by Hughes, Ian
Therefore, although it is possible to castigate Belisarius over his lack of aggression, an analysis of the possible reasons for his decisions allows us to understand the motives behind his decisions. It is possible that a decision to make a decisive strike at the Persians in either of the two campaigns could have resulted in Khusrow suffering a major defeat, yet on balance Belisarius made the only decision that was open to him. Throughout his campaigns he rarely threw away the lives of his men without strong strategic or tactical reasons. In the east, he decided that the risks outweighed the potential gains and the casualties he would suffer. The continuing care Belisarius took with the lives of his men no doubt contributed to his lasting popularity with the troops.
Finally, although it is possible to claim that Belisarius made a grave mistake in gaining the animosity of Theodora by refusing to accept her nomination for the throne in the event of Justinian’s death, his actions are understandable. As a close friend of Justinian and as a powerful figure in Constantinople, Belisarius could not have stood by and allowed a rival to become the ruler of the empire. It is unlikely that any new emperor would allow the continued existence of such a powerful competitor as Belisarius. Consequently, Belisarius was in a nowin situation as he would be seen as either the supporter of an extinct line or a threat to the existing one. Yet in one respect his decision making was to be very fortunate. He refused – or was unable – to take part in the meeting that decided not to accept any candidate proposed by Theodora. It is possible that Belisarius assumed that, if he took no active part, he would be more readily acceptable as a candidate for emperor from among the military leaders. Almost by accident, the decision not to attend instead saved his own life.
Chapter 12
Italy again
Italy after Belisarius
In 540 Justinian had sent Alexander to reorganise the new territory upon the imperial model for taxation. The choice would prove to be a mistake. He was nicknamed ‘Snips’ after a set of curved cutters that he used to trim the edge off coins whilst still allowing them to appear round. In this way he was able to build up a store of the metal and so increase his personal wealth. Upon his arrival in Ravenna Alexander announced an investigation into the taxes paid by the Italians to the Goths since they had arrived in Italy with Theoderic nearly a century before. He found that the natives had underpaid the Goths and declared that the underpayment was now due to the emperor. He also stopped the corn ration that was given to the poor at St Peter’s in Rome. Obviously, these actions immediately began to alienate the Italians to the imperial cause (Proc, Wars, VII.i.31–33).
Alexander also launched an inquiry into the financial condition of the troops, charging many of them with fraud and of costing the state money, putting many of them on trial and then fining them large sums of money. Whilst some of the money was forwarded to Constantinople, much was retained by Alexander. Finally, he reduced the expenditure on the army. Although his actions increased the cash in the empire’s coffers, as well as enlarging his personal wealth, they began to undermine the loyalty of the troops, many of whom became increasingly unwilling to fight. His actions would later be highlighted by Gothic rulers as the negative aspects of imperial rule.
Alexander’s actions were to some extent mirrored by the actions of the Byzantine commanders Justinian had left in Italy. Ignoring Belisarius’ earlier guidelines, they began to treat the natives badly, taking what they wanted whenever they desired from whoever owned it. The troops followed their example, possibly being spurred on by the knowledge that Alexander’s decisions were depriving them of what they believed were their rewards for their victory.
All of this is in contrast to the state of affairs under Belisarius, whose self-restraint had resulted in him being trusted by the natives, and who did not allow his troops to take goods from the natives without payment. The imperial conquest began to turn sour.
Ildibadus
Upon hearing that Belisarius had left Italy, Ildibadus had taken control of the remnants of the Goths. He slowly gathered his forces together, being joined by several Byzantine deserters, unhappy with the conditions under Belisarius’ successors. Beginning with approximately 1,000 troops at Ticinum, slowly the Ligurian and Venetian towns and cities changed allegiance and pledged their support.
The Byzantine general Vitalius now advanced into Venetia with a force of Byzantine troops accompanied by Heruls. Meeting Ildibadus at Tarbesium (Treviso), Ildibadus defeated Vitalius in battle and forced him to retire. Despite this promising beginning, things quickly went awry for Ildibadus. First, he quarrelled with Uraias, the man who had suggested he be crowned king. According to Procopius, Uraias’ wife entered the baths in which Ildibadus’ wife was present. Uraias’ wife completely ignored the queen, who complained to Ildibadus. Shortly after, Ildibadus had Uraias put to death. The incident caused dissension in the Gothic ranks, as many disagreed with the execution.
However, nothing was done before Ildibadus made his second, fatal, mistake. He organised the marriage of a man and woman in his court. One of his guards, Velas, was in love with the woman and took exception to the arrangement. Taking advantage of his privileged position, he assassinated Ildibadus at a banquet. At this juncture the tribe of the Rogi, a subdivision of the Goths who had fiercely maintained their independence, declared their leader Eraric as king.
Eraric
Hearing of the death of Ildibadus and fearing that he would be next, Totila, Ildibadus’ nephew, sent messengers to Constantianus. Totila was in control of Tarbesium, and he agreed to surrender the town in exchange for sanctuary. Constantianus agreed and a date was set for the exchange. Before the transaction could be completed, the Goths lost patience with Eraric. They offered the kingship to Totila, who informed them of his deal with Constantianus and of the date that it would be fulfilled. He said that if Eraric was killed before that date, he would accept their offer instead.
Throughout this period, when the Goths had been in disarray and vulnerable, none of the Byzantine generals in Italy other than Vitalius had united their forces and taken any aggressive action. Possibly due to this inactivity, Eraric despatched envoys to Justinian to ask for the same peace treaty that had been offered earlier: namely, that the Goths would be allowed to retain all of Italy north of the Po whilst the empire controlled all of Italy to the south of the river. Procopius also claims that Eraric’s envoys in secret offered to surrender the whole of Italy in return for a large sum of money, and this may be one of the reasons for the Goths’ antagonism towards their new king. Whatever the cause, the negotiations came to nothing as Eraric was killed by his own troops and Totila was declared king.
Totila and the War for Italy
When news of the death of Eraric reached Justinian, he realized that during this period in which the Goths were paralysed by internal dissensions his generals in Italy had done nothing. He now sent a letter reprimanding them for their inactivity and demanding action. Accordingly, John the nephew of Vitalianus, along with Bessas and Vitalius all now travelled to Ravenna, meeting Constantianus and Alexander ‘Snips’, who were already there. Leaving garrisons in the other cities, they marshalled their forces before marching against Verona, planning to capture the city before moving on to Ticinum where Totila had his headquarters. Constantianus and Alexander led 12,000 men under eleven commanders (Proc, Wars, VII.iii.2–5) towards Verona, setting their camp about 60 stades from the city where the plains stretched all the way to Mantua.
From this point onwards their actions showed the limitations of military campaigns run by committee. When Marcian, a citizen of the Veneti who was an imperialist at heart, offered to bribe a friend of his who was a guard at Verona, the Byzantine generals accepted. However, they decided that one of them needed to lead an advance party that would rush the gate and hold it until the main force arrived. None of them wanted to actually take part in such a risky venture. Eventually, Artabazes agreed to undertake the task. Artabazes was the Persian general who had surrendered the fortress of Sisaur
anon to Belisarius in his eastern campaign the previous year (541). He had been deployed to Italy by Justinian to reinforce the forces fighting the Goths.
With only 100 men Artabazes took control of the gate, attacking the Gothic troops in the vicinity and killing the guards on the nearby walls. The entire Gothic garrison, fearing that this was a major Byzantine assault that had already secured a gate and a section of the walls, fled to a nearby hill overlooking the city. Unfortunately, the main body of the Byzantines was still 40 stades (about 5 miles) away. Procopius states that they had stopped whilst the generals argued over the plunder that would be taken when the city fell (Wars, VILiii. 15–16). Seeing from their vantage point that there were only a few Byzantines in the city, the Goths returned and attacked Artabazes and his men, driving them from the gate and on to the city walls, where defence was easier. The Byzantine generalsfinallyresumed the advance only to find the gate closed against them.
As the army approached, the men on the walls called for them to come to their aid, but instead the army retired to a safe distance and watched while they fought on. Realising that help was now impossible, the men on the walls jumped off in an attempt to escape death. Many were killed by the fall, but others – including Artabazes – fell upon soft ground and survived.
Artabazes was furious with the generals for both failing to advance quickly enough to support his attack upon the town, and also for failing to take any action to help when they saw that he and his men were in difficulty. As the attack had failed, the army left Verona and moved across the Po towards Faventia (Faenza).
Totila received news of the events at Verona and realised that the Byzantines were badly commanded, being led either by a committee or by a single commander with a divided command, rather than a gifted individual. He immediately decided to take advantage of the situation. He summoned the Goths from Verona to join him in Ticinum, leaving behind only a garrison to maintain their command of the city. Upon their arrival, he marched against the Byzantines with his whole force of some 5,000 men.
As the Goths advanced towards them, the Byzantines held a debate to decide what they should do. Artabazes advised that although they outnumbered the enemy, and despite the fact they had been defeated by Belisarius, they should not underestimate the Goths. He suggested that they should wait until the Goths began to cross the River Po, wait until half were across, and then launch an attack whilst the Goths were divided. As the debate continued the Byzantines remained stationary.
Unobserved by the Byzantines, Totila arrived at the Po. He dispatched 300 troops with orders to travel down river for 20 stades in order to cross and come up behind the Byzantine camp. In this way, they could attack the Byzantine rear at the height of the forthcoming battle.
Crossing the river unopposed, Totila marched towards the Byzantine camp, and at his approach the Byzantines formed their battle lines. Before the battle began, a Goth called Valaris rode between the armies and laid down a challenge to individual combat. Artabazes accepted the challenge and killed the Goth, but not before being mortally wounded himself, dying three days after the battle. The battle itself now began and raged fiercely until the 300 Goths sent down the river by Totila arrived and, as planned, attacked the Byzantine rear. Taken by surprise, the Byzantines panicked and fled.
A short time later, Totila sent an army under Vledas, Roderic and Uliaris to lay siege to Florentia (Florence). Not expecting to be attacked, the Byzantines in the city had not gathered provisions for a siege, so immediately sent a message to Ravenna asking for help. An army was sent under Bessas, Cyprian and John the nephew of Vitalianus. Upon their approach the Goths withdrew to the valley of Mucellis (Mugello) and the Byzantines, learning that they were still in the vicinity, decided to force a battle.
Leaving a small garrison in Florentia, the Byzantines advanced towards the Goths. The Byzantine commanders decided to send a small, picked force of men under one of their number in advance of the main body. In this way, it was hoped, the Goths would be surprised and, when they were fully engaged, the Byzantine main body would arrive and the battle would end. The commanders decided to draw lots to decide who would lead the advance party, and John the nephew of Vitalianus won the dubious prize of going ahead of the main force. Unfortunately, the other commanders now refused to follow the plan and give him their best troops. He was forced to go ahead leading only his own contingent of men.
The Goths saw John and his men approaching and retreated to the top of a nearby hill. John led his men in an assault upon the position, but, outnumbered and downhill, they were forced back and then routed. As they ran, a rumour spread that John had been killed. When they reached the main body of troops, the rumour of John’s death spread and the entire army now fled, each of the commanders leading their troops to different towns and cities, as circumstances dictated. Once in position, they settled down and prepared to be besieged. They no longer had any thought of leaving their sanctuaries, or of uniting and fighting the Goths in open battle. John himself made his way to Rome.
Most writers have followed Procopius in his castigation of the Byzantine commanders in Italy. Their refusal to cooperate and join together in order to defeat Totila resulted in a prolongation of the war. If they had acted in concert at an early stage, they may have been able to defeat Totila before he was able to build up his forces. These historians, along with Procopius, neglect to mention one salient factor: in 542 the plague arrived in Italy and the commanders were staying in place in order to avoid catching it.
Either dismissing the threat of the disease or deciding that the risk was worth the possible gains, Totila decided to maintain an active stance. He now showed the political and personal abilities that were to make him the Byzantines’ most formidable foe; he showed respect to all of the prisoners he had taken, treating them all courteously and with kindness. When the treatment was contrasted with the behaviour of Alexander ‘Snips’, who was acting on behalf of the Emperor, the captives found it easy to change sides and pledge their allegiance to Totila.
So ended the campaign season of 542. There was plague in Constantinople and Justinian was only slowly beginning his journey to a full recovery; Belisarius was in disgrace for relieving the emperor of spoils taken in the Vandal and Gothic Wars. The Goths were resurgent in Italy, having beaten the armies that had ventured to face them in open battle, with the Byzantine forces now penned into their cities and waiting to be attacked.
The campaign of 543
At the start of the new campaign season, Totila quickly retook Caesena and Petra, but was resisted when he attempted to gain control of the towns in Tuscany. Therefore, he bypassed Rome – the scene of Witigis’ defeat – and entered Campania and Samnium. Taking Beneventum, he razed the city walls to the ground. It appears that he believed the Byzantines to be superior in siegecraft – both in the taking and the holding of towns – so wanted to deny them the opportunity to fight in sieges. He was, however, confident in his ability to defeat them in open battle. With no walls, the towns of Italy could not harbour the Byzantines and they would be forced to fight on his terms.
Totila’s political wisdom also began to bear fruit. Naples was garrisoned by Conon with 1,000 Byzantine and Isaurian troops. Setting up his camp nearby, Totila sent a force which retook Cumae and other strongholds near to the city. In this way he captured many of the wives and families of Italian senators who had been living in the region, believing themselves to be safe from attack. Totila now freed the captives, so winning a reputation for wisdom and humanity. Whether this was done in imitation of Belisarius, or was a result of his natural disposition is not known. What is known, is that he now began to acquire esteem amongst the Italians for his honesty and honour.
Totila waited outside Naples, but, realising that no troops were going to be sent out against him, he dispatched small contingents throughout Apulia and Calabria. With the towns having no walls and so putting up little resistance, he soon controlled both of these territories and was able to collect their taxes fo
r his own uses.
The loss of this revenue, coupled with the strict budgetary measures of Alexander ‘Snips’, soon resulted in the soldiers’ pay being in arrears. The troops became increasingly unwilling to leave the cities and risk their lives for the emperor. Furthermore, the Italian landlords from Apulia and Calabria also lost their incomes, since they had moved to the towns to protect themselves and so could do nothing to stop Totila claiming their rents. As a result, the Italians became increasingly restless.
Justinian’s response
Since the Battle of Mucellis, the Byzantine commanders had refused to leave the towns to which they had fled. Constantianus was in Ravenna, John nephew of Vitalianus in Rome, Bessas in Spoletium, Justinus in Florentia, and Cyprian in Perusia. The other, lesser commanders were in whichever town they had sought refuge with their troops. Realising that these commanders were unable to make decisions together, Justinian appointed Maximinus as praetorian prefect and gave him supreme authority in Italy. Unfortunately, according to Procopius, he was ‘inexperienced, timid, and prone to delay’ {Wars, VH.vi.12). Sent from Constantinople with a fleet and army (consisting of Thracians under Herodian and Armenians under Phazas the Iberian, plus a few Huns) Maximinus reached Epirus in Greece and halted.