by Hughes, Ian
Sent to see the Pope for a second time, Belisarius and his associates could not on this occasion persuade Vigilius to return to Constantinople. Instead, Vigilius sent a letter known as the Encyclica to the emperor, putting his own views and proposing negotiations, whilst simultaneously excommunicating the patriarch of Constantinople and two eastern bishops.
The matter dragged on, through the deliberations of the Fifth Ecumenical Council held at Constantinople, until the defeat of Totila and the removal of the Goths as a threat in Italy. Realising that he now had no need to keep the Italian bishops on his side, the emperor struck. He sent a letter to the council asking them to condemn/excommunicate Vigilius and pass the emperor’s edict. The council agreed and Vigilius was banished to an island in the Sea of Marmara, while Theodore and Theoderet were anathematised. Strangely, it was decided that the offending letter attributed to Ibas was not written by him, and so he was not anathematised.
It is interesting to note, however, that in the intervening period when the Pope decided to reply in a negative manner to the conclusions of the Council, he summoned Belisarius along with three other secular individuals and three bishops, and requested that they carry his judgement to Justinian. Although they refused to carry his message, it is significant that Belisarius was still placed highly enough in the esteem of the emperor and of the Pope that he was considered vital to communication between the two at a very difficult time. His political good sense and support seems to have been highly valued by both.
Spain
Whilst Narses was defeating Totila at the Battle of Taginae, Justinian had already made plans to intervene in Spain. Earlier, in 534, Belisarius had sent a force along the north coast of Africa to evict the Visigoths from their stronghold at Septem (modern Ceuta). Although in 547 King Theudis made an attempt at recovery, his force had been heavily defeated.
Yet the situation began to deteriorate for the Visigoths. As in both Vandal Africa and Gothic Italy, the Visigothic rulers of Spain had internal difficulties with their subjects which finally erupted in 550/551. In a situation equivalent to that of Gelimer with Tripolitania and Sardinia, the new King Agila was faced with two simultaneous rebellions. In this case, it was the ‘Romans’ of Cordova and his kinsman Athanagild that rebelled.
Realising that he was faced with yet another opportunity at conquest, Justinian ordered Narses to detach Liberius along with approximately 2,000 men from his army and send them to Spain. They landed in 552 and so began the reconquest of large parts of the south of Spain. After three years of campaigning the Byzantines captured Cartagena, helped by the disunity of the Visigoths who were divided in their support between Agila and Athanagild.
Realising that they were faced with a similar peril to the Goths and Vandals, the Visigoths took matters into their own hands. In 555 Agila was murdered by his own troops and Athanagild became sole king. Nevertheless, due to their temporary weakness, the Visigoths were forced to negotiate with the Byzantines, who were allowed to keep most of the territory under their control, including the Balearic Islands.
Persia
Meanwhile, the war with Persia dragged on. In 547 Justinian sent 8,000 men to support Goubazes, ruler of Lazica, who had transferred his allegiance back to the Byzantines. Although the Byzantine attack on Petra was interrupted by Mehr-Mehroe arriving with 30,000 Persian troops, such a large force could not be adequately supplied so was later forced to withdraw, after reinforcing the garrison in Petra.
In 549 there were battles in Lazica, but these were inconclusive until Byzantine reinforcements arrived to tip the balance. Dagisthaeus dismounted many of his cavalry to form an infantry phalanx that stopped the savaran, the Persian general being killed and his army defeated.
In 551 the Byzantines determined to finally take Petra. Despite a stubborn defence, the city fell at last. Although Mehr-Mehroe arrived with an army containing elephants and laid siege to Archaeopolis, these were defeated with heavy losses (Proc, Wars, VIII.xiv. 1–44).
In a reversal of fortune, in 554 Mehr-Mehroe counter-attacked again and this time captured the city of Telephis, held for the Byzantines by Martinus. (Agathias. II. 19.5 – 21.11). Escaping from the city, Martinus attempted to capture Ottogaris in 555 but was heavily defeated.
Finally, in 556, Martinus beat a Persian army said to be 60,000 strong in the final battle in Lazica. The war gradually petered out, but peace was not signed until 560/561, when a fifty-year peace was declared upon the payment of 30,000 gold solidi by the Byzantines.
The Last Battle
We have little information concerning Belisarius’ activities between the controversy of the ‘Three Chapters’ and the late 550s. It is likely that he remained in Constantinople to act as a councillor to the emperor and was given duties commensurate with his standing as a successful and highly-regarded international figure. It is almost certain that he was in the capital when a new outbreak of plague occurred in 558. It is also probable that he may have given up hope of being given a military appointment or of achieving military glory, yet there was to be one final chance.
It has been noted that possibly the weakest frontier and the one most often crossed by armies intent on plunder was the Danube. Throughout Belisarius’ campaigns one of the most recurrent themes is that of potential reinforcements being needed to expel either Slavs or Huns after they had crossed the Danube and attacked the Balkans. In 550 Germanus had been stopped from invading Italy by an irruption of Slavs, and in 552 Narses was similarly impeded by an invasion of Huns.
In 559 there was yet another invasion across the Danube. An army of Kutrigur Huns led by Zabergan crossed the frozen Danube in March and invaded Byzantine territory. Passing through the provinces of Scythia and Moesia, they invaded Thrace before the army split, with one part heading towards Greece and the other, led by Zabergan, heading for the Chersonese (Agathias, V.l 1.5–7).
According to Agathias, Zabergan had determined to cross into Asia Minor, an area completely unplundered and extremely wealthy in comparison to the often-ravaged Balkans: consequently, he led 7,000 troops to attempt the crossing (Agathias, V. 12.4–5). After taking a large number of prisoners and a vast quantity of booty, the Huns passed the Long Walls and approached Constantinople (Agathias. V. 13.1–5).
At this point Agathias denounces Justinian for his disregard for military affairs. Agathias claims that the army, which had once numbered 645,000 men had been allowed to decline until only 150,000 men remained (V.13.7); he had also allowed the quality of the troops in the capital to decline, due to his neglect and abuse and his failure to pay their wages. Furthermore, they were no longer concentrated in the city ready to be deployed but were scattered around Thrace, intent upon their own business (V. 14.2–5). As a final concern, the Scholari (Guards) were now of poor quality, due to their being composed of friends of the emperor or of men who had paid large sums to enrol in the unit. Therefore, when the capital was under threat, the men comprising the ‘elite force’ surrounding the emperor were not actually soldiers at all (Agathias, V. 15.1–6).
Advancing steadily, the Huns reached the village of Melantias on the River Athyras, only a short distance from the capital itself. Understandably, there was panic in the city. With all of his generals engaged abroad and unable to return at such short notice, Justinian had only one course of action open to him. He appointed Belisarius to take command against the Huns.
However, it seems likely that there were no combat-ready troops left in Constantinople to meet the crisis. We are told by Agathias that Belisarius only had ‘300 heavily-armed veterans from Italy’ (V.16.2). These were probably the last remnants of his comitatus, left over from his earlier days of military activity, retained as his personal bodyguards; even in peace he would have needed a certain number of attendants in accordance with his dignity and status. Strangely, these men are described as being armed with ‘shields and javelins’ by Agathias, where they might have been expected to be armed with bows (Agathias.V.19. 4). Although it is possible that they did in
deed have bows that are simply not mentioned by Agathias, there is a possible explanation for their armament. It is not unreasonable to assume that these men were a dedicated group of Goths, Vandals or other Germanic tribe armed in their native fashion and dedicated to the service of Belisarius. Alongside these he was followed by a large number of unarmed civilians from the capital and peasants who had lost their farms during the Hunnic advance.
Camping at the village of Chettus, near to the Huns at Melantias, Belisarius had the peasants and civilians dig a large trench around his camp before lighting a large number of campfires to exaggerate the size of his force and sending out spies to keep an eye on Hunnic movements (Agathias,V.15.2–16.4–5). At first the Huns were subdued by the threat, but once they learned of the true composition of Belisarius’ forces they prepared to attack. Zabergan with 2,000 Huns detached himself from the main force and advanced towards Chettus (Agathias, V. 19.3). In the meantime, Belisarius was having trouble with the raw levies. They had become overconfident and were totally unprepared for a real battle. As a result, Belisarius made a speech that sobered the men, leaving them more cautious but still confident in eventual victory (Agathias, V.17.1–11).
Learning from his scouts of Zabergan’s approach, Belisarius deployed his forces. Judging that the Huns’ approach would lead them through a nearby wooded glen, he split his 300 veterans into three groups of 100. Two of these divisions were sent into the woods on either side of the glen, and ordered to wait for a signal from Belisarius before emerging to attack the Huns in the flank and rear. In this way, Belisarius hoped to constrict the enemy within a very tight space, so negating the advantage of their superior numbers. Belisarius remained in the centre with the remaining 100 veterans, and he deployed the untrained men behind him, with orders to shout and make a lot of noise (Agathias. V. 19.4–5).
When the enemy saw Belisarius’ small force they advanced to meet him in the glen. Belisarius led the charge with his men, with the main force of peasants and citizens holding their ground and causing as much noise as they could. He also gave the signal for the troops in the woods to charge into the flanks and rear of the Huns. Agathias relates that the noise and the confusion caused by the swirls of dust created by the peasants was out of all proportion to the size of the battle. The Huns now did exactly what Belisarius had anticipated; they drew together ‘so tightly that they could not defend themselves, since there was no room to use their bows and arrows or to manoeuvre with their horses’. Stunned by the noise and dust, the Huns were finally broken by Belisarius’ frontal assault and, as the peasants and citizens advanced, they fled in disorder. Even now, Belisarius retained control; the pursuit was orderly and did not allow the Huns to regroup and counterattack, since the Byzantines retained their order and so did not present a target vulnerable to such a move. The nature of the attack and their defeat so terrified the Huns that they did not even use the ‘Parthian-shot’ tactic for which they were famous, instead fleeing without any attempt at resistance (Agathias,V.19.7 – 20.1).
Retreating to Melantias, Zabergan immediately broke camp and the Huns withdrew. At the same time, the Huns that had advanced to the Chersonese had started their assaults. However, Germanus the son of Dorotheus defeated their attempts to take the city, even destroying an attempt by the Huns to attack the city from the sea by using small skiffs against their hastily-made armada of reed boats (Agathias. V.22.3–8).
Both groups of defeated Huns now came together under Zabergan, and learned that the assault on Greece had also failed. Yet Zabergan refused to leave Byzantine territory without something to show for his efforts, so he ransomed the captives they had previously taken before returning to their homes north of the Danube.
According to Agathias, the episode served to highlight the difference between Justinian and Belisarius: the population of Constantinople lauded Belisarius for saving them in their hour of need and defeating the Huns when heavily outnumbered (V.20.5); they castigated Justinian for his seemingly cowardly action in ransoming the captives and so ‘buying’ peace (V.24.1). Yet Agathias saw further than this, and relates that Justinian now stopped the tribute to a separate group of Huns, led by Sandilch, claiming that the money that was due to them had instead been paid to Zabergan and his horde; if they wanted the money, they needed to get it for themselves. As a consequence, the Huns of Zabergan and Sandilch spent a long time in a war against each other, so leaving the empire free from attack and so weakening the two groups that by Agathias’ time they had fallen under the control of other barbarians and no longer existed as separate entities (V.25. 6).
Belisarius as general
This last battle shows that Belisarius had lost none of his ability to motivate and control his men and ensure that they followed his plans for engagement. Furthermore, the manner of the ambush and the reasoning behind the decision to use it illustrate that he had lost none of his strategic or tactical ability after such a long time taking part in only civilian affairs. As a final observation, his deployment of the large number of civilians and the manner in which they contributed to the battle with only a little risk to their lives show that he had retained his desire to keep casualties amongst his own forces to a minimum. The battle was a model for those who are outnumbered and outclassed by the enemy.
The last acts
Sadly, Belisarius victory was later used against him. Men of rank remained jealous of his abilities and his influence with the emperor and so began a rumour that he was aiming at the throne; as a result, he was not given any recognition for his deeds against the Huns (Agathias, V.20.5-6).
Furthermore, when another group of Huns invaded the Balkans in 562, Belisarius was overlooked for command against them (as noted by Norwich, Byzantium, 1989, p.261). It is possible that, in this instance, a younger general could be trusted to lead the fight against the Huns: after all, Belisarius was by now aged around 60. Instead of military glory, Belisarius was embroiled in conspiracy. In November of that year a plot against the emperor was uncovered and two of Belisarius’ staff implicated. Under torture, one of the men named his master as conspirator. Belisarius was formally accused in December 562, when Justinian removed his dignities and privileges and began an inquiry. Under house arrest, Belisarius accepted the situation without protest and waited for the judgement of the emperor.
After a full investigation, Belisarius was found not guilty of plotting to kill Justinian and was restored to favour with all of his previous titles in July 563. The later story that Justinian had Belisarius blinded and forced him to sit in the Lausus Palace with a begging bowl is a complete fabrication.
In Italy, Narses was forced to defend the country from two rebellions. The first was in 563, led by Amingus the Frank and Widin the Goth. The rebellion was defeated and both men were killed. The second was in 565, led by Sindual the Herul. Again, the rebellion was defeated and Sindual was captured and hanged. These would be the last consequences of Belisarius’ invasions of which he would have been aware. He died in March 565 aged around 60 years. Antonina survived him, but it is not known when she died. Only eight months later, in November 565, the Emperor Justinian also died. It was the end of an era.
Chapter 14
Conclusion
Epilogue
The Byzantine reconquests were not destined to last. In Spain, a revival of Visigothic power gradually reduced the Byzantine possessions until, in the year 631, they were eliminated from the peninsula.
In Italy, events were much more complicated. In 568, only three years after the death of Belisarius, the Lombards invaded Italy, disrupting the province, annexing the north of Italy and establishing the duchies of Benevento and Spoleto in the centre and south. Although control of the remainder remained in Byzantine hands, the long, tortuous border with the Lombards remained a constant threat and siphoned away much needed revenue and manpower. This unsatisfactory arrangement would last until the eleventh century, when the Byzantines were finally expelled from Italy.
The almost-constant warfare on
these two fronts would be a drain on the empire when facing its two greatest crises of the seventh century. The first of these was the Persian invasion led by Khusrow II, which, in a series of campaigns over 10 years (607–616), conquered Syria, Armenia, Lazica and Iberia, before culminating in 616 with the capture of Egypt. The Emperor Heraclius was only able to overcome the danger by first forming an alliance with the Khazars (recently established in the Caucasus) and then invading Persia. After the capture of his capital by Heraclius, Khusrow II was deposed by his nobles and a peace agreed that ceded all of the conquered territories back to the Byzantines.
The second crisis came shortly after the Persian War. This was the eruption of Islam. Without warning, a major new military force was unleashed on the world. Within a very short space of time the armies of the Prophet conquered Syria, Egypt, Mesopotamia and Tripolitania from the Byzantines. The Byzantines were lucky: at the Battle of al-Qâdisiyyah in 636 the Sasanids suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Arabic forces. Sasanid Persia came to an end shortly afterwards. As the Byzantines grimly held on in Asia Minor, the Muslims seized the province of Africa in 696, and swept along the North African coast before overrunning Visigothic Spain by 711.