The Games That Changed the Game

by Ron Jaworski

  Belichick ultimately landed that same job assisting head coach Ted Marchibroda with the Baltimore Colts, starting out at $25 a week. From there, he quickly moved up the coaching ladder, with stops in Detroit and Denver before joining the Giants in 1979. In New York, Belichick spent a dozen years coaching the defense for Ray Perkins and Bill Parcells. Two of those seasons, 1986 and ‘90, ended with Super Bowl championships. That second ring got him his first head coaching job. From 1991 through 1995 he directed the Cleveland Browns but then resigned to go back with Parcells for stints with the Patriots and Jets before being named New England’s head coach in 2000. After a rough first year, Belichick put together a run that has made the Patriots arguably the decade’s most dominant team: nine straight winning seasons, seven division titles, four Super Bowl appearances, and three league championships. His success has made him the subject of many books, ranging from a biography by Pulitzer Prize–winning author David Halberstam to studies of Bill’s management principles that have become business book list best sellers.

  Bill’s blueprint for success is built on core philosophies, beginning with his approach toward acquiring personnel. I’ve heard him say again and again, “It’s not about collecting talent, it’s about building a team. Some players fit better into one system or style of play than they do in another.” Belichick assigns specific tasks for each of his players. He wants those tasks completed the way they’re taught in practice. If each player does his job as instructed, Bill’s team usually wins. “I want players that fit specific roles, and do the specific jobs they’re asked to do,” Belichick stated. “I’m more inclined to draft a consistent player, a guy who produces singles and doubles, instead of trying to draft a home run hitter or the next Hall of Famer, someone who makes big plays once in a while but may or may not have the total package to be successful in the NFL.

  “In any season, we’ll get critical plays from guys that maybe haven’t had that many other plays during the year. But at a specific moment, it becomes ‘their time,’ and they come through. That’s really what we’re all about: everybody on the team performing and being prepared when called upon. Who knows exactly what those situations will be or when they’ll come? My thing on preparation is that everybody needs to know what to do. You can’t just count on one player—the quarterback or the middle linebacker, to know what to do in different situations, because everything happens so fast. I don’t really feel like we’re prepared until everybody knows how they should react in certain situations. It’s our job as coaches to make sure they understand that, so we can react quickly and decisively in those critical situations. If we have a tough, smart football team that’s ready and plays well under pressure, then we’ll win our share.”

  This approach makes a lot of sense, but plenty of today’s teams prefer stockpiling as many Pro Bowlers as possible. Good strategy is important, they’ll concede, but ultimately they believe that better talent usually wins out in the NFL. Big guys crush little guys, fast people run away from slow people, and so on. For these teams, that principle isn’t going to change. And there are also a number of NFL coaches who are steadfast in going with the same strategies all the time. They arrive at the stadium each Sunday and basically declare, “Here’s what we do. We do it pretty damn well. We’re going to run things like we always do—and it’s the other team’s job to try to stop it.”

  Belichick’s view is much different. “Every week is its own challenge,” he emphasized. “Every game brings its own set of circumstances, adjustments, play style, and matchups. We focus on what we want to do for that week, not what we did two weeks before or ten weeks before.” Super Bowl XXXVI put that philosophy into action and showcased it as no game had done previously.

  A little more than two months earlier, the Rams beat New England, 24-17, during the tenth week of the regular season. The Patriots played pretty well but ultimately failed to achieve their main goal: disrupting the precise timing of Mike Martz’s offense. “They only scored twenty-four points,” said Belichick, “but I never really felt like we had control of the game. It seemed like every time they needed a pass, they could hit one.

  “We thought going in that night we couldn’t just let St. Louis settle in and throw. We wanted to get them out of their rhythm, put pressure on Warner, force incomplete passes. So we blitzed—a lot. Unfortunately for us, their offensive line was great. By my count, we blitzed them forty-three times and never really got much heat on Warner. His line did a tremendous job, not only blocking us but also in making adjustments to pick up our blitzers. In the end, Warner always seemed to have enough time to make his throws.”

  Even though the Patriots were frustrated about losing, they weren’t totally discouraged. In the locker room afterward, the mood was surprisingly upbeat. Veteran safety Lawyer Milloy observed, “You would have thought we won the game, because everybody was saying, ‘Hey, if they’re supposed to be the next Super Bowl champs, what can we be?’ That was the most positive we’d been after any game the whole year. And you know what? We didn’t lose another game the rest of the season.” Mike Martz also had high regard for the team he had just beaten. “That was the most physical game we played that year,” he praised, “and I mentioned to the media at the time that this was a Super Bowl team. The Patriots were the best opponent we had played to that point.”

  One reason why New England was so tough was the versatility and flexibility of its defenders, the perfect example being Mike Vrabel, a free agent addition who hadn’t found a home in Pittsburgh but was a perfect fit for Belichick’s schemes in New England. He was equally adept coming out of a three-point stance or standing upright, and could attack from any angle. Another waiver-wire pickup, the highly intelligent thirty-three-year-old Roman Phifer, filled a specific role as New England’s pass coverage linebacker. In Lawyer Milloy and Ty Law, the Patriots had defensive backs that were physical and tough, with the versatility to defend the run at the line of scrimmage and execute their responsibilities in pass coverage. They were also extremely effective blitzers.

  More experience came from linebacker Bryan Cox and defensive backs Otis Smith and Terrell Buckley, smart veterans who quickly learned Belichick’s new schemes—schemes with just enough wrinkles and variations that opponents couldn’t have previously studied on tape. The Rams certainly weren’t fully prepared to deal with them, and the results were evident on the scoreboard. Powerful St. Louis would be held to a single field goal through the first three quarters.

  My first NFL head coach was Chuck Knox, a guy who won more games in his career than a lot of coaches who are in the Pro Football Hall of Fame. Chuck was legendary for dozens of sayings his players referred to as “Knoxisms.” The one I remember best is, “What you do speaks so well. There’s no need to hear what you say.” Bill Belichick is very much of the same mind. “We don’t have many signs in our locker room,” he noted. “We have a quote from the great Chinese general Sun Tzu dating back to 540 B.C. It says, ‘Every battle is won before it is ever fought.’ We have another sign that says, ‘Penalties lose games.’ But that’s it. What we do have are pictures of our players from games we’ve won, scenes of them making plays or celebrating a teammate’s success. We’re not big on signs. We’re bigger on pictures.”

  I’m not sure if one particular photo is mounted on the walls of the Patriots facility, but if it’s not, it should be: the image of any New England defender from Super Bowl XXXVI knocking Marshall Faulk on his ass.

  Rams Series No. 1

  1st Quarter, 14:48 remaining: St. Louis 0, New England 0

  The Patriots began the game in a 4-3 defensive set. This wasn’t what New England had run during the early part of the season. But after six-year-veteran Tedy Bruschi proved he was more than capable of handling assignments from the traditional middle linebacker position, Belichick switched his base defense from a 3-4 to a 4-3. This gave Bill a blank canvas on which to draw up new alignments for his defenders to master—and his opponents to figure out.

  Durin
g the Rams’ opening drive, New England’s secondary disguised its looks and schemes, shifting personnel after the snap and dropping some defenders into coverage as others moved into the box. The goal was to create hesitation and uncertainty; to disrupt Warner’s usual rapid-fire processing of information and sharp dissection of coverage. The Patriots had made similar rotations the first time the two teams played but had then switched to constant blitzing. “We certainly aren’t going to do that again after they picked us apart in the regular season,” Belichick told his players. Indeed, the Rams rarely saw Bill dial up a blitz call in Super Bowl XXXVI. The switch in strategy wasn’t a total surprise to Warner, but it did affect him. He was not the same quarterback this time around, which became evident early on.

  Belichick’s Bull’s-Eye game plan was simply this: Whenever Marshall lined up in the offset position—either alongside or slightly angled from Warner—he was going to be hit. The Patriots were willing to sacrifice putting heat on Warner to neutralize Faulk. “Rather than disrupt the passing game by trying to pressure them,” Belichick revealed later, “we were going to disrupt the passing game by trying to jam the receivers, and most importantly, take care of Faulk. We wanted to keep him out of the passing game. Everything was geared toward where Faulk lined up, with an emphasis on pass coverage.”

  An early example occurred in this first series when a penalty put St. Louis in a third-and-18 hole. Vrabel lined up as an end, yet was assigned to physically go after Faulk if he immediately released to the outside on a pass route. After the snap, Faulk pretended to block, then took off. Vrabel intended to blast Faulk but landed only a glancing blow. Marshall slipped free for a screen pass, but it didn’t gain enough yardage for a first down, so the Rams punted. It would be one of the few times that Marshall avoided severe head-on contact all day.

  Rams Series No. 2

  1st Quarter, 8:15 remaining: St. Louis 0, New England 0

  St. Louis picked up the game’s first score but had to grind for every yard as New England’s defense tightened the screws. St. Louis ran nine plays on the drive. The Patriots played man-to-man, with their corners in press coverage on seven of those plays. They had safety help over the top, which is why they were able to do this, but, conceptually, they were in physical man-to-man coverage. Although Warner completed six passes, none gained more than 14 yards. The third play of the series, a 3-yard pass to Bruce, spoke volumes about New England’s get-tough approach. Tight end Ernie Conwell crossed into the middle, covered by Phifer. Out of the corner of his eye, Conwell detected a blur. It was Bruschi, who was free to roam because his man, fullback James Hodgins, had stayed in to block. Tedy promptly knocked Conwell off his feet. At the same time, cornerback Ty Law ran all the way from the other side and stopped Bruce cold with a textbook open-field tackle.

  Four plays later, Faulk absorbed his first truly brutal collision. Seeing that Marshall was lined up offset, Willie McGinest moved from his crouched defensive end position, switching to outside linebacker. Following the snap, Faulk released outside. As if shot from a cannon, McGinest ran straight into Faulk and pushed him backward, even though he wasn’t primarily involved in the call. At the same time, Phifer busted up a botched tight-end screen to Conwell, who lost yardage on the play.

  Despite these setbacks, completions to Bruce, Faulk, and the seldom-used Hodgins moved the ball to New England’s 32-yard line. On third-and-3, the Rams came out in one-back, four-wide-receiver personnel, with Faulk aligned in a wide receiver’s position in the left slot. It’s known as an “empty set,” with no one in the backfield behind Warner. But the play’s design was to the right, away from Faulk. The three wideouts to that side attacked the press coverage. Bruce broke open to the sideline against Law, who was clearly playing to the inside. But a confused Warner threw to the wrong man, trying to force it to tightly guarded veteran wide receiver Ricky Proehl. The pass was incomplete, and St. Louis settled for a Jeff Wilkins field goal to take a 3-0 lead.

  It was only two drives, but patterns were emerging. Clearly, Belichick’s heightened aggression was bothering the Rams. “The game plan was to hit those guys, knock ‘em down, beat them up,” admitted Bryan Cox, “Every play, run or pass, getting the ball, not getting the ball. You had to hit the Big Three—and that was Holt, Bruce, and Faulk.” Vrabel could also see the difference from their regular-season game. “Bill was obviously not going to give the Rams the same looks after they’d beaten us the first time,” he recalled. “So we changed things up. I also think we were a better team in the Super Bowl than we were in November. We had a better understanding of what we wanted to do. We just tried to jam their receivers with our corners and line-backers—and, obviously, hit Marshall as much as possible.”

  Rams Series No. 3

  1st Quarter, 1:59 remaining: St. Louis 3, New England 0

  The Rams’ offense thrived on quick-striking play selections, a pace that hurried opponents first into uncertainty, then into making mistakes and breakdowns. By being physical and disrupting the timing of routes, New England allowed the Rams to pick up yardage only in small bites, as opposed to their usual big gulps. The Patriots were forcing St. Louis out of its comfort zone, and it happened again on this drive. Except for one big pass completion, the Rams were forced to grind it out, an approach that both Martz and his players despised. After needing three plays to make a first down, Warner hoped to accelerate the tempo by turning to his bread and butter: the intermediate passing game, also known as a “second-level” throw. This is a completion that occurs anywhere from 15 to 22 yards past the line of scrimmage, and the Rams were better at it than anyone in football.

  But more in-your-face contact by the Pats’ defense put a stop to that. On first-and-10 at the Rams’ 37, Torry Holt lined up only a few yards from left tackle Orlando Pace, giving Vrabel an easier path to jam Holt and slow his release. Torry was likely the intended receiver, but with the play’s timing disrupted, Warner faked a toss to Faulk. It didn’t fool New England defensive end Bobby Hamilton, who, unblocked, breezed in and sacked Warner for a 5-yard loss.

  The next play was more of the same. This time Vrabel belted Faulk when he tried to release outside, while McGinest popped wide-out Az-Zahir Hakim coming out of his stance. With his two main targets out of position, Kurt’s internal clock told him he’d better bail out, but all he did was step up into more pressure. Warner’s throw to Hakim was high, not one of his customary accurate darts, and Az paid dearly by absorbing his second nasty hit of the play—a vicious shot in the rib cage from Phifer. Not surprisingly, Hakim dropped the pass. The Rams’ skill players, from Faulk on down, were taking their lumps, and they weren’t liking it.

  Hakim got some revenge on the following play, when the Pats rushed only three players on third-and-15. The offensive line gave Warner plenty of time to set up, and Kurt connected for a 29-yard completion, the longest Rams play of the first half. It was vintage Warner—a terrific throw against two-man coverage. Hakim also did his job, beating Buckley by running a Rams’ staple: the intermediate in-breaking route.

  From there, the drive sputtered. On first-and-10, New England was in its base 4-3, with the corners playing press man coverage on the outside, and the linebackers and safeties playing zone concepts on the inside. The call was supposed to be a pass to Faulk down the seam, but the inside-zone scheme took it away. Instead Warner went to Conwell, who was running an underneath pattern. It ended badly, as Lawyer Milloy drilled the St. Louis tight end, and the pass was dropped. On second down, Warner picked up 5 yards on a designed quarterback draw, but he was not so fortunate on third-and-5.

  New England went into its dime package of six defensive backs, with its corners in press coverage. It was then that Belichick called his first blitz of the game. The blitzer wasn’t a linebacker but safety Tebucky Jones, and the blitz was both well disguised and unexpected, given that the Rams had seen nothing like it in the twenty-two previous plays they’d run. Warner’s hurried pass was tipped by six-foot-six rookie Richard Seymour at th
e line, forcing the Rams to try another field goal. This time, Wilkins’s kick went wide. Another frustrating slow-as-molasses series for St. Louis that produced no points.

  Of the nine plays in this drive, the Patriots played man coverage in seven of them. Six of those plays found New England corners pressing their assigned receivers. This was a very aggressive posture for Belichick, considering the extraordinary talent of St. Louis’s skill players. Something you rarely see in the NFL was unfolding: matchups that would remain virtually unchanged throughout an entire game. Ty Law on Bruce, Otis Smith on Holt, and Terrell Buckley on Hakim. And Bill was showing surprising confidence in his other nickel and dime backs, Terrance Shaw and Antwan Harris, neither of whom was considered to be at the same talent level as the Rams they were covering. But within the Pats’ aggressive scheme, they were more than holding their own.

  Rams Series No. 4

  2nd Quarter, 10:08 remaining: St. Louis 3, New England 0

  St. Louis started out well, with two Faulk runs picking up 20 yards. It looked as if the Rams were finally settling into their customary rhythm. But then Belichick made his best defensive call of the game, resulting in one of the most shocking plays in Super Bowl history.

  With first-and-10 at the Rams’ 39, the Patriots deployed their 4-3 base personnel but didn’t show that alignment. For the first time all day, New England went into a 5-2 set—Vrabel aligned across from Conwell in a three-point lineman’s stance. Following the snap, all five players on the front, including Vrabel, rushed Warner. Right offensive tackle Rod Jones turned his attention inside to the hard-charging Bobby Hamilton and did not react to Vrabel. With Conwell free-releasing into his route and Faulk working to the other side, there was no one in position to account for Vrabel.