William Pitt the Younger: A Biography

by William Hague

  It cannot be known for certain why Pitt was so determined to get his way on a matter which might be considered as of secondary importance to a government heavily embroiled in one war and about to embark on another, simultaneously facing serious shortages of food, yet of primary importance to powerful figures who were trenchantly opposed to any change. He had generally observed the rule which has since become an axiom of politics, that battles should be ‘big enough to matter but small enough to win’, but it is questionable whether this issue possessed either of those attributes.

  That Pitt was persuaded of the merits of Catholic emancipation is not a sufficient explanation of his action, since he had been forced to abandon many a cherished project over the years because of the strength of political opposition. The probable truth is that he felt under an obligation to some of his closest colleagues who were very strongly in favour of the measure, most notably his Irish team of Cornwallis and Castlereagh, who had always understood that this policy would eventually go ahead, and his most senior lieutenants Dundas and Grenville, with whom he had encountered serious difficulties in the preceding year. He would not want to let these Ministers down, and some of them believed the King would buckle, Cornwallis writing that ‘if Mr. Pitt is firm, he will meet with no difficulty.14 Pitt may have believed this, but in any event would not have felt he was walking on the thinnest of ice since, even having put the matter to the King from a united Cabinet, he could still retreat if absolutely necessary. Rose, who often worked with Pitt on an hourly basis, wrote that ‘I am very strongly inclined to believe that Mr. Pitt had not, in the first instance, an intention of pressing the Catholic question on the King immediately.’15 Pitt may therefore have been trying to satisfy his colleagues that the matter was being attended to, avoiding a split, while keeping his mind on other things and working out how to get round the King at a later stage.

  Whatever his intentions, Pitt’s misplaced faith in Cabinet confidentiality was to prove fatal, since the discussions of 25 January were almost immediately leaked to George III. At the King’s levée on 28 January, in Pitt’s absence, he exploded within earshot of many observers at the unfortunate Dundas: ‘What is the Question which you are all about to force upon me? what is this Catholic Emancipation which this young lord, this Irish Secretary has brought over, that you are going to throw at my Head? … I will tell you, that I shall look on every Man as my personal Enemy, who proposes that Question to me … I hope All my Friends will not desert me.’16

  The force of this eruption shattered the ice beneath Pitt’s feet in an instant. No such event had occurred in the entire seventeen years of his ministry. Whether it had been parliamentary reform, abolition of the slave trade, the dismissal of the Duke of York from Flanders or the peace negotiations with France, George III had always kept his private feelings to himself, except in discussion with Pitt or other members of the Cabinet. On this issue he was prepared to proclaim his most emphatic opposition to the views of the Cabinet, and he did not mind who heard him. What is more, his language was chillingly reminiscent of the words he employed in 1783 which presaged the downfall of the Fox – North coalition and the appointment of Pitt.

  Nor did the King let matters rest there. While the Cabinet convened to consider what was now a crisis – with a majority in favour of Catholic emancipation but a powerful minority still against – George III was lobbying Loughborough, Auckland, the Archbishop of Canterbury and Addington. To the last-named he wrote that ‘the most mischievous measure is in contemplation … This is no less than the placing the Roman Catholics of the kingdom in an equal state of right to sit in both houses of parliament … I know we think alike on this great subject. I wish he would … open Mr. Pitt’s eyes on the danger arising from the agitating this improper question, which may prevent his ever speaking to me on a subject on which I can scarcely keep my temper.’17

  Addington, a trusted confidant of both George III and Pitt, now became a go-between. Both men knew, after the aborted discussions of 1797, that if Pitt were to resign Addington would be his likely successor. On the night of Saturday, 31 January, on the basis of Addington’s discussions but without further reference to the Cabinet, Pitt wrote to the King with a powerful summary of the case for Catholic emancipation. He explained that he was ‘on full consideration convinced that the measure would be attended with no danger to the established church … But the grounds on which the laws of exclusion now remaining were founded, have long been narrowed, and are since the Union removed: – that those principles, formerly held by Catholics, which made them considered as politically dangerous, have been for a course of time gradually declining and, among the higher orders particularly, have ceased to prevail.’ He argued that the days of foreign pretenders supported by Catholic powers overseas were over and that ‘modern Jacobinism’ was now the threat, that Catholic clergy could be made more dependent on the government and therefore more easily controlled, and that a new oath administered by the preachers and teachers of all Christian faiths would allow ‘the security of the Constitution and Government’ to be ‘effectually strengthened’.18

  Having stated his case, Pitt went on to explain how he proposed to act:

  It would afford him indeed a great relief and satisfaction, if he may be allowed to hope that your Majesty will deign maturely to weigh what he has now humbly submitted, and to call for any explanation which any part may appear to require. In the interval which Your Majesty may wish for consideration, he will not on his part importune Your Majesty with any unnecessary reference to the subject and will feel it his duty to abstain himself from all agitation of this subject in Parliament, and to prevent it, as far as depends on him, on the part of others. If on the result of such consideration Your Majesty’s objection to the measure proposed should not be removed, or sufficiently diminished to admit of its being brought forward with Your Majesty’s full concurrence, and with the whole weight of your Government, it must be personally Mr. Pitt’s first wish to be released from a situation which he is conscious that, under such circumstances, he could not continue to fill, but with the greatest disadvantage.

  This threat, however, came with a simultaneous olive branch:

  At the same time, after the gracious intimation which has been recently conveyed to him of Your Majesty’s sentiments on this point, he will be acquitted of presumption in adding, that if the chief difficulties of the present crisis should not then be surmounted, or very materially diminished, and if Your Majesty should continue to think that his humble exertions could in any degree contribute to conducting them to a favourable issue, there is no personal difficulty to which he will not rather submit than withdraw himself at such a moment from Your Majesty’s service. He would even, in such case, continue for such a short further interval as might be necessary to oppose the agitation or discussion of the question, as far as he can consistently with the line, to which he feels bound uniformly to adhere, of reserving himself a full latitude on the principle itself, and objecting only to the time, and to the temper and circumstances of the moment. But he must entreat that, on this supposition it may be distinctly understood that he can remain in Office no longer than till the issue (which he trusts on every account will be a speedy one) of the crisis now depending shall admit of Your Majesty’s more easily forming a new arrangement, and that he will receive your Majesty’s position to carry with him into a private situation that affectionate and grateful attachment which your Majesty’s goodness for a long course of years has impressed on his mind.19

  Finally he added a rebuke:

  He has only to entreat Your Majesty’s pardon for troubling you on one other point, and taking the liberty of most respectfully, but explicitly, submitting to your Majesty the indispensable necessity of effectually discountenancing, in the whole of the interval, all attempts to make use of your Majesty’s name, or to influence the opinion of any individual or descriptions of men, on any part of this subject.20

  George III replied the next day, expressing his ‘cordia
l affection’ for Pitt and his ‘high opinion of his talents and integrity’, but explained that his ‘sense of religious as well as political duty’ prevented him ‘from discussing any proposition tending to destroy this groundwork of our happy Constitution, and much more so that now mentioned by Mr. Pitt, which is no less than the complete overthrow of the whole fabric’. In response to Pitt’s entreaties that he refrain from influencing opinion in the meantime, the King countered with the proposal that he would ‘abstain from talking on this subject’ if Pitt would ‘stave off’ the whole matter, although he added ‘I cannot help if others pretend to guess at my opinions, which I have never disguised.’ Finally he said he hoped that Pitt’s sense of duty ‘will prevent his retiring from his present situation to the end of my life; for I can with great truth assert that I shall, from public and private considerations, feel great regret if I shall ever find myself obliged at any time, from a sense of religious and political duty to yield to his entreaties of retiring from his seat at the Board of Treasury’.21

  The opening of Parliament and the debate on the Address now intervened, and in the meantime Addington was being pressed by George III to form a government if necessary: ‘Lay your hand upon your heart,’ the King said to him, ‘and ask yourself where I am to turn for support if you do not stand by me.’22

  The day after the debate on the Address, Pitt wrote a further letter to the King, expressing disappointment at his refusal even to consider the proposals or to undertake to disassociate himself from public opposition to them:

  … he must frankly confess to your Majesty that the difficulty even of his temporary continuance must necessarily be increased, and may very shortly become insuperable, from what he conceives to be the import of one passage in your Majesty’s note, which hardly leaves him room to hope that Your Majesty thinks those steps can be taken for effectually discountenancing all attempts to make use of your Majesty’s name, or to influence opinions on this subject, which he has ventured to represent as indispensably necessary during any interval in which he might remain in office.23

  As a result, on 5 February 1801 George III accepted Pitt’s resignation. In reply, he said he had hoped that the matter would have been resolved by ‘the strong assurance I gave Mr. Pitt of keeping perfectly silent on the subject whereon we entirely differ, provided on his part he kept off from disquisition on it for the present’. Instead: ‘I must come to the unpleasant decision, as it will deprive me of his political service, of acquainting him that, rather than forego what I look on as my duty, I will without unnecessary delay attempt to make the most creditable arrangement, and such as Mr. Pitt will think most to the advantage of my service, as well as to the security of the public.’24

  Addington agreed the same day to form a ministry, Pitt having assured him of his support and said to him, ‘I see nothing but ruin, Addington, if you hesitate.’25 From Pitt’s point of view, Addington was the perfect successor. He was respected on all sides of the House of Commons and George III found him congenial. In addition, and very significantly, he owed his political career wholly to Pitt, and on most subjects was likely to be highly susceptible to his opinions. There is some evidence that Pitt already had his eye on a more substantial long-term successor, the junior MP Spencer Perceval, who was about to become Solicitor General, but at this stage had only been a Member of Parliament for five years. Perceval would indeed become Prime Minister in due course, and would develop a command of the House of Commons comparable to that of Pitt at his most formidable, but it was too early in 1801 to place him or any other newcomer into the front rank. In any case, at the age of forty-one Pitt was not looking for a replacement for himself; Addington fitted the bill because he could credibly fill Pitt’s place for now, without necessarily wanting or deserving to keep it for good.

  Pitt’s letters to his closest associates in the hours after he received the King’s definitive response have a matter-of-fact and almost contented tone. To his brother he admitted: ‘I did not foresee the extent of the consequences to which within this week the question has led,’ but said that what he had done had been ‘right towards the King, the public and my own character … I am most happy to find that the Speaker feels it is his duty, in which I have most strongly and decidedly encouraged him, not to decline the task.’26 On a letter to Pretyman he wrote a postscript saying: ‘Rose, I believe, will write to you, and very likely in a tone of despondency which I am sure the case does not call for.’27 In resignation, as in office, Pitt’s tone was straightforward, correct and self-sacrificing.

  Political resignations, though, are rarely so simple. However much a single event or issue may dictate the timing of a major resignation, there are usually, except in the case of misdemeanour or retirement, accompanying grievances or calculations which cause it to be submitted or accepted. There is no doubt that without the sudden eruption of the Catholic issue, Pitt’s resignation would not have taken place when it did. The fact that the King and the Prime Minister differed so markedly on an issue which they both regarded as important, and one of them considered to be of the highest possible importance, was obviously a major problem. Nevertheless, Pitt and George III had, for over seventeen years, found a way of maintaining their partnership despite strong disagreements on a range of subjects. On this occasion, they were both prepared to countenance mutual abstinence from the subject in some form, and Pitt’s initial letter expressing his ‘personal wish to be released’ but also his readiness to submit to any ‘personal difficulty rather than withdraw himself at such a moment’ is well short of an adamant insistence on resignation. Given these indications of flexibility, some further explanation is required as to why two men who had worked together productively for so long parted company within the space of a few days, and without any meeting taking place between them.

  Why did George III not try harder to keep the man he had once begged to come into office, by stressing Pitt’s duty in a dire international situation and at least briefly considering his proposals, if only to reject them and then have everyone stay silent? No doubt the answer is in part the intense annoyance he felt at being placed in such a difficult position by Ministers whom he knew had been scheming behind his back, albeit incompetently, for months. Significantly, however, the affront the King felt on this score came on top of a mounting sense of grievance against Pitt and his fellow Ministers which had developed in his mind in the course of 1800. He had been unhappy with the government’s conduct of the war that summer, not without good reason, and was frustrated that the Cabinet had ignored his views. In addition, Pitt’s many distractions, ill-health and consequent shorter working hours made him neglectful of keeping regular contact with the King, sometimes going for weeks even in London without seeing him. Pitt himself admitted that ‘other Business and want of Health often made him postpone both written and personal communication with the King’.28

  George III was therefore becoming distinctly fed up with what he could have seen as rather high-handed treatment from his senior Ministers. Even so, throughout most of the previous seventeen years he would have known that he had to keep Pitt at all costs for fear of the likely alternatives, in particular Charles James Fox. But in the late 1790s Pitt’s very domination of the political scene had removed any such danger in the foreseeable future. Fox had absented himself from Parliament, and even if he resumed his attendance (which he was about to do), no conceivable coalition could any longer be constructed with him at the head of it. The old Whig party had been broken, and the views of the conservative Whigs such as Portland, Windham and Spencer who had joined the government in 1794 had become indistinguishable from those of Pitt. A change of Prime Minister would therefore no longer mean a change of the government’s political complexion. All that was needed was a new man capable of leading such a government, and since George III had formed an increasingly high opinion of Addington, and Pitt himself had floated him as a replacement when contemplating resignation in 1797, the solution was obvious. If George so wished it, he could now
have a government supported by Pitt and many of the current Ministers but no longer headed by Pitt. This is not to say that he was being untruthful in expressing the hope that Pitt could have remained his Prime Minister until the end of his life, but it did mean that if a serious dispute arose between them he no longer had to sacrifice his trenchantly held views.

  Pitt’s motives in that crucial first week of February were more complex, but all the evidence is that to him it was not such a straightforward matter as simply resigning rather than being unable to implement a policy he regarded as crucial. He would in any case have been distracted by the need to make multiple decisions on other matters, including a major parliamentary debate and preparation for the budget which was to be delivered two weeks later. The impression that a number of factors were playing on his mind when he contemplated resignation is reinforced by the way in which his letter to the King of 31 January left so many options open, and by the fact that his assessment to colleagues of whether he would be resigning changed thereafter from day to day – although this would partly reflect uncertainty over the King’s final response. But Pitt cannot have thought he was resigning solely over the principle of Catholic emancipation, since he was happy to support as his successor a man who was specifically against it. What else was going on in his head?