RN

by Richard Nixon

  He put his arm around me and said, “We must do something of vast historical importance. We want every Russian and every American to be friends that talk to each other as you and I are talking to each other here on this boat.”

  I had many thoughts as the boat went by Yalta and the harbor—in Crimea the war—one of the most useless wars in history and one where both sides lost terribly. About the only thing good that came out of it was the Red Cross.

  I made the point, just to try it out on him, that the danger in advanced nations and, of course, the implication included the Soviet Union among them, is the weakening of character. If he thought it through he could have thought of Mao’s Red Guards and the Cultural Revolution. Brezhnev agreed and said sociologists and psychiatrists are now studying this question. The point, of course, was that as people got more material goods they became less “hungry,” lost their drive, and become almost totally obsessed with self, selfishness, and every kind of abstract idea.

  As we later walked back to the dacha after getting off the boat, Gromyko was on my right and I was glad to have a talk with him. He said that his analysis was that I was doing considerably better politically in the United States. He said, “It’s really about nothing.”

  I said that the Crimea had been the cradle of war in the nineteenth century and that we could make it the birthplace of peace in the twentieth century.

  On the boat I had said to Brezhnev that our goal must be the reduction of nukes and Brezhnev responded, “We must destroy the evil that we have created.” He again came back to the theme that I was always welcome in the Soviet Union, even after ’76.

  The long boat ride, after the morning walk and the afternoon session, was very tiring. That night I had dinner with Pat alone on the balcony outside our room.

  Diary

  As we looked out at the sea, there was a three-quarter moon. Pat said that since she was a very little girl, when she looked at the moon, she didn’t see a man in the moon or an old lady in the moon—always the American flag. This, of course, was years before anybody ever thought of a man actually being on the moon or an American flag being there.

  She pointed it out to me and, sure enough, I could see an American flag in the moon. Of course, you can see in the moon whatever you want to see.

  The next morning Brezhnev and I rode together to the airport. He took advantage of the long ride to importune me again on the Middle East. He said that while Sadat might believe in putting Egypt first, Nasser had appealed to a stronger sentiment of pan-Arabism. I did not repeat for him my analysis of what I considered to be Sadat’s brilliant positioning in the flexible middle ground between those extremes.

  Diary

  I simply said, “Don’t let the Mideast become the Balkans for the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Don’t let anyplace else, Southeast Asia, the Mideast, or the Caribbean, become a point of difference between us that draws us into conflict, when there are many more important issues that could draw us together.” I had used this argument with him in pointing out how Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had gotten along well, particularly emphasizing the Roosevelt-Stalin relationship in fighting the war, because they did not allow differences on what the peace was going to be like to deter them from their main goal of defeating the Nazis.

  Of course, historically, my own view is that this was a mistake—that Churchill was right in insisting that there be more discussion at that point and that we should have made some kind of a deal that would have avoided the division of Europe on the basis that it finally came out.

  The subject of religion came up, and Brezhnev said, “What the hell difference does it make what God Americans pray to—we recognize all religions. All we care about is whether they are for peace.” He again described his policy on Jewish emigration. He said, “As far as I am concerned, I say let all the Jews go and let God go with them.”

  He spoke of the destruction of civilization from nuclear war and repeated what Khrushchev had said fifteen years earlier: that we must remember that in such a war, the white race would be destroyed and only the yellows and blacks would remain to rule the world.

  During this ride I suggested we have a “mini-summit” before the end of the year. Brezhnev enthusiastically agreed. We felt it should not be held in Washington or Moscow but in some place in between; I used the term halfway house, and he mentioned Switzerland. I told him it was essential to reach agreement on offensive weapons before the end of the year. Otherwise, I warned, since no agreement had been reached at this summit, Congress would go forward on a greatly increased defense budget. I suggested that Kissinger return to Moscow in September to arrange the agenda, and then Brezhnev and I could meet again in October, November, or December. I said that we must agree in principle on a reduction of military arms, and he nodded his head vigorously.

  When we arrived at the airport, Brezhnev went back to Moscow and Pat and I flew to Minsk. I noted in my diary: “On the color side, whereas wild flowers predominated in the Crimea, when we were at Minsk there were purple and yellow flowers—so we had the Whittier colors, purple and gold. Great fields of purple flowers.”

  The crowds that greeted us everywhere during Summit III seemed genuinely and spontaneously warm. Occasionally someone would shout out “Peace is very important.” I noted that in nearly every casual conversation, whether with the people in the street or with the leaders in the Kremlin, the subject invariably turned to one of three topics: the desire for friendship and peace with the United States based on equality; the devastation Russia had suffered in World War II; or pride in Russia’s cultural heritage, including the Czarist palaces and buildings. In Minsk the people seemed to reach out to us. Some had tears in their eyes. I felt that such things could not go unnoticed by their leaders. “In the end,” I noted in my diary with cautious hope, “the Russian leadership must reflect their people’s desires.”

  On our boat ride, Brezhnev and I had agreed that while Pat and I were in Minsk, Kissinger and Gromyko should make one more attempt at reaching an agreement on limiting offensive nuclear weapons. As soon as I was back in my room in the Kremlin, Kissinger came up to report that he had not been able to make any progress whatever. Gromyko had spent the time nit-picking and was apparently unable or unwilling to negotiate seriously.

  In order to be able to talk freely, Kissinger and I went outside and walked up and down in the open courtyard. He was concerned because we would be going home empty-handed on SALT. But the Pentagon’s last-minute about-face had made it impossible for us to engage in any flexible negotiating. If we had been able to return with even a controversial SALT agreement, Kissinger was convinced that we would have been able to educate public opinion to accept it. “And,” he added, “it’s a lot better subject to be debating about than Watergate.” Despite this disappointment over SALT, he felt that Summit III had been a success even without a SALT agreement, and he said he did not think that I would be impeached now.

  “Well, Henry,” I said, as we started back upstairs, “we have to do what is right, regardless of the press analysis or the political consequences. You’ve done a superb job under enormous pressures against overwhelming odds. You can be proud. Now we shall just have to see where events take us. We have done our best.”

  It was clear by this time that Summit III was not going to produce any big news as far as new agreements were concerned. Some in the press were already trying out a critical line that attributed this failure to my Watergate troubles, implying that the Soviets were holding out either because they thought I might make greater concessions because I needed a foreign triumph to alleviate my domestic problems or because they thought that I was not going to survive and they might get better terms from my successor.

  In normal times Summit III would have been hailed as a successful meeting. It produced the threshold test ban, further restrictions on ABMs, agreements to seek controls on environmental warfare and for cooperation in energy, the opening of additional consulates in both countries, and, most important, the
oral agreement I made with Brezhnev for a mini-summit before the end of 1974 for the purpose of reaching agreement on limitations of offensive nuclear weapons.

  In my judgment my Watergate problems and the impeachment hearings did not play a major part at Summit III. Our intelligence beforehand—and my distinct impression while in the Soviet Union—was that Brezhnev had decided to go all out for détente and place all his chips on my survival and my ultimate ability to deliver on what I promised. It was the American domestic political fluctuations, most of which had preceded Watergate, that cast the greatest doubt on my reliability: the failure to produce MFN status and the agitation over Soviet Jews and emigration had made it difficult for Brezhnev to defend détente to his own conservatives. Similarly, the military establishments of both countries were bridling against the sudden reality of major and meaningful arms limitation and the real prospect of arms reduction if and as détente progressed. These problems would have existed regardless of Watergate.

  Diary

  There are some, of course, who will want to put blame on Watergate for our failing to get an agreement on offensive nukes but, on the other hand, I think that it came out about right. We went as far as we could go at this point without raising an issue which could have lost us some of our good conservative supporters, and we did just about what the traffic would bear. As it turned out, it’s probably just as well that we were unable to reach any agreement with the Russians on the nuclear front, because to have to take this thing on now would mean that we would have to be opposed to some of our best friends prior to the impeachment vote.

  The fact was that neither side was prepared to go any further at Summit III. I think that both Brezhnev and I grasped this situation at the outset, and that is what accounted for his highly personal and warm demeanor. We both understood that if the process of détente could be maintained through a holding-pattern summit, we might be able to make a breakthrough at the next meeting.

  Overall, I summarized Summit III as a mixed bag; its success or failure would have to be determined in light of the way events developed before the next meeting at the halfway house.

  Diary

  There is nit-picking to the effect that it was not as successful as the other two. The main thing is that the process went forward, and this is in itself an achievement. Peace is never going to be achieved once and for all—it must be constantly worked on. That’s why these continuing summits between major powers must go forward, even though we don’t have great announcements to make after each one.

  I am inclined to think that in arranging the next summit, it’s the informal meetings which provide the greatest opportunity for progress. I think the formal ones—the plenary sessions—produce the least, because everybody’s talking for the record and making a record.

  Brezhnev has been much more forthcoming when we meet informally in the car or elsewhere than when we are sitting down in a formal group with others present. The larger the group, the less free the conversation is. This is something that is true in all forms of society, but it is particularly true in the Soviet Union and in the Communist states.

  On July 2, the last night of Summit III, we gave a reciprocal dinner at Spaso House, the American ambassador’s residence. Brezhnev was the most relaxed I had ever seen him. Even Mrs. Brezhnev, who like most Soviet wives seemed uncomfortable in the limelight of Western visits, opened up and talked freely about her family.

  Diary

  At dinner Brezhnev spoke very warmly, grabbing me by the arm, first, about the meeting that we would have in between—the so-called halfway summit at halfway house—and second, that after 1976 he wants to see me. He said he thought he would be in power after that time and, even though because of our Constitution I would not be in, that I would always be welcome in the U.S.S.R.

  Brezhnev’s granddaughter was very pretty, and he has a very handsome son-in-law as well. Mrs. Brezhnev commented on Tricia, who had visited Russia, saying when she stepped off the plane she looked like a white winter snowflower. At one point, incidentally, he told me about his great-grandchild—a girl—one and a half. Mrs. Brezhnev said that the child had started walking at ten months and I said that taking the first step was always the hardest. He said, yes, that’s true. He said in the case of his great-granddaughter now after that first step the only way they could keep from falling down was to almost run. Brezhnev compared this to U.S. and Soviet relations.

  He clowned it up a bit by hitting a couple of keys on the piano, which allowed me to say something about playing a duet the next time he came to the United States. It’s very difficult, however, to get the Russian elite to respond to any comments that are humorous, particularly when they are in a large group. Individually they will be warm and friendly, but collectively they immediately freeze—they have to watch to see what the others do before they react.

  The last morning in Moscow Brezhnev and I held a final meeting alone in his office. I repeated my strong belief that we should try for a SALT accord by the end of the year so that the United States did not go ahead at an increased pace in the development of arms. I also urged what I called “increased communication” between us for taking care of the kind of problems that had arisen in the Middle East.

  At the plenary session before we went to St. Vladimir Hall for the final signing ceremony, I said that we must not be discouraged by the fact that we did not settle every issue every time. It was important simply to keep talking.

  Diary

  The rest of the plenary meeting was really pro forma. They obviously want to put as good a face as possible on the summit as Brezhnev had in his dinner toast the night before when he interestingly enough took some credit for the Soviet Union and détente for the end of the war in Vietnam and holding off in the Mideast. Obviously, in both of these cases this was an overstatement. I think it would be better stated that in both areas the Soviet Union did not play a positive role, but, on the other hand, while they could not take credit for bringing about either of the peace settlements, they could have intervened more strongly than they did and made it impossible for us to accomplish our goal of having any peace settlement at all.

  The Soviets ended Summit III with a flourish of ceremony and spectacle. We signed the protocols on the new limitation of ABMs to one site only, the treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests, and a joint statement on negotiations to control environmental warfare.

  After the signing ceremony we went to St. George Hall, where a buffet that exceeded even the sumptuousness of the one at the end of Summit I had been laid out on two tables running the length of the vast room. While we were talking and toasting each other, I noticed that the small orchestra on the balcony was playing the music that had been played at Tricia’s wedding.

  To my surprise Brezhnev, Gromyko, Podgorny, and Kosygin all climbed into the car with me for the ride to the airport. Brezhnev sat on the jump seat in front of me. He was extremely quiet on the way out, letting Kosygin and Podgorny do most of the talking. At the airport we performed the traditional farewell ceremonies. Then Brezhnev and I turned and headed toward Air Force One.

  Diary

  As I was walking to the plane, I said that my only regret was that he was not coming with us back to the United States. And he said that, as a matter of fact, he had been thinking the same thing as we drove out to the airport. I really think he had a feeling of loss, and felt sad that the trip was over. He had looked forward to it—had built it up—had hoped that it would achieve a great deal—and now that it was over he was getting somewhat of a letdown.

  I think he realizes that it wasn’t a “home run,” and yet it did make some progress and we talked on several occasions, including the last time at the dinner, of a meeting, perhaps in November, at a neutral place.

  I wondered if it would be the last time that I would see Brezhnev. At times he looked very good but at other times he looked very tired. He started very late in the morning—10:30 or eleven o’clock—for every meeting.

  My othe
r feeling was one of disappointment on the fact that we couldn’t get some sort of agreement on SALT and that the chance of getting it in the future looked pretty hard.

  When I got on the plane, I went back through the cabin and said, “Well, we’re home again.” I recalled on our ’53 trip that every time we got on the plane after some very dreary stops we would eat the rather plain food with great relish because it was safe and clean and we would always say, “Well, we’re home again.” I am sure everybody felt that way when they got on the plane this time.

  IMPEACHMENT SUMMER

  All the while we were in the Soviet Union, the impeachment effort at home had continued much as before. A few days after my return the House Judiciary Committee began releasing Doar’s compilation of evidence on the Watergate break-in and cover-up, thus ensuring that Watergate would dominate the headlines in the weeks before the crucial vote on impeachment. The Ervin Committee also began to leak and then to release accusations from its supposedly secret report.

  Despite its headline impact, however, this so-called evidence was generally admitted to be weak. ABC began its evening news with the announcement that there were “no bombshells.” “No startling new disclosures,” was NBC’s verdict. And CBS reported that there were “no shockers, no startling new revelations.” Jack Germond of the Washington Star summed up by saying, “The smoking pistol has yet to be found in President Nixon’s hand.”

  That the evidence against me fell flat was satisfying; but the situation was still far from reassuring. On July 5 I summarized the situation as I saw it.

  Diary

  I remember Harlow saying almost a year ago, this issue has no legs to it. He may be right—may have been right, then—but so much has been added on—the personal taxes and all that sort of thing—so many doubts have been raised that one wonders what the situation is now.