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Jim Baen’s Universe

Page 69

by Edited by Eric Flint

Issues be­gan to ari­se with the con­t­rac­tors and the te­ams. One of which is that Burt Ru­tan’s te­am was ba­si­cal­ly “run off" from the com­pe­ti­ti­on due to the “high pa­per­work bur­den” re­qu­ired. Burt Ru­tan and his Sca­led Com­po­si­tes te­am had bu­ilt the first com­mer­ci­al man­ned and re­usab­le spa­ce ve­hic­le, but NA­SA’s ap­pro­ach so­me­how led to Ru­tan’s te­am le­aving the com­pe­ti­ti­on.

  The fi­nal com­pe­ti­ti­on ca­me down to the usu­al sus­pects, Loc­k­he­ed Mar­tin on one si­de and Nor­t­h­rop Grum­man and Bo­e­ing on the ot­her. Loc­k­he­ed Mar­tin’s te­am ba­si­cal­ly tri­ed to re­sell the de­ad pen­gu­in lif­ting body de­sign that kil­led the X-33 prog­ram and Bo­e­ing’s de­sign was mo­re li­ke the old Apol­lo ap­pro­ach with so­me mo­di­fi­ca­ti­ons.

  These prog­rams we­re to go thro­ugh a spi­ral de­ve­lop­ment ap­pro­ach fol­lo­wing then NA­SA Ad­mi­nis­t­ra­tor Se­an O’Ke­efe’s di­rec­ti­on. O’Ke­efe put Re­ar Ad­mi­ral (re­ti­red) Cra­ig Ste­id­le in char­ge of the de­ve­lop­ment prog­ram. Ste­id­le had used the spi­ral de­ve­lop­ment ef­fort-qu­ite suc­ces­sful­ly-for the F-35 Jo­int Stri­ke Fig­h­ter de­ve­lop­ment prog­ram. Ho­we­ver, that prog­ram was a De­par­t­ment of De­fen­se lar­ge ac­qu­isi­ti­on prog­ram that ope­ra­tes qu­ite dif­fe­rently than the spa­cec­raft de­ve­lop­ment com­mu­nity is ac­cus­to­med to. The spi­ral ap­pro­ach was be­gin­ning to bog down when the new NA­SA Ad­mi­nis­t­ra­tor Grif­fin to­ok over.

  On June 28, 2005, Grif­fin ma­de his dis­tas­te for the pre­vi­o­us ma­na­ge­ment ap­pro­ach qu­ite cle­ar to Con­g­ress:

  “You as­ked, what will we be do­ing dif­fe­rent? First of all, I ho­pe ne­ver aga­in to let the words spi­ral de­ve­lop­ment cross my lips. That is an ap­pro­ach for lar­ge systems very re­le­vant to DoD ac­qu­isi­ti­on re­qu­ire­ments, but I ha­ve not se­en the re­le­van­ce to NA­SA and I ha­ve pre­fer­red a much mo­re di­rect ap­pro­ach, and that is what we will be re­com­men­ding and im­p­le­men­ting.

  … I ho­pe that you will see… a stra­ig­h­t­for­ward plan to rep­la­ce the shut­tle and a very stra­ig­h­t­for­ward ar­c­hi­tec­tu­re for a lu­nar re­turn that, on the fa­ce of it, will se­em to you that if we are to do the­se things, that the ap­pro­ach be­ing re­com­men­ded is a lo­gi­cal, cle­an, sim­p­le, stra­ig­h­t­for­ward ap­pro­ach.”

  So, we now ha­ve a new Pre­si­den­ti­al ini­ti­ati­ve to re­turn to de­eper spa­ce as we did for the Apol­lo era. And we ha­ve a new NA­SA ad­mi­nis­t­ra­tor who is fi­red up to ma­ke so­me chan­ges to the old ways and to mo­ve for­ward-and back-to the mo­on. Do we ha­ve a plan? How will we do it?

  How We Will Ma­ke it Back to the Mo­on

  The new ap­pro­ach at NA­SA has be­en a com­p­le­te chan­ge from the pre­vi­o­us de­ve­lop­ment ap­pro­ach. In the sum­mer of 2004 Grif­fin, whi­le at John’s Hop­kins Ap­pli­ed Physics La­bo­ra­tory be­fo­re he was na­med O’Ke­efe’s suc­ces­sor, par­ti­ci­pa­ted in a study for NA­SA cal­led Ex­ten­ding Hu­man Pre­sen­ce in­to the So­lar System. The study sug­ges­ted three sta­ges.

  Stage 1 - develop the crew ex­p­lo­ra­ti­on ve­hic­le (CEV), fi­nish the In­ter­na­ti­onal Spa­ce Sta­ti­on (ISS), re­ti­re the Shut­tle Or­bi­ter as so­on as pos­sib­le.

  Stage 2 - develop an up­da­ted CEV ca­pab­le of mul­tip­le month long man­ned mis­si­ons, with com­po­nents re­qu­ired to enab­le hu­man flight to the mo­on and Mars, Lag­ran­ge po­ints, and va­ri­o­us ne­ar-Earth as­te­ro­ids.

  Stage 3 - develop hu­man-ra­ted pla­ne­tary lan­ders such as the LEMs of the Apol­lo era.

  The new prog­ram is cal­led Pro­j­ect Con­s­tel­la­ti­on and Pre­si­dent Bush’s bud­get re­qu­est in 2005 was for $428 mil­li­on and $6.6 bil­li­on over the next fi­ve ye­ars. The bud­get re­qu­est was for the de­ve­lop­ment of the CEV and, in fact, was con­fir­med by Con­g­ress with the full amo­unt of fun­ding re­qu­es­ted by the Pre­si­dent.

  So, what to do now? Well, NA­SA, un­der the new Ad­mi­nis­t­ra­tor Grif­fin, set up a study to de­ter­mi­ne what wo­uld be the best way to re­al­ly get star­ted back in­to spa­ce. The Ex­p­lo­ra­ti­on Systems Ar­c­hi­tec­tu­re Study, af­fec­ti­ona­tely re­fer­red to as ESAS in NA­SA-spe­ak, was ini­ti­ated. In lar­ge, the ESAS study de­ri­ved si­mi­lar con­c­lu­si­ons as the study ef­fort pre­vi­o­usly do­ne by the Ex­ten­ding Hu­man Pre­sen­ce in­to the So­lar System ef­fort.

  The ESAS study has led to the de­ve­lop­ment of so­me new spa­ce ve­hic­les. The­se ve­hic­les are known now as the Ex­p­lo­ra­ti­on La­unch Ve­hic­les. The Ex­p­lo­ra­ti­on La­unch Ve­hic­les Of­fi­ce has de­ve­lo­ped the sco­pe of the de­ve­lop­ment ef­fort as such:

  Crew La­unch Ve­hic­le (CEV) - a sin­g­le fi­ve seg­ment re­use­ab­le so­lid roc­ket bo­os­ter that is hu­man-ra­ted (RSRB/M) and has an up­per sta­ge that is po­we­red by a sin­g­le en­gi­ne de­ri­ved from the old Sa­turn V J-2 roc­ket en­gi­ne

  Cargo La­unch Ve­hic­le (CLV) - a system that has a co­re sta­ge de­ri­ved from the Spa­ce Shut­tle Ex­ter­nal Tank with fi­ve Spa­ce Shut­tle Ma­in En­gi­nes (SSMEs) po­we­ring it. Atop the co­re sta­ge is a lar­ge car­go con­ta­iner. Al­so at­tac­hed to the co­re are two of the fi­ve seg­ment RSRB/Ms.

  Earth De­par­tu­re Sta­ge - this com­po­nent of the Ex­p­lo­ra­ti­on Ve­hic­les sco­pe is the up­per sta­ge that is at­tac­hed to the CLV and will be the all im­por­tant system for get­ting out of Earth’s or­bit and to the mo­on. The up­per sta­ge com­po­nent uses tan­ka­ge de­ri­ved from the Spa­ce Shut­tle’s Ex­ter­nal Tank and is po­we­red by a sin­g­le J-2 en­gi­ne.

  The con­cept is ac­tu­al­ly bril­li­ant from a pa­per­work and re­in­ven­ting the whe­el per­s­pec­ti­ve. In or­der to put a hu­man be­ing on top of any spa­cec­raft, a li­te­ral mo­un­ta­in of pa­per­work must be com­p­le­ted. Most of the pa­per­work in­vol­ves pro­ving that each in­di­vi­du­al com­po­nent of the spa­cec­raft down to the screws, nuts, and bolts ha­ve flown be­fo­re and are of a qu­ality that they ha­ve an ex­t­re­mely low risk of fa­ilu­re. A spa­cec­raft of the CEV or CLV sta­tu­re will ha­ve as many as two mil­li­on se­pa­ra­te parts. If each of tho­se parts ha­ve a han­d­ful of forms to be fil­led out, chec­ked off, and so on, the pa­per­work nig­h­t­ma­re be­co­mes ap­pa­rent.

  But what if the­re we­re a who­le bunch of parts that ha­ve al­re­ady had the pa­per work com­p­le­ted on them? In that ca­se the­re wo­uld be no ne­ed to re­in­vent the whe­el and fill out all that pa­per­work aga­in. So, the ESAS gro­up de­ve­lo­ped the bril­li­ant Ex­p­lo­ra­ti­on La­unch Ve­hic­les plan.

  The CEV is ba­sed on the SRBs flown with the shut­tle and an up­per sta­ge en­gi­ne flown in the Apol­lo prog­ram. The CLV and Earth De­par­tu­re Sta­ge fol­low the sa­me ap­pro­ach. But we­re the­re not prob­lems with the shut­tles that ca­used the Chal­len­ger and Co­lum­bia in­ci­dents?

  Of co­ur­se the­re we­re, but aga­in this is re­al­ly cle­ver, tho­se com­po­nents are left out. The prob­lems that ca­used the Chal­len­ger in­ci­dent we­re due to the SRBs ha­ving thrust ex­ha­ust le­aks aro­und the seg­ments of them. This hot ex­ha­ust he­ated up the Ex­ter­nal Tank and ca­used it to ex­p­lo­de. That prob­lem was due to the old SRB de­sign and the ope­ra­ti­on pro­to­cols be­ing vi­ola­ted. That prob­lem was fi­xed long ago.

  The Co­lum­bia ac­ci­dent was due to fo­am fal­ling off the Ex­ter­nal Tank and da­ma­ging the Or­bi­ter’s he­at shi­eld ti­les. That prob­lem was sol­ved by the­re no lon­ger be­ing an Or­bi­ter and all of the crew and pay­lo­ad com­po­nents are abo­ve the tan­ka­ge. The­re­fo­re, not­hing can fall off
the tan­ka­ge and da­ma­ge the crew com­po­nents. Oh, and by the way, the crew will be re­tur­ned in a cap­su­le and re-en­ter just li­ke the Apol­lo as­t­ro­na­uts did ex­cept that they will land on land the way the Rus­si­ans do it, in­s­te­ad of wa­ter.

  Brilliant!

  Sounds a lot li­ke the old Apol­lo, do­esn’t it? Well, Apol­lo wor­ked well and the SRBs in the shut­tle prog­ram ha­ve wor­ked well. So, the new plan is to ta­ke the best of both worlds and marry them to­get­her with mo­dern com­pu­ters, mo­dern de­sign and fab­ri­ca­ti­on tec­h­ni­qu­es, and new flight systems and avi­onics.

  The Mis­si­on Pro­fi­le

  So he­re is how a mis­si­on might go. The crew of three to six as­t­ro­na­uts will climb abo­ard the CEV. They will la­unch abo­ut the sa­me ti­me the un­man­ned CLV is la­un­c­hed. Atop the CLV in the car­go com­par­t­ment is the Lu­nar Sur­fa­ce Ac­cess Mo­du­le, or LSAM, which is an up­da­ted ver­si­on of the Apol­lo LEM.

  The RSRB/Ms will fall back to Earth to be re­fur­bis­hed for fu­tu­re la­un­c­hes just as the SRBs do with the shut­tle. The CEV up­per sta­ge will me­et and dock with the CLV up­per sta­ge, which con­ta­ins the Earth De­par­tu­re Sta­ge and the LSAM. The doc­king will be much li­ke the Age­na mo­du­le and the Ge­mi­ni spa­cec­raft doc­ked, or the sa­me as the Apol­lo Com­mand Ser­vi­ce Mo­du­le (CSM) and the LEM doc­ked in LEO.

  Now all ma­ted to­get­her, the Earth De­par­tu­re Sta­ge fi­res its mo­der­ni­zed J-2 en­gi­ne. The thrust from the en­gi­ne pla­ces the CEV and the LSAM in­to a tran­s­lu­nar in­ser­ti­on tra­j­ec­tory and the Earth De­par­tu­re Sta­ge is then jet­ti­so­ned.

  As the CEV/L­SAM ap­pro­ac­hes the mo­on, a burn of the LSAM en­gi­ne is ma­de to put the spa­cec­raft in­to a lu­nar or­bit. This is cal­led a lu­nar or­bit in­ser­ti­on ma­ne­uver. Then the CEV and the LSAM se­pa­ra­te just as the CEV and the LEM of the Apol­lo prog­ram did. The CEV will con­ti­nue to or­bit the mo­on whi­le the LSAM des­cends to a lu­nar lan­ding.

  At this po­int the LSAM is on the mo­on. Wha­te­ver the lu­nar mis­si­on of the day is will be un­der­ta­ken. On­ce the mis­si­on is com­p­le­ted, the crew will climb back in­to the LSAM and fi­re the As­cent Sta­ge. The As­cent Sta­ge por­ti­on of the LSAM lifts the crew back up to me­et with the CEV. On­ce the CEV and the As­cent Sta­ge dock the crew will le­ave the As­cent Sta­ge. The CEV is then se­aled up and the As­cent Sta­ge is jet­ti­so­ned.

  The CEV then fi­res its en­gi­ne in a tran­sE­arth inj­ec­ti­on ma­ne­uver. On­ce the CEV en­gi­ne is used up it is jet­ti­so­ned, le­aving just the Crew cap­su­le. The Crew cap­su­le then re-en­ters Earth’s at­mos­p­he­re di­rectly and will land with pa­rac­hu­tes at a pre­de­sig­na­ted land-ba­sed lan­ding zo­ne.

  Mission com­p­le­ted and ever­y­t­hing is A-OK!

  How Do­es the New Spa­cec­raft Com­pa­re to the Apol­lo?

  The CEV is the smal­lest of the two new spa­cec­raft systems. It will be abo­ut three hun­d­red ni­ne fe­et tall with a to­tal lift-off mass of two mil­li­on po­unds. It will be ab­le to lift abo­ut fif­ty-fi­ve tho­usand po­unds to LEO. Re­call that this spa­cec­raft will im­p­le­ment one fi­ve seg­ment RSRB/M with an up­per sta­ge that uses the mo­di­fi­ed J-2 en­gi­ne. The J-2 en­gi­ne uses li­qu­id ox­y­gen and li­qu­id hydro­gen for oxi­di­zer and fu­el.

  The CLV will stand three hun­d­red fif­ty-eight fe­et tall and will ha­ve a to­tal lift-off mass of abo­ut six mil­li­on fo­ur hun­d­red tho­usand po­unds. It can lift one hun­d­red and twen­ty-one tho­usand po­unds to a trans-lu­nar inj­ec­ti­on. This spa­cec­raft uses two of the RSRB/Ms and fi­ve SSMEs for the co­re sta­ge and a sin­g­le J-2 en­gi­ne for the up­per sta­ge.

  The ori­gi­nal Apol­lo spa­cec­raft was the Sa­turn V. It sto­od three hun­d­red six­ty-fo­ur fe­et high and had a to­tal lift-off mass of abo­ut six mil­li­on fi­ve hun­d­red tho­usand po­unds. It con­sis­ted of three sta­ges. The first sta­ge con­sis­ted of fi­ve F-1 en­gi­nes that ran off of li­qu­id ox­y­gen and roc­ket pro­pel­lant. The se­cond sta­ge was fi­ve J-2 en­gi­nes. The third sta­ge was one J-2 en­gi­ne.

  When we con­si­der the com­bi­na­ti­on of the CEV and the CLV spa­cec­raft de­signs and com­pa­re them to the Apol­lo spa­cec­raft we can re­ali­ze that the new system is in­de­ed an up­g­ra­de and not simply a copy of the old ide­as. The CEV/CLV com­bi­na­ti­on will enab­le a lar­ger pay­lo­ad to be de­li­ve­red to the mo­on. This me­ans mo­re crew and mo­re sci­en­ce will be enab­led.

  There is anot­her ne­ed for the two dif­fe­rent spa­cec­raft-the CEV and the CLV. The CEV will be ne­eded im­me­di­ately to carry crew and small amo­unts of sup­pli­es to the In­ter­na­ti­onal Spa­ce Sta­ti­on. The CEV will most li­kely be the first system de­ve­lo­ped to flight re­adi­ness.

  The CLV has a com­p­le­te ot­her use that most pe­op­le ha­ve yet to re­ali­ze. We no lon­ger ha­ve any Ti­tan roc­kets and if the Spa­ce Shut­tle is de­com­mis­si­oned the U.S. will ha­ve lost its ca­pa­bi­lity to pla­ce he­avy pay­lo­ads in­to Earth or­bit. An exam­p­le of the­se pay­lo­ads might be the Hub­ble Spa­ce Te­les­co­pe. Only the Spa­ce Shut­tle or a Ti­tan co­uld lift such a pay­lo­ad to the pro­per or­bit. If the shut­tle is go­ne be­fo­re the James Webb Spa­ce Te­les­co­pe is com­p­le­ted, how do we ex­pect to get the thing in­to or­bit?

  What abo­ut ot­her na­ti­onal as­sets that are ne­eded for de­fen­se pur­po­ses and in­tel­li­gen­ce gat­he­ring pur­po­ses? It is li­kely that tho­se pay­lo­ads are lar­ge as well. What abo­ut com­mer­ci­al very lar­ge re­lay systems li­ke the Trac­king and Da­ta Re­lay Sa­tel­li­te System or TDRSS? How will we get next ge­ne­ra­ti­on systems up wit­ho­ut the shut­tles or Ti­tans?

  The CLV can do it! We will not ne­ed the up­per Earth De­par­tu­re Sta­ge. In­s­te­ad of that part of the ve­hic­le, we can pla­ce the he­avy pay­lo­ads the­re. The CLV might even of­fer us the ca­pa­bi­lity to la­unch systems with pay­lo­ads lar­ger than Del­ta IVs and At­las Vs can han­d­le to hig­her or­bits such as ge­os­y­n­c­h­ro­no­us ones.

  So, in the ne­ar term, as the shut­tles are de­com­mis­si­oned we might ha­ve to ta­ke the­se new NA­SA spa­cec­raft and im­p­le­ment them with a du­al use. That is a go­od idea. That is one of the smar­ter things NA­SA co­uld do or co­uld ha­ve do­ne in the last few de­ca­des. At this po­int, it is un­c­le­ar if NA­SA has tho­ught of this po­ten­ti­al du­al use of the Ex­p­lo­ra­ti­on La­unch Ve­hic­les. On the ot­her hand, it is li­kely that the air for­ce has. And with Grif­fin’s pre­vi­o­us ti­es to DoD and the in­tel­li­gen­ce com­mu­nity it is most li­kely that he has con­si­de­red this as well.

  So What Are the Long Po­les? Why Sho­uld We Go Back?

  An over­vi­ew of the prog­ram do­es not re­al­ly re­ve­al any hard tec­h­no­logy prob­lems. Most all of the tec­h­no­lo­gi­es be­ing con­si­de­red for the Ex­p­lo­ra­ti­on La­unch Ve­hic­les are flight tes­ted from he­ri­ta­ge spa­cec­raft such as the shut­tles and the Apol­lo prog­rams. The big­gest hur­d­le ap­pe­ars to be ma­in­ta­ining en­t­hu­si­asm for the mis­si­on. What do we do on­ce we get to the mo­on?

  We are no lon­ger in a Cold War era spa­ce ra­ce with the So­vi­ets-al­t­ho­ugh many wo­uld ar­gue that we are in a Cold War-li­ke spa­ce ra­ce with the Chi­ne­se-so get­ting the­re first can­not be our go­al. NA­SA Ad­mi­nis­t­ra­tor Grif­fin has cre­ated a te­am of high ran­king NA­SA of­fi­ci­als to in­ves­ti­ga­te our long term mo­on go­als. Why are we go­ing back?

  Well, to start with, the mo­on is a lot clo­ser to Mars and is a go­od pla­ce to prac­ti­ce le­aving Earth and go­ing to anot­her spa­ce body with man­ned systems. If we can’t
go back and forth bet­we­en the earth and the mo­on, how do we ex­pect to go to Mars? It will be go­od prac­ti­ce and an ex­cel­lent met­hod of flight tes­ting our con­cepts and tec­h­no­lo­gi­es.

  We ha­ve no idea what the mo­on is all abo­ut. We ha­ve stu­di­ed the mo­on with pro­bes and a few man­ned mis­si­ons and from te­les­co­pes, but the­re is a lot abo­ut the mo­on that we simply do not know. The­re are de­ep cra­ters ne­ar the po­les that ha­ve per­pe­tu­al sha­dows over the flo­or and so­me of the­se ha­ve gi­ven con­fu­sing re­adings to va­ri­o­us pro­bes. So­me of the pro­bes ha­ve de­tec­ted high le­vels of hydro­gen and ot­her sub­s­tan­ces that se­em out of pla­ce. We simply do not fully un­der­s­tand what the mo­on is, how it got the­re, and what we can do with it. We ne­ver knew the­re was gold in Ca­li­for­nia un­til we got the­re and star­ted dig­ging aro­und in the dirt. Per­haps the mo­on will hold si­mi­lar ric­hes. Ke­ep in mind that the ric­hes will ha­ve to be lar­ge, to over­co­me the cost of the ex­pe­di­ti­on thro­ugh spa­ce to the mo­on.

  What abo­ut for ot­her sci­en­ti­fic pur­po­ses? The far si­de of the mo­on is an ide­al pla­ce for ra­dio as­t­ro­nomy as the­re is no “no­ise” from ter­res­t­ri­al ra­dio com­mu­ni­ca­ti­ons the­re. It wo­uld al­so of­fer a plat­form for ot­her as­t­ro­no­mi­cal ob­ser­va­ti­on posts as the mo­on has no at­mos­p­he­re to in­ter­fe­re with the elec­t­ro­mag­ne­tic sig­nals co­ming from outer spa­ce.

  Finally, the­re sho­uld be a mi­li­tary out­post the­re. What!? A mi­li­tary ba­se on the mo­on!? Why not? Think of it this way. What if glo­bal dip­lo­macy col­lap­sed and Chi­na or Rus­sia or any ot­her co­untry de­ci­ded to des­t­roy the Uni­ted Sta­tes of Ame­ri­ca’s de­fen­se ca­pa­bi­li­ti­es. If so­me­how all of our ba­ses and mi­li­tary re­so­ur­ces we­re wi­ped out then we wo­uld be de­fen­se­less. But, if the­re was a con­tin­gent of for­ces on a ba­se on the mo­on they wo­uld of­fer us a last re­sort. As with He­in­le­in’s The Mo­on is a Harsh Mis­t­ress, we co­uld im­p­le­ment a ra­il­gun on the mo­on that co­uld hurl pro­j­ec­ti­les to Earth which wo­uld ca­use des­t­ruc­ti­on of enemy tar­gets far bet­ter than nuc­le­ar de­vi­ces wit­ho­ut the un­de­si­rab­le ra­di­ati­on fal­lo­ut. Of co­ur­se, the­re are so­me ma­j­or tec­h­ni­cal hur­d­les for such a system, but it is fe­asib­le.

 

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