Belisarius: The Last Roman General

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Belisarius: The Last Roman General Page 27

by Hughes, Ian


  Although it is possible that Belisarius could have advanced further than he did, given that he was unaware of the exact position of the main Persian army and lacked the time to lay siege to fortresses such as Sisauranon, the suggestion that he should have taken Ctesiphon is a little absurd. Even if he had taken the capital, his return journey with the ex-slaves would have been slow and easy for the Persians to attack. Belisarius was always careful of his men’s lives and it is extremely unlikely that he would ever have countenanced such an invasion without detailed information on the Persian deployments. This part of the story should be seen as an attempt to ridicule the man who Procopius once thought capable of achieving much more, and is evidence of Procopius’ slow change of attitude towards Belisarius: he was no longer the conquering hero of Africa

  Upon her arrival, Antonina was placed under arrest and treated poorly, but Procopius states that Belisarius did not kill her due to the affection that he felt for her (Anekdota, 3.2–3). This may be true, but it is just as likely that, hearing of her service to the empress, he also believed that he would be punished if anything happened to his wife.

  At this point the couple were recalled to Constantinople by the empress, as she had heard of events in the east. Photius also arrived in Constantinople, having captured Theodosius, taken all of the money he had with him, and sent him under guard to Cilicia, where Belisarius’ bucellarii had been sent to spend the winter.

  In consideration of her service against John the Cappadocian, Theodora now forced Antonina and Belisarius to be reconciled, at the same time arresting those who had travelled to Ephesus to arrest Theodosius. These men were tortured, including Photius, to reveal Theodosius’ whereabouts. Finally, she discovered where he was and had him brought to the palace. Shortly afterwards he was revealed to Antonina and their affair would in all likelihood have continued, had he not shortly afterwards contracted dysentery and died.

  Photius, after several attempts, escaped from prison and travelled to Jerusalem, where he spent the rest of his life as a monk. Procopius attacks Belisarius for his refusal to help Photius during his time of imprisonment and after, yet, as it was the empress that was holding him, it is unclear what Belisarius could have done in the matter (Anekdota, 3.29-31).

  The series of events had lasted throughout the winter, reaching their conclusion as the campaigning season for 542 approached.

  The Third Year: 542

  In the spring of 542, Khusrow again led an invasion into Byzantine territory. Following the same route as he had in 540, keeping the Euphrates on his right hand side, he marched until he reached Sergiopolis. The priest of Sergiopolis, Candidus, had earlier promised to pay a ransom for the release of the captives taken during the sack of Susa. He had never paid. Whether under pressure from the citizens who were hoping to avoid an attack, or hoping to avert any punishment by facing the king in person, Candidus went to see Khusrow and pleaded for clemency. Khusrow had him tortured and then demanded double the original amount, as had been agreed earlier. Candidus authorised a payment by giving Khusrow treasures from the sanctuary in the city. Khusrow sent men to the city and took the treasures: it was not enough.

  Khusrow now decided to capture the city by ostensibly sending men back to the sanctuary for more but giving them orders to capture the gate and allow the army to enter. However, a Christian in the army of Al-Mundhir by the name of Ambrus crept near to the fortifications and warned the citizens of the plan. When Khusrow’s men approached the city they were refused entry. Khusrow immediately laid siege to the city. Some 6,000 men were committed to an assault, but they were repulsed after heavy fighting. Yet the citizens now fell into despair and would have surrendered if Ambrus had not informed them that the Persians’ water supply was running low and that they only had enough left to last for two days. Taking heart, the defenders held out until, as predicted, the Persian army lifted the siege two days later and moved in search of water. Candidus was never released from captivity.

  Khusrow, possibly after taking advice from his officers and spies, now led the army through the province of Euphratensis (Commagene), heading towards Syria and especially Jerusalem. He had learned that the territory was poorly defended, as it did not expect an invasion, and rich, as it had not been pillaged for a long time.

  Learning of the invasion, Justinian had sent Belisarius back to the east. Belisarius arrived in Euphratensis at roughly the same time as Khusrow. Justus, Justinian’s nephew, and Buzes, along with other commanders, had retreated to Hieropolis upon learning of the Persian invasion. They now sent letters to Belisarius requesting that he join them. Belisarius declined the invitation, instead going to Europum and establishing his headquarters there. He quickly gathered an army before recalling Justus, Buzes and the others to him. Leaving Justus with a few men to act as a garrison, the rest of the commanders and troops marched to Europum and joined Belisarius.

  When he learned of Belisarius whereabouts, Khusrow dropped his plans to invade and sent Abandanes to Belisarius to acquire information and also put forward a complaint that Justinian had not sent the ambassadors that Khusrow expected. Belisarius’ scouts reported the approach of Abandanes, so Belisarius selected 6,000 men of fine build and stature and led them on a hunt far from the camp. He also ordered his guardsman, Diogenes, and Adiolus son of Acacius to take 1,000 cavalry across the river and so block the route of the Persian army back into Persia.

  As Abandanes approached, Belisarius had a pavilion erected and then set the ‘huntsmen’ on either side, first the Thracians and Illyrians, then the Goths, Heruls and finally the Vandals and Moors. As on the previous day, they were all equipped for hunting not for war. When Abandanes entered the pavilion he immediately complained about the lack of ambassadors from Justinian. These, he said, could have sorted out the difficulties and helped prevent a war. He was dismissed by Belisarius, being informed that ambassadors would not be sent whilst the Persians were on Byzantine territory.

  Returning to Khusrow, Abandanes informed the king that Belisarius was a great general, and commanded troops such as he had never seen. He then added that if Khusrow beat and killed Belisarius, he would only have defeated a servant of Justinian; if Belisarius beat Khusrow, the defeat would bring disgrace upon the Persians and damage the whole kingdom. Furthermore, as they were in Byzantine territory, a defeated Byzantine army could retire to its strongpoints and reform; a Persian defeat would see them being pursued in a hostile land with a long distance to travel before they could find sanctuary. Finally, he reported that the Byzantines had a force on the far side of the river. Unfortunately, there were only two routes the Persians could use to return to Persia. They had already travelled upon one route and used up all of the provisions it could supply. The Byzantine cavalry that had crossed the river was blocking the Persian retreat in the other direction. That route also could not be used.

  Taken these matters into consideration, Khusrow decided that his only means of escape was to fight a battle and force a river crossing. Yet Belisarius did not want to fight a battle, he simply wanted the Persians out of Byzantine territory. The Persians were allowed to reach the river, where they quickly erected a bridge and crossed over. Once across, Khusrow sent messages saying that he had kept his part of the agreement and now wanted ambassadors to be sent. Belisarius crossed the river after him and kept pressure on Khusrow, who continued his journey out of Byzantine territory. He asked the king to maintain wisdom and treat the Byzantines he encountered on his return journey as friends. Khusrow agreed, providing that a hostage was provided for Byzantine good conduct and the sending of ambassadors.

  With his task completed, Belisarius travelled to Edessa and sent a noble of the city to be Khusrow’s hostage. However, on his return journey, no longer pressured by the Byzantine army and with no hostage to force the Byzantines to keep to the agreement, Khusrow attacked and sacked Callinicum. As he was there the hostage arrived and, satisfied with the year’s events, Khusrow finally left Byzantine territory.

  Proco
pius now claims that all of the troops, who had been scared and outnumbered, as well as the citizens of the east, praised Belisarius for repelling an invasion without fighting a battle. Belisarius was now summoned to Constantinople to be sent back to Italy, where in his absence the situation had become desperate (Proc, Wars, II.xxi.1–34). Such is the story given by Procopius in order to win renown for his patron Belisarius. It does not, however, contain all of the information needed to form a true picture of events.

  The Plague and Justinian

  In 541 disease had broken out in Egypt. Procopius gives us a clear description of the illness, which allows us to clearly identify it. It was bubonic plague. The description in Procopius almost precisely matches the descriptions of the disease from the Middle Ages – including the use of the term bonbon (Wars, II.xxii.17). It rapidly spread and was already in the vicinity when Khusrow invaded Euphratensis and Belisarius arrived at Europum. Their urgency to avoid the disease is adequate explanation for the desire of both Belisarius and Khusrow to end the campaign quickly and leave the area.

  Yet Belisarius’ ploy of showing strong and fit troops to Abandanes needs explanation. It is likely that Belisarius was demonstrating clearly to Khusrow that not only were his troops fit and free from disease, they were also unworried about catching the disease, instead preparing for a hunt. In effect, this display of strength and bravado increased the pressure on Khusrow. He now realised that he was faced by an army unaffected by the disease and so capable of strong resistance, not weakened by the ravages of plague and so easily defeated or outmanoeuvred. Furthermore, the display of nonchalance contrasted sharply with Khusrow’s desire to leave the area as quickly as possible.

  Although Belisarius had given the initiative to Khusrow, he was secure in the knowledge that Khusrow did not want to fight a battle, as the ensuing delays would increase his chances of contracting the plague. Belisarius probably surmised that Khusrow’s next move would almost certainly be to retreat to Persia. He was correct in his assumption.

  Yet his overconfidence nearly proved his undoing. Once the Persians were retreating, Belisarius moved north to Edessa, so relieving the Persians of the threat of attack. It would have done little to maintain the majesty and terror of the Persian ruler if, in a major campaign, his only success was the capture of Candidus and the gaining of a previously-agreed ransom. The sack of Callinicum would have enabled Khusrow to claim a victory, since even though threatened by disease and a Byzantine army under one of its greatest generals, he had still accomplished a major feat.

  Due to this, Procopius alleges that Belisarius had to face accusations of cowardice for allowing Khusrow to retire unmolested after his attack at Callinicum (Anekdota, 3. 30–1). Although in some ways understandable, such claims were never to receive a general airing or to be brought in front of a court: it would appear that the majority of people recognised the gravity of the situation and applauded Belisarius for his decision not to risk battle with a possibly infected army.

  As Belisarius retired to his headquarters, events in Constantinople changed the whole complexion of both his campaign and his career. In 542 the plague had reached Constantinople. According to Procopius the first recorded outbreak was at Pelusium in Egypt (Wars, II.xxii.6). From there it had travelled throughout the whole of Egypt, including Alexandria, and along the coast northwards towards Palestine. Possibly being transmitted by the fleas of the black rat, as in the Middle Ages, the disease was carried by ship around the eastern Mediterranean; Procopius noted that it ‘always took its start from the coast’ (Wars, II.xxii.9). The first outbreak occurred in Constantinople in the middle of spring, when Belisarius and Procopius were still in residence before their departure to the east to face Khusrow (Wars, xxii.10).

  Procopius states that the disease lasted for four months in Constantinople, at first making little impact on the number of recorded deaths. Yet, before long it was claiming 5,000 deaths per day and, at its height, 10,000 per day (Wars, xxiii.1–4). Overall, the disease is estimated to have taken 300,000 lives in the capital alone (Norwich, Byzantium, p.233). Yet by itself the virulence of the disease in Constantinople is unlikely to have affected Belisarius’ career. Circumstances were to change. At some point during the summer (no dates are given by Procopius) Justinian caught the plague.

  Belisarius’ fall from favour

  Obviously there was a time lapse between Justinian contracting the disease and the news reaching the commanders in the east. By the time the news arrived, the whole of the Middle East was suffering from the plague, so the commanders of the armies naturally assumed that, given their experience of the disease, Justinian would die and may already have done so. At a meeting it was agreed that the army commanders would not endorse any replacement chosen to be emperor in their absence from Constantinople.

  The decision was to have grave consequences. Theodora’s only source of power was her marriage to Justinian. If Justinian died, she would have to quickly search for an imperial replacement, presumably marrying the man in the process of making him emperor. This was the only way in which she would be able to maintain her hold on power if Justinian died. When news reached her of the meeting in the east she interpreted it as a personal attack, since it would be unlikely that the generals would approve of her choice of emperor. The individual would be ousted and her grip on power lost. The throne would then pass to one of the generals, most likely Belisarius, since he had the most popularity with the people.

  With her fate resting upon the health of Justinian, she watched and waited for Justinian’s recovery. Fortunately for her, he survived. As soon as his survival was assured, Theodora struck. The two generals who were thought to have instigated the fateful meeting – namely Buzes and Belisarius – were recalled to Constantinople. Belisarius was never to return to the eastern frontier. Unaware of events in the capital, the generals arrived in Constantinople.

  Taken by surprise, Buzes was thrown into the dungeons, charged with treason (Anekdota, 4.6–12). He was to remain there for twenty-eight months, until Theodora relented and he was released. However, by some chance Belisarius had not attended the meeting in person. Without that evidence, it was difficult to lay the same charges against him. However, he was charged instead with reserving for himself money taken in the Vandal and Gothic campaigns that should have been delivered to the emperor. He was stripped of the rank of magister militum per Orientem, with the title being bestowed upon Martinus. The empress also confiscated all of his wealth and forbade his friends and associates from communicating with him. Finally, his comitatus was disbanded, with the officers and palace eunuchs casting lots for the individual units (Proc, Anekdota, 4.13–16).

  Belisarius as commander in the East

  In the east, Belisarius only served in two out of the three years of campaigning before his final recall to Constantinople. In both of these Procopius raised doubts about his competence. The question remains as to whether these claims were merely malicious or whether they had a basis in fact.

  In his first year on campaign, the second year of the war, Belisarius only advanced a short distance into Persian territory. Procopius ascribed this to his desire to confront Antonina concerning her affair with Theodosius (Anekdota, 2.19–20). However a close reading of the text reveals that Procopius thought that this had only reinforced his resolve to retire (‘This information, however, led him much more quickly to the decision’ - Anekdota, 2. 20). The analysis shows that, whatever he thought of Belisarius’ private life, Procopius – even in the vindictive Anekdota – grudgingly concedes that Belisarius had acted properly in deciding to withdraw.

  The factors that affected this decision readily support the hypothesis. Firstly, Khusrow was reported as being engaged against the Huns, yet, with an army that could be composed entirely of cavalry, it was possible that he could arrive unexpectedly and so take the Byzantines by surprise, possibly with disastrous consequences. Secondly, although Belisarius’ strategy had effectively pinned Nobades in Nisibis, the city still had a
large garrison. The arrival of Khusrow with a large force of Persians would free the garrison and so enlarge the forces under Khusrow’s immediate command. In such circumstances, discretion was required, not an ill-informed advance deep into Persian territory. When Procopius claims in the Anekdota that Belisarius could easily have taken the Persian capital of Ctesiphon, he did so in hindsight, knowing that the Persians could not have interfered with the action (Anekdota, 2. 25).

  In Belisarius’ final year of campaigning, both Belisarius and Khusrow were constrained in their actions by fear of the plague. Although Belisarius could have forced a battle, it could easily have been lost due to the large numbers of the invading army. Furthermore, even if he had won, remaining in the area could have led to his troops contracting the disease, which would have decimated his forces and so left the east vulnerable to attack. As it was, with disease possibly already present in the Persian army, a withdrawal was the wisest move, since it protected his own troops whilst likely leaving the Persians decimated by the disease and consequently vulnerable. Belisarius would not have known that the plague was destined to devastate both empires, leaving them both weaker than they had been originally.

 

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