Islands of Destiny: The Solomons Campaign and the Eclipse of the Rising Sun

by John Prados

  While Allied intelligence—Ultra especially—contributed every day to the success of SOPAC operations, arguably it rendered its greatest service in the five weeks or so from Santa Cruz to Tassafaronga. During that interval Halsey’s legions stood on a knife’s edge. Cactus might yet have been isolated—as Rabaul would be later. Halsey’s inferior surface forces could have been swept from the sea, and his single, weakened aircraft carrier overwhelmed from the sky. Intel enabled Halsey to block the enemy. That the Halsey fleet did not always succeed—Tassafaronga being a notable calamity—is no reflection on the pillars’ performance.

  Yamamoto’s error in planning for the future rather than acting in the moment stood revealed before the end of the year, when the Japanese on Guadalcanal had become so starved they were incapable of offensive action in any event, and by which time Allied naval forces had begun to grow powerful. Careful Japanese offensive plans had to be scrapped in favor of ones to save the men on Starvation Island. By then major Japanese air operations yielded small effects. The attrition of Japanese air, in turn, made ground and naval sallies increasingly ineffective. Halsey’s South Pacific command first inched up The Slot, then advanced at an accelerating pace.

  Allied intelligence still furnished key information—its failure to detect the Japanese evacuation from Guadalcanal at least balanced, if not eclipsed, by the Ultra breakthrough on the Yamamoto ambush—but as SOPAC’s raw power grew, the value of secret information diminished. Intelligence continued to multiply force but by a lesser factor—although it had a last great contribution still to make: the secret knowledge that led to the slaughter of the Imperial Navy’s heavy ships at Rabaul.

  The logic of the Japanese approach would be completely vitiated after Guadalcanal, when the focus turned from whittling down the adversary to force protection. The decisive battle doctrine had prevailed. Suddenly the Japanese rarely committed big ships—never their battleships—and sent carrier air groups to fly from land bases, never their flattops. The Imperial Navy’s light forces, already addled by virtual attrition, were left unsupported against an increasingly capable and technologically sophisticated SOPAC fleet. So deplorable did the situation become that a Rabaul staff officer publicly remonstrated with his superiors for the high command’s attitude. Forty Imperial Navy destroyers were lost in the Solomons campaign, more than a third of its prewar strength. New construction did not make good those losses. The Americans (in all theaters) also had forty destroyers sunk to the end of 1943—but added two hundred. The Japanese fleet so carefully husbanded for decisive battle lacked escort protection when it did emerge.

  When Admiral Koga finally sent in the heavy ships, they suffered a Pearl Harbor in reverse. Soon after that Fortress Rabaul itself became powerless against the Allied aerial armada. From Pearl Harbor to Rabaul the war had gone full circle in just under two years. The rapidity with which the Solomons transformed from arena to backwater is a measure of Allied triumph and Japanese failure. There would be no Japanese dictation of terms at the White House. Instead there would be a Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay.

  ENDNOTES

  PROLOGUE

  “We realize our own fault”: (p. 2) Ugaki Diary, June 10, 1942, p. 162. “I am the only one who must apologize”: (p. 3): Fuchida and Okumiya, Midway, quoted p. 188. “This present setback”: (p. 3): Ugaki Diary, op. cit. “America’s Enemy no. 2”: (p. 7): Harper’s Magazine, April 1942. “What we need…is numbers”: (p. 8) Ugaki Diary, June 21, 1942, p. 166. “Small success”: (p. 9) Ugaki Diary, June 30, 1942, p. 167. “The Japanese Navy still had”: (p. 10) Fuchida and Okumiya, Midway, p. 186.

  1. ALL ALONG THE WATCHTOWER

  “If ever a sledgehammer”: (p. 22): Fuchida and Okumiya, Midway, p. 46. “To invade strategic points”: (p. 24): Navy General Staff Directive No. 47, January 29, 1942, Headquarters, Far East Command, Military History Section, Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directives, p. 20; U.S. Navy Microfilm J-27 (hereafter cited as IGHQ Directives). “Our biggest loss”: (p. 25): Robert J. Cressman, “Carrier Strike Through Mountain Passage,” World War II Magazine, December 1986, quoted p. 41. “The farthest advanced base”: (p. 30): 8th Base Force Secret Order No. 1, April 28, 1942. Captured document translated and disseminated by the Combat Intelligence Center, Pacific Fleet, October 5, 1942 (SRH-278, War Diary, Combat Intelligence Center, Pacific Fleet, 1942, pp. 56–57. NARA: RG-457). “The tea in this cup”: (p. 31): John Toland, The Rising Sun, quoted p. 346. Baird is truly scathing: (pp. 37–39): These reminiscences can be found in “The Pacific War Through the Eyes of Forrest R. ‘Tex’ Baird,” Cryptolog, v. 10, no. 2, Winter 1989, pp. 4–18. Historian John R. Lundstrom, who has mounted the broadest defense of Admiral Fletcher (Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), completely fails to take Baird’s recollections into account. “This enemy employed a huge force”: (p. 41): Ugaki Diary, August 7, 1942, p. 177. “Exercise strategic command”: (p. 52): George C. Dyer, The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971, v. I, quoted p. 303. “Forces of the United States Pacific Fleet”: (p. 54): CINCPAC Communiqué No. 6, August 8, 1942. USN Communiqués Nos. 1–300, p. 73.

  2. UNDER THE SOUTHERN CROSS

  “[It] is evident that [Allied] operational commanders were aware”: (p. 56): Commo Intel in Pac War SRH. “A real bull’s eye”: (p. 60): Kenney, A General Reports, p. 59. “Someone told me that an air raid”: (p. 61): Herbert L. Merillat, Guadalcanal Remembered, p. 57. “INDICATIONS POINT STRONGLY”: (p. 71): COMSOPAC-CTF61, 220910 Aug 1942. Nimitz Command Summary: Running Estimate and Summary (hereafter cited as CINCPAC Greybook), December 7, 1941–August 31, 1942 (declassified May 3, 1972), Reel 1, p. 808. Date-time groups (“220910”) in U.S. message traffic are given in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). The Solomons were twelve hours ahead of GMT. “We were completely unable to see”: (p. 76): Barrett Tillman, “The Carrier War Remembered,” Naval History Magazine, October 2010, quoted p. 33. “INTERCEPTS INDICATE”: (p. 77): CINCPAC-COMINCH 242305 Aug 1942. CINCPAC Greybook, Reel 1, p. 809. “A frightful blast”: (pp. 77–78): Tanaka Raizo, “The Struggle for Guadalcanal,” in David C. Evans, ed., The Japanese Navy, p. 168. “Like a broken record”: (p. 87): Harold L. Buell, Dauntless Helldivers, p. 138. “At this rate we can whip ourselves”: (p. 88): Samuel B. Griffith, II, The Battle for Guadalcanal, quoted p. 136. “The ridge you insist on putting your new CP behind”: (p. 95): Vandegrift, Once a Marine, quoted p. 151. “Thinner than Gandhi himself” et seq: (pp. 100–1): Agawa Hiroyuki, The Reluctant Admiral, quoted p. 328. Agawa (and Tsuji in the original) dates this on September 24, but it is clear from Ugaki’s diary that this meeting took place four days later.

  3. A CRIMSON TIDE

  “I liked Ghormley”: (p. 103): George Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 116. “Will hold what they have”: (p. 104): Time, October 26, 1942, quoted p. 30. “This is the decisive battle”: (p. 106): Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, quoted p. 143. “The operation to surround and recapture Guadalcanal”: (p. 106): Kenneth Friedman, Morning of the Rising Sun, quoted p. 243. “For the past six or seven weeks” et seq: (p. 110): CINCPAC, “Estimate of Enemy Capabilities, October 1, 1942 (declassified August 12, 1976). CINCPAC Greybook, Reel 1, p. 1072. “The impression is gained that the enemy”: (p. 111): CINCPAC Fleet Intelligence Summary, October 10, 1942 (declassified July 11, 1985). NARA: Records of the National Security Agency (RG-457): SRMN-009, CINCPAC Fleet Intelligence Summaries, 22 June 1942–8 May 1943. [Hereafter the National Security Agency records will be cited only by their “SR” numbers.] “What are we going to do”: (p. 112): James B. Hornfischer, Neptune’s Inferno, quoted p. 171. “Where is the mighty power of the Imperial Navy”: (p. 115): Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, quoted p. 143. “There’s a million of ’em” et seq: (p. 116): C. Raymond Calhoun, Tin Can Sailor, quoted p. 63. “All at once the murmuring night exploded”: (p. 119): Nikolai Stevenson, “Four Mont
hs on the Front Line,” American Heritage, October–November 1985, p. 53. “The shelter shook”: (p. 119): Herbert Merillat, Guadalcanal Remembered, p. 175. “It now appears that we are unable to control the sea” et seq: (p. 123): CINCPAC Greybook, October 15, 1942; Reel 2, p. 1093. “From all indications”: (p. 126): CINCPAC Greybook, October 22, 1942; Reel 2, p. 1100. “Impatiently” et seq: (p. 129): Hara Tameichi, Japanese Destroyer Captain, p. 124. “STRIKING FORCE WILL PROCEED”: (p. 131): Hara, quoted pp. 126–27. “THIS COMMAND HAS THE WHOLE RESPONSIBILITY:” (p. 132): Ugaki Diary, October 24, 1942, p. 245. “I admit I’ve objected to your suggestions”: (p. 136): John Toland, The Rising Sun, quoted p. 460. “What you said before was true”: (p. 137): Ibid., quoted p. 461. “The crescendo of the fighting ashore”: (p. 138): William F. Halsey with J. D. Bryan, Admiral Halsey’s Story, p. 121. “ATTACK—REPEAT—ATTACK”: (p. 138): Quoted, ibid. “OPERATE FROM AND IN POSITIONS”: (p. 147): John Lundstrom, The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign, quoted p. 409. “Our men have become quite proficient”: (p. 149): Okumiya and Horikoshi, Zero, quoted p. 193. “Damn fool!”: (p. 151): Ugaki Diary, October 26, 1942, p. 250. “Again? Am I to fly again today?”: (p. 152): Okumiya and Horikoshi, Zero, quoted p. 195. “Apprehend and annihilate any powerful forces”: (p. 154): Basil Collier, The War in the Far East, 1941–1945, quoted p. 299. “I got the impression”: (p. 155): Kondo Nobutake, “Some Opinions Concerning the War,” in Goldstein and Dillon, eds., The Pacific War Papers, p. 314. “Halfhearted advance” et seq: (p. 155): Hara Tameichi, Japanese Destroyer Captain, p. 133. “Largest part” et seq: (p. 156): Imperial Navy, Destroyer Squadron 10 Records (Washington Document Center no. 160985), Naval Historical Center, Records of the Japanese Navy and Related Translations, box 37, folder: “WDC 160875.” “The Combined Fleet is at present striking heavy blows”: (p. 157): Imperial Rescript of October 29, 1942. Samuel E. Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, quoted p. 224.

  4. EMPIRE IN THE BALANCE

  “Japanese Fleet Quits Solomons”: (p. 160): New York Times, October 31, 1942. “Naval quarters” et seq: (p. 160): New York Times, October 29, 1942. “GROUND SITUATION AT CACTUS CAN BE TURNED IN OUR FAVOR”: (p. 161): CINCPAC-COMSOPAC Dispatch 282225, October 1942. CINCPAC Greybook, Pt. 2, p. 965. “On a grand scale”: (p. 166): CINCPAC Greybook, November 8, 1942, Pt. 2, p. 1158. “All-out attempt upon Guadalcanal soon”: (p. 166): CINCPAC Fleet Intelligence Summary, November 9, 1942. SRMN-009, “CINCPAC Fleet Intelligence Summaries, 22 June 1942–8 May 1943” (declassified July 7, 1985), p. 178. “ULTRA. INDICATIONS THAT MAJOR OPERATION”: (p. 167): CINCPAC-SOPAC et al., 092107, November 1942; CINCPAC Greybook Pt. 2, pp. 902–3. “What is the range and bearing?” et seq: (p. 175): Hara Tameichi, Japanese Destroyer Captain, quoted p. 140. “Pandemonium”: (p. 176): Ibid., p. 141. “Cease firing, own ships!” et seq: (p. 177): James Hornfischer, Neptune’s Inferno, quoted pp. 288, 291. “We’ve got the bastards”: (p. 183): Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey’s Story, quoted p. 130. “THIS FORCE TO OPERATE”: (p. 184): Ivan Musicant, Battleship at War, quoted p. 114. “The sudden appearance of enemy battleships”: (p. 192): Kondo Nobutake, “Some Opinions Concerning the War,” in Goldstein and Dillon, eds., The Pacific War Papers, p. 314. “GUADALCANAL ATTACK FORCE”: (p. 193): Ugaki Diary, November 14, 1942, quoted p. 271. “On Nov. 14, while escorting our transport fleet”: (p. 194–95): Imperial Headquarters announcement, November 18, 1942; New York Times, November 19, 1942, p. 2. “[A] continuance of that night engagement”: (p. 195): Kondo Nobutake in Goldstein and Dillon, eds., The Pacific War Papers, p. 316. “It is now definite”: (p. 199): CINCPAC War Diary, November 15, 1942 (Nov. 16 in the South Pacific). CINCPAC Greybook, Pt. 2, p. 1168. “ONCE AGAIN RADIO INTELLIGENCE HAS ENABLED”: (p. 200): CINCPAC-COMSOPAC et al., 170139 Nov 42. NARA: RG-457, NSA Records, SRH-306 “Exploits and Commendations, World War II” (declassified July 18, 1984), p. 7. “Our Army troops…are starving”: (p. 201): Orita Zenji with Joseph D. Harrington, I-Boat Captain, quoted p. 138. “It was an error on my part”: (p. 206): Hara Tameichi, Japanese Destroyer Captain, quoted p. 165. “The time for changing the future policy”: (p. 210): Ugaki Diary, December 8, 1942; op. cit., p. 301. “To withdraw from Guadalcanal,” et seq: (p. 211): Colonel Sanada Joichiro Interrogation (WDC 62081). NARA: Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, John Toland Papers, box 3, folder: “Guadalcanal.” “During the period from about the latter part of January”: (p. 212): IGHQ Navy Directive No. 184, January 4, 1943. IGHQ Directives, p. 80. “OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE IS RABAUL”: (pp. 213–14): COMSOPAC-COMSOWESPAC, 280145 Nov 42. CINCPAC Greybook, Pt. 2, p. 1001.

  5. INCHING FOR GROUND

  “It’s deplorable indeed”: (p. 218): Ugaki Diary, December 28, 1942, p. 314. “A major action…is expected soon”: (p. 226): CINCPAC Fleet Intelligence Summary, January 31, 1943. NARA: RG-457, SRMN-009 (the fleet summaries quoted below are also from this source). “The major operation predicted yesterday”: (p. 226): CINCPAC Fleet Intelligence Summary, February 1, 1943. “INDICATIONS ARE THAT JAP OFFENSIVE”: (p. 229): COMINCH Dispatch 012330 February 1943. NARA: RG-457, SRMN-044. “ARE THERE ANY INDICATIONS”: (p. 230): COMINCH Dispatch 062149, February 6, 1943, Ibid. “AS YET NOTHING”: (p. 230): COMSOPAC Dispatch 080931, February 7, 1943. Ibid. “The fake message which helped”: (p. 231): Ito Haruki 1958 Interview. Naval Historical Center, Morison Papers, box 26. “The return of the Advance Force to Truk”: (p. 231): CINCPAC Fleet Intelligence Summary, February 9, 1943. “‘TOKYO EXPRESS’ NO LONGER HAS TERMINUS ON GUADALCANAL”: (p. 231): Message, Patch–Halsey, February 9, 1943. Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, quoted p. 371. “The end was as abrupt as the beginning”: (pp. 231–32): Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II, quoted p. 127. “It was very useful to have”: (p. 234): Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, quoted p. 401. “Became the victim”: (p. 238): W. J. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets, p. 116. “It looked like the 4th of July” et seq: (pp. 242–43): James Fahey, Pacific War Diary, pp. 36–37. “They made glaring tactical mistakes”: (pp. 247–48): Office of Naval Intelligence (Op-16-FE), “Characteristics and Quality of Japanese Naval Pilots,” October 25, 1943. NARA: RG-38, Naval Operations: ONI Reports, box 2, folder: “1943 ONI F-14 Serials.” “We’d go in individually” et seq: (p. 248): Eric Bergerud, Fire in the Sky, quoted p. 541. “Display their all-out joint might”: (p. 250): NGS Directive No. 184, January 4, 1943. IGHQ Directives, p. 82. “Enemy Fleets in advance bases”: (p. 257): NGS Directive No. 206, March 25, 1943. IGHQ Directives, p. 104.

  6. WAR OF ATTRITION

  “There will be no hope”: (p. 260): Ugaki Diary, April 3, 1943, p. 320. “More than once this lack of experience” (p. 261): Okumiya Masatake and Horikoshi Jiro, Zero, p. 175. “Increased air activity” (p. 262): CINCPAC Fleet Intelligence Summary, April 4, 1943. NARA: RG-457, SRMN-009, p. 343. “Large air action by land-based planes”: (p. 262): CINCPAC Fleet Intelligence Summary, April 6, 1943. Ibid., p. 345. “There’s millions of ’em”: (p. 263): Washington Post, January 23, 2009, quoted p. B9. “A good stimulus”: (p. 267): Bruce Gamble, Fortress Rabaul, quoted p. 327. “The meeting concluded”: (p. 268): Okumiya and Horikoshi, Zero, p. 176. “We’ve hit the jackpot”: (p. 270): Roger Pineau, “The Death of Admiral Yamamoto,” Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly, October 1994, quoted p. 4. “I personally did the whole thing” et seq: (p. 270): John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, quoted p. 459. “An attempt will be made to intercept”: (p. 271): CINCPAC War Diary, April 16, 1943. CINCPAC Greybook, Pt. 2, p. 1510. “Hold on, Kelly”: (p. 274): Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey’s Story, quoted p. 157. “No officers were evident along our route” et seq: (p. 276): Hara Tameichi with Fred Saito and Roger Pineau, Japanese Destroyer Captain, p. 176. “A number of Lightning fighters”: (p. 278): Navy Department Communiqué No. 348, April 18, 1943. Department of the Navy, Navy Department Communiqués 301 to 600, March 6, 1943 to May 24, 1945. United States Navy: Office of Public Information, 1945, p. 17. “In a race of unknown men”: (p. 281): Time magazine, November 8,
1943, p. 30. “No matter how many times the enemy shall advance”: (p. 283): Address No. 4 to the Combined Fleets, May 23, 1943 (JICPOA Item no. 4986). United States Congress, Joint Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack, Report: Congressional Investigation Pearl Harbor Attack. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946, Pt. 6, p. 612. “The information created a tumult”: (p. 286): Hanami Kohei, “The Man I Might Have Killed Was Kennedy,” Yomiuri Daily, November 2, 1960. “Once more the setup of Tassafaronga”: (p. 290): Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 181. “While night fighting had long been regarded”: (p. 292): Hanami Kohei, op cit. “The air units and surface units will cooperate” et seq: (pp. 296–97): Southeast Area Force Operation Order No. 10, July 18, 1943. Naval Historical Center: Records of the Japanese Navy and Related Documents, SOPAC Translations, box 3, item no. 730. “We had three alternatives”: (p. 299): quoted in “Japanese Captain Was in Ship That Sank P.T. 109,” Evening Post (Sydney), August 1, 1963. “Unprecedented” et seq: (p. 300): Yamashiro Satsumori, “Collision with American PT-109 Boat,” Suiko, September 1960 (publication of the Suikokai Society, English trans-lation provided to John F. Kennedy). Japanese dispute over PT-109: (p. 300–1): This discussion is based upon letters to President Kennedy from the Japanese participants, press clippings, and other material contained in the files “PT-109 Correspondence—Japanese,” and “PT-109 Correspondence—Robert Donovan” in box 132 of John F. Kennedy’s Papers (Personal Papers, Personal Secretary’s Files) at the Kennedy Library. “Isn’t there someplace where we can strike”: (p. 302): Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. New York: HarperCollins, 2000, quoted p. 466. “Undoubtedly reliable” et seq: (p. 305): ONI, “Japanese Intelligence Activities in South and Southwest Pacific Areas,” February 9, 1944 (declassified May 3, 1972). NARA: RG-38, ONI Series, box 8, folder: “Intelligence Organs.” “Fought bravely, then died of starvation” et seq: (p. 308): Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, quoted pp. 466–67. “You have just noted the brief life expectancy of a destroyer” et seq: (p. 312): Hara Tameichi, Japanese Destroyer Captain, quoted p. 226.