictated two notes about the way the domestic situation had developed.

  Diary

  As the week ends and as the trip begins, there seems to be a feeling that the momentum is changing somewhat, although we have felt this before and have been disappointed.

  One thought that has occurred to me, which I developed at Camp David as I took a walk down the nature trail on a very muddy path, is that from now until approximately the first of August when the Supreme Court will rule, the thing to do is to just treat every day as basically the last one and not to be constantly concerned about what may happen in the future. I have tried to do this over the past year and a half, but it has been very difficult at times because we seem always to be fighting the battle or trying to deal with some new development.

  But all in all, looking back over this last fifteen or sixteen months, to me the great tragedy is that it seems to be a year and a half almost that is lost. We have accomplished some good things but I have had to spend an inordinate amount of my time thinking about this problem, and, of course, emotionally it has taken a great deal out of me. We certainly have made our mistakes but perhaps the year has taught us all somewhat more compassion and understanding, although I must say that it has also brought clearly to light the unbelievable battle in which we are engaged and how high the stakes are and how bitter and fanatical the opposition is. We simply have to stick it out.

  On June 5 I held a meeting for some of the leaders of the American Jewish community. I was disturbed by what I considered to be their shortsighted outlook.

  Diary

  I pointed out that hardware alone to Israel was a policy that made sense maybe five years ago but did not make sense today, and that they had to have in mind that each new war would be more and more costly because their neighbors would learn to fight, and there were more of them. And that second, looking into the future, someone would have to hold the ring against the Russians, as we did with the alert in 1973.

  I made it very clear there is going to be no blank check in our conversations with the Israelis although, of course, I expressed sympathy for their military needs and, of course, enormous respect for their bravery, etc.

  As a matter of fact, whether Israel can survive over a long period of time with a hundred million Arabs around them I think is really questionable. The only long-term hope lies in reaching some kind of settlement now while they can operate from a position of strength, and while we are having such apparent success in weaning the Arabs away from the Soviets and into more responsible paths.

  On June 9 we had a lively family dinner. Afterward, while the girls and their husbands went downstairs to watch a movie and Pat went upstairs to finish her packing, I went to the Lincoln Sitting Room and dictated a note describing the problems and opportunities I saw in the historic trip we were to begin the next morning.

  Diary

  I don’t know whether I got across adequately the point that not just this trip when it is concluded, or the two and a half years remaining when it is concluded, will mean that we have secured our goal of a lasting peace. It is going to require tending thereafter by strong Presidents for the balance of this century. And who knows what can happen thereafter.

  All I must do is to do everything possible to see that we leave a structure on which future Presidents can build—a structure based on military strength, diplomatic sophistication, intelligence, and, of course, a strong strain of idealism which will lead to progress despite some rough waters through which we will have to pass toward our goal of a permanent peace in that area.

  As I complete this day, June 9, I begin this trip recognizing the profound importance it will have for the future as far as the Mideast is concerned, and as far as the American position in the world.

  I was fully aware that the success or failure of this trip might make the decisive difference in my being able to continue to exercise presidential leadership abroad and at home despite the merciless onslaught of the Watergate attacks.

  Diary

  The irony of it all is that, as I told Ziegler, the press—or at least most of the press—will be more obsessed with what happens with the minuscule problems involved in Watergate than they are with the momentous stakes that are involved in what I will be doing and saying in the Mideast.

  This is probably a turning point in terms of the whole so-called Watergate issue, but also a turning point insofar as the presidency itself is concerned. I am going to devote myself over this next ten days to doing everything possible to restore some respect for the office as well as for the man.

  During the flight to our first stopover, Salzburg, Austria, Haig told me that Kissinger was upset about an editorial in that morning’s New York Times that accused him of having dissembled in his Senate testimony about the 1969 wiretaps. He said that Kissinger was talking about holding a press conference in Salzburg in order to answer this charge.

  “A Times editorial isn’t a charge, Al,” I said. “It’s nothing more than a Times editorial, and that doesn’t mean a goddamn thing. If he holds a press conference, he’ll only play into their hands by giving them a Watergate lead for their first story from this trip.” I said that if Kissinger felt he had to have a press conference, he should at least not be defensive but approach the question positively on the ground that the wiretaps were legitimate and necessary.

  But Kissinger was in no mood to take this advice. He called a press conference and opened it with a long and emotional statement. After going through the details of his testimony on the wiretaps, he introduced an aggrieved personal note. “I have been generally identified, or, it has been alleged that I am supposed to be interested primarily in the balance of power,” he said. “I would rather like to think that when the record is written, one may remember that perhaps some lives were saved and that perhaps some mothers can rest more at ease, but I leave that to history. What I will not leave to history is a discussion of my public honor.”

  The real bombshell came during the question period that followed when, in reply to a question, he said, “I do not believe that it is possible to conduct the foreign policy of the United States under these circumstances when the character and credibility of the Secretary of State is at issue. And if it is not cleared up, I will resign.”

  I issued a public statement expressing my understanding of Kissinger’s desire to defend himself against malicious leaks, adding that all Americans would recognize, as I did, that his honor needed no defense.

  Diary

  All in all, what really concerns me about this attack on Kissinger is the total irresponsibility of the Times and Washington Post and all of our opponents at a time we are traveling abroad to take him on on this flimsy issue. The mistake that he made, of course, was to hypo his case with the threat to resign, which, among other things, is an empty cannon.

  The first reaction to Kissinger’s threat to resign was a resounding chorus of support for him. Within a few days, however, even a few of his supporters were calling his Salzburg performance a tantrum, while a small band of critics was claiming that it had been a calculated maneuver to distract attention from the charges against him. But in the end his threat to resign had the effect he desired and put his critics on the defensive. Later, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reconsidered his testimony and announced that he was still in good standing with them. This, at last, seemed to put the matter to rest.

  We stayed overnight in Salzburg in order to get used to the time change.

  Diary

  I felt good this morning except for the fact that my left leg is having exactly the same symptoms it had when I was in Hawaii and had what was diagnosed as a blood clot. I am having Lukash come over and take a look at it since he was the one who measured it before.

  It is much larger than the right leg and it really makes me quite lame. I, of course, will not allow them to do anything which will disrupt the trip at this point.

  I was suffering from phlebitis, an inflammation of a vein. After Lukash examined the leg he told
me that the danger of phlebitis is that a blood clot might form and break loose into the bloodstream; if it reached the lungs, it could cause a fatal embolism. Fortunately, he seemed to think that the swelling in my leg was in fact the aftermath of the inflammation and that the greatest danger had already passed. He told me to wrap the leg in hot towels at least four times a day and to stay off it as much as possible.

  Later I called Haig in and showed him my swollen leg. I told him that I wanted the few people who knew about it to keep it absolutely secret.

  We landed in Cairo on June 12 in the hot afternoon sun. President Sadat and his wife were waiting at the airport, and I was immediately impressed by both of them. Sadat is a handsome man, somewhat taller than I had expected from his pictures. In the car he turned to me and said with intense feeling, “This is a great day for Egypt.”

  As soon as we started on the road to Cairo, I got the first taste of what was perhaps the most tumultuous welcome any American president has ever received anywhere in the world. For mile after mile along both sides of the road people were packed a hundred deep. In Cairo itself the streets and large squares were overflowing. Conservative estimates put the crowd at over a million.

  But even more impressive than the sheer number was the obvious sincerity of the crowd’s emotion. Sadat seemed to sense what I was thinking, because he leaned over and shouted in my ear so that I could hear him. “This is a real welcome from the heart,” he said. “These people are here because they want to be here. You can bring people out, but you can’t make them smile.” We passed under large arches that had been built across the streets, decorated with huge pictures of Sadat and me, proclaiming us “Great Men Dedicated to Peace and Progress.” The noise was overwhelming as a million people yelled “Nik-son, Nik-son, Nik-son!” at the top of their lungs.