Affection and Trust: The Personal Correspondence of Harry S. Truman and Dean Acheson, 1953-1971

by David McCullough

  One wonders what happened at the first talk and what he thought of the mission apart from misrepresentations.

  Might it not be better to cut the whole story down to cover very briefly your purpose (which must I think have taken Berlin into the picture), the political situation, Fred’s willingness to go, Marshall’s concern, your very proper consideration for that and the abandonment of the idea—say less than half the length it now is?

  Page 358. I have suggested a way out of the mixed metaphor of the “ground swell in the grass roots.”

  Page 362. At the very top of the page, as indicated, the meaning of the sentence is not apparent. How small states get an “equal voice” I don’t understand; nor, how the electoral system “saves a lot of trouble” in “abnormal” situations. If this is useful here, it ought to be cleared up.

  Pages 379–381. Point 4 is presented in these pages as a capital investment program. But on pages 383, 384, 386, 390, and 393, both the discussion and the appropriations asked for and given concern a technical assistance program. The capital asked for was small, except in India at the end, and was to build pilot or demonstration plants.

  Page 380. I suggest eliminating the part about colonialism. Point 4 was not an attack on colonialism and did not operate in colonial areas. What you say on pages 380–1 will only cause hard feelings.

  These are a lot of tough criticisms, not calculated to endear the critic. But they call attention to what seem to me to be errors which will harm you. The story except for Chapter III and part of Chapter II is a fine one and holds the reader.

  I have almost finished the last volume, pages 396–858, and will start a letter in a day or two.

  Most warmly and faithfully,

  Dean

  P.S. This letter though begun on the 18th is finished and mailed today July 20. D.

  Although Truman had already turned over the memoir manuscript to his publisher, he tells Acheson he can still make changes on the galleys. He looks forward to receiving Acheson’s comments on the final part of the second volume.

  July 19, 1955

  Dear Dean:

  I found your letter of the 11th on my desk when I returned from Chicago and I certainly do appreciate very much your generosity in helping me polish up this second volume.

  I am hoping that if there are any errors of fact you will point them out, and if my recollection of the meaning of the facts at the time they took place has gone askew I know you will set me straight.

  I am going over the second volume as carefully as I can but I had to make the turnover on June 30th. We will still have time to make corrections on the galley proofs.

  If it is convenient to you to send in the installments of 200 pages, or groups of chapters, that will be very satisfactory to me.

  I sincerely hope that you and Mrs. Acheson have the grandest time in the world on that European trip. I’ll be in touch with you right along.

  It is almost as much satisfaction to get this Time contract behind me as it was to get out of the White House and I want to say if it had not been for the help which you and John Snyder, and one or two others, gave me I don’t believe I would ever have been able to get it done. Of course, Bill Hillman and Dave Noyes really did a yeoman’s job on putting this material together.

  Sincerely yours,

  Harry S. Truman

  You are just too good and too patient.

  July 25, 1955

  THE HONORABLE HARRY S TRUMAN

  AM SENDING YOU TOMORROW A LONG LETTER WITH SUGGESTIONS WHICH I HOPE YOU CAN CONSIDER THE LAST 400 PAGES OF MANUSCRIPT, WHICH I AM ALSO MAILING TO YOU

  DEAN ACHESON

  Acheson’s comments on the last part of Truman’s second volume of memoirs deal with General MacArthur’s deployments in the Korean War, in violation of orders, which brought in the Chinese intervention and greatly damaged the Truman administration’s standing in public opinion. The “Wake Island meeting” refers to a flight Truman made to Wake Island, in the mid-Pacific, to meet with General MacArthur about the conduct of the Korean War.

  July 25, 1955

  Dear Mr. President:

  I have now finished reading your manuscript and return the last volume with my suggestions.

  This manuscript flows along more smoothly than the last one and is most interesting. I congratulate you on it. For your generous references to me, I am profoundly grateful.

  My comments are divided into two groups:—minor and stylistic suggestions; and, suggestions going to substance.

  The former do not require comment and appear as interlineations on pages 396, 401, 402, 403, 405, 414, 417, 418, 421, 425, 435, 438, 478, 479, 488, 489, 492, 494, 496, 510, 512, 515, 516, 521, 524, 529, 547, 576, 579, 591, 607, 626, 683, 684, 685, 688, 693, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 703, 704, 712, 713, 714, 720, 721, 776, 794, 820 (Edward VIII killed that phrase), 821 (unnecessary and meaningless sentence), 828, 838, 841–2 (in the last sentence on the page running over something is left out).

  Suggestions dealing with substance:

  P. 406. The second paragraph as written seems to contradict the first paragraph. I have made on the page a guess as to what Bevin said.

  The last paragraph, as it runs over on 407, can well be cut. It sounds like one of Bob Lovett’s more involved efforts and really says nothing. The same is true of the rather trifling and desultory discussion reported on p. 408. What really happened appears at the bottom of 408.

  P. 415. It is often and erroneously said that under our constitution the nation cannot commit itself in advance to go to war under specified circumstances. Unless Mr. Bricker changes things, the U.S.A. has in foreign affairs all the powers of sovereignty and can bind itself in any way it chooses. [Senator John W. Bricker sponsored the Bricker amendment limiting treaty power.] The changes indicated save this point without raising the argument.

  P. 451. Question: Isn’t the reference to parities being forced down inconsistent with what you have said above about the Brannan Plan? For the first time, the Brannan Plan became clear to me in your explanation. But this sentence mixed me up again.

  P. 470. I suggest that in view of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Peters case [Peters v. Hobby, 1955] you leave these two paragraphs out. The Court decided that under your order the Loyalty Review Board had authority only to review an appeal by the employee. It would be a mistake to cause any new confusion as to what the order provided.

  P. 487. The slogans indicated do not seem to me to be “similar” to the others which appealed to intolerance. Shouldn’t they come out?

  P. 497. I don’t understand the last sentence on the page. Shouldn’t the sentence read: “How else could you have known that it should not be brought before your Committee unless you saw it and formed your own judgment?” And yet do you mean to imply that in all such cases chairmen of committees should see secret papers? Perhaps the best course is to leave out your reply.

  P. 513. Is this classified information? It may now be public knowledge; but I cannot recall reading anywhere the method by which we learn about atomic explosions in Russia.

  P. 514. I would leave this out. There is evidence that the Russians are pretty good in scientific development.

  P. 525, top. Was the first test thermonuclear shot in March 1951? I had thought that it was still unproven until the November 1952 test.

  Pp. 554–557. Blair House meeting on Korea, June 25, 1950. The best account of “Why We Went to War in Korea,” is in the Saturday Evening Post of November 10, 1951, by Beverly Smith. He wrote it after, by your orders, he had seen all our notes and papers. You should read it and then revise these pages which are skimpy on the greatest story of the 1949–1953 Administration and sometimes not altogether accurate.

  To begin with, method—which was one of your strong points—is wholly left out of your story. It was this: Louis Johnson [Secretary of Defense, 1949–50] and Bradley were away, flying back from Tokyo on that Saturday night. Over the phone you told me to get together with the Service Secretaries and the Ch
iefs of Staff and get working parties started getting recommendations for you when you got back. These obviously could not be cleared with Louis and Brad and so the first order of business after I reported on the state of affairs was to lay out the recommendations for discussion. They formed the framework of the whole evening. It was not, as would seem on page 556, a series of off-the-cuff, disjointed observations.

  One other preliminary observation. You did not permit any discussion until dinner was served and over and the Blair House staff had withdrawn. Then you asked me to report on the situation and recommendations. This I did first before anyone made any observations.

  The situation report is what you have up to the top of 556. Then I reported the following recommendation for immediate action:

  1) That MacArthur should evacuate Americans from Korea—the dependents of the Military Mission, etc.—and, in order to do so, should keep open the Kimpo and other airports, repelling all hostile attacks thereon. In doing this, his air forces should stay south of the 38th Parallel.

  2) MacArthur should be instructed to get ammunition and supplies to the Korean army by airdrop and otherwise. [Truman staff marginalia: “That the Seventh Fleet should be ordered into the Formosa Strait to prevent the conflict spreading in that area.”]

  3) The Seventh Fleet should be ordered from Cavite north at once. We should make a statement that the fleet would repel any attack on Formosa and that no attack should be made from Formosa on the mainland. (At this point you interrupted to say that you agreed that the fleet should be ordered north at once, but that you would sleep on the statements until the fleet was in position. You expressed no opinion on them on the merits.)

  4) The situation was not clear enough to make any further recommendations that night.

  After this report you asked each person in turn to state his agreement or disagreement and any views he might have in addition. Two things stand out in this discussion. One was the complete, almost unspoken acceptance on the part of everyone that whatever had to be done to meet this aggression had to be done. There was no suggestion from anyone that either the United Nations or the United States could back away from it. This was the test of all the talk of the last five years of collective security. The other point which stands out in my mind from the discussion was the difference in view of what might be called for. Vandenberg and [Admiral Forrest] Sherman thought that air and naval aid might be enough. [General J. Lawton] Collins [army chief of staff, 1949–53] (and I think Bradley) were clear that if the Korean army was really broken, ground forces would be necessary. But no one could tell what the state of the Korean army really was on Sunday night. Whatever the service estimates might be everyone recognized the situation as serious in the extreme.

  After listening to the discussion, you directed that orders be issued carrying out the recommendations as modified by you.

  Louis Johnson has said that he and I had a debate on Formosa that night; he for protecting it, I against. That is completely untrue.

  P. 559. Throughout Monday the situation in Korea deteriorated rapidly. You called another meeting at Blair House Monday night. The same persons were present, except that Assistant Secretary of State [Elbert G.] Mathews took Rusk’s place and Secretary of Navy [Francis P.] Matthews was not present. The decisions taken that night were announced by you the next day, Tuesday, June 27th. The draft was prepared by me and adopted by you with minor changes. They were:

  1) U.S. air and sea forces to give Korean force cover and support.

  2) Seventh Fleet would neutralize Formosa.

  3) Our forces in the Philippines would be strengthened.

  4) Aid would be accelerated to Indo-China.

  5) Senator [Warren] Austin [U.S. ambassador to the U.N., 1946–53] was to report all this to the U.N.

  Meanwhile the Security Council of the U.N. met again and adopted the Resolution (on June 27th) calling on all members of the U.N. to give assistance to South Korea. That morning you met with the Congressional group.

  P. 564. On Thursday (our time) MacArthur made an air reconnaissance of Korea and during the night on the wire with Collins asked for permission to move in a regimental combat team as the beginning of a two division force since the Korean army had dissolved. Permission was given, and later general agreement with your action was voiced by the NSC and a meeting of Congressional personnel.

  The clear skeleton of this story of progressive decisions as events called for them does not come out clearly in these pages which are interspersed with too much conversation about who said what. The important thing is to get the bones in—because they are glorious bones—and let the conversational flesh come along afterward. [Truman marginalia: “Correct as hell is hot.”]

  Pp. 581–588. Harriman’s Memorandum of his talks with MacArthur.

  The inclusion of this memorandum raises serious questions. [Truman staff marginalia: “HST says go ahead.”]

  First. This should not be published without W.A.H.’s consent—and he should know the dangers to him as pointed out below. The literary rights in this memo belong to the writer and not the receiver. While you might have published it for governmental purposes while in office, you now have no official right to do so. [Truman marginalia: “Correct.”]

  Second. The memo will bring attacks and recriminations on W.A.H., who is in active politics and will want to run for Governor, or President, or to be Secretary of State some day. The memo, particularly the part of p. 583 which makes such a fool of MacArthur, will arouse his friends. [General Matthew] Ridgway and [General Lauris] Norstad will be drawn into the row to say whether things were or were not said. Then on page 585 MacArthur “thought it might be a good idea to let him [Chiang] land [on the mainland] and get rid of him that way.” This will be furiously denied. [Truman marginalia: “Will it?”]

  Then Averell says, “I explained in great detail why Chiang was a liability,” etc. Dewey can ring the changes on this to Averell’s great embarrassment. [Truman marginalia: “Can he?”]

  I think it very bad business to print the memorandum. You can go through it and say that Harriman, who kept notes of his talk with MacArthur, told you that _________ and then paraphrase those portions of the memo which relate to the real point, which is that Averell explained the policy to MacArthur who said that he would, of course, loyally support it. [Truman marginalia: “Let’s look and see if this may be right.”]

  P. 590. Your description of the meeting is not as I recall it. My notes of it are: “When we came into his office the President had in his hands some yellow sheets of newsticker paper. He told us to sit down. He was obviously angry. He read aloud to us the whole MacArthur letter, his voice getting harsher as he read. He said that this letter had been sent by MacArthur to the Veterans of Foreign Wars over the open telegraph; it was now on the AP ticker. He didn’t see how this could be done without somebody in the U.S. government knowing about it. He was going to ask each one of us in this room whether we had anything to do with it, whether they knew anything about it or were in any way whatever involved in it. He pointed at each person in turn around the room. Each answered, ‘No, sir.’

  “By the time the President got through it was a pretty thoroughly intimidated group. He turned to Louis Johnson and said, ‘I want this letter withdrawn. I want you to send an order to MacArthur to withdraw this letter. That is an order from me. Do you understand that?’

  “Louis said, ‘Yes, sir, I do.’ The President said ‘Go and do it. That’s all.’ Everyone went out and disappeared very fast.”

  Pp. 599–600. This is a very important and critical point in your relations with MacArthur. There is more to the matter of orders violated than you make clear—as I recall it. But my recollection and notes should be checked against the papers you have.

  I was in New York on September 28, at the U.N. You sent for me to return to Washington. I got there that evening. The next day, Friday, September 29, after a cabinet meeting, General Marshall and I went to Blair House to lunch with you. When lunch was
over and the luncheon things cleared away, an officer came in with a large map on which were the troop dispositions. General Marshall explained the military situation. He said the North Korean army was dissolving. The question was what orders should MacArthur be given. He told us of a tentative order sent by the Joint Chiefs to MacArthur for comment on, I think, the 27th. He now laid it before the President. The idea, as I recall it, was that MacArthur by amphibious and other operations would occupy, fortify, and hold the line Pyongyang-Wansan, running southwest to northeast across Korea. North of that line only Korean troops might operate.

  This was discussed by the three of us. All the points which later became important were considered; i.e., as we might move north of this line, our supply line and air support would become longer and more difficult, the enemy’s easier and shorter. The danger of Chinese intervention would increase. We came nearer to the Soviet border which would involve greater risks. The President concluded,—General Marshall and I were in complete agreement—that MacArthur should stand on the line mentioned and not go further north with U.N. troops—only Korean units might be used for policing and pacification if that proved possible.

  I do not have and cannot find in the hearings before the Joint Congressional Committee the directives of September 27 and September 30, although they are discussed and certain portions of them are quoted in the Hearings before the committee by General Collins on pages 1216, 1230, and 1239. I believe that my recollection of what they contain is correct, but it would be most important to have this verified. They came up a month later, as I point out below, when on October 25 the Joint Chiefs protested against the general advance order which MacArthur had issued without consultation with them on October 24. This is a very important matter, because it was this advance, which, according to my recollection, was contrary to his directives, which brought about the disaster in North Korea. I think it now seems plain that, if MacArthur had kept his army where he was told to keep it, in a strongly fortified position, it would not have been disorganized and routed by the Chinese intervention.