by Hughes, Ian
Humiliated, Belisarius now called Constantinus and ordered him to relinquish the daggers. When Constantinus again refused, Belisarius summoned his guards. Thinking that he was about to be executed out of hand, Constantinus drew a dagger and attempted to strike Belisarius. He was restrained by Ildiger and Valerian before the guards arrived and he was placed under arrest. According to the Anekdota, Procopius claims that Belisarius was willing to release Constantinus once the daggers had been returned, but was persuaded by Antonina to execute the general because she had a grudge concerning remarks Constantinus had made against her (Anekdota, 1.22–5 for the cause of animosity; 1.28–30 for the execution). Procopius declared that this was the ‘only unholy deed done by Belisarius’ (Proc, Wars, VI.viii.18), and that it earned him the enmity of Justinian and the Byzantine notables (Anekdota, 1.30).
The End of the Siege
As the talks progressed, the reinforcements and supplies arrived at Ostia. Under cover of the non-aggression agreement, Belisarius now transferred all of the supplies to Rome using the river to help in the transportation of the goods. The Goths watched from their vantage point at Portus and the transfer was completed by the winter solstice.
Byzantine command of the sea now began to affect the situation. Unable or unwilling to risk transporting supplies to their garrisons by boat, the Goths were forced to withdraw their troops from Portus and Centumcellae. Due to famine, they were also forced to leave the city of Albanum. Belisarius quickly sent troops to occupy all of the vacated positions. Although the Goths protested that this was in violation of their non-aggression treaty, Belisarius laughed and refused to withdraw his men.
Since he had been reinforced, and confident that he could defend the city, he dispatched some troops further afield in order to put pressure on the Goths. John, nephew of Vitalianus, who had recently arrived with 800 Thracians, along with 400 men from Valerian’s command under Valerian’s nephew Damianus, and 800 bucellarii under Suntas and Adegis, were sent to set up a camp in the vicinity of Alba. John was ordered not to act aggressively or commit any warlike act unless the Goths had broken the armistice first. However, when the Goths did, he was to take control of the district of Picenum, so pushing Byzantine control further to the northeast.
At the same time, Datius, the priest of Milan, along with envoys, arrived and offered to surrender the city and the whole district of Liguria to Belisarius, requesting troops to act as a garrison. In light of the armistice, Belisarius decided to agree but then detained the envoys over winter, thus gaining time and so not being seen as the man who broke the truce.
Unhappy with Belisarius and his deployment of troops around Italy, Witigis decided that the capture of Rome was still possible, given the more relaxed conditions now prevailing. He sent scouts into the Aqua Virgo aqueduct at night to establish whether it could be used for access to the city. The lights of the torches they carried were seen by the guards, and, when it was reported to Belisarius, he ordered an investigation. The Byzantines found extinguished torches in the aqueduct and so posted guards. Consequently, the Goths gave up on the attempt
Instead, Witigis decided upon a frontal assault on the Pincian Gate. Unfortunately for the Goths, Ildiger and his men, who happened to be on duty at the time, saw the Goths forming up for the assault and mounted a preemptive attack. Many of the Goths were killed, and the noise of the fighting alerted the rest of the Byzantines to the danger. The Goths withdrew and Witigis considered his options.
He determined that the final attempt on the city would be made against the walls that ran alongside the Tiber. Here, the ancients had relied upon the river to do most of their work and so had erected only a small wall with no towers. Witigis bribed two Byzantines to move along the wall distributing drugged wine to the guards, so allowing the Goths easy access. However, one of the men – probably after taking the money – went to Belisarius and told him of the plot, naming the second man. This individual was arrested and, under torture, revealed the full details of the plan. He was then mutilated, but not killed, mounted on an ass, and sent into the Goths’ camp.
At this point, Witigis realised that the siege could not be won. Furthermore, disturbing news now reached him from Ravenna. For with the Goths’ breaking of the armistice, Belisarius had sent a message to John in Picenum, ordering him to take control of the area. John with 2,000 cavalry had travelled throughout Picenum, enslaving Gothic women and children, but, following Belisarius’ policy, leaving the native Italians unharmed. He was brought to battle by Ulitheus, Uncle of Witigis, but the Byzantines won a resounding victory, killing most of the Goths, including Ulitheus himself.
Procopius records that John was a daring, efficient and experienced officer who used his expertise to help bring the siege of Rome to an end. With nice strategic insight, John had bypassed Auximus and Urbinus, since they both had garrisons and were difficult to assault, and instead had accepted the invitation by the citizens of Ariminum to occupy their city. John recognised that, since the city was close to Ravenna, the Goths were likely to lift the siege of Rome and return to Ravenna to protect their city from the threat of being captured. He was correct: upon hearing the news, Witigis ordered the army to leave Rome and march on Ravenna.
As the Goths withdrew, Belisarius planned one more action against them. Since most of his cavalry was away from the city, Belisarius decided to use his infantry alongside his remaining cavalry. Deciding that if he faced the entire Gothic army he would likely suffer a heavy defeat, he decided to focus the attack on the Gothic troops that had been encamped west of the Tiber. He waited until over half of the Goths had crossed the Milvian Bridge and then assaulted the rear of their retreating columns. The ensuing battle was quick and decisive. Although the Goths resisted manfully at first, they soon broke and fled across the bridge, many being killed or wounded in the crush while more were pushed over the bridge and so drowned in the Tiber. It was now the middle of March 538, and the siege of Rome was over; it had lasted for one year and nine days.
Belisarius and Witigis
The question remains as to why the siege of Rome failed and whether the failure was due to the incompetence of Witigis or the superior generalship of Belisarius.
In one respect Belisarius was extremely fortunate: having recently defeated the Vandals and witnessed their inability to resist his horse archers, he was now facing an army with the same weakness. He had recognised the similarity very early in the campaign and so been confident throughout that he would be victorious (Proc, Wars, V.xxvii.28-29). Consequently, during the siege he had used the horse-archers’ superior abilities in order to wear down the Goths slowly, constantly defeating them in small-scale encounters and so reducing their morale. However, when he changed his tactics – allegedly under pressure from his own troops, whose morale had been correspondingly increasing – he risked losing control of the battlefield and allowing the Goths the chance to fight the battle on their own terms. The Goths seized their chance and defeated the Byzantines in the only open battle of the siege. Recognising his mistake, Belisarius did not repeat the attempt at facing the Goths in the open, even when pressed by the Romans to do so. It is the sign of a good commander that, if he makes a mistake, he does not repeat it and so suffer unnecessary casualties amongst his men.
Finally, when he realised that the Goths’ endurance was waning, Belisarius took positive action and so placed the Goths themselves under the pressures of a siege. By almost continuously retaining the initiative, Belisarius controlled most of the encounters that took place. Apart from the battle, his strategy and tactics utilised the innate superiority of his troops in a specific style of warfare. Overall, he displayed a high level of military competence.
Witigis does not fare as well in the analysis of the siege. Having failed to take the city in the traditional manner, using battering rams, siege towers, and so on, he recognised the importance of the port of Portus in the supply of Rome, and its capture must rate as one of the high points of the Gothic siege. Although the Goths
did not entirely surround the city, the large population depended upon vast amounts of goods being transported by ship; the roads did not have the same capacity and so the city faced famine and disease.
Witigis’ control of his troops during the Battle of Rome is the other high point of the Gothic siege. Despite losing many casualties without being able to reply, the Goths maintained their discipline and formations until the decisive point of the battle. The timing of the charge caused the Byzantine wing to panic, and the panic spread throughout the army. Without the cover of a small group of infantry, the defeat could have been far worse.
However, in other areas Witigis’ strategy does not stand up to inspection. Time and again he failed to take the initiative or respond to the Byzantine hit-and-run tactics with a tactic of his own to nullify the effects of the Byzantine horse archers. Furthermore, he totally failed to grasp the purpose of the tactic and his own attempts to emulate it ended in dismal failure as his troops were incapable of long-distance missile fire.
Finally, the free movement allowed to the Byzantines towards the end of the siege, and the lack of response by the Goths, illustrates that Witigis was a general of average, but limited qualities. He did not maintain the pressure upon the defences that would have allowed the Goths a chance of victory. His lack of forward planning proved to be his downfall.
Chapter 10
The Victory of Belisarius
With the siege over and the Goths defeated, Belisarius now had enough troops to begin the conquest of the rest of Italy. His first act was to accede to the Milanese envoys’ demands and send a force of 1,000 men, comprised of Isaurians under Ennes and Thracians under Paulus, to occupy Milan. The whole force was under the command of Mundilas, who had a few of Belisarius’ bucellarii to act as a personal bodyguard. With the troops went Fidelius, who had been appointed praetorian prefect by Belisarius. He was a native of Milan and was sent to act as personal proof of Roman efficiency and good intentions.
The army travelled by sea from Portus to Genoa, before arriving at Ticinus. Here, the Goths of the region had deposited their wealth for safekeeping, leaving a strong garrison of efficient troops as guards. As the Byzantines approached, the garrison left the city and a pitched battle was fought. The Byzantines were victorious, and in their pursuit came near to capturing the city itself. Shortly afterwards, Fidelius went alone to a church to pray. Upon leaving, his horse stumbled and he fell. This was within sight of the city walls, and a small group of Goths came out and killed Fidelius.
Politically weakened by the loss, the Byzantines moved on and finally entered Milan. They sent small garrisons to the neighbouring cities of Bergomum, Comum and Novaria, plus other strongholds, in order to secure the whole of Liguria for Rome.
When Witigis learned of the defection of Milan, he sent a large army under the command of his nephew Uraias to lay siege to the city. In accordance with their agreement, the Franks sent 10,000 Burgundians to assist Uraias in the siege, although Procopius may have exaggerated the strength of the Burgundian force. No Franks participated, since they were still supposed to be allied with the Byzantines against the Goths.
In Milan, Mundilas prepared to face the Goths. But, as he had left garrisons throughout Liguria, he had only 300 regular troops for the defence, according to Procopius, and so he was forced to rely upon the citizens to help maintain a guard on the walls.
With provision made for the attack on Milan, Witigis followed the roads towards Ariminum, deploying his forces as he went. Gibimer and 1,000 men were to garrison Clusium; Albilas with 1,000 men went to Urviventus; Uligisalus and 400 men to Tudera; Visandus and 4,000 men garrisoned Auximus; and Moras and 2,000 men were to hold Urbinus. Another 400 men were left in Petra (in Picenum), and 500 men each in Caesena and Montferetra. Witigis led the rest to Ariminum to lay siege to the city and so remove the threat to Ravenna.
Correctly surmising that Witigis would attack Ariminum, Belisarius sent 1,000 men under Ildiger and Martinus to the city with fresh orders for John, who currently held it for Rome. Belisarius could be certain that they would arrive before Witigis since the Goths had been forced to use a longer, more circuitous route. The Byzantines still had garrisons in Narnia, Spoletium and Perusia and Witigis wanted to avoid these cities as they would slow his progress towards Ariminum. Ildiger and Martinus used the direct route of the Flaminian Way.
Ildiger and Martinus had orders to proceed via Ancon, which was garrisoned by Conon, take men from that garrison, and then go to Ariminum. Conon was to remain at Ancon. Once at Ariminum, John and his cavalry force was to be replaced by infantry comprising those from the command of Ildiger and Martinus combined with those taken from Ancon. The strategic reasoning behind the decision is simple to understand. Belisarius hoped that the presence of only a few troops under an unknown commander would be less of a threat to the Goths, resulting in them not bothering to lay siege to the city, but instead going on to Ravenna and reserving their troops for more vital commitments. On the other hand, if they did decide to lay siege to the city, the cavalry forces under John would be best deployed where their mobility was an advantage. Combined with the cavalry of Ildiger and Martinus, they could pose a real threat to the Goths besieging the city, causing casualties and disrupting supplies.
On the way to Ariminum the road passed through a tunnel cut through where the mountains came down to a river’s edge, with the north and south entrances covered by iron gates. This was known as Petra, and Witigis had sent 400 men to act as a garrison at that point. The Byzantines attacked the southern gate and were repulsed, having to resort to scaling the cliffs before the garrison surrendered. Leaving a small force of their own to guard Petra, Ildiger and Martinus continued to Ancon and collected some of the garrison before arriving at Ariminum.
Disregarding Belisarius’ orders, John refused to leave. After much argument, Ildiger and Martinus left the infantry from Ancon to supplement the garrison, and returned to Belisarius, accompanied only by the bucellarii that Belisarius had sent with John. Damianus and the 400 foederati remained with John. Justinian had attempted to nullify just this kind of intrigue and infighting by appointing Belisarius as sole commander for the campaign. In Africa this had worked, due to the speed of the campaign and there being no need to dispatch reinforcements. In Italy, the need for large numbers of additional troops – who needed high-ranking commanders – resulted in a situation where friction began to arise.
The Siege of Ariminum
Shortly after Ildiger and Martinus had left to join Belisarius, Witigis arrived at Ariminum and placed the city under siege. He quickly built a siege tower, but this time it was designed to be pushed by men stationed inside the tower: there was to be no repeat of the failure outside Rome when the oxen had been killed. When the tower was ready, Witigis had it manoeuvred near to the wall, ready for use the following morning. Placing guards around the tower, the Goths retired for the night.
Although the inhabitants of the city panicked, John remained calm. That night he led a force of Isaurians outside the city walls, but, instead of attacking the tower, they quietly deepened the existing trench in front of the wall, throwing the spoil to the wall side of the trench to create an inner earthwork. Late in the night the Goths became aware of activity and quickly mounted an attack, but John withdrew into the city, believing the trench to be deep enough for his purposes.
He was soon proved to be correct. Witigis was extremely dissatisfied with the guards, so had some of them executed. He then began the assault. Observing that the ditch was now deeper in front of the tower, he ordered his men to throw faggots into the trench before pushing the tower forwards. As the tower advanced its weight crushed the faggots and it sank a little into the trench. The advance now ground to a halt, since the tower came against the newly formed earthwork, made from the spoil of the previous night, and could not progress any further.
As the tower was now vulnerable, Witigis decided to withdraw, taking the tower with him. John did not want this, so led a sortie
out of the city. After fierce fighting, the Goths succeeded in withdrawing with the tower, but lost so many men that Witigis decided to simply starve out the defenders, who were already low on supplies.
Now that he needed far fewer troops for a siege than for an assault, Witigis dispatched an army under Vacimus to Auximus to join with the garrison there and make an attempt upon Conon in Ancon. As the Goths approached Ancon, Conon led his troops out and formed a line of battle. Upon seeing the numbers arrayed against them, the Byzantines fled back to the city, where the defenders had already closed the gates. Many men, including Conon, only gained access by climbing ropes let down from the walls.
Unfortunately, the Goths already had siege equipment prepared and immediately attempted to take the city by storm. Using scaling ladders they managed to gain a foothold on the battlements but Ultimuth, a Thracian of Belisarius’ guards, and Gouboulgoudou, a Hun of Valerian’s guards, drove the attackers off the walls, both being severely wounded in the feat.
Meanwhile, Belisarius left a few men to garrison Rome and sent some to Tudera and Clusium to make camps ready for laying siege to these cities. Upon the Byzantines’ approach, however, the Gothic garrisons of both cities surrendered and were sent to Sicily and Naples. Belisarius now detached men to act as garrisons for the two cities.