by Hughes, Ian
It may be that Justinian wanted to recall him for a campaign against Persia, yet of the three explanations this is the most unlikely. After his return from Italy, Belisarius was only once more sent to fight an enemy of Rome, and it was not Persia, as we shall see. That he was not used as a general apart from one instance suggests that he was not recalled for his military abilities.
There might, in fact, be yet another reason for Belisarius’ recall. Justinian had recently lost Theodora, the wife that had helped to formulate policy both abroad and at home. Without her assistance, which had been a constant since his coronation in 527, it is likely that Justinian had a gaping hole in his decision-making apparatus. Belisarius was required by Justinian to help in the role of advisor. Whatever other attributes can be given to Belisarius, his honesty and straightforward approach was likely to be indispensable to Justinian at a difficult time of readjustment.
Before leaving for Constantinople, Belisarius made two final dispositions to try to keep Italy in Byzantine hands. In Rome he left a garrison of 3,000 men under Diogenes, and Rhegium was garrisoned by Thurimuth and Himerius.
Belisarius as general in Italy
Procopius, being the major source for the events, is usually followed when he lays the blame for the lack of success with Justinian. However, Procopius’ account – and therefore any conclusion based upon it – is heavily biased. At no point, for example, does Procopius acknowledge that there were limits to the empire’s reserves of manpower and that these were overstretched due to the Persian War, the revolts in Africa, and the continued invasions of the Balkans by the Huns, Slavs and others. Furthermore, at no point in his History of the Wars is the catastrophic effect of the plague upon reserves of manpower noted. In fact, as has been noted by Teall (1965), between 542 and 546 all Byzantine military projects ground to a virtual halt as the full effects of the epidemic made themselves felt. When Belisarius was in Italy, Justinian simply did not have the necessary men spare to send to Belisarius.
To compensate for the lack of manpower, it is likely that Justinian was relying to a great degree upon the aura that surrounded Belisarius. He had now acquired a great reputation as a general and was recognised as a man of his word. Unfortunately, it was also recognised that Belisarius would not always be the man in charge and the replacement sent by the emperor was likely to have no such high ideals and be prone to ignore the natives and indulge in corrupt practices. Belisarius could make any promises that he liked; the natives now knew they would only be kept as long as he was present in person.
One further point needs to be borne in mind when assessing Justinian’s response to Belisarius’ pleas for troops: the quick conquest of the south of Sicily and the surrender of the Goths during Belisarius’ first campaign are likely to have caused Justinian to seriously underestimate the capacity of the Goths to resist. When Belisarius was first recalled from Italy, the war had been all but over, and there would have been no reason to suspect that the Goths would be able to make such a startling recovery and regain control of the majority of Italy in such a short time.
Unsurprisingly, upon his redeployment to Italy there was no mass Italian uprising in favour of Belisarius, nor did any of the deserted troops accede to his requests to return to their former service. The integrity and respect felt for the general was no longer a shield against the mistrust of the emperor and his other appointees. Belisarius was now in a position where he could not win except by overwhelming military strength, and, as we have seen, during his five years in Italy the necessary troops were never to be available.
Although his actions during his second period in Italy showed that he was still attempting to take the initiative and force Totila on to the back foot, at very few points did he manage this due to the lack of resources. Maybe the best that can be said about this period is that, thanks to his efforts, the Goths failed to completely evict the Byzantines from Italy during a period when their position in the peninsula was extremely weak and vulnerable.
Yet this raises a further point about the war in Italy. Both the Goths and the Romans suffered from the same handicap: namely, the difficulty of maintaining both the numerous garrisons and a field army of sufficient force to give a good chance of victory in the field. Battle was to be avoided.
This must surely be connected to the lack of commitment shown by many native Italians to either the Goths or the empire. A large number of Italians were – understandably – reluctant to commit themselves to either side when they were unsure of who would be victorious; choose the wrong ally and there would in all likelihood be serious repercussions when you were defeated. Yet, by their lack of commitment, the Italians ensured that neither side would be in a secure enough position to attempt to defeat the opposition. As long as Belisarius was prying for weak points and attempting to subvert the Italians to the imperial cause, they would waver and the fight would hang in the balance. Once he had been recalled, the generals that were left failed to make any move to gain the alliance of the Italians and, realising that the imperial cause was, as a consequence, in decline, many Italians decided to join with the Goths. In part, this helps to explain both the lack of large scale operations in Belisarius’ second stay in Italy, as well as the rapid collapse of imperial power when he left.
It is noteworthy that, after Belisarius’ recall, Totila ordered the resumption of the games at Rome and then launched an attack on Sicily. The first was a direct challenge to Justinian, since only the emperor could give permission for games to be held. The second was a sign that Gothic power, which a few years before had been on the verge of total defeat, had been spectacularly resurrected by Totila. To submit to these indignities was unthinkable. However, by this late date the effects of the plague were starting to recede and the empire was slowly recovering its strength. Available troops were freed for service in Italy and a large number of foederati and allies was collected and sent under Narses to finally defeat the Goths.
Chapter 13
Twilight
Whilst Belisarius was travelling back to Constantinople, a conspiracy had been formed to murder Justinian. The conspirators were Artabanes, Arsaces and Chanarangas. Artabanes, an Armenian, had been created magister militum per Africam in 546 for his loyalty, and had fallen in love with the emperor’s niece, Praeiecta. She had gone to Justinian and asked for permission to marry Artabanes. The couple were given permission to marry and Artabanes was recalled to the capital. There, he was applauded by the people and honoured by Justinian, who made him magister militum praesentalis and comes foederatum, a well as giving him an honorary consulship. His happiness was not to last. Learning of his elevation, his existing wife arrived from the east before the marriage could take place. The Empress Theodora supported his wife’s claims, and although after Theodora’s death he renounced his wife, by that time it was too late: Praeiecta was married to another. Unhappy with the course of events, Artabanus was receptive to the approaches of Arsaces and Chanarangas and joined the plot against Justinian.
The conspirators decided to move after Belisarius had returned, since it was likely that he would be acclaimed emperor upon the death of Justinian and his unquestioned loyalty would likely mean the death of the conspirators. Therefore, he also was to be killed.
The plot was exposed to several court officials, including Marcellus, yet they withheld the information from Justinian, since as yet there was little firm evidence. However, when Belisarius approached the city the plot was revealed. Under torture, all of the details were unmasked, yet Artabanes was only held under arrest in the palace and had his titles removed. Later, he would be restored to favour when there was a shortage of competent generals to fight in all of the theatres of war opened by Justinian.
Belisarius returns to Constantinople
After his return to Constantinople, Belisarius settled down with Antonina. According to Procopius, he was accorded first place in dignity, although out-ranked by others (Wars, VIII.xxi.2–3). This may be true, though it may also be an exaggeration by Proco
pius in order to elevate Belisarius’ stature in the eyes of the populace. Whatever the reality of his standing with the people, Belisarius does appear to have been honoured by Justinian. Throughout his lifetime of service he had remained loyal to the emperor, despite some extremely difficult circumstances, and Justinian may have realised that Belisarius deserved rewards. Consequently, he was reinstalled as magister militum per Orientem, and may also have been made either comes protectorem or comes domesticorum (Proc, Wars, VIII.xxi.1). It is unclear from Procopius which of these posts was held, although by this time both were honorific titles with little real power and no military responsibility.
Earlier, Joannina, the daughter of Belisarius and Antonina, had been betrothed to Anastasius, the grandson of Theodora. Now that Theodora was dead, Antonina declared the engagement cancelled, much to the dismay of the young couple, who appear to have become genuinely attached to each other. According to the Anekdota, due to the cancellation of the engagement Belisarius was now the victim of gossip suggesting that he was dominated by Antonina (Anekdota, 5.24-7). In spite – or possibly because – of all his achievements, Belisarius was now a figure for jealousy and rancour.
The end of the war in Italy
In Italy, without Belisarius in command the situation quickly deteriorated. Although he had achieved little, the threat of his presence may have helped curb the aggressive tendencies of Totila. Once Belisarius had gone, Totila was to take the initiative in dramatic fashion.
As Belisarius withdrew in 548 the Franks occupied Venetia, and in the following year the unpaid garrison of Rome lost patience with the emperor and betrayed the city to Totila. Neither of these may have happened had Belisarius still been in Italy, since his reputation as a warrior may have deterred the Franks and his reputation for fair play may have led the garrison in Rome to hope for eventual payment by the government.
However, in response to the new challenges Totila acted fast. Possibly in an attempt to elevate his standing with the native Italians, he decided to revive the staging of the games in the Circus Maximus. Furthermore, with the threat of Byzantine aggressive action removed, Totila sent his fleet to ravage Sicily, leaving garrisons in some of the strong points. Furthermore, he was able to secure the capture of Sardinia and Corsica, neither of which had been garrisoned by the Byzantines (Proc, Wars, VIII.xxiv.31–33).
The whole series of events was a distinct shock to the Byzantines. Justinian appears to have been astonished by the extent of the Goths’ recovery – at this point only the cities of Ravenna, Ancon, Dryus and Croton in Italy were still in Byzantine hands. Furthermore, by the staging of the games, and especially by the raid on Sicily and the taking of Sardinia and Corsica, Totila had sent a clear message of strength, defiance and scorn to the emperor. In response, Justinian decided to send Germanus with a large force to complete the conquest. To further this aim, Germanus married Witigis’ widow, Matasuintha. In the meantime, Artabanes was given command of an army and sent to regain mastery of Sicily, a task which he quickly completed (Proc, Wars, VIII.xxiv.1-3).
Following his appointment, Germanus set about raising troops in the Balkans, but before he could depart for Italy he was distracted by a Slav invasion across the Danube directed at Thessalonica. Deterred – possibly by Germanus’ reputation – the Slavs turned west and entered Dalmatia. Germanus was now free to invade Italy. Unfortunately, the unexpected happened: Germanus died suddenly of an illness.
After a delay, Justinian finally ordered Narses the eunuch to take command. The reasons for the choice are unclear, but Narses had one ability that would make him the ideal choice: he had the strength of character necessary to dominate the generals still present in Italy and force them to follow his orders.
Narses spent most of 551 in Thrace and Illyria recruiting, training and organising his troops. It is thought that his army may have comprised as many as 35,000 men (see, for example, Norwich, Byzantium, p. 251), although Treadgold, (Byzantium and its Army, 1995, p. 61) gives the more reasonable number of 20,000 men for the total army. Included in the army was a core of Byzantine troops, supplemented by men collected from Thrace and Illyricum. They were joined by the remnant of Germanus’ forces, led by John nephew of Vitalianus. Following a recent treaty agreement, the Lombards sent 2,500 heavily-armed cavalry, accompanied by 3,000 fighting men as servants. There were also 3,000 Heruls, 400 Gepids, a large number of Huns, and Cabades nephew of Khusrow with many Persian deserters (Proc, Wars, VIILxxvi. 10–13). Following the apparent recovery of the Goths, Justinian was determined to finish the war once and for all.
In 552 Narses ordered his army to gather at Salona. He did not take the sea route to Italy due to the presence of a large Gothic fleet in the southern Adriatic. Instead, in the summer of 552, after a delay caused by another invasion across the Danube (this time by a large number of Huns), he entered Italy by land from the north. Totila gathered his troops and moved to face the invasion. It was to prove a mistake: at the Battle of Taginae, he was defeated and killed. Undeterred, the Goths decided to crown Teias as their new king. Whilst the Goths were making their choice, Narses began the siege of Cumae where Totila had deposited the majority of his treasury (Proc, Wars, VIII.xxxiv.19, 21).
In the following year, 553, Teias gathered the remainder of the Gothic army together and marched towards Narses. Again, the decision to fight an open battle was to be fatal. At the Battle of Mons Lactarius, Teias was defeated and killed by Narses. That same year a Frankish army under Lothar and Butilin invaded Italy and defeated the Byzantines’ Herulian allies, whilst the Byzantines took the city of Lucca and Aligern surrendered Cumae to Narses.
In 554, the vanguard of Lothar’s army was defeated, and shortly afterwards Lothar died. Upon his death, his army quickly disintegrated and returned home. Meanwhile, Butilin was heavily defeated by Narses at the Battle of Casilinum.
In 555 the last major Gothic force surrendered at Campsa. Yet some of the cities remained loyal to the Goths and the last one to surrender, Verona, only did so in 561.
The Three Chapters
It is not known what Belisarius’ reaction was to the appointment of Germanus, and later Narses, to the command in Italy. Since Belisarius had only recently been recalled and had achieved little in his five years of command in Italy, it is unsurprising that he was not chosen to lead the army of invasion in 550 or 551/552. It may also be possible that Justinian remained jealous and that he did not want Belisarius to win more renown by completing the conquest. Alternatively, as suggested previously, we must bear in mind the possibility that Justinian was in need of people he could trust around him to give him sensible, unbiased advice now that Theodora was dead. Given his past record, Belisarius was an ideal man to fill such a position. Justinian could not afford to lose his most loyal and trustworthy advisor.
When Belisarius returned to Constantinople the religious debate of the ‘Three Chapters’ was in full swing. At this time there were major divisions between the Orthodox Church, which dominated the west and the majority of the east, and the Monophysites, who were mainly to be found in Egypt, Syria and Palestine. The Orthodox Church followed the decision of the Fourth Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon (451) which maintained that Christ was one man possessed of two natures, while the Monophysites maintained that Christ had only one nature, the divine.
In an attempt to diffuse the situation, Justinian had – under pressure from Theodora – issued ‘The Three Chapters’, an edict condemning the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrrhus and Ibas of Edessa. The edict declared that these writers were too supportive of Nestorian beliefs. Nestorianism, first preached by Nestorius (appointed bishop of Constantinople in 427) declared that Christ had two distinct persons, one divine and one human. This belief was now only held by a small and dwindling minority and it would appear that Justinian may have been attempting to unite the Orthodox and the Monophysites against a common ‘enemy’.
The attempt failed. The Monophysites, who had been hoping for real concessions were
unappeased and the Orthodox bishops of the east only accepted the ruling under pressure. However, in the west the teachings of Theodore, Theodoret and Ibas had been approved by the Council of Chalcedon, supported by the Orthodox church. Accordingly, western bishops believed that the move had been an attempt to favour the Monophysites and the papal legate in Constantinople pronounced the ban of the Church upon the patriarch of Constantinople as a response to the edict.
Summoned to Constantinople from Sicily, Pope Vigilius found himself opposing the emperor and, fearing for his safety, he took sanctuary in the Church of Saints Peter and Paul. Appointed as one of the ‘memorati iudices’, Belisarius was sent to Vigilius and, along with his colleagues, succeeded in persuading the Pope to leave the sanctuary and continue to participate in the debate. Although Belisarius was no longer used in a military role, the fact that Justinian was willing to use him in such a delicate mission, plus the fact that Vigilius was willing to listen to the delegation, make it obvious that he remained in favour and was seen as a man of influence.
Despite returning to the palace, Vigilius realised that he was under close supervision and in a position equivalent to close arrest. Accordingly, he fled to the Church of St Euphemia in Chalcedon. This was more than just a clever escape: by placing himself in the same church where the Council of Chalcedon had deliberated in 451, Vigilius was making a very clear statement of his intentions.